Sixty-third General Assembly

First Committee

9^th Meeting (PM)

WORLD’S FATE RESTS WITH ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS,

YET STATE OF AFFAIRS UNSTABLE AT BEST, DISARMAMENT CHIEF TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE

Heads of Atomic Energy Agency, Disarmament Conference, Chemical Weapons,

Test-Ban Treaty Organizations, Describe Efforts to Keep Pace with Emerging Threats

The future of the world rested in the fate of arms control and disarmament intergovernmental organizations, yet the current state of affairs in the fields of disarmament and arms control was unstable at best, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte, said today.

Addressing the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), Mr. Duarte said that many Member States were confronted with a variety of crises, some of which had been particularly hard on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and had inspired doubts about the Treaty’s effectiveness in achieving its goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.  Then too, some of the crises related to the lack of any multilateral legal obligations in certain fields, such as missiles, space weapons and conventional armaments.

Today, the heads of some key arms control and disarmament organizations – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the Conference on Disarmament, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons -- spoke to the Committee about the impasses and breakthroughs they had experienced in an effort to keep pace with, and even ahead of, the indisputably fluid security environment.

With only nine countries remaining to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of CTBTO, Tibor Toth, said his organization was making sure the verification regime was ready from “day one” of the Treaty’s entry into force.  The system would comprise 337 facilities in 89 countries, each hosting a range of recording equipment maintained by nearly 500 operators worldwide, around the clock.

With the CTBT verification regime, a new standard of transparency had been achieved, which represented a new democracy in the verification of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, he said, urging the Committee to stay focused, at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference, on the gravity of nuclear dangers, and for Member States to contemplate the importance of progress on the test-ban Treaty’s entry into force.

At the same time, asserted the representative of the Director General of the IAEA, Gustavo Zlauvinen, there was growing concern over the health of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  As a result, the role of objective and independent verification was likely to become ever more important.  The Agency would continue to need a robust “toolbox”, which contained the necessary legal authority to gather information and carry out inspections that were able to rely on state-of-the-art technology, a high calibre workforce and sufficient resources.

He said, however, that some 30 NPT non-nuclear-weapon States parties had not yet brought into force their required comprehensive safeguards agreements, and more than 100 States had yet to accede to Additional Protocols.  The Agency projected that the number of nuclear power reactors could increase by up to 60 per cent and associated fuel cycle facilities by up to 45 per cent by 2030.  To address that increase, the Agency needed to ensure that its verification technology was on par.  It had evaluated more than 160 States and applied safeguards to more than 950 nuclear facilities and installations for some $200 million annually.

Overcoming the standstill in the disarmament regime was another hurdle.  The Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Tim Caughley, explained that the current stalemate did not mean that the Conference was moribund.  In his view, it had come closer than ever since 1998 to reach a consensus on a programme of work.  The main development in 2008 had been the new proposal by the Conference’s six presidents to address priorities on the agenda, a move seen as increasing the prospects for the adoption of a work programme.

“This state of affairs suggests that flexibility will be required on the scope of the qualification that the programme of work needs to be comprehensive and balanced,” he said.  In that context, he noted that the Russian Federation and China had tabled their draft outer space treaty with a research mandate, and not a negotiating one.  There was no barrier to the emergence of a cross-regional approach to finding solutions to the current impasse.  The increased intensity of work in the Conference, demonstrated by the marked rise in the number of attending dignitaries, had indeed been a revitalizing element.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of tons of chemical weapons had already been destroyed and the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention remained a priority, said the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ Director-General, Rogelio Pfirter.  The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) now covered 98 per cent of the worldwide chemical industry relevant to it, and a similar percentage of the world’s population.  But the 2012 deadline for elimination of all chemical weapons posed a significant challenge, especially for the Russian Federation and the United States.

He added that the effective and efficient industry inspection regime established under the Chemical Weapons Convention was key to the non-proliferation effort and to promoting confidence among States parties in the chemical industry’s legitimate and peaceful activities, he said.  Continued refinement and higher intensity of the industry’s verification efforts was crucial to that objective.

Statements in the thematic debate on nuclear weapons were made by the representatives of Australia, Chile, Norway, Pakistan, Japan, Austria, Russian Federation, New Zealand, Indonesia, Cuba and Kuwait.

The representative of Syria exercised the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 16 October, to continue its thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) continued its thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

Members would first hear opening remarks by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte, as well as:  the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Tim Caughley; the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Rogelio Pfirter; the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Tibor Tóth; and the representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gustavo Zlauvinen.  Following those statements, the Committee would convene an informal discussion with the panellists, before resuming its formal thematic debate.

Opening Remarks

SERGIO DUARTE, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, reiterated that the role of intergovernmental organizations in arms control and disarmament was diverse and the future of the world lay in the fate of their global process.  The current state of affairs in the fields of disarmament and arms control was unstable, at best.  At worst, he recalled the judgement of Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, President of the General Assembly, who had warned on 16 September that the world was in danger of “sinking in the morass of mad, suicidal selfishness”.  While disarmament and arms control were not fatally condemned to that description, the words of the Assembly President merited the attention of the First Committee.

He said that many Member States were confronted with a variety of crises, which were aggravated year after year by the loss of a sense of common purpose, the rise of mutual mistrust and the misperceived need to seek security in measures of self-help, rather than cooperative multilateral action guided by the rule of law.  Some of those crises had been particularly hard on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and had inspired doubts about the Treaty’s effectiveness in achieving its goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.  Some of the crises related to the lack of any multilateral legal obligations in certain fields, such as missiles, space weapons and conventional armaments.

The problem also extended to incomplete legal regimes like the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), he said.  Additional challenges were arising from technological advances, which merited concern and collective action.  There were also organizational challenges at the domestic and international level, he said, along with a wide gap in commitments in the field of disarmament and the regulations needed to implement them.

Mr. CAUGHLEY, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, explained that the current stalemate did not mean that the Conference was moribund; it had come closer than ever since 1998 to reach a consensus on a programme of work.  The current Conference President would offer the secretariat’s perspective when he addressed the First Committee during the thematic debate on disarmament machinery on 23 October.  This year, the Conference had begun its work in a spotlight, as the United Nations Secretary-General had called political leaders to support the Conference.  A total of 18 dignitaries from 65 members lent their support.  In addition, the Russian Federation Foreign Minister, together with China, had submitted a treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and on the threat or use of force against outer space objects, a treaty that had garnered more that 50 media reports.

He said that the Conference presidents sustained the practice of a collegial presidency, known as the “P-6”.  That leadership continuity had enabled the development of a schedule of activities and had helped to engender real coherence, in contrast to the adhoc approach taken in previous sessions.  The 2008 presidents had also continued the valuable practice of issuing progress reports, and the Conference again developed a substantive report to the United Nations General Assembly.  Work on the thematic debate on seven substantive items on the Conference’s agenda, headed by seven appointed coordinators, had been geared towards helping to determine the relative ripeness of the respective agenda items for the Conference’s more intense treatment.  However, some members were reluctant to give formal status to coordinators and a small minority of member preferred establishing subsidiary bodies.  In the absence of agreement on a formal programme of work, the coordinators played a useful role in facilitating the agenda’s thematic debates.

The main development in 2008 had been the new proposal by the six presidents to address priorities on the Conference’s agenda, a move seen as increasing the prospects for the adoption of a work programme.  The proposal contained previously-proposed mandates, specifically to negotiate an agreement banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons use and other nuclear explosive devices, while providing for substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an outer space arms race.  However, consensus on that proposal was not yet forthcoming, despite the lack of explicit opposition to a negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.  Clear concerns remained, however, about the scope of such a treaty and its verification requirements.  In addition, certain linkages continued to be drawn, conditioning the proposed treatment of one issue to the treatment of another.  There were also calls for a “comprehensive and balanced” programme of work, seeking equal treatment of the four core issues.  But a number of members questioned the practicality of taking up four issues at once.

“This state of affairs suggests that flexibility will be required on the scope of the qualification that the programme of work needs to be comprehensive and balanced”, he said.  In that context, he noted that Russia and China had tabled their draft outer space treaty with a research mandate, and not a negotiating one.

Nevertheless, resolving the programme of work remained the main challenge, he said.  Recognizing that there were firm proposals on individual core issues already on the table, such as the United States draft on a fissile materials treaty, there was a certain irony that in aiming for a comprehensive approach, the Conference continued to end up without a programme of work.  It was tempting from the Conference secretariat’s perspective to ask whether the Conference should treat its annual schedule as its programme of work.  While that would not overcome the problem of linkages, it might serve to make them less institutional.  Some members had questioned the value of the regional groupings in the Conference; the query would lose significance once substantive work began.  There was no barrier to the emergence of a cross-regional approach to finding solutions to the current impasse.  The increased intensity of work in the Conference, demonstrated by the marked rise in the number of attending dignitaries, had indeed been a revitalizing element.

Mr. PFIRTER, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), gave an update of the progress made by the organization in pursuit of its mission and mandate.

As at 30 September, the OPCW had verified the destruction of more than 28,600 metric tonnes of Category 1 chemical weapons, he said.  That represented 41.25 per cent of the total stockpiles declared by Albania, India, Libya, Russian Federation and the United States and a State party which requested anonymity.  Some 915 metric tonnes, or 51.8 per cent, of Category 2 chemical weapons was also destroyed.  All States which had declared Category 3 chemical weapons had completed the destruction of those weapons.  The anonymous State party had also completed the destruction of its entire chemical weapon stockpiles.  The 2012 final deadline for completing the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles posed significant challenges, especially for the United States and the Russian Federation.  The latter country had destroyed 29 per cent of its Category 1 stockpiles, while the United States had destroyed 55.4 per cent.

He said that the large quantities of chemical weapons that the Russian Federation and the United States had to eliminate in a safe and environmentally sound manner and the inordinately large expenditure that obligation entailed had made them special cases.  He praised India for its efforts in destroying its stockpiles.

Continuing, he said that the effective and efficient industry inspection regime established under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) was key to the non-proliferation effort and to promoting confidence among States parties in the chemical industry’s legitimate and peaceful activities.  Continued refinement and higher intensity of the industry’s verification efforts was crucial to that objective.  The Chemical Weapons Convention now covered 98 per cent of the worldwide chemical industry relevant to it and a similar percentage of the world’s population.  National implementation of the Convention’s provisions and reporting on steps taken in that regard constituted clear obligations to States parties.

He noted that the number of States parties that had enacted legislation covering all key areas had increased from 51 in October 2003 to 82 by 10 October 2008.  Some 126 States parties had also informed the OPCW secretariat of the legislative and administrative measures they had adopted.  The number of States parties that had designated or established their national authority -– a step required under the Convention -- had increased to 177, or 96 per cent of all States parties.

The OPCW would continue to respond to both the call by the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly to play its part in addressing the challenges posed by terrorism to international peace and security, he pledged.  Those security threats had created a renewed interest in the ability of the organization to coordinate the delivery of assistance to States parties in case of an attack or the threat of an attack with chemical weapons.  The universality of the Convention remained a priority.  In the Middle East, Iraq and Lebanon had completed parliamentary procedures towards that goal, but Egypt, Israel and Syria remained a concern.   Israel had signed, but not ratified, the Convention, while Syria continued to cite security concerns for remaining outside of it.  The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was the only country that had had no contact with the OPCW.

Mr. TOTH, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, said that the organization now had 180 members.  While the necessary ratifications of the CTBT by nine countries still remained, universalization and implementation of the Treaty were approaching.  The CTBTO was making sure that the verification regime was ready from day one of the Treaty’s entry into force.  The system would comprise 337 facilities traversing the territory of 89 countries, each hosting a diverse range of recording equipment across four key technologies.  It would be maintained by nearly 500 operators around the globe, around the clock.

He said that nearly 70 per cent of the International Monitoring System had been certified to date.  That system had recorded the nuclear event in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2006.  By the end of this year, some 250 facilities would be transmitting data back to the International Data Centre in Vienna.  More than 1,000 authorized institutions in more than 100 countries had direct access to the data generated by the International Monitoring System.  Data provision arrangements had been signed in the last few months with Japan, Philippines and Australia.  Similar arrangements would soon be signed with Indonesia and others.

With the CTBT verification regime, a new standard of transparency had been achieved, which represented a new democracy in the verification of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, he said.  The Commission recently initiated an International Scientific Studies project, in cooperation with the international scientific community.  In September, a team of trained inspectors had gone to Kazakhstan to conduct the first integrated field exercise of its kind, under the concept of Treaty onsite inspection.

He urged the Committee to stay focused on the gravity of nuclear dangers and for Member States to contemplate the importance of progress on the CTBT’s entry into force at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Mr. ZLAUVINEN, representative of the Director General of the IAEA, said that the expectations of the Agency’s safeguards system had grown in the last 50 years, in response to technological and geopolitical changes and to the experience gained through responding to various verification challenges.  In addition to the introduction of comprehensive safeguards in the early 1970s, the Agency’s experience in Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the 1990s had profoundly impacted the safeguards system.

He said that past experience had highlighted the importance of considering a State’s nuclear programme as a whole, rather than just as individual facilities.  As a result, verification had become less mechanistic and more information-driven.  There were growing concerns over the health of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  As a result of those concerns, the role of objective and independent verification was likely to become ever more important.  The Agency would continue to need a robust “toolbox” that contained the necessary legal authority to gather information and carry out inspections that were able to rely on state-of-the-art technology, a high calibre workforce and sufficient resources.

Some 30 NPT non-nuclear-weapon States parties had not yet brought into force their required comprehensive safeguards agreements and more than 100 States had yet to accede to Additional Protocols.  The Agency projected that the number of nuclear power reactors could increase by up to 60 per cent and associated fuel cycle facilities by up to 45 per cent by 2030.  As a result of that expected increase in verification workload, the Agency needed to ensure that its verification technology was on par.  It evaluated more than 160 States and applied safeguards to more than 950 nuclear facilities and installations for some $200 million annually.

Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons

CAROLINE MILLAR ( Australia) affirmed her Government’s strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, saying that, while the world no longer lived with the daily fear of nuclear war between two super-Powers, it had nonetheless witnessed concerning developments in the nuclear landscape over the past decade.  Nuclear-armed States outside the NPT had emerged.  The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and had conducted a nuclear test.  Iran was engaging in sensitive nuclear activities, in violation of international law.  The risk of nuclear proliferation and radiological terrorism was increasing.  Meanwhile, discontent mounted over the performance of NPT nuclear-weapon States in meeting their obligations.

Yet, she said, since the Committee’s last meeting, “ Australia has been encouraged by a discernible, if tentative, shift in mood in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”.  The proposal by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in June to establish an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was designed to reinvigorate the work in the lead-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.  Those who had joined Australia in that endeavour had accepted the tough task of bringing fresh vision to the interconnected challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament and to make realistic recommendations.

She said that, while the NPT remained the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, it was under great pressure.  The opportunity afforded by the 2010 Review Conference should not be lost.  Balanced, progressive and reinforcing steps were needed to realize a world free of nuclear weapons, and all States had to play their part.  But it was right to look for the nuclear-weapon States to take the lead by making lasting reductions in their nuclear arsenals.  Australia welcomed reductions made by the United States and the Russian Federation.  Strong leadership would be needed from both countries to ensure further irreversible cuts.  Australia also welcomed announcements of cuts by the United Kingdom and France.  It further encouraged nuclear-armed States to reassess and limit the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies.

Reiterating Australia’s commitment to the CTBT, she said its signature and ratification without delay should be a priority for all.  The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones was also a real and important step in nuclear disarmament.  Diplomacy should be used to bring all States into the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and all States should ratify IAEA’s Additional Protocol.

Underlining the threat posed to regional security by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear-weapon activities, she welcomed that country’s agreement to resume disablement of its Yongbyon nuclear facilities.  She also expressed deep concern over Iran’s persistence in proliferation-sensitive activities, saying Iran must comply immediately with its obligations and suspend its activities related to uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water.  Also concerning was information indicating the undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria.  Australia called on Syria to show maximum cooperation with the IAEA, so its assessment could be completed.

ALFREDO LABBE (Chile) reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament was not only the most important chapter in the United Nations disarmament machinery, but it was also mandatory, in order to move towards the elimination of those weapons.  Chile was active in the competent bodies and hoped strides would be made at various upcoming meetings, including the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

He said he hoped that recent political changes would bring about the restoration of the non-proliferation regime.  He underscored the importance of the Kissinger, Schultz and Perry letters published by the Wall Street Journal, which had reaffirmed that the “cream of the crop” had recognized the importance of moving towards disarmament.  The key actors and stakeholders should take on the Review Conference process.  “The future was dependent on it, and ignoring this process would only lead to a stalemate”, he warned.

He commended Australia for gathering interested persons in the field of disarmament, noting that nuclear disarmament also depended on the entry into force of the CTBT.  He also commended Colombia’s efforts towards the ratification of the Treaty, calling the country an example to be followed.  Within the Conference on Disarmament, and outside of it, steps should be taken towards elaborating a fissile material cut-off treaty.  Chile, along with Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland, would introduce a resolution regarding de-alerting nuclear weapons.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were two sides of the same coin, he said.  There were no good or bad proliferators.  All proliferation was dastardly and all nuclear weapons presented a risk to international security.  The only rational course of action was to work decidedly against those weapons.

KNUT LANGELAND, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, said that, even though the NPT was the core pillar for global security, the Treaty was threatened and faced pressure.  Outstanding proliferation challenges must be addressed.  He welcomed recent progress to solve the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s dossier and urged Iran to comply with the international community’s demands to facilitate negotiations towards an outcome acceptable to all.

But the backdrop was grim, he said, adding, “It does not make sense that more than 20,000 nuclear weapons remain nearly 20 years after the cold war ended.”  Another complicating element was that nuclear energy use was expected to grow in years to come, a fact that could not be neglected since more frequent use meant challenges to non-proliferation, the environment and human safety.  With the rapidly approaching NPT Review Conference, he was not assured of a successful outcome taking into account the many differences among State parties as to how to strengthen the Treaty.  States parties must mobilize the necessary political will to sustain the Treaty, which was not only a non-proliferation instrument, but a disarmament treaty, which aspired to facilitate peaceful cooperation in nuclear energy and technologies.

Innovative ways were needed towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, such as reaching across regional groupings and engaging civil society, he said.  Norway was trying to contribute to that effort through its Seven-Nation Initiative and through broad partnerships, expressed at the Oslo conference.  The conference’s outcome had, among other things, taken note that progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons demanded leadership at the highest level, that ridding the world of those weapons was a joint enterprise by all States, and that the world should move forward in developing non-discriminatory fuel cycle arrangements in close cooperation with the IAEA.  He hoped that the conference’s outcome would be useful at the next NPT Review Conference.  He also welcomed efforts such as the Blix Commission in identifying recommendations that might mobilize broad support.  He also commended the recent Australian and Japanese high-level commission on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

ZAMIR AKRAM ( Pakistan) said that 30 years after the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, humanity was still faced with the danger of more than 25,000 nuclear warheads.  Despite substantial reductions in existing arsenals, nuclear disarmament remained an elusive objective.  Recent trends had witnessed a progressive erosion of international arms control and non-proliferation structures.  That was evident from the disavowal by most of the NPT nuclear-weapon States of complete nuclear disarmament; demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; the prolonged entry into force of the CTBT; prospects of new tests by some States; and the emergence of doctrines envisaging the use of nuclear weapons, among others.  Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were important to international peace and security.

He said that Member States could enable the Conference on Disarmament by demonstrating the political will to address all the priority issues in its agenda -– nuclear disarmament, security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty.   Pakistan supported the negotiation of a fissile material treaty because, among other things, it was essential for the effective cessation of a nuclear arms race.  Pakistan also remained committed to negative security assurances and was opposed to unfair restrictions on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.  Central issues of inter-State conflicts must also be addressed.

SUMIO TARUI ( Japan) said that reducing the number of existing nuclear weapons -- an estimated 26,000 to 27,000 warheads -- was the international community’s first priority.  This year, for the first time in the history of the Group of 8 (G-8), which includes four nuclear-weapon States, the Leaders’ Declaration called for States to undertake reductions of nuclear weapons in a transparent manner.  France recently reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile to fewer than 300 warheads, the first such case by a nuclear-weapon State.  It was important for the Russian Federation and the United States to fully implement the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty) and to undertake nuclear arms reductions beyond those provided for in the Treaty in an irreversible and verifiable manner.  Japan further urged both nations to successfully complete the negotiations for a legally binding instrument that would be the successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

He called for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty without delay through the adoption of the Conference on Disarmament text -- CD/1840.  Countries that had not yet signed onto and ratified the CTBT should do so, without delay.  He called on nuclear-weapon States to further reduce the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems in ways that promoted international stability and security.  The nuclear issues of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran required particular focused efforts of the international community.  He noted the recent agreement between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on a series of verification measures.  Japan was committed to achieving a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issues of that country within the six-party talks.  He regretted that Iran had continued and even expanded its uranium enrichment programme,  in defiance of calls by the international community.  He urged it to cooperate with the IAEA.

ALEXANDER MARSCHIK ( Austria) said that the language of nuclear threats was obsolete, yet 20 years after the cold war, suspicions and mistrust had nurtured fears of a global nuclear arms race.  As a result, it was imperative that the CTBT enter into force soon.  Austria had continued raising awareness about the Treaty and the benefits of the scientific civil application of its international monitoring system, such as tsunami warnings and earthquake monitoring.  Austria has sponsored several CTBTO workshops and meetings, and, in September in New York, a ministerial conference with the participation of 100 States, in support of the CTBT.

He said that NPT setbacks over the last decade were exemplified by a recent Nuclear Suppliers Group decision regarding an exemption for a non-NPT member State from the Group’s export control guidelines, raising legitimate questions as to whether the international community still accorded the Treaty the same priority it did 10 years ago.  The NPT was the foundation for the international non-proliferation architecture, but serious efforts by United Nations Member States were needed to overcome the paralysis of that international regime.

The IAEA’s work was essential and it should be the international community’s priority to cope with non-proliferation challenges, in particular by, among other things, strengthening the Agency’s safeguards system, including the Additional Protocol, and advancing the “multilateralization” of the nuclear fuel cycle, he said.  Austria had proposed the creation of a new multilateral framework for nuclear energy, which, over time, would include converting enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations.  “In our view, there should not be a differentiation in ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, only in ‘wants’ and ‘want-nots’”, he said.  “For those States that opt for nuclear energy, access to nuclear fuel should be a strictly regulated, but impartial and fair, undertaking.”  That long-term vision required a step-by-step approach, and Austria suggested that the first step should be the creation of an international fuel reserve, under IAEA auspices.

He said that the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction had increased exponentially with the development of advanced delivery systems.  Until a multilateral missile control arrangement was established, The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was the only such instrument.  Austria had hoped more Member States would join the list of subscribing States.

VICTOR VASILIEV ( Russian Federation) said he had been holding lengthy and extensive discussions with the United States on arms reduction and had hoped to take the best from the START and to form a new accord.  He was grateful that his country’s position had been supported by the Collective Security Treaty Organization.  The Russian Federation’s approaches to disarmament were embedded in the country’s foreign policy, and it aimed at reducing weapons to minimal levels.

He said his country had consistently opposed nuclear weapons.  He reaffirmed his country’s position regarding the crucial test-ban Treaty, but acknowledged that its fate was a concern.  He called upon the nine remaining countries to ratify it so that it could come into force.

Turning to nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the zone in Central Asia, he said those areas would foster peace and stability in their regions, and Russia fully supported their establishment.  He welcomed the ratification of the Central Asian Treaty and was preparing to settle the remaining issues regarding a zone in South-Eastern Asia.  As a member of the Quartet on Middle East issues, Russia supported the establishment of such a zone in that region.  Regarding non-proliferation, negative security assurances was a key issue associated with the indefinite extension of the NPT.  Russia had granted such assurances to more than 100 countries and advocated the drafting of an international instrument for that purpose.  He supported the resurrection of the ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament on that topic.

DON MACKAY ( New Zealand) said creating a world safe from nuclear weapons remained one of the international community’s most urgent priorities.  The focus of New Zealand’s efforts on nuclear issues remained the NPT.  The Treaty might be able to make substantive progress during the current review cycle in the area of transparency and confidence-building measures.  A part of the New Agenda Coalition, New Zealand supported ideas on systematised nuclear accounting within the NPT as a way to increase transparency.  A reporting mechanism for national arsenals would also be a substantive confidence-building measure.

He hoped that a high level of support would continue to be achieved for the Coalition’s annual nuclear disarmament resolution.   New Zealand would present a resolution along with Switzerland, Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria and Sweden, on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems.  He urged the “Annex 2” States to ratify the CTBT without delay.  Nuclear-weapon-free zones were a powerful symbol for demonstrating the strong collective will that existed to eliminate weapons.  He also attached great importance to ensuring that the IAEA had all the necessary resources to conduct its work.

FEBRIAN RUDDYARD( Indonesia) said that Member States must deliver on their commitments to world peace and prosperity or risk undermining the security of people everywhere and the reputation of the United Nations.  The international community would not have peace of mind unless the clearly non-workable paradigm of ensuring security through nuclear weapons was abolished.

He said that nuclear weapons must be eliminated in a systematic and comprehensive manner.  That responsibility lay in the hands of nuclear-weapon States, and he urged them to expedite their disarmament efforts.  The best assurance against the threat of nuclear weapons was their complete eradication.  The NPT remained the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and adherence to it was critical for the Treaty’s survival.

Indonesia remained concerned that, while non-nuclear weapon States had agreed to renounce the nuclear option under the NPT, some nuclear-weapon States were retaining their nuclear arsenals, in clear violation of their Treaty obligations.  That situation was unfair and did not enhance confidence-building measures.

He said that nuclear disarmament was possible and could be achieved through practical, sensible and careful measures.  It was high time for the nuclear-weapon States to move away from rhetoric.  States outside the NPT should sign it without delay.  Until then, they should receive no cooperation on nuclear matters.

MARIETA GARCIA JORDAN ( Cuba) reiterated her concern about the serious threat to humankind posed by the existence of an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons.  There were 32,300 nuclear weapons in the world, and more than 12,000 were ready to be used.  The continuous possession of nuclear weapons was an irresponsible incentive to proliferation.  The situation was of particularly grave concern for non-nuclear-weapon States like Cuba.  The NPT was not an end in itself, but a means to achieving the supreme goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  That was the only sure way to avoid their possible disastrous use.  However, issues of nuclear disarmament could not continue to be ignored while attention focused mainly on horizontal non-proliferation.

At the same time, she called for respect for the inalienable right of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  She also reiterated the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice on the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Cuba considered essential nuclear-weapon-free zones, which guaranteed that nuclear weapons would neither be used nor threatened to be used in the regions of such zones.  She stressed the need to commence multilateral negotiations leading to the prompt conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.

ABDULAZIZ SOYAN ALAZEMI ( Kuwait) stressing that nuclear weapons threatened international peace and security, and humankind, warned that the nuclear disasters that could result from those weapons could transform the world into a mass graveyard and lead to further division and tension between peoples.  To avoid that catastrophe, he called upon Member States to endeavour to look hard at the realities of disarmament and consider the vital benefits.  He noted with deep concern the increase in the scope of global and regional challenges and dangers.  “This makes us adhere more by international instruments and other relevant disarmament agreements, particularly the NPT,” he said.

He said that nuclear disarmament at the regional level, through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, was an important step in creating an atmosphere of trust and ending the nuclear arms race.  Thirteen years had elapsed since the Middle East resolution was adopted at the NPT Review Conference, yet Israel remained an impediment to its implementation.  Arab and international demands increased for Israel’s accession to the NPT, yet it continued to “procrastinate its accession”.  He, therefore, reaffirmed the importance of pressing Israel to accede to that Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in order to render the Middle East region a zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Right of Reply

Syria’s representative, exercising his right of reply, said the Australian representative had played the devil’s advocate.  The delegate had read the map of Israel and made statements that were not correct.  It was disturbing that she had turned a blind eye to the real threat and danger of Israel’s nuclear weapons and Israel’s continued violation of international law and its aggression against Syria.  Her statement meant that Australia supported Israel’s stand in the field of non-proliferation.  Syria had taken a principled position, and in yesterday’s statement had said that Syria had fulfilled its commitments.  It would have been better for the Australian representative to congratulate Syria for its compliance and to condemn Israel, which had 200 nuclear warheads and was outside the NPT and the realm of the IAEA.

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For information media • not an official record