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ECOSOC/6295

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL HOLDS PANEL DISCUSSION ON USE OF MILITARY ASSETS FOR NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF

16 July 2007
Economic and Social CouncilECOSOC/6295
Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Economic and Social Council HOLDS PANEL DISCUSSION ON USE OF MILITARY ASSETS


FOR NATURAL DISASTER RELIEF

 


(Reissued as received.)


GENEVA, 16 July (UN Information Service) -- The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) this afternoon held a panel discussion on the use of military assets for natural disaster relief.


Introducing the panel discussion, Hjalmar Hannesson ( Iceland), Vice-President of the Council, said at a time where the incidence and severity of natural disasters were increasing, military assets continued to be requested, offered and provided by Governments in support of humanitarian relief operations.  But such support had not been without challenges.  By holding the panel, ECOSOC recognised the need to take stock of the role military assets played in response to past disasters and discuss challenges.


Margareta Wahlström, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, serving as moderator for the discussion, said that in ECOSOC in 2005, the topic of the role of military assets in natural disaster relief had been raised.  The Oslo Guidelines were guiding the use of those military assets and were updated recently.


Colonel Roberto Claudio del Rosal Ibarra, Head of the Sub-Section for Civil Protection at the Ministry of Defence of Mexico, said that internationally and generally speaking, the frequency of conflicts in and between States had decreased, and public opinion seemed to show that there was no need to continue to invest in the armed forces.  However, a new range of challenges had required a need to overhaul the armed forces in Mexico, with the inclusion of aspects such as environmental aspects, which impacted the State.


Jean-Jacques Graisse, Senior Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), said WFP had benefited time and again from cooperation with providers of foreign military assistance.  The military were trained and equipped to respond to crises.  He questioned whether States were staying true to the “last resort” concept for the use of military assets, as advocated in the Oslo Guidelines.  He also raised the issue of who “paid” for the use of military assets and how this affected humanitarian budgets.


Susan Johnson, Director of the National Societies and Field Support Division of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), said that effective response relied on preparedness, and this required planning establishing the roles of all, including national actors and the military.  Military actors had tremendous resources, and these, put to work in moving humanitarian assistance and saving lives, could help ensure an effective disaster relief operation.  But the military should not generally be delivering aid to the beneficiary, but taking on a support role to ensure this delivery through the provision of logistics and engineering facilities.


Paulo Zucula, Director of National Disaster Management Institute of Mozambique, said that in 2000, 2001 and 2007, Mozambique had to use military aid for its natural disasters.  Between 2000-2001 and 2007, there were two different cases of managing the disasters: on the one side the rescue and on the other, the nutrition of the population.  These two phases were different, especially when it came to the coordination, and so the use of the military had also to be different.


Alyson J.K. Bailes, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said that the Institute had been commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to study the effectiveness of military assets in international responses to natural disasters.  This study took the form of an empirical review of the responses mounted to a number of recent natural disasters.  Foreign military assets had played a useful and important role in delivering prompt humanitarian relief in each of these cases, particularly when civilian capacity had been insufficient to address the humanitarian challenges.


In the course of the interactive discussion with the panellists, speakers raised several questions and issues, such as noting the increased number of natural disasters in past years.  It was a global threat that must be taken seriously.  Organizations with a humanitarian mandate should be at the forefront.  But military assets could support these efforts, when there were no other capabilities, often at the early stages of natural disasters.  The Oslo Guidelines should be fully respected.


Speaking in the context of the discussion were the representatives of Portugal on behalf of the European Union, Bolivia, Pakistan, Norway, Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and United Kingdom.


The Council will meet on Tuesday, 17 July, at 10 a.m., when it will continue with its humanitarian segment and hold a panel discussion on needs-based humanitarian financing, including the Central Emergency Response Fund.


Opening Statements for Panel Discussion on Use of Military Assets for Natural Disaster Relief


HJALMAR HANNESSON ( Iceland), Vice-President of the Economic and Social Council, said that all had witnessed a high level of support of foreign military assets in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in large disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, the South Asian Earthquake and the floods in Mozambique.  Thirty-five Member States had provided military assets for humanitarian relief to the Indian Ocean tsunami-affected countries.  In response to the South Asian Earthquake, Pakistan’s National Army had delivered the bulk of relief, but it also received substantial assistance from foreign armed forces.


At a time where the incidence and severity of natural disasters were increasing, military assets continued to be requested, offered and provided by Governments in support of humanitarian relief operations.  But such support had not been without challenges, Mr. Hannesson observed.  By holding this panel, ECOSOC recognized the need to take stock of the role military assets played in response to past disasters and to discuss future challenges.  It was hoped that the panel would identify the guidelines and operational practices to ensure the effective delivery and coordination of relief efforts in response to disasters.


MARGARETA WAHLSTRÖM, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, acting as moderator, said that the topic of the role of military assets in natural disaster relief had been discussed in the Economic and Social Council in 2005.  It was also worth noting that the Oslo Guidelines, which provided a framework for the use of military assets in disaster relief, had been updated recently.  She then introduced today's five panellists.


ROBERTO CLAUDIO DEL ROSAL IBARRA, Head of the Sub-Section for Civil Protection of the Ministry of Defence of Mexico, said internationally and generally speaking, the frequency of conflicts in and between States had decreased, and public opinion seemed to show that there was no need to continue to invest in the armed forces.  However, a new range of challenges had required a need to overhaul the armed forces in Mexico, with the inclusion of aspects such as environmental issues that impacted the State.  In the case of disaster, the Mexican Armed Forces had to maintain order, protect individuals and their belongings, and help in rebuilding in areas affected.


Mr. del Rosal Ibarra said the disasters which affected and disrupted the normal life of the population in Mexico tended to be events which had a major impact on daily life: earthquakes, forest fires, droughts, high temperatures and volcanic activity.  That was why the Mexican military had been involved in dispensing aid to the civilian population in cooperation with the authorities for some time.  The Government constantly updated guidelines to help the authorities deal with the situation with regard to disasters, climate change, and disaster areas.  The involvement of the armed forces in disaster relief was regulated by law, and that regulation ensured that they had the power to act immediately in case of accident or disaster, in close cooperation with the national authorities.


Mexico had been sending international humanitarian aid to other countries since the beginning of the twentieth century, and such assistance was a guiding principle of Mexico's foreign policy, Mr. del Rosal Ibarra said.  Humanitarian aid and assistance covered a wide range of activities including helping victims of conflict and war and the provision of materials for assistance in the case of natural disasters.  Humanitarian assistance was provided without charge, and targeted the most vulnerable or most seriously affected, but did not discriminate between victims on any other grounds.  Indeed, humanitarian assistance was becoming more and more important.  In order to prevent and mitigate natural disasters, the Government of Mexico had set up a unit in which various Governmental bodies participated.  As part of the assistance, building materials, medicines, search and rescue teams and training were provided, while respecting the wishes and the national sovereignty of the State concerned.


JEAN-JACQUES GRAISSE, Senior Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), said that the value of making use of military assets to respond to the enormous logistic challenges presented by natural disasters was not in doubt.  WFP had benefited time and again from cooperation with providers of foreign military assistance: recently, in response to the Mozambique flood crisis this year; in the aftermath of the South-East Asia earthquake; and during the Indian Ocean Tsunami emergency response.  The military were trained and equipped to respond to crises.  The United Nations was also trained and equipped to respond but there were more crises than reserves.  The logistical capacity of the United Nations to respond was considerable: in 2006 alone, WFP had distributed 4 million metric tons to feed some 90 million people, using over 200 chartered vessels and 2,000 liner vessels.  It flew over 32,000 tons of cargo and transported some 400,000 passengers using over 100 fixed and rotary winged aircraft.


Among one of the two key issues Mr. Graisse wanted to highlight, was if they were staying true to the “last resort” concept for the use of military assets, as advocated in the Oslo Guidelines.  The Oslo Guidelines, which were non-binding on the members who had signed, clearly stated that “foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there was no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military or civil defence assets could meet a critical humanitarian need.  The military or civil defence asset must therefore offer a unique capability and availability”.  However, the humanitarian community must be pragmatic and recognize that the scale and scope of a disaster might call for assets well in excess of those which could be found on the open market.


The second issue Mr. Graisse wished to touch on had to do with the question about who “paid” for the use of military assets and how that affected humanitarian budgets.  The extent to which humanitarian budgets had been affected by the use of military assets was yet undetermined.  With regard to the direct implications for the State providing military assistance to a relief operation, the lack of clarity on who would foot the bill produced delays in the provision of the assets, which were readily available.  For the humanitarian agencies, the true cost of the military contribution was not known until well after the event.  The donor funds were then compelled to absorb the military costs as part of the multilateral contributions to emergency operations.  Noting that in natural disasters the last resort justification tended to reflect more of a “unique availability” and not a “unique capability”, it was essential from a humanitarian agency perspective to follow the Oslo Guidelines pragmatically when considering the advantages of speed and efficacy of military assets use without undermining the ultimate goal of the operation – the optimization of efficient assistance to the beneficiaries.  Joint preparedness activities to improve awareness and understanding of respective mandates, activities, and working modalities should be implemented.


SUSAN JOHNSON, Head of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) New York delegation to the United Nations, said that, within its international activities, IFRC sought the right balance between the principles of the organization and practical action.  In terms of national collaboration, a day did not pass without the Red Cross or Red Crescent society taking action.  Effective response relied on preparedness, and that required planning and establishing the roles everyone would play, including national actors and the military.  Within the clear division of labour, it was perfectly reasonable for the Government to assign specific roles to the military.  The roles should be appropriate to both the capacities of the military, and the context of the country.  Military actors had tremendous resources, and those – put to work in moving humanitarian assistance and saving lives – could help ensure an effective disaster operation.


There were life-threatening situations where military assets made a difference.  But the military should not generally be delivering aid to the beneficiary, but should be taking on a support role to ensure this delivery through the provision of logistics and engineering facilities, Ms. Johnson underscored.  That role was one of background infrastructural support.  When it came to frontline interaction with affected families, villages and neighbourhoods, it was best to turn to the experienced humanitarian actors.  That was because effective humanitarian action took more than good logistics; it also depended upon the experience of humanitarian action and strong dialogue with affected people, so that the response could be tailored to specific needs.


The view of those affected by the disaster also needed to be taken into account, Ms. Johnson observed.  It was in the short term that assets of military actors could best be used in life-saving action.  As the response operation extended through to recovery and longer-term development, there was less logic for the deployment of military assets; that work was best facilitated by humanitarian actors and relevant Government ministries such as health, social welfare and economic development.  IFRC recommended that there should be a reduction of bureaucratic barriers to international actions, but that should be conditioned on minimal guarantees of quality, coordination and accountability – and for military actors, also on the special considerations laid out in the Oslo Guidelines.


PAULO ZUCULA, Director of the National Disaster Management Institute of Mozambique, said that in 2000, 2001 and 2007, Mozambique had to use military aid for its natural disasters.  Between 2000-2001 and 2007, there were two different cases of managing the disasters: on the one side the rescue and on the other, the nutrition of the population.  These two phases were different, especially when it came to the coordination, and so the use of the military had also to be different.  In 2000 and 2001, the country did not make this distinction yet.  The military forces were efficient when it came to the rescue, but the delivering of the goods was messier.  There were goods delivered that were sometimes not needed and the logistic process was sometimes very complicated.  In order to have an effective coordination of the military forces, there should be a good coordination of the civilian broad based platform.  In 2000 and 2001, there was no coordination platform neither for the civilians, nor for the army.  In 2007, having learnt from the past, there was a permanent broad based coordination platform.


Donors and United Nations representatives as well as local armed forces were sitting there, he said.  Without good coordination of the domestic armed forces, there would be no improvement of the situation.  The Ministry of Defence was involved therefore from the early warning stage and in the disaster management system.  The armed forces had an agreement with the neighbouring countries.  Due to this mechanism, the country could build up joint armed forces.  The integration of the different institutions needed to be encouraged and there should be one person connecting both military forces and the civil assets.  It was important to differ between the two phases of disaster relief assistance.


ALYSON J. K. BAILES, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said the Institute had been commissioned by the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs to study the effectiveness of military assets in international responses to natural disasters.  This study took the form of an empirical review of the responses mounted to a number of recent natural disasters.  Foreign military assets had played a useful and important role in delivering prompt humanitarian relief in each of these cases, particularly when civilian capacity had been insufficient to address the humanitarian challenges.  This trend was developing, and could develop further in a dynamic international environment, in terms of varying and changing Government policies on the use of military assets, as well as of the unpredictability of natural disasters.


One clear pattern seen so far in the cases studied was that foreign military assets were predominantly provided for natural disaster response through ad hoc bilateral arrangements.  Most of the cases under review took place in countries where the military was the only organization equipped to respond to such emergencies.  A number of countries that had in the past provided their military assets for disaster responses were of the opinion that providing military assets bilaterally could be more efficient and quicker than doing so through a multilateral framework.  However, experience suggested that bilateral provision had led to problems of coordination: both gaps and duplication of efforts and resources between the military assets provided by different countries.


A related issue that had also emerged from the study and was highlighted in the Secretary-General’s report was that countries often did not have standardised policies or procedures for responding to natural disasters, either on their own territory or in other countries.  Recently some countries that had provided military assets for disaster response had taken steps in this direction.  The Oslo Guidelines provided a framework for a systematic, consistent approach to the use of foreign military assets for international disaster relief assistance - however, these Guidelines were not being consistently applied.  Military assets could be useful in ensuring that immediate relief assistance be delivered to the affected population, but their use would generally not be efficient or desirable during the rehabilitation phase as soon as civilian capacity could take over.


Discussion


In the course of the interactive discussion, speakers raised a number of questions and comments, such as noting the increased number of natural disasters in past years.  They had become a global threat that must be taken seriously.  Organizations with a humanitarian mandate should be at the forefront.  But military assets could support these humanitarian efforts, when there were no other capabilities, often at the early stages of natural disasters.  It was emphasised that the Oslo Guidelines should be fully respected.  Governments and humanitarian agencies working on the ground should rapidly provide information.  Successful coordination of military assets was also a key to resolving a situation.  Duplication of the relief supply should be avoided.  Military assets were seen as a complementary tool.  There were merits in relying on the added value of using military assets.  It was asked how military assets could be integrated best in a way that local actors could feel more comfortable.  In addition, a question was raised on the most successful cases of the use of military assets in the recent past and what had contributed to those successes.


Another speaker mentioned that it was clear that the Oslo principles did not say that one should stop using the potential of the armed forces.  It was an opportunity to cooperate and consolidate the ties with the armed forces.  In some countries, the armed forces needed some training with regard to natural disaster situations.  It was necessary to look at things from the cost point of view.  There was sometimes a lack of coordination when military units came in.  It was asked what the criteria were concerning the decision on the need to bring in armed forces support.  With regard to the duplication in terms of bilateral provision of military assets, it was asked how the bilateral arrangements could be more efficient.  In addition, a question was raised on what assets could be used in a given situation.  Another speaker mentioned the issue of coordination.  Several speakers highlighted the need for coordination and in this regard, the role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the international humanitarian community was key.


The use of military assets should be under the same scrutiny as civilian ones.  On the cost side, rather than looking at the relative costs, the alternative costs should be considered as well.  The military should be used uniquely in a complementary way.  A question was raised on the wider implications and consequences of a long-term use of military assets.  The use of military assets should also take into consideration a gender perspective.  It was asked what role could the Member States play in disseminating the Oslo Guidelines and what role could be played to ensure that the military assets deployed could make a significant change on the ground.


Speaking during the interactive discussion were Portugal on behalf of the European Union, Bolivia, Pakistan, Norway, Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and United Kingdom.


Concluding Remarks


Mr. ZUCULA, Director of the National Disaster Management Institute of Mozambique, said in Mozambique there were one or two simulations of disasters per year, involving members of civil society, Governmental organizations and others.  But when disaster hit, other people came, and these came with their own targeting and a different approach to manage the disaster, none of which was wrong per se.  As a recipient country, there was a need for a system to help the helpers to help, otherwise the situation was a mess.  On the issue of the need to keep discussing the concept of the use of foreign military assets as a last resort, this should continue, as there was a need to determine what was a “last resort”.  Depending on capacity that was already in place and predictions established, the country suffering from a disaster could clarify its needs.


Ms. BAILES, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said that the study might not come up with a golden rule.  It all depended on the circumstances.  The research task was to comment on the relative value.  It was easy to define the wrong reason or moment to bring in military assets.  If a country was doing it in order to compete, to look good, or because its military forces needed training, these were not the right motives.  It was correct that the consent of the host country was crucial because this was the barrier against an action regarded as intrusion.  A country could have a small military and could use the help of its neighbouring countries, disposing of bigger military forces.  The local cultural and security conditions needed to be considered.  In some countries like the United Kingdom, the trust in the armed forces was very high.  But in others, this was not the case, for example when military forces were drawn in civil wars etc.


There were some countries deploying forces for reasons other than defence or monitoring, she said.  If there was another legitimate reason for forces to be there, it was not unreasonable to deploy the military there.  On the question on how to know when military forces were needed, the sheer extent of the disaster could already be a determining factor therefore.  There should always be a civilian option.  On the demand side, contingency planning and exercising allowed a country to check what assets it had and what assets its neighbours had.  Regional organizations could also work together for security reasons.


Ms. JOHNSON, Director of the National Societies and Field Support Division of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), said on national capacity, it was important to recall that when people were in trouble, the first live-saving actions would be those of neighbours and family, and their capacity to respond to these needs was the day-to-day work of the national societies.  One of the important features of experienced humanitarian actors was the capacity to do quick but comprehensive and effective needs assessments that were disaggregated per the need of the particular vulnerabilities of the individuals concerned.  This capacity of humanitarian actors spoke to the need of the front-line of humanitarian action, and provided more scope for a gender-based humanitarian response than if the situation was placed in the hands of the military.


If Governments were contemplating using the military in humanitarian action or disaster response, it was very important that the latter had training, covering a range of issues, including interaction with other actors.  Short-term humanitarian actions should take into account the experience and need of the community, as well as the relationship of that community and understanding of that relationship with the military.  There was a need for a broad view to involve a range of actors to ensure there were no gaps in the humanitarian response.


Mr. GRAISSE, Senior Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), said that with regard to good examples of cooperation, Mozambique, Pakistan and the tsunami were examples, and also Timor-Leste and Lebanon.  It was sometimes difficult when the military arrived, because they could be invasive in terms of the space they needed to operate.  That explained sometimes why they were more costly.  On the issue of local actors and partners, it was useful to have the capabilities of the local air force or other military assets in the region.  In this regard, it was very valuable to engage the local army.  Efforts needed to be made to improve the way of cooperation with the military.


Military assets were used when they were useful but they were also bought sometimes, he said.  Regarding coordination and the role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Food Programme always wanted to consult with OCHA colleagues because they could tell better whether it was sound or not to engage in certain activities or to the bring the military assets in.  It was true that in the cases of the floods in Mozambique, South African helicopters were used to rescue people.  After having done their job, they started having a budget problem and WFP then agreed to contribute to the costs in order to continue the operations.


Mr. DEL ROSAL IBARRA, Head of the Sub-Section for Civil Protection of the Ministry of Defence of Mexico, said with regard to the national civil protection system, they had to put some order into the components of the system.  A problem was that each body that could help had its own disaster to manage, and there was a need for a coordinating agent.  In Mexico, it was the Government ministries and this had allowed the Government to work at three levels: municipal, State, and Government.  In Mexico, the armed forces were present throughout the territory, and had links with the three levels, and could therefore easily contact the authorities in the area.


With regards to the preparation of the armed forces, Mexico had created a culture of civil protection, and the military educational services knew about the needs of civil protection at each level, thus participating actively in various trials and tests that had borne fruit.  The National Protection System had various funds which it could access.  There was also an infrastructure developed by the private sector to prevent and mitigate the aftermath of disasters, in a context of cooperation with the authorities.  Mexico also promoted coordination with other countries through joint training courses, among others.


Ms. WAHLSTRÖM, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, said that when the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was established, support to civil and military coordination was one aspect of its work.  Learning from the tsunami, there was a great opportunity to work with the armed forces.  Investments were made to have permanent people on the ground.  The issue of the last resort was important and it became clear that it was sometimes a rather flexible term.  A consultative group was working on that issue.  With regard to engaging in the dissemination of the Oslo Guidelines, Canada gave the example of including it in its national framework.  In a simplistic manner, many of those that were not aware of the Oslo Guidelines could now leave the session knowing more.


There were lots of good practices that could be shared, she said.  It was important to capture those and carry them further on.  It was not all about the use of the military; one should start with the civilian assets first and see where the military could complement them.  The study should allow to follow-up consistently on a number of issues that had been raised here.  Thanks were expressed to the panellists for sharing their rich experiences.


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For information media • not an official record
For information media. Not an official record.