SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN OUTER SPACE LINKED TO NATIONAL SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT; INACTION COULD LEAD TO WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD

Sixty-first General Assembly

First Committee

11^th Meeting (PM)

SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN OUTER SPACE LINKED TO NATIONAL SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT;

INACTION COULD LEAD TO WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD

Extending Deadlines for Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles Examined;

Bioterrorism Threat Intensifies Call to Universalize Biological Weapons Convention

Mankind must not be allowed to sink into the quagmire of the weaponization of outer space as a result of its current inaction, the representative of China told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today, during a thematic debate on outer space and weapons of mass destruction.

As a result of swift technological advances, the twenty-first century would witness a growing number of countries taking part in and benefiting from the exploration and utilization of outer space, he said.  More than ever, sustainable peace in space was closely linked with each and every country’s security, development and prosperity.  For that reason, the nearly 40-year-old Outer Space Treaty needed to be strengthened and a new international legal instrument concluded, in order to close the loopholes of the existing framework.

All States were interested in ensuring that outer space did not become a battlefield, as the growing debate at the recent Conference on Disarmament on preventing an outer space arms race had attested, the speaker from the Russian Federation said.  Russia and China were working towards a treaty, which, instead of focusing on preventing an outer space arms race, envisioned the non-stationing of weapons in outer space, since an arms race was not possible in a sphere where weapons were already banned.  Given that space activities could be impeded by weapons placed elsewhere or by objects that were not weapons at all, the text also proposed adding the obligation of non-use of force or threat of force.

The representative of the United States stressed, however, that the danger against which all must be vigilant was not a theoretical arms race in space, but rather threats to deny peaceful access to it, especially ground-based capabilities intended to impede access to space systems and services.  Any satellite could be made to destroy another satellite simply through a collision, which did not lend itself to an old style “arms control” approach.  All countries shared an interest in access to outer space, and its loss would have profound global economic consequences.  He opposed the proposal to open negotiations on preventing an arms race in outer space, as there was no arms race there and no prospect of one.

India’s representative, noting the dramatic acceleration in international cooperation for peaceful uses of outer space, said that had offered developing countries the chance to leap forward and become full parties in the global economy of the twenty-first century.  With the increasing use of outer space for development and with the pervasive application of space technology to almost every aspect of modern life, one could not overlook potentially harmful threats.  He also supported upgrading the framework for regulating space activities, which had been created when space technology was in its infancy.

On the subject of biological weapons, several representatives stressed that, since both biotechnology and genetic sciences were evolving rapidly, so were the risks of abuse.  Masood Khan, President-Designate of the upcoming Review Conference on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention), said the threat of bioterrorism meant that there was never a more urgent need for full compliance with the Convention.  With 155 States parties, the Treaty was not yet universal, but none could argue that biological weapons had any legitimate role in national defence.

The representative of Canada said it was important not to become complacent on the subject of chemical weapons.  While the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) had become a model of a verifiable disarmament agreement and enjoyed near universality, it still faced important challenges.  Next month, and again in December, States parties would be asked to address the question of extending the deadlines for destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles.  While the circumstances that had led to some possessor States to invoke the Convention’s extension provisions might be understandable, they were not easily acceptable.  Even a five-year, one-time-only, extension might not be sufficient to ensure the total destruction of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons.  She, therefore, encouraged possessor States to destroy their stockpiles as quickly as possible.

Statements were also made in the thematic debate by the representatives of Finland (on behalf of the European Union), Brazil, New Zealand, Switzerland, Republic of Korea, Norway, France, Australia, Venezuela, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Belarus and Japan.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 12 October, to continue the thematic debate on other weapons of mass destruction and the disarmament aspects of outer space.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to hold its thematic discussion on other weapons of mass destruction and the disarmament aspects of outer space, and to hear introductions of further draft resolutions and decisions.

Statements

MASOOD KHAN, President-Designate of the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, said that the Sixth Review Conference was only a few short weeks ahead and, as the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs had said, practical and positive steps were within reach.  That needed to be applied to the Biological Weapons Convention as well.

Quoting the Secretary-General, he said that the Convention was as relevant today as it had been 31 years ago.  While developments in the sphere of life sciences brought great benefits, they brought considerable dangers, too.  In turn, there was never a more urgent need for full compliance with the Convention.

Referring to remarks by Hans Blix, he said that nuclear, biological and chemical weapons were the most inhumane of all weapons, as they caused destruction on a vast scale and had impacts far more indiscriminate and long-lasting.

The Biological Weapons Convention had experienced marked success in serving as the global norm on biological weapons, he continued.  The use of disease as a weapon was repugnant to mankind.  With 155 States parties, the Convention was not yet universal, but none could argue that biological weapons had any legitimate role in national defence.

Furthermore, the upcoming Review Conference needed to strengthen the Convention, he said.  It was a fundamental pillar against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and, despite past disappointments, owing to differences in opinion, it was imperative to “convert divergences into convergences” now.  Bioterrorism had added urgency to that task.  The international community should ensure that the peaceful applications of biotechnology were safely and securely developed for all to use, worldwide.

Though it was too early to give a definitive account of what lay ahead, the outcome document should be concise and easily understandable, while recapturing and reaffirming the core elements of the Convention, he said.  Although there was no “silver bullet”, the work should be pursued collectively.  He urged delegates to ask questions, make observations, and give guidance.

KARI KAHILUOTO (Finland), on behalf of the European Union, urged States that were not yet parties to the Biological Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention to adhere to those treaties and join the mainstream.  He also urged all States to meet their obligations under Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006), including in relation to enacting domestic penal legislation.  The control of emerging technology would continue to be an issue of considerable concern in the area of chemical and biological weapons.  The potential for illicit use of such technologies highlighted the need to monitor technological developments with potential use in such weapons programmes.

He said that at the Sixth Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention next month, the European Union would contribute a full review of the Convention’s operations including the implementation of undertakings of its States parties.  It would promote several essential issues including universal adherence to the Convention, full compliance with all obligations, national implementation measures and control over pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins.  The Union would also identify effective compliance mechanisms and seek to enhance transparency through the increased exchange of information among States parties.  It would also promote compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions to eliminate the risk of such weapons being acquired or used by terrorists.  The European Union would support a further intersessional work programme until the next Review Conference, which should be held no later than 2011.

The Chemical Weapons Convention was a unique disarmament and non-proliferation instrument, which must also be strictly applied, he urged.  One of its most important features was the obligation for possessors of such weapons to destroy their stockpiles by specified deadlines.  He urged the possessors to take every possible step to meet those deadlines and for all States parties to implement their own legislation as per article VII of the Convention.  The verification regime implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was essential for deterring non-compliance with the Convention.  Its Technical Secretariat must also be well-prepared and equipped to conduct challenge inspections.

He said that the European Union was aware of the growing involvement of the international community in outer space activities for development and progress, as well as its increasing dependence on outer space for economic and industrial development and security.  The Union was cooperating in various space initiatives, which should be developed in a peaceful environment.  An arms race in outer space must be prevented.  That issue was an important matter to be dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament, in a way subjected to agreement by all.

CARLOS ANTONIO DA ROCHA PARANHOS ( Brazil), speaking on behalf of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), reaffirmed his delegation’s resolve to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.  Multilateralism was the best way to strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.  He reiterated the importance of establishing efficient national monitoring regimes, in order to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.  His delegation was in full support of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) for the same reason.  While highlighting the universal importance of the Convention, he understood that there was a need to strengthen the Convention, for which a verification mechanism was crucial.  He also recommended the establishment of an administrative unit designed to lend technical support to State parties to the Convention. 

On the Chemical Weapons Convention, he reiterated, also on MERCOSUR’s behalf, his commitment to the Treaty and reaffirmed his support to achieve full implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004).  The Convention had been ratified by 180 States.  There was a need to prioritize the cooperation among States and also to ensure efficient programmes of the OPCW.  He attached special importance to verification and control mechanisms while appealing to countries to destroy their chemical arsenals.  Furthermore, it was imperative to improve border and customs controls.  In light of that, there was a national need to properly train human resources committed to those tasks.

GILLIAN FROST ( Canada) said that, ahead of next month’s convening of the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Canada had identified four areas in which the Convention could be further strengthened:  national implementation; confidence-building measures; implementation support; and annual meetings.  Those measures were not meant to be exhaustive and all efforts to reach the common goal of a strengthened Convention should be examined carefully.  Through collaboration with other States parties, Canada hoped to build on the “accountability framework”. 

She said that it was important not to become complacent on the subject of chemical weapons disarmament.  While it had become a model of a verifiable disarmament agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention still faced important challenges.  Next month and again in December, States parties would be asked to address the question of extensions for destruction deadlines.  While the circumstances that had contributed to the necessity for some possessor States to invoke the Convention’s extension provisions might be understandable, they were not easily acceptable.  Even a five-year, one-time-only extension might not be sufficient to ensure the total destruction of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons.  She, therefore, encouraged possessor States to destroy their stockpiles as quickly as possible. 

Noting that the Chemical Weapons Convention would have its Second Review Conference in April 2008, she said it was not too soon to begin taking stock of the Convention’s implementation and examining how States parties might best ensure its continuing relevance as a key element of security.  With the recent accession of its 180^th member, the Chemical Weapons Convention was approaching true universality and Canada would continue to support such efforts until every country had become a State party and was fully implementing its obligations under the Convention.  The arms control and disarmament agenda had suffered disappointments in recent years.  That could not happen again with the upcoming Biological Weapons Review Conference.

DON MACKAY ( New Zealand) said that, with the upcoming Biological Weapons Convention Review conference, his country was looking to ensure that the Convention remained relevant in a dynamic biotechnology environment.  New Zealand supported an interstitial process, and a code of conduct and scientific cooperation that was flexible enough for any new issues that might arise during the next review period. 

On the Chemical Weapons Convention and implementation of the work of OPCW, he said that all chemical weapons stockpiles must be destroyed by 2012, the deadline set by the Convention.  New Zealand would continue to focus on universalization and implementation of the Convention, particularly in improving the methodology for selecting sites for inspections.  New Zealand was contributing to that effort by its contribution to the 2002 “Group of Eight (G-8) Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction”.

He said that it was in everyone’s interest to preserve space for the development of peaceful technology and scientific exploration.  Preventing its weaponization was fundamental to safeguarding the ability to access space resources now and in the future.  He supported work towards a new comprehensive legal framework regulating the demilitarization of outer space.  Arguments that there was no need to address that issue because there was no arms race in outer space ignored the preventive benefits of the cautionary approach.  Transparency and confidence-building measures had an important role to play.

CHENG JINGYE ( China) said that, in light of the swift development of outer space science and technology, the international community was faced with the pressing task of strengthening the effectiveness and the universality of the nearly 40-year-old Outer Space Treaty.

He said that the twenty-first century would witness a growing number of countries taking part in and benefiting from the exploration and utilization of outer space.  More than ever, sustainable peace there was closely linked with each and every country’s security, development and prosperity.  It was the common wealth of mankind.  “The exploration and peaceful utilization and exploitation of outer space is the common right of all peoples; and maintaining a peaceful and clean outer space is the common obligation of mankind”, he said.  It was worrisome that since man began the exploitation of outer space, the spectre of an arms race there and its weaponization had haunted the international community.

He said that a world free from outer space weapons was no less important than a world free from weapons of mass destruction.  Many difficulties on the thorny path of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had already been witnessed.  Mankind must not be allowed to sink in the quagmire of the weaponization of outer space as a result of current inaction. 

Concluding a new international legal instrument to close the loopholes of the existing legal framework related to the issue was the only effective way of coping with the challenge of the weaponization of outer space, he stressed.  He expressed satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament had conducted a meaningful debate on the prevention of such an arms race earlier in the year.  The Conference should re-establish an ad hoc committee on that issue at an early date so that substantive work could be conducted.  It would be the best way to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty.

JÜRG STREULI ( Switzerland) stressed the fact that biological weapons were a source of great concern.  Both biotechnology and genetic sciences were evolving rapidly and, consequently, so were the risks of abuse.  The Biological Weapons Convention provided the essential framework aimed at preventing the biological threat from States or elsewhere.  He appealed to all States to sign and ratify both the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare as soon as possible.

He urged delegates to find common ground, and he recommended that a follow-up process to the Convention be established.  Switzerland would continue to be active and constructive during the process.  It was currently drafting a working document on confidence-building measures, and welcomed the Convention’s future universalization.  He looked forward to fruitful discussions.

ROBERT LUACES ( United States) said that the use of space was increasingly important to all aspects of international commerce, peace and security.  The information revolution depended, to a large extent, on collective advances in space, including on communication, navigation and remote sensing.  The increasing importance of space to both commerce and national security had given rise to several concerns, including the potential vulnerability of the space system to disruption from natural and manmade sources.  The international community should recognize that protection of space access was a key objective.  Space capabilities were vital to the United States’ national interest, whether in ground or space, which included the supporting link of such networks.

He said that all countries shared an interest in access to space and in deterring others from preventing such access.  His country’s new space policy set forth guiding principles on the critical importance of space access and use for economic and national security, as well as its long commitment to peaceful access to and use of space.  The modern world relied on the free right of passage in space, and everyone should be committed to that right.  To lose such access would have profound global economic consequences.  Technology from space accomplishments touched nearly every aspect of daily life, from cars and planes to farmers’ crops and battlefield awareness.

The danger against which all must be vigilant was not a theoretical arms race in space, but rather threats to deny peaceful access to it, especially ground-based capabilities intended to impede access to space systems and services, he said.  Any satellite could be made to destroy another satellite simply through a collision, which did not lend itself to an old style “arms control” approach.

For those reasons, the United States opposed the proposed negotiations on preventing an arms race in outer space, he explained.  The international community should oppose such talks as well.  The United States would also oppose new legal regimes or other restrictions to prohibit or limit access to or use of space.  “There is no arms race in space,” he said.  “There is no prospect of an arms race in space.”  The United States would continue to protect its access to and use of space.

He said it was necessary to continue to work together to advance international space cooperation and to improve the global community’s use of space.  The United States had undertaken several efforts to safeguard such use by all, for example, by providing information on objects in space through a public domain website, leading the way on guidelines on orbital debris, assisting other space-faring nations in collision avoidance, and providing free information on solar storms and radio blackouts.  The United States was firmly committed to protecting space access and improving ways States could benefit from economic and scientific development and international peace and security.

CHANG DONG-HEE ( Republic of Korea) said that the Biological Weapons Convention remained the fundamental, legal and normative foundation in the prevention of biological and toxin weapons.  With advances in biotechnology and life sciences, and the increase in weapons’ availability, however, there was a risk that non-State and State actors could take advantage of loopholes.  While reaffirming the use of biotechnology for peaceful purposes, there was an urgent need to reinforce the Convention. 

He said his Government attached significant importance to the Sixth Review Conference, but noted that work should continue beyond that on a more regulated basis.  It was imperative to seriously consider ways to promote universal adherence to the Convention.  His country had introduced a working paper on universalization of the Convention.  He, meanwhile, urged all States to show flexibility and take an open-minded approach. 

On the Chemical Weapons Convention, universal accession was still necessary and he appreciated that that remained a top priority for the OPCW.  Yet, the fact that many countries still remained outside that Convention meant the threat persisted.  He was confident that possessor States were fully committed to destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles as soon as possible.  He also understood the delay due to domestic factors such as environmental protection requirements.  He reiterated, however, that the deadline for stockpiles destruction must not extend beyond 2012.  “Let’s not be complacent”, he urged.  In light of terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, it was vital that no chemical weapons fall into the wrong hands. 

PAUL MEYER ( Canada) expressed the wish that each of the day’s topics could be debated separately so as not to “mix the poisoned apples of biological weapons with the orbiting oranges of outer space”.  He said that there was a need for an increasingly broad concept of space security, which addressed not only the weaponization of outer space, but also the broader military, environmental, commercial and civil dimensions of space.  As everyone drew ever-increasing benefits from space assets, space-faring and non-space-faring nations alike shared a stake in ensuring that human actions did not jeopardize the current and future benefits offered by outer space.  Towards that goal, the work of the international community could be optimized by enhancing dialogue between the various United Nations bodies with an interest in outer space.

He said that a key element of a multilateral architecture for space security would be negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of an appropriately scoped, legally binding ban on space-based weapons.  Expert presentations on those and other elements of such a ban were needed, in order to build consensus within the Conference on the way forward. 

The sheer growth of space activities worldwide and the commercial as well as national security benefits derived from space activities provided a strong rationale and incentive for the global community to work cooperatively in ensuring that such benefits were maintained, he said.  Developing “rules of the road”, space debris mitigation guidelines, and more coordinated space traffic management were some of the ideas that could contribute towards that goal.

He said that transparency and confidence-building measures could dispel potential misperceptions about space activities, particularly if they were used in a non-interfering or non-intrusive manner that was still robust enough to give States a degree of reassurance about the intent and purpose of space launches.  Canada had put together a short paper listing some of the types of transparency and confidence-building measures relating too outer space, which had already been developed and applied.  A copy of that statement was being distributed in the hall.

KNUT LANGELAND ( Norway) said that the Chemical Weapons Convention had been achieving impressive results, but it was imperative to encourage the few remaining countries to become party to the Convention without delay.  That Treaty was an essential instrument in the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.  It was necessary that all chemical stockpiles be destroyed and that the conversion of chemical facilities be carried out within the agreed time limits.

On the Biological Weapons Convention, he said that Norway advocated the adoption of practical and durable measures.  Some of those included:  the need for an intersessional programme of work; the need to refine confidence-building measures; the need for more dialogue aimed at bringing forward the Treaty’s article X assistance; and the need to develop preventative measures such as codes of conduct for those involved in life sciences.  More resources were also vital, though he praised the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for its support, adding that a well-functioning support unit was crucial.  The “Biological Weapons Convention community” also needed to enhance partnerships with the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Organization for Animal Health, he concluded.  Increased involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society was also required.

SERGEY KOSHELEV ( Russian Federation) said his country favoured strengthening the multilateral basis for solving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) must be strengthened and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention were all important.  Urgent action was needed in the latter area because of the danger of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.  The 1925 Geneva Protocol was still topical, and reservations by States to that important instrument should be removed. 

He called on all States to reject the use of chemical weapons.  His country abided by its disarmament obligations and it was working to eliminate its chemical arsenals within the specified time frame.  Last month, three missile sites had been destroyed and there was now a third Russian mechanism for destroying chemical weapons test facilities.  The large-scale task of destroying chemical weapons could not be resolved by one State alone; increased financial and technical assistance were also needed.  National measures for implementation were necessary elements for the stable functioning of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  His country was ready to help other States to develop national legislation and it was willing to share its experience.

The upcoming Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention should produce a detailed article-by-article review of the Convention seeking to enhance the effectiveness of related activities in the next five years, he urged.  In the absence of a consensus text, he favoured intersessional work.  To prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and the chance of those weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors, it was important for all States to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).  The main threat of proliferation was the uncontrolled traffic and risk of outflow of dual use chemical and biological substances, he added.

FRANÇOIS RIVASSEAU ( France) said that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was the precursor to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.  It remained relevant today as the international community stood at the crossroads of humanitarian demands, and the quest to meet disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. 

Considering that the Protocol had been in force for more than 80 years, he said that it was understandable that some States had not recently examined their status on the text.  Only 22 States still held reservations and he called upon all who made reservations at the time of accession to consider withdrawing them, with a view to ensuring the absolute prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

CAROLINE MILLAR ( Australia) said that the forthcoming Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference presented a vital opportunity for the international community to strengthen its defences again proliferation.  It was imperative not to squander that opportunity, as the threat of bioterrorism persisted.  Australia was a long-standing advocate for full and effective implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

She said her Government encouraged State parties to fulfil their obligations under the Convention and under resolution 1540 (2004).  Of particular importance was the need for national legislative, administrative and enforcement measures to ensure effective implementation of the Convention.  She also encouraged a close examination of confidence-building measures, as those were a vital transparency measure.

National implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention was vital to its continuing relevance, but it was also important to take care of the institution itself.  A “BWC Meetings Secretariat” could help both in management of confidence-building measures and in the universalization of the Convention.  Australia would put forward an action plan that offered clear and practical steps to encourage States to join the Biological Weapons Convention, she added.

PUI LEONG ( Venezuela) said that, as the common heritage for all mankind, outer space needed to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.  Military systems in outer space endangered collective security.  Venezuela had signed the Outer Space Treaty, and was party to other instruments related to outer space, as well.  The Treaty was the legal framework guiding the international community’s action in outer space.  She hoped that further talks on the subject would be fruitful.

Considering that States possessed technological capacities in outer space, they needed to renounce any military systems –- both defensive and offensive -- she stressed.  In November 2005, her Government had authorized the establishment of the Venezuela Space Centre Foundation.  Aimed at designing the coordination related to the peaceful uses of outer space, the Centre acted as a decentralized agency in outer space matters.  An agreement had also been signed with China on space cooperation.

Mr. VASILYEV ( Russian Federation) said that he would have preferred holding separate discussions on each thematic cluster.  The growing debate on preventing an arms race in outer space at the recent Conference on Disarmament showed that all States were interested in making sure outer space was not turned into a battlefield.  Consensus on the issue could be achieved, as that was the one topic that had met with greatest unanimity at the Conference.

During the debate, there had been interesting and weighty comments and proposals made.  There was the Russia-China initiative on a treaty to prevent the weaponization of outer space and to prevent the use or threat of use of force on space objects.  After more than 20 years of consideration, there had been tangible progress in the Conference on developing solutions to those problems.  The Conference’s main conclusion was that it should resume substantive work in that area.  It was counterproductive to say that the issue was not ripe.

He said that, after the Conference’s debate, it was important to clarify the new treaty, contained in Conference on Disarmament document 1679.  His country did not propose the treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space.  Rather, the treaty was focused on the non-stationing of weapons in outer space, although that was not its final name.  His country was trying to resolve the problem differently.  An arms race was not possible in a sphere where there was a general prohibition on weapons.  Violence to space objects could be done without space weapons, if weapons were based elsewhere or the objects were not weapons but were still able to impede activities.  For that reason, he proposed adding the obligation of non-use of force or threat of force.

Document 1679 put forth several main obligations, including the non-launching into orbit of any weapon-containing object, the non-use of force or threat of force, and not helping other States or organizations in activities prohibited by the treaty, he said.  The text was a step forward in international law on peace in outer space and the normal functioning of space objects.  Measures in the new treaty were of interest to all States without exception.  Weapons in space could bring “great evil” to all and must be prevented.

WITJAKSONO ADJI ( Indonesia) said that it was imperative that the Committee double its efforts and ensure that the Biological Weapons Convention remained a vital element in the international response to threats.  Indonesia and Australia had co-hosted a workshop to facilitate greater understanding among countries in the region to achieve the common objectives.  On a national level, it was the responsibility of each State to take effective measures to address current threats and challenges.

He urged that the three pillars of the Chemical Weapons Convention -– destruction, non-proliferation and international cooperation -- be respected by all parties.  All existing chemical stockpiles should be destroyed without delay.  He commended the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for providing assistance in that process.  At the same time, he was concerned at the slow pace of destruction, and he urged the States concerned to conform to the agreed deadline.  Intergovernmental cooperation was essential in controlling transboundary movement of material used in the production of chemical weapons.  He added that certain State parties to that Convention still required assistance in meeting their treaty obligations.

SARALA FERNANDO ( Sri Lanka), after reiterating her Government’s support for the Biological Weapons Convention, said that Sri Lanka viewed outer space as the common heritage of mankind.  The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967, remained the most important instrument.  Though at that time, only few States had the ability to have space programmes, the situation today was quite different.  There had been unprecedented advances in space technology -- it was now within reach of an increasing number of developed and developing countries.  Furthermore, space technology played an important role in developing countries, as it had applications in the fields of communications, health, food security, and disaster management.  All had a stake in keeping outer space peaceful for all mankind, she concluded.

The representative of India said that there had been a dramatic acceleration in peaceful uses of outer space and international cooperation for that purpose.  There was also an increased potential for developing countries to “leapfrog” and become full parties in the global economy of the twenty-first century.  In the past year, India had signed, along with the Russian Federation and the European Union, agreements for cooperation in space programmes, such as a 2008 mission to the moon that would carry surface mapping instruments.

He said that, with the increasing use of outer space for development and with the pervasive application of space technology to almost every aspect of modern life, one could not overlook the harmful possibility of threats to outer space.  He supported upgrading the framework for regulating space activities.  That framework had been set at the infancy of space technology.  Respect for safety and security of space by all countries was a prerequisite for the continued flow of space services.  The ad hoc committee at the Conference on Disarmament on preventing an arms race in outer space should be re-established.

VALERY KOLESNYK ( Belarus) said that his Government fully supported efforts aimed at preserving peace in outer space.  It was vital that the international community recognize that the threat of an arms race in outer space was not hypothetical, but real.  It was crucial not to lose time in creating a foundation for the peaceful uses of outer space.  He, therefore, supported all relevant, international agreements and confidence-building measures.

KENZO OSHIMA ( Japan) said that the upcoming review of the Biological Weapons Convention was important, as there had not been a good review in 10 years.  There were several items to address, many of which were not included in articles.  It was important to pay attention to both approaches -- article-by-article and cross-cutting issues.  It was also important to make the maximum efforts for the Conference’s success.

On preventing an arms race in outer space, he noted that there had been extensive, good discussions at the Conference on Disarmament under the chairmanship of the Russian Federation.  Issues to be addressed, such as maintaining safe operation of outer space, should be addressed in related bodies.  Many of the issues were technical in nature.  Many concepts mentioned were not clear to other countries, including his own, such as the “weaponization of outer space” and an “arms race in outer space”.  Thus, there was a need to discuss those concepts and what they meant, as well as where and in what framework related problems could best be addressed.

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