SECURITY THREATS TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE ADDRESSED IN FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE, DRAFT TEXTS

Sixtieth General Assembly                                  

First Committee                                            

13^th Meeting (AM)

SECURITY THREATS TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT

COMPLIANCE ADDRESSED IN FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE, DRAFT TEXTS

Thematic Debate Continues; Other Resolutions Introduced

Concern Reducing Military Budgets, Mediterranean Security

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) continued its thematic debate today, with a focus on regional and other disarmament measures, and heard the introduction of four draft resolutions on a broad range of issues, including security threats to information technologies and a new text on compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

As part of its new practice of inviting the heads of relevant groups to speak, the Committee heard from the Chairman of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Vincente Berasategui.  He said that, in two sessions this year, the Board, a group of eminent persons in the field of disarmament, had expressed deep concern at the lack of any progress on several critical disarmament and security issues.  Many members had deplored the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to reach consensus on the important issues before it, and several had deemed “astonishing” the omission of a section on disarmament and non-proliferation issues from the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. 

The Chairman of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Audrey Krutskikh, said it was a first attempt to consider the question.  The experts agreed that targeting information technologies was an extremely attractive way to damage society and disrupt security.  The vulnerability of information systems could be exploited, including by a small but highly motivated group of non-State actors, or “cyber-criminals”.  Thus, the Group focused attention on the need to counter such security challenges through threat reduction and risk management. 

Introducing a draft resolution on the question, the representative of the Russian Federation similarly warned that opportunities for the hostile use of information technologies by criminals, terrorists and States posed a credible threat to national, regional and global security.  Stressing the need for a clear understanding of the character of those threats and challenges, in order to neutralize those threats in a unified way, he said the draft called for the establishment of a new group of governmental experts, with a start-up date in 2009, to further examine that novel and complex issue. 

Introducing a new draft resolution entitled “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements”, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation said the text was an opportunity for the international community to reflect on the changing face of the global arms control and non-proliferation challenge faced by all.  The draft was intended, not only to bring the issue of compliance to the international community’s attention, but also to emphasize that compliance with international treaties and obligations was critical to international peace and security, and to exhort governments to seek common cause in pursuit of diplomatic means to bring international violators back into compliance.

She said that the international community was facing significant proliferation challenges, none more dangerous than non-compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation obligations.  It was well known that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had a nuclear weapons programme and had concealed it while a party to the NPT.  And, Iran’s nuclear programme marked another area of concern.  In both of those cases, parties to international agreements undertook actions over years and even decades to “cheat”.  Their non-compliance was not “technical”; those were not accidents or oversights.  If they were, it would be reasonable to expect that expressions of concern would result in timely resolution.  The challenge posed by non-compliance was great, but she believed the international community was up to the challenge. 

Weighing in during the debate on regional disarmament, Iran’s representative said his country, by renouncing the nuclear option and placing its nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) system, had shown its determination to achieve the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.  All of Iran’s nuclear facilities were devoted to peaceful purposes and under full-scope IAEA safeguards.  Owing to Israel’s non-adherence to the NPT, however, and its refusal to place its regime under the IAEA system, the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had not materialized.  Confident of United States’ political and military support, Israel had neither acceded to the NPT nor placed its nuclear facilities under the IAEA.

Germany’s representative introduced a draft resolution on reduction of military budgets, and Algeria’s representative tabled a text on strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Canada, Uruguay (on behalf of MERCOSUR), Singapore, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Romania.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Tuesday, 18 October to continue its thematic debate and to hear the further introduction of draft resolutions and decisions.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to begin its thematic debate on regional disarmament and other disarmament measures, and to hear the introduction of related draft texts.  It was also expected to hear a briefing by the Chairman of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Vincente Berasategui, and the Chairman of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Audrey Krutskikh.

Statement by Advisory Board Chairman

VINCENTE BERASATEGUI, Chairman, Advisory Board, said that a complete summation of the Board’s work in 2005 was contained in the Board’s report (document A/60/285).  He would highlight only some of the observations and recommendations of the Board.  First, the Board had expressed its deep concern at the lack of any progress with regard to several critical disarmament and security issues.  Specifically, many Board members had deplored the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as a result of the impossibility of reaching consensus on the important issues before the Review Conference.  The Board, in turn, had highlighted the urgent need to move forward, including in matters involving non-state actors’ acquisition of arms, in order to prevent a weakening of the current system of legal standards governing disarmament and non-proliferation.

Noting that the Board had taken up four substantive items in 2005, he said that the first concerned gaining control over the nuclear fuel and fissionable material cycle.  In its deliberations, the Board had taken into account the report on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, which had been published this year by a group of experts set up by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  It had been acknowledged that creating multilateral nuclear approaches might offer multiple advantages for dealing with non-proliferation.  It was said, however, that that was no panacea for dealing with existing failures to comply with the NPT, or for its lack of universality, or, for that matter, for fully guaranteeing the involvement of States not party to the NPT.  Notwithstanding all of that, the Board had felt that it was not beyond reach to achieve a multilateral agreement or guarantees on nuclear fuel.

The Board had submitted several recommendations in that regard, he went on.  First, it felt that short-term opportunities should be considered for applying multilateral approaches to the nuclear issue on a voluntary basis.  It also felt that further thought should be given to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in terms of a voluntary moratorium on building facilities in exchange for guaranteeing the supply of fissionable material.  The Board felt that existing approaches and tools should be fully used, including export controls and steps taken by the Security Council, including under resolution 1540 (2004).  It also supported the broadest possible accession to the IAEA safeguards and Additional Model Protocol, and intensification of the Global Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiative.

The second item involved regional security and global standards for small arms and light weapons, he said.  The Board pointed out that the United Nations, in a relatively short time, had taken some initial, but major, steps in devising global norms in that regard.  It acknowledged with satisfaction the role played by regional and subregional organizations alike, as well as that played by civil society in combating the small arms scourge.  The Board recommended, first, that the second biennial meeting of States to review implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms, held in July in New York, as well as the first conference of the parties responsible for reviewing that programme, to be held in 2006, should go into greater depth into the matter of global norms in that regard.  Second, there should be stronger coordination and greater cooperation including between the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as between the United Nations and the relevant financial institutions, in order to come to grips with the small arms problem in all its ramifications, through a broad and holistic approach.

He said that the third item had involved regional-level challenges and opportunities with regard to unconventional and conventional arms.  The Board noted that, in the period following the cold war, opportunities had emerged for adopting dynamic regional and subregional approaches to disarmament and non- proliferation.  The Board felt that those should prompt negotiations to deal with more extensive measures, leading to general and complete disarmament.  It recommended that regional disarmament agreements should contribute to enhancing security and stability region-wide, at the lowest possible level of arms and armed forces, without diminishing the security of any participating State.  Also from the regional dimension, the Board considered the nuclear matter of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran’s nuclear programme, and the virtuous cycle of democracy, multilateralism and peace developed in Latin America, as well as the small arms threat in Africa.

Regarding the fourth item, disarmament machinery, he said that the Board had recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should be kept intact and strengthened, without prejudice to adjusting its procedural provisions.  Several ideas had been floated, such as creating decision-making groups or subsidiary bodies.  As for the Disarmament Commission, while certain members said they favoured extending the current mandate, others felt its functions could be absorbed by the First Committee or a subsidiary body of the Committee.

Noting that the Board also acted as the Board of Trustees for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), he said it adopted, for submission to the General Assembly, the report of the Institute’s Director.  It covered the Institute’s activities from August 2004 to July 2005, together with the work programme and the budget for 2006.  This year was UNIDIR’s twenty-fifth anniversary.  It had done an impressive job with limited resources, and its work had drawn acclaim in the most diverse media.  The Board, once again, appealed for greater backing from Member States for the Institute’s invaluable work.  

He said that the Board had decided to include the following items on its 2006 agenda:  consideration of the disarmament situation, taking into account the decisions adopted at the World Summit; and measures to forestall the proliferation of arms systems to non-state actors.  Regarding the first agenda item, he said that had been introduced in the hope that the Summit would have taken up issues crucial to disarmament and non-proliferation.  While the sections in the outcome text on values and principles, along with the one on collective peace and security, were directly intertwined with disarmament and non-proliferation matters, he profoundly regretted that the document had failed to contain a section on disarmament and non-proliferation, issues which, for decades, had figured among the most urgent problems facing the international community.  Several Advisory Board members had shared with him their concerns at that “astonishing omission”.  Fortunately, the Board’s recommendations had been circulated and were well known to the United Nations membership, and were grounds for hoping that the Organization’s future work would take them into account.

Statement by Chairman of Group of Governmental Experts

ANDREY KRUTSKIKH, Governmental Group of Experts, said his job was to share his impressions on the first discussion of experts, on one of the most important international security issues, the roots of which flowed from the global information revolution.  In its resolution 58/32, which was adopted by consensus, in December 2003, and which is called “Achievements in Computerization and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security”, the Secretary-General asked a group of governmental experts to consider existing threats in the area of information security and possible joint measures to eliminate them, and also to conduct research of existing international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems.  The Group conducted three meetings with experts from 15 States.  The first meeting was held in July 2004 in New York, the second meeting was held in March and April 2005 in Geneva and the final session was in July 2005 in New York.

He said the group considered opinions which had been reflected in the replies received from Member States on their reaction to General Assembly resolutions on international security and also to substantive contributions of governmental experts, including national contributions on the range of issues on international information security.  The work of the group was the first attempt to consider the question of international information security and the group itself was a unique mechanism for researching the issue.  The group conducted a systematic and in-depth analysis.  The group fully agreed to the preambular part of the report and a survey on the current status on the area of insuring international information security.  All experts emphasized that States and citizens depended on information and communications technologies in the areas of economic development and social prosperity.  It was recognized that those technologies could have a significant impact on national and international security.  Information was becoming a very valuable element of national property and an important resource.  The growing dependence of States on information and communications technologies, at the national and global level, presupposed that questions of confidentiality and integrity were a growing concern.

An increasing number of breaches of security had done financial damage, he said.  The blending of electronic and physical infrastructure presupposed that systems would encounter problems.  Such linkages made information and communications technologies an extremely attractive way to damage society, its interests and the integrity of the infrastructure of States, thus disrupting their security.  The group focused attention on the need to counter challenges to security by threat reduction and risk management.  The vulnerability of information systems could be used by many individuals, and identifying them not always possible.  A small but highly motivated group of non-State actors could disrupt the work of networks and the possibility could not be ruled out that non-States could hire cyber-criminals.  In new forms, they’re conducting an information war and the group agreed that preventing attacks, identifying suspects and prosecuting individuals remained a priority. 

He said the group analyzed the relevant initiatives of private sector organizations, such as Internet Alliance, and the World Wide Alliance of Information Technologies and Services.  In that context, the group noted that, although individual Member States must take measures to ensure security, the global nature of information and communications technologies, its threats and vulnerabilities, meant international actions were just as important.  The group’s experts proposed a number of steps and measures.  It agreed to a significant number of substantively important sections in its final report, although a full text of the report was not possible, because of the limited period of time, the range of issues and, even using translation, the different languages and lack of unified definitions on key terms.  There were also different interpretations of international law.  To develop common approaches to information and communications technologies, the international community would need more time and effort, and those efforts must continue by means of a joint consideration under the auspices of the most influential international organizations. 

LARBI EL HADJ ALI ( Algeria) expressed his ardent support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world.  Their establishment should be viewed as both implementing the provisions of Article VII of the NPT, which recognized States’ rights to conclude regional treaties that ensured the absence of nuclear weapons on their territories, as well as a step towards freeing the world from nuclear weapons.  A conducive climate for the creation of such zones had been established in several regions of the globe, including the African region, where States had concluded the Pelindaba Treaty.  Algeria had been the third African country to sign that instrument. 

At the same time, he said he was deeply concerned at the absence of progress in that regard in the difficult region of the Middle East, where only Israel had continually refused to join the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.  Specific measures should be taken to implement the resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the NPT States parties at the review of the NPT in 1995.  The international community must take a final decision and make a steadfast commitment to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, bearing in mind that the only real safeguard of security rested with the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

HERD ABDULAZIZ ALOWAIS ( United Arab Emirates) said, notwithstanding confidence-building measures adopted by his country with regard to disarmament, the security situation in the Middle East continued to pose a major threat to international peace, security and stability.  Israel continued to possess a nuclear-weapon arsenal.  Israel was the only State in the Middle East not party to the NPT and not willing to place its nuclear facilities under the control of the IAEA.  The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been prevented because of the double standards applied in the realm of disarmament, in general.  That had encouraged Israel to pursue its irresponsible policy of developing its own nuclear weapons arsenal.

She called upon the international community to live up fully to its responsibilities as far as peace and security in the Middle East was concerned.  To do that, Israel must be prompted to bring its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA.  The international community needed to exert greater pressure to get the Israeli Government to heed the call for it to join the NPT, and the IAEA.  Also, she called upon all States, especially the nuclear States, to abide by the commitments that they had made.  Once those measures had been enacted, it would enhance confidence and create a positive environment and that would strengthen efforts to contain violence and to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.

ALI AL-KUBAISI ( Qatar) called for urgent steps to implement the call to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution adopted at the NPT review in 1995.  He exhorted all States to accept the NPT obligations, and for those that had not yet done so to submit their nuclear facilities and activities to IAEA guarantees.  Until that zone’s establishment, its principles must be accepted and States must not engage in any steps to modernize weapons where those existed, or to acquire or install them on their territories.  States in the region generally agreed to the provisions of such a zone and of the relevant resolutions.  He welcomed all initiatives designed to create a zone in the Middle East free from all weapons of mass destruction. 

With that in mind, he recalled that Qatar had signed the NPT on 10 December 1996 and had reaffirmed its sincere commitment in all international forums to turn the Middle East into a zone free from nuclear and other mass destruction weapons.  Israel must also join the NPT and submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA guarantees, in line with the call in the relevant United Nations resolutions.  He, meanwhile, called on all States to bring pressure to bear on Israel to “bend to the will” of the international community and implement all relevant resolutions, as the only State in the region that had not signed the NPT or submitted its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards.  That, in turn, bred insecurity in the region, which endured a looming threat because of those “death-dealing” weapons. 

SAJA MAJALI ( Jordan) said she welcomed all initiatives that would lead to general and complete disarmament and had continuously supported all related efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the international, regional and subregional levels.  She had also welcomed all efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world.  Efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in the Middle East, was vital.  Israel remained the only State in the region that had not acceded to the NPT and that refused to subject its nuclear facilities and weapons to IAEA safeguards and inspection.

Since 1974, she added, the General Assembly had adopted more than 32 resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and had called upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of that proposal, and to declare that they refrain from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and that they agree to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.  To date, however, that had not been realized.

She said both the 1995 resolution and the 2000 conclusions on the Middle East adopted in the respective review conferences of the parties to the NPT, as well as under numerous resolutions, called on the international community to urge Israel to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision.  Israel’s accession to the NPT remained of the utmost importance.  Such an undertaking would bring the world closer attaining the universality of the NPT and would further consolidate the global non-proliferation regime.  Its accession to the Treaty would defuse existing tensions, bring about tangible progress in other bilateral tracks of the peace process, enhance confidence-building measures, mitigate the regional arms race allowing for the huge financial resources to be redirected towards economic and social development and have an overall positive impact on regional peace and security.  Implementation of IAEA safety measures would, furthermore, prevent the occurrence of potential nuclear accidents and spare the region the risk of radiological contamination.

SIHAM MOURABIT ( Morocco) said that a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean region required a deepened international commitment and solidarity to assist the countries in the region in mastering the regional challenges.  Without persistent attention, the region would remain a fertile breeding ground for all manner of tension and terrorism.  The gap was widening between the two banks of the Mediterranean, further jeopardizing security in the region.  Closing that gap required the active cooperation of both banks and the real economic integration of those South of the Mediterranean.  The international community was duty-bound to see to it that the region remained a haven of peace, prosperity and security.  She reaffirmed Morocco’s unswerving commitment to its bilateral and multilateral obligations, as well as its active support of maintaining peace and security. 

Warning that the Middle East situation was still fraught with threats and tensions, she said that that was a major problem for the further political, economic and social development for all areas surrounding the Mediterranean.  She hoped the second anniversary of the Barcelona Conference in November would prove catalytic, in terms of attaining the aims of the action programme for strengthened peace and stability, economic development, the consolidation of democracy, and the achievement of security region-wide.  Elections earlier this month had lent further impetus to the Barcelona process, she said. 

GHALEB EL-ANBAKI (Iraq) said he would like to note the Constitution of the Iraqi Republic on which the referendum was conducted on article 9, paragraph E, the Iraqi Government pledges to respect the commitments of Iraq and implement its international guarantees concerning the prohibition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and prohibited the development, manufacture and means of delivery of such weapons.  He hoped that pledge would be approved when the results of the referendum were announced in the next few days.  Since 1974, an item on the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had been included and it enjoyed special importance.  The Member States in the NPT, at the 1995 review conference, approved the indefinite extension of the NPT and called upon all States in the region to adhere to the NPT as quickly as possible and to subject their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection.

He said all Arab States were parties to the NPT and to regional agreements.  All States parties during the 2000 review conference underlined the importance of bringing about the universality of the NPT.  The adherence of Israel would bring about universality.  Most states had underlined international statements and interventions on the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.  Israel was called on by name to adhere to that Treaty.  He called for the implementation of General Assembly resolutions and Security Council resolutions in order to establish for a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

MILAD ATIEH ( Syria) said that Israel, which had acquired nuclear weapons outside the NPT regime, was being completely ignored.  Moreover, it was actually being supported, while NPT States parties were being deprived of acquiring nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  Israel’s “wholesale expansionist policies” were based on a huge arsenal of both conventional and non-conventional weapons, prominent among them, nuclear weapons.  Israel managed a very dangerous nuclear programme, which threatened security, both regionally and globally.  And, it was not under IAEA safeguards.  More than any other region, the Middle East was the most exposed to military and security threats.

He said his country had been one of the first to call for a Middle East zone free from all weapons of mass destruction, and it had worked seriously to realize that objective.  A recent initiative had been its submission of draft resolution to the Security Council in December 2003, on behalf of the Arab group, on freeing the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons.  He looked forward to international support to adopt a clear call on Israel to adhere to the NPT and to finding an effective mechanism to bring about the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

PAUL MEYER ( Canada) said verification in international arms control and disarmament agreements was a very important subject to his delegation.  Verified compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements provided significant security benefits to the international community.  Non-compliance with arms control and disarmament commitments could seriously erode the trust so vital to its success.  Although verification mechanisms required significant resources, they were wise investments.  Furthermore, the continued potential threat of weapons of mass destruction, in particular to international peace and security, meant that the questions of potential non-compliance remained front and centre.

Verification, he said, required an active research and development programme if it was to be kept up-to-date.  His country continued its tradition of funding advanced verification research through the International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) and it had established the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance in conjunction with Carleton University.  The Centre’s initial focus had been on arms control and disarmament treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction.  At the United Nations, as well, verification had a long and distinguished history.  In 1990 and 1995, separate groups of governmental experts charged with studying the role of the United Nations in the field of verification reported back with recommendations.  Some of those recommendations had yet to be fully considered or acted upon.  Following the 1995 report, Canada took the lead of First Committee resolutions reaffirming the sixteen principles.

He said the resolution last year took a more activist role and established a panel of governmental experts to examine the issue in 2006 and report back to the First Committee.  The panel will begin work in January and explore all aspects of verification.  He had four areas of consideration for the panel:  review the conclusions of the 1990 and 1995 group of experts; analyze and draw lessons from recent verification experiences; examine how to improve existing mechanisms; and look at the role of the United Nations in verification.  The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission experience demonstrated the capacity of the United Nations to develop and maintain a highly professional, impartial and effective verification capability that had been actively considered by previous verification expert groups.

On behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), ENRIQUE LOEDEL ( Uruguay), said that confidence-building measures led to peace and security.  That tool, above and beyond declaring the zone free from nuclear weapons, also stipulated the strengthening and progressive establishment of consultative machinery, which covered matters of defence and security among the Member States of his region.  Indeed, MERCOSUR had been a pioneer in enacting such measures and it had witnessed the benefits, in terms of strengthened peace and democracy in the Americas, making possible greater transparency and dialogue among the nations.  That had created an environment conducive to arms control and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction proliferation, which, in turn, had freed up resources for economic and social development. 

He called for the further development and implementation of confidence-building measures, in order to overcome traditional security threats and master the other challenges and security realities of the twenty-first century.  Such non-military measures must be developed to complement confidence-building measures among States.  For MERCOSUR and associated States, confidence-building measures designed to enhance security were irreplaceable in the context of bilateral, subregional and regional arrangements developed to complement security institutions forged over the years.  Uruguay was a party to the relevant conventions in the Americas.  The MERCOSUR had set up a forum for concerted political action, as well as several working groups for tackling security issues. 

Steps for tracing illicit firearms and exchanging data on their manufacture, was introduced by the countries in the region, he said.  MERCOSUR was also developing ways of exchanging experience on a subregional basis, and developing methods for quantifying military expenditures, as well as publishing military papers and staging joint activities in such areas as demining and military exercises.  Overall, confidence-building measures were a dynamic concept.

DEANNE TAN ( Singapore) said the international community was dealing with new global security challenges that were immediate and critical.  The idea of proliferation did not only refer to nuclear arsenals kept by States, but it had widened to include any actors on the international, regional and subregional levels.  The materials being proliferated included nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.  The threat posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction was not only dangerous, but it could too easily slip through the gaps in the existing framework of non-proliferation controls.  The global terrorist network had the resources to acquire weapons of mass destruction.  In this dynamic and complex security environment, united and inclusive action on the multilateral, regional and national fronts were essential to preserving continued security.  The traditional security architecture of the cold war era and the argument that nuclear weapons protected States’ security, were no longer credible solutions to the problem.  But, for collective action to be effective, States needed to demonstrate firm political will to work together towards a shared objective.

She said the international community needed to recognize the need to move forward on the twin fronts of disarmament and non-proliferation.  Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation remained at the heart of the NPT and were mutually reinforcing.  All States should fully support and contribute to the vibrancy of multilateral non-proliferation regimes, such as NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.  To fully address the current proliferation threat by terrorists, States must proactively contribute to the effectiveness of national controls.  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which called on Member States to enhance domestic controls and step up cooperation against weapons of mass destruction, filled a gap in other non-proliferation regimes that omit non-State actors.  But, its effectiveness could only be complete when individual States enact, implement and enforce control legislation vigorously.

Her country placed great emphasis on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and of Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention).  Singapore also participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which sought to build capacity for inter-State cooperation to disrupt the clandestine supply of weapons of mass destruction and related material to illegitimate non-State actors.  The involvement of many different agencies and expertise in a PSI exercise underscored the varied types and levels of action that States could, and should, take to counter proliferation threats.  As a small country that was highly dependent on its port and aviation hub for its livelihood, Singapore was cognizant of the need to balance security with economic interests.  The universalization of non-proliferation efforts was crucial to achieving an effective international commitment.  Singapore was a proud co-sponsor of the resolution on “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”.

CRAIG MACLACHLAN ( Australia) said his Government considered it one of its fundamental responsibilities to safeguard Australians from the threat of weapons of mass destruction.  That was one of the gravest threats confronting Australia and the entire world.  Too often, international security affairs seemed remote to the day-to-day lives of citizens.  But, the reality was very different, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction.  Non-proliferation education was an important element of his Government’s efforts to safeguard its citizens.  The global security environment had dramatically changed since the end of the cold war.  Globalization had increased the opportunities for States to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction.  Moreover, with the rise of transnational terrorism, States confronted the menace of terrorists fulfilling their desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction.

Government strategies must be multidimensional in today’s complex global environment, he said.  That was precisely the approach taken by his Government.  Internationally, Australia was working to strengthen the implementation and durability of the international system of non-proliferation treaties.  The Australian Government had strengthened controls against the risk of weapons of mass destruction terrorism.  The Government was stepping up its engagement with Australian business and universities to improve their awareness of proliferation risks associated with exports of sensitive materials and the transfer of know-how through person-to-person contacts.  The international community could not afford the perils of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  There must be a greater understanding about its nature, the importance of making full use of the range of tools developed to curb the spread of destructive weapons and the need for strengthened international cooperation through a concerted, educative effort.

YOSHIKI MINE ( Japan) said his country, along with seven others, submitted to the 2005 NPT review a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education, which stressed that the successful implementation of the United Nations study would require an active partnership among national governments, regional, international organizations and academic institutions.  His country placed great importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education and was making efforts in that field.  Japan had sponsored a United Nations Conference on disarmament issues in a different local city each year since 1989.  And it had invited disarmament and non-proliferation experts to give lectures.

This year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings, he said.  Nevertheless, nuclear weapons continued to exist.  The call for the elimination of nuclear weapons within the international community was stronger than ever.  One of the main reasons why nuclear weapons continued to exist was because the true nature of nuclear devastation was not fully understood.  The true terror of nuclear weapons was in the fact that the vast majority of casualties were innocent civilians, and the use of those weapons led to the most horrific, long-lasting, complex and inter-generational effects.  There was a pressing need to correctly relate the inhumane effects caused by nuclear weapons.  To that end, the further promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation was essential. 

ANTON V. VASILIEV ( Russian Federation) introduced the draft resolution on information technology in the context of international security (not yet issued).  Each year since 1998, his delegation had submitted the draft to the Committee.  Considering the scope of influence of communication technologies on all spheres of society and State, the issue of information security was a priority, requiring extremely serious international consideration, under United Nations’ auspices.  Opportunities for the hostile use of information technologies by criminals, terrorists and States posed a credible threat to security at the national, regional and global levels.  Thus, there should be a clear understanding of the character of those threats and challenges, so as to develop an acceptable unified approach for their neutralization.  Only then would it be possible to guarantee the maximum use of those technologies’ advantages. 

He said that the global community was in the initial phases of thinking through those topical and sensitive problems.  Useful work had been done by the group of governmental experts, but the group had been unable to agree on a final document, given the novel nature and complexity of the issues.  The disagreements had concerned differing views over setting priorities for different threats in the area of information security.  Nevertheless, the discussions had promoted a better understanding of the issues.  The presence of those threats in this day and age was virtually undisputed, yet developing common approaches for threat reduction required more time; the expert group had held only three sessions in two years. 

Of particular danger were the threats of the hostile use of information technologies for military, political, criminal or terrorist purposes, he said.  The distinguishing features of the use of such technologies destructively were their general accessibility, indiscriminate impact, and the possibility of that such use could be camouflaged as peaceful activities.  Those technologies were also susceptible to transboundary use, and were relatively inexpensive and generally effective.  In Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), the Council had emphasized that a growing number of acts of international terror were using communication technologies for the preparation and conduct of those acts, which threatened the peace and security of all States.  Threats to information technologies had proven that security in today’s world was indivisible and, consequently, combating those threats must be collective.

This year, on the initiative of his Government, the General Assembly had adopted an international convention to suppress acts of nuclear terrorism, he noted.  That instrument had been developed as an alert, before the perpetration by terrorists of nuclear-related terrorist acts.  He hoped that a new group of governmental experts would find new representatives from States that had not had the time to participate previously.  He favoured enlarging the group’s membership, so as to make it more representative.  His draft resolution was based on prior such texts, which had been adopted without a vote.  The new text had taken into account the work of the group of governmental experts and, bearing in mind the budgetary complications, had deferred the start-up date of a new group until 2009. 

CHARLOTTE DARLOW ( New Zealand) said education in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation was essential.  Civil society also played a vital role in instigating progress.  Her country supported United Nations studies and recommendations and ensured all States to take effective measures at the national level, to improve systems for disarmament.  Effective partnerships needed to be maintained.  New Zealand had found the inclusion of representatives an invaluable way to strengthen the links between governments.  And she said her country would continue to find ways to seek improvement in the area.

REZA NAJAFI ( Iran) said that nuclear-weapon-free zones were recognized as a regional instrument to strengthen regional and international peace and security.  Such zones were instrumental in preventing the threat of nuclear war, and were in conformity with the provisions of the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.  Three decades had elapsed since Iran had first submitted the idea for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in 1974.  The resolutions on the establishment of such a zone in the region had been adopted by the General Assembly since 1980 without a vote, administration of the significance of that noble idea. 

He said that Iran, by renouncing the nuclear option and placing its nuclear facilities under the IAEA system, had shown its determination to achieve the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.  Such an act had underscored Iran’s undiminished support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with the ultimate objective of ridding the world of those weapons.  Iran ratified the IAEA statute in 1958 and, subsequently, signed the NPT in 1969, which its parliament ratified in 1970.  That process had been furthered by the ratification of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1973, and further accomplished by the signing of the Additional Protocol in 2003. 

In implementing its NPT obligation, specifically Articles II and III, all of Iran’s nuclear facilities were devoted to peaceful purposes and under full-scope IAEA safeguards, he went on.  In order to contribute to realizing a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, Iran had also joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.  Owing to Israel’s non-adherence to the NPT, and more importantly, its refusal to place its regime under the IAEA system, the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had not materialized. As requested by the General Assembly in last year’s resolution on the subject, the Secretary-General would inform the Assembly of the results of consultations with countries in the region on the realization of that idea.  Pursuant to that quest, the Secretary-General should dispatch a special envoy to countries in the region for consultations, aimed at facilitating the establishment of such the zone. 

Israel was the only non-party to the NPT in the region, despite repeated calls by the international community, the 1995 resolution of the NPT review, and other related resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly, he said.  Israel, confident of the political and military support of the United States, had neither acceded to the NPT nor placed its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards, or declared its intention to accede to the NPT.  Israel’s clandestine nuclear activities seriously threatened regional and international peace and security, and endangered the NPT regime.  He firmly supported an agreed plan of action and timetable for universal adherence to the NPT in the Middle East.  There should be enough pressure on Israel to accede to the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, in order to pave the way for the long-sought goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

BERNHARD BRASACK ( Germany), introduced a draft resolution on objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures (A/C.1/60/L.42).  The draft was a follow-up version of 2003.  It encouraged Member States that had not yet participated, to submit nil returns, so participation would be further increased towards the goal of universalization.  Significant progress was recorded this year in the level of participation by Governments in the two global arms transparency instruments maintained and operated by the United Nations Secretariat –- the Register of Conventional Arms and Standardized instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures based on the respective Netherlands and Germany/Romania resolutions.  A promising upturn and a record number of submissions by Governments had been recorded for the United Nations system for Standardized reporting on Military Expenditures.  In 2004, there were 79 reports and this year so far, there had been 70.  So far, more than 115 Governments had participated in the reporting instrument at least once. 

He said a series of regional and subregional workshops had been conducted in 2004 and early 2005 focusing on the signatory States of the Nairobi Declaration, covering the horn of Africa, East Africa and the Great Lakes region, as well as the States belonging to the Southern African Development Community, together with United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom.  The United Nations standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures was also discussed at a regional workshop.  In addition to raising funds to hold workshops, the Department for Disarmament Affairs had also made efforts to promote the United Nations reporting instrument by publishing books.  It recently issued a book containing guidelines for making submissions to the United Nations reporting instrument and it had collaborated with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean on the report to promote transparency of military expenditures.

The report of the Secretary-General published this year, which contained information from Member States on military expenditures, was worth looking at.  It helped to enhance and sustain global transparency initiatives.  He also appealed to those who only participated once or more, to be more consistent.  The international community needed to raise the participation.

DORU COSTEA ( Romania) thanked the German delegation for tabling the draft on the reduction of military budgets.  Its submission emphasized the importance of transparency in military expenditures, which could not be overstated.  Next year would be 25 years since the General Assembly first adopted a resolution on reduction of military budgets, which set up the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.  Together with the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the system was an invaluable source of data for both the military and civil society.  More should be done, however, to develop a real culture of reporting, leading to increased openness and transparency.  That was needed especially in areas of tension, including in Romania’s own region.  He hoped for the text’s adoption without a vote. 

PAULA DESUTTER, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, United States, said that her country was sponsoring a resolution entitled “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements” (document A/C.1/60/L.1), for the first time.  Hopefully, delegations would view the text as an opportunity for the international community to reflect on the changing face of the global arms control and non-proliferation challenges faced by all.  The draft was intended, not only to bring the issue of compliance to the international community’s attention, but also to emphasize that compliance with international treaties and obligations was critical to international peace and security, and to exhort governments to seek common cause in pursuit of diplomatic means to bring international violators back into compliance.

She said that United States and most of the other Member States, had sought to supplement its national efforts at strengthening security with multilateral tools, including arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements.  The United States, however, generally did not join regimes or sign international agreements that constrained the freedom to exercise its national right to pursue its security when its compliance was not going to be reciprocated.  Few countries would be likely to enter into any agreement –- be it multilateral or bilateral -– if they believed that other parties were unlikely to comply with its terms.  When the United States adhered to a treaty, therefore, it wanted to know whether the other parties were also complying, and it wanted to discover non-compliance early enough to be able to deny violators any benefit from such non-compliance. 

Thus, the United States viewed verification, compliance and compliance enforcement as critically interrelated, she said.  For example, verification had two purposes:  detection and deterrence.  If detection had no consequences for the violator, then verification had no meaning, and deterrence was unachievable.  The cases of North Korea and Iran illustrated vividly the importance of two concepts, which were inherently part of compliance:  compliance assessment and compliance enforcement.  The United States’ process of reaching non-compliance judgments was defined in United States law, based in international obligations.  Congress had established specific institutions, most notably her bureau, to ensure that the compliance assessment process was rigorous, systematic and objective.  While the United States’ experience was in many ways unique, the methods it used were available to all. 

She said that when the available information suggested a possible compliance question, one of her first steps was to study the international agreement or other commitment in question to see what States parties were obligated to do, she said.  In cases where the information was troubling, but insufficient to reach a firm finding of violation, she would “caveat” it by noting explicitly uncertainties or ambiguities in the evidence.  Whenever possible, she distinguished between inadvertent and deliberate violations, because that distinction could have an important bearing on what action needed to be taken to address the problem.  She also endeavoured to communicate the degree of seriousness of a violation and to identify the steps that might be needed to bring the party back into compliance, or to respond in other ways that rectified the concern. 

Determining whether a State was in violation with its international obligations was not a simple matter, but a State party to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament rested its safety and security, in part, on other countries’ compliance with those agreements and commitments, she said.  The compliance process for the United States, therefore, was a key component of its national security and a necessary early warning call to action.  There was no perfect verification, she stressed.  Her country considered an arrangement or treaty to be effectively verifiable if the degree of verifiability was judged sufficient, given the compliance history of the parties involved, the risks associated with non-compliance, the difficulty of response to deny violators the benefits of their violations, the language and measures incorporated into the agreement and its own national means and methods of verification. 

She said that the degree of verifiability must be high enough to enable the United States to detect non-compliance in sufficient time to reduce the threat presented by the violation and deny the violator the benefits of his wrongdoing.  A combination of international data declarations, international cooperative measures and on-site inspection regimes would be sufficient for detecting non-compliance.  Those were useful tools for investigating indications of non-compliance, as the IAEA had done in Iran, for example, and for detecting inadvertent violations.  On-site inspections, however, provided information according to the agreed access and collection capabilities negotiated by the parties, and only provided such information was available at the specific time and place of the inspection.  They provided, at best, a snapshot in time.  Even cooperative measures, such as remote cameras and seals for continuous monitoring -- while quite powerful –- were limited to the locations where they were employed. 

Verifiability assessments were also informed by a much broader array of factors, including the proven reliability of the negotiating partners in adhering to agreements, the incentives given parties might have to cheat on a given agreement, and the relative significance of cheating pursuant to the obligations, she said.  After two years of concerted consideration of all of those factors, the United States, for example, had concluded that a “internationally and effectively verifiable (fissile material cut-off) Treaty” was not achievable, even with a highly intrusive inspection regime, she said.  For that reason, she urged her colleagues at the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a normative fissile material cut-off treaty that relied on each State using its own resources to verify compliance.  Pending the treaty’s conclusion, all nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the NPT should publicly commit not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  Four of the five nuclear-weapon States, including the United States, had made such a commitment. 

She said that the international community was facing significant proliferation challenges, none more dangerous than non-compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation obligations.  It was well known that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had a nuclear weapons programme and had concealed it while a party to the NPT.  The IAEA Board of Governors did its duty in reporting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement to the Security Council on several occasions.  The Agreed Framework signed in 1994 had frozen plutonium production, but the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by then had embarked on a covert uranium enrichment programme.  It then expelled the IAEA inspectors in late December 2002.  The last round of six-party talks concluded with a public commitment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to give up all its nuclear weapons and all existing nuclear programmes and return to the NPT and its nuclear safeguards agreement.  Given that country’s past record of disregard for its international commitments, the international community would expect sufficiently strong verification measures to ensure that it was meeting its obligations. 

Iran’s nuclear programme marked another area of concern, she said.  Last month, the IAEA Board of Governors formally declared what many had known for some time, namely, that Iran’s breaches and failures of its obligations to comply with its Safeguards Agreement constituted non-compliance in the context of Article 12c of the IAEA Statute.  Based on a simple reading of that Statute, such a finding required a report to the Security Council.  The Board would discuss the timing and content of that report at its next session.  Such a report, in and of itself, however, would not resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.  Resolution required Iran’s rulers to make the strategic decision to comply with their international obligations, and not to flaunt them.  In both of those cases, parties to international agreements undertook actions over years and even decades to “cheat”.  Their non-compliance was not “technical”; those were not accidents or oversights.  If they were, it would be reasonable to expect that expressions of concern would result in timely resolution. 

“In Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea we are dealing with cases of intentional non-compliance”, she said.  North Korea and Iran had made strategic decisions to pursue programmes and undertake activities that they knew full well violated their obligations.  They invested vast national resources to pursue those covert programmes –- resources that their people might well have wished were being invested in other ways.  Those programmes were pursued covertly.  Those regimes took advantage of the period before discovery to reap benefits, such as technical cooperation and assistance, which flowed from being parties to the NPT.  There was some good news, however.  The international community in various forums was addressing the problem of proliferation and abuse of “peaceful cooperation”.  For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had developed new guidelines that supported suspension of transfers of trigger list items to States found to be in non-compliance of their safeguards obligations. 

In terms of the way forward, she said that the violators could not be allowed to benefit from their violations.  Doing so undermined the regimes, faith in the regimes, and reduced security for all.  Each country should consider those questions.  The challenge posed by non-compliance was great, and there were no easy answers.  The United States believed the international community was up to the challenge. 

LARBI EL HADJ ALI ( Algeria), once again, tabled the draft resolution on strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (document A/C.1/60/L.47), on behalf of the co-sponsors.  By introducing the text on a regular basis, the co-sponsors were showing their dedication to making the area one of peace and stability.  They reiterated their willingness to promote cooperation and solidarity in an area rich in its potential and culture.  Destiny had made it necessary to have an in-depth dialogue, calling for a multiplication of common initiatives to bring together the two shores of the Mediterranean.  The Barcelona conference had laid the framework for new relations, and had recognized the privilege and characteristics of the region.  As in past years, he sought the draft’s adoption without a vote.

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