RISKS OF MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION HIGHLIGHTED IN FIRST COMMITTEE

22 October 1997

Press Release
GA/DIS/3087

RISKS OF MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION HIGHLIGHTED IN FIRST COMMITTEE

19971022 Israel Says True Risk of Proliferation Stems from Iran, Iraq; Other Speakers Cite Israel's Failure to Sign NPT, Abide by IAEA Safeguards

Allegations about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East were highlighted this morning in the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), as the Committee continued its general debate.

The representative of Israel told the Committee that the agenda item on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East singled out Israel and diverted attention from the true risk of proliferation in the region, which derived from the activities of Iraq and Iran. Those States were engaged in clandestine efforts to preserve or to acquire nuclear-weapon capabilities.

Iran represented the greatest threat to security and stability in the Middle East and beyond, he continued. Its weapons programme extended far beyond the geographic confines of the region and threatened the security of other Members. Yet, the international community refused to speak out against Iran's policies, which included calls for the destruction of Israel.

However, concern over Iran's drive to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not divert attention from Iraq's defiance of United Nations resolutions and its persistent efforts to conceal its capabilities in the area of weapons of mass destruction, he said. Attempts to normalize relations with Iraq undermined the overriding objective adopted by the international community to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Iraq said that his country had complied with its United Nations obligations. While there were gaps in the available data, nothing had indicated that Iraq had succeeded in producing nuclear weapons. If Israel was "bemoaning insecurity in the region and seeking disarmament", then what could it say about its acquisition of hundreds of atomic bombs and huge stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic weapons? he asked.

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The representative of Iran, also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he categorically rejected the "baseless points" raised by the representative of Israel against his country. Israel was trying to divert attention from its nuclear threat and its militaristic policies by making unfounded claims.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Bahrain, Bolivia, Turkey, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Libya, Syria, Cuba, United Republic of Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, as well as by the observer for the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The First Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Thursday, 23 October, to continue its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

In the context of assurances to non-nuclear weapon States, the Committee is expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such zones have already been created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok); and the African Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of similar zones in South Asia, Central Europe, and the Middle East.

Other nuclear disarmament issues under review include the adoption last year of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), so far signed by 148 States. The Committee will assess the implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Another matter before the Committee is the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, subject to the emergence of a consensus and agenda. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the international non-proliferation regime will also be considered.

The Committee is expected to focus attention on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). It will consider the multilateral efforts under way to strengthen the verification mechanism of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).

Also under discussion will be the treaty agreed to in Oslo following the so-called "Ottawa process" -- the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The Committee will also consider ways to further negotiations on that weapon in the Conference on Disarmament, namely Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).

(For more background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3079 of 9 October.)

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DAVID DANIELI (Israel) said that the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel proposed to the General Assembly a binding code of conduct for relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Such a code would facilitate uninterrupted negotiations and crisis management, promote dialogue, and contribute to renewed trust and confidence between the leaders and the people.

A similar code of conduct could advance regional security and arms control between the parties of the Middle East, he continued. Israel aspired to achieve a regional security framework to provide a cooperative multilateral response to regional security problems. Regional security dialogue and a gradual implementation of confidence-building measures, in tandem with the bilateral process between Israel and its neighbours, would pave the way for more ambitious arms control and disarmament measures. Ultimately, it was the progress towards a more peaceful, stable and secure region that would govern the pace and the scope of regional arms control measures.

The region still lacked formal mutual recognition by and between all States, agreed mutual borders and a common acceptance of peaceful means as the only tools of regional policy, he said. A multitude of conflicts and hostilities characterized inter-regional relations, accompanied by shifting regional alliances and rivalries. There also existed a lack of common understanding regarding the delineation of the region for regional security and arms control purposes. Multiple structural imbalances also prevailed. Yet, it was hoped that all States in the Middle East might move from viewing their security perceptions as a zero-sum game to an evolving cooperative structure.

He said that he regretted that the promising work of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), established in the context of the peace process in Madrid in 1991, had been halted by overly ambitious and politically unrealistic agenda objectives. All concerned were called upon to demonstrate the flexibility needed to resume the talks. His Government attached considerable importance to the participation of Syria and Lebanon in the working group towards confidence-building and conventional arms control. Further, it had participated and supported efforts by the international community to curb the proliferation of conventional as well as non-conventional weapons and, where appropriate, to endorse global agreements as a complement to regional ones.

Repetition of arguments and counter-arguments would not advance the issue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, he said. The regional parties did not see eye to eye on some very basic premises nor on the prerequisites and guidelines or the modalities of establishing such a zone. While all supported the goal, some agreed that it must take into account specific regional characteristics, but that alone served as too narrow a basis for a common approach to that complex task. Moreover, there had been no promising recent developments to make the establishment of that zone more

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attainable in the future. Certainly not the advocacy of the destruction of Israel by some and the relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by several regional States which, at the same time, had pledged to forsake their possession.

His Government's position was clear, he said. After peaceful relations and reconciliation were established among all regional States, Israel "will most definitely want to see the establishment in the Middle East -- through direct negotiations among all its members -- of a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles, based on mutual and effective verification". There was no reason to change that position. What should be changed in the Middle East was the general state of military threat and instability, violence and unwillingness to renounce the use of force as a legitimate instrument of policy.

The agenda item on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East reflected a transparent political motivation to single out Israel, he said. It was intended to divert attention from the true risks of proliferation in the region, deriving from such regional States as Iraq and Iran, which were engaged in ongoing clandestine efforts to preserve or to acquire military nuclear capabilities. No carefully worded, so-called "mild resolution" addressed to his country could conceal that fact.

While his country had voted in favour of adopting the NPT in 1968 and had welcomed the Treaty's indefinite extension, the NPT was not an adequate response to its security problems and regional concerns, he said. In his region, NPT membership by itself was not a panacea, as events had proven time and again and Israel's attitude towards the NPT had become, unjustifiably, a major subject of criticism in annual resolutions. No other member State, including those for whom national security reasons prevented their joining the NPT, had ever been subject to such repeated condemnatory resolutions. All delegations were, therefore, called upon to resist the annual temptation to demonstrate their support of the NPT in terms of Israel's condemnation.

If the Committee wished to be relevant to the evolving situation in the Middle East, it should address itself to the dangers posed by Iran and Iraq, he said. The Iranian leadership continued to speak in terms that threatened Israel and called for its destruction. Yet the international community remained deaf and refused to speak out against Iran's policies, declarations and actions. Iran represented the greatest threat to security and stability in the Middle East and beyond. The ramifications of its weapons programme extended far beyond the geographic confines of the region and threatened the security of other members. It was incumbent upon all member States to exercise the full weight of their influence and to take concrete steps before it was too late.

Furthermore, he said, concern over the Iranian drive to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not divert attention from Iraq's

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continued defiance of Security Council resolutions and its persistent efforts to conceal its true capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. Attempts to normalize relations with Iraq undermined the overriding objective adopted by the international community to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

BIBI SHARAF AL-ALAWI (Bahrain) said the danger of the use of nuclear weapons had been much reduced by the end of the cold war and there was, therefore, no need for States to maintain nuclear arsenals. Priority should be given to the substantial reduction of such weapons, as a first step towards their complete elimination. She endorsed the ruling of the International Court of Justice calling for negotiations to that end.

It was important to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction, she said. She supported efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and last month her country had ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. It was also a party to the NPT, which should be recognized without reservations. That Convention should be durable and respected by the international community. She supported the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which would be an appropriate structure for disarmament as the world approached the twenty-first century.

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was one of the steps towards the guarantee of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a positive step towards general and complete disarmament, she said. Her country supported all such steps, including the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. There should be no weapons of mass destruction in that region. She called on Israel to comply with the safeguard standards of the IAEA.

She supported the banning of anti-personnel landmines and commended all efforts currently underway to eliminate such weapons. International cooperation in arms control was always vital, she added, especially in the current world situation in which countries were so economically integrated.

MARCO ANTONIO VIDAURRE (Bolivia) said Latin America and the Caribbean had traditionally promoted policies to consolidate world peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. Thus, he viewed with concern the commercial interests that compromised disarmament achievements and encouraged "arming for war". Such interests also depleted resources for social and economic development. He appealed for the necessary removal of landmines from Latin America and the Caribbean, in accordance with commitments entered into in Oslo and in order to promote friendly relations between neighbouring countries. In that respect, he was pleased to have participated in the Ottawa process.

Touching on a few items that had his country's support, he welcomed the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention and efforts aimed at strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. He supported the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which could be expanded to include small arms and thus, help build confidence at the regional level. Concerning nuclear weapons, the

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overwhelming support of the NPT was welcome, especially the adherence of new States, particularly Brazil. All others should accede to that Treaty as soon as possible. Its objectives and principles could orient preparatory work for the year 2000 Review Conference. Progress aimed at ratification of the second Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) was also welcome.

It was necessary to totally and definitively eliminate nuclear weapons from the earth, he said. To that end, he supported a gradual phased programme of nuclear disarmament, as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement of countries. States were legally obligated to pursue negotiations in good faith to eliminate those weapons, according to the opinion of the International Court of Justice. Also necessary was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that regard, he supported the move to render the southern hemisphere nuclear-weapon-free. He urged all States to be flexible with regard to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

TULUY TANC (Turkey) said that general and complete disarmament under strict international control should be pursued realistically, through a balanced approach. The success of disarmament measures depended on an atmosphere that inspired confidence and on provisions for undiminished security for the concerned countries. Verification and greater transparency were essential elements.

He said that the main focus of the year's disarmament agenda was the question of anti-personnel landmines. During the year, Turkey had implemented a renewable three-year moratorium on their export and transfer. The most realistic solution lay in a phased approach that targeted an effectively implemented regime and ensured universality. While the result of the Oslo conference was welcome, Committee statements last week indicated that the convention fell short of achieving universality. For one thing, it left out one-fourth of the world's land mass. Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was the most appropriate forum for addressing the problem. For example, the revision of Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which it negotiated, defined the legitimate use of those weapons.

He said that Turkey last year signed the CTBT on the day it opened for signature. It was a very significant instrument and he attached importance to its early entry into force. The next logical step should be the early initiation of negotiations in the Conference to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, held in April 1997, was another significant development. At that session, the five nuclear-weapon States expressed their determination to continue implementing fully all provisions of the Treaty, including article VI. He anticipated the ratification of START II and the commencement of negotiations of START III.

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While he welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, he said that their establishment should be based on agreements freely arrived at by concerned countries. He welcomed the September conference in Tashkent to explore the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and hoped that those ongoing regional efforts would soon bear fruit. While progress had been made towards the elimination of both chemical and biological weapons, the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction were far from being extinguished.

His Government had consistently supported the concept of military transparency. It was, by itself, a confidence-building tool. Since its establishment in 1992, the Register of Conventional Arms had significantly contributed to promoting openness and transparency in military matters. As stated in the Secretary-General's recent report, however, in order for the Register to fulfil its potential, it must increase participation and expand its scope. All neighbours, including those in the Middle East, should participate in the Register. A similar system had been adopted within the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in July 1997.

Towards more effective safeguards under the IAEA, he said he supported the new programme measures contained in the "93 + 2 Programme" successfully finalized in June 1997. He particularly supported the measures involving broader access to information, as well as physical access including no-notice inspections and the use of environmental sampling methods. The safe transport of radioactive materials required a separate, legally binding measure. In attaching the highest priority to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, his country had joined the Missile Technology Control Regime last April.

KIM CHANG GUK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said the overwhelming majority of nations demanded the complete abolition of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The very existence of such weapons posed a threat to world peace and security. Yet, the nuclear-weapon States had not discarded the outdated doctrine of "nuclear deterrence". Nuclear disarmament should be the priority of disarmament, aiming at the complete elimination of such weapons.

In that context, he supported the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, with nuclear disarmament the main item of discussion. Nuclear-weapon States should completely stop the testing and production of such weapons and give assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States of non-use of those weapons under any circumstances. He supported the programme of action for the elimination of such weapons made by the 28 non-aligned countries at the Conference on Disarmament.

In the region of north-east Asia, in particular the Korean peninsula, the legacy of the cold war remained intact, he continued. Instability on the

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peninsula was related to military collusion and the arms race of outside forces. The military conspiracy between the United States and Japan, and between the United States and South Korea had strengthened, and there were large-scale military exercises in the region. South Korea was introducing up-to-date military equipment on a large scale, with a contract to buy more than $3 billion worth of AWACS aircraft and $370 million worth of "Stinger" missiles.

France and other major Powers were also racing to sell weapons to South Korea, he said. Such moves, which reflected the policies of the cold war era, were inevitably provoking self-defence counter measures from his country. The present tension existed in a "vicious cycle of aggravation".

The situation on the Korean peninsula required the establishment of a peace arrangement at an early date, he said. Lasting peace could not be achieved under the present armistice, which was neither war nor peace. His country had already proposed to replace the old armistice agreement with an interim agreement to prevent the possibility of military confrontation on the Demilitarized Zone. The proposal reflected his country's desire to prevent another war and preserve a lasting peace.

His country had expressed its willingness to take part in "Four-Party Talks" proposed by the United States, and had attended two rounds of preliminary talks to such an end, he said. Questions relating to the conclusion of a Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States peace agreement and the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea should be the top agenda items of such talks. "The withdrawal of the United States troops from South Korea is essential in the way of eradicating the very root of a new war in the Korean peninsula", he said.

The "United Nations Command" in South Korea remained a stumbling block in bringing about peace on the peninsula, he said. "The `United Nations Forces' in South Korea means the United States Forces and the `United Nations Command' is the United States Command", he said. He called for the dissolution of the United Nations Command in South Korea. If foreign forces were withdrawn and a new peace mechanism put in place, other issues between North and South Korea could be resolved between the two sides.

The Korean people could realize the reunification of the country by themselves, he said. They had already agreed on the principles of independent, peaceful reunification and of national unity. They had agreed on the principle of "One nation, one State, two systems and two governments". Different ideologies and systems were no longer obstacles in the way of forming a unified State. Under such a policy, the arms race and the threat of military conflict on the peninsula would disappear. His Government would spare no effort towards the establishment of a new peace mechanism in the peninsula.

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ABDUL HAFID S. SHEIKH (Libya) said that after a stagnation in disarmament efforts, the world was now discussing disarmament and international security with a backdrop of certain successes. He noted the indefinite extension of the NPT and the opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons. However, the world should not be overly optimistic, because the threat of nuclear weapons could not be overlooked. The manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons continued and such weapons still terrorized mankind. Nuclear disarmament remained an important issue, as did the refusal of nuclear-weapon States to agree to the total elimination of such weapons.

Mankind should be freed from the terror of nuclear weapons, he said. Steps must be taken to ensure a focus on nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must show a willingness to create a nuclear-weapon-free world within a defined time-frame. The proposals of the Group of 21 -- non-aligned and others in the Conference on Disarmament -- had provided a pragmatic approach that could lead to complete nuclear disarmament.

His country, like others in the international community, appreciated the progress that had been made, he continued. However, agreements that should have been a step towards full and complete disarmament had not been in keeping with those hopes. There were many gaps in the CTBT, as more technically- developed countries could still improve on their nuclear arsenals by conducting laboratory experiments. His country had registered its opposition at the time the Treaty was approved. No one could say that partial efforts would suffice or would slow the development of nuclear weapons. Agreements of the past had not had a big impact on nuclear arsenals.

The non-nuclear-weapon States must be provided with guarantees of security that nuclear weapons would not be used against them, he said. However, there was no binding treaty to give such assurances. The nuclear- weapon States were resisting such negotiations. Some were saying that a unilateral declaration would suffice, but that did not ensure that nuclear- weapon States would commit themselves to such guarantees.

Some nuclear-weapon States insisted that their nuclear weapons ensured their security and that of their allies, he continued. He did not understand that reasoning, unless those States wished to maintain a monopoly over the world. The International Court of Justice had held that nuclear weapons ran counter to international law. Regarding the nuclear option, his country supported the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and had signed a treaty in that regard relating to his region. However, Tel Aviv's possession of nuclear weapons threw the region into a shadow. Israel was terrorizing the region, refusing to abide by the appeals of the international community to renounce its nuclear weapons. Yet, while Israel was supported by various other States, Islamic States in the third world were not given a chance to maintain their own security.

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A fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, was a very wise idea, he said. It would provide an essential foundation for disarmament. Zones of peace in the world would enhance peace and security at the national and international levels. Weapons of mass destruction and foreign fleets should be removed from the Mediterranean.

KHALIL ABOU-HADID (Syria) said that with the end of the cold war there was no longer any justification for the presence of nuclear arsenals or for a security system based on competing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless, the nuclear option prevailed. They insisted on the need to technologically update those weapons, thereby securing a monopoly of nuclear weapons. The "nuclear club" then granted the technology to other countries outside the club, which in turn contributed to the threat to international peace and security.

He said the Conference on Disarmament must set up a specialized committee in order to deal with disarmament matters, particularly aimed at negotiating a phased programme of nuclear disarmament within a specific time- frame that bound all States. The fourth special session devoted to disarmament should be convened as promptly as possible. Likewise, meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the year 2000 Review Conference of the NPT should strive for a true balance with respect to assurances to non-nuclear- weapon States. While the NPT was not an end in itself, it paved the way for complete disarmament.

He said that technical assistance to certain non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the NPT, with respect to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, had been impeded by certain nuclear-weapon States. Yet, those States had offered such technology to Israel, which had refused to accede to the NPT, thereby facilitating Israel's nuclear capacity. The universality of the NPT was a prerequisite for its credibility. While the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions was a positive step, the region of the Middle East was, unfortunately, very far from achieving that objective because of Israel. Israel was the only country in the region that refused to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Its acquisition of chemical weapons in that very sensitive region would always be a source of potential suffering.

MARIA DE LOS ANGELES FLOREZ (Cuba) said a realistic analysis showed the existence of unjustified and dangerous inconsistencies in the implementation of measures defined by the United Nations in the field of disarmament and international security. Until the goal of nuclear disarmament was finally reached, it would be necessary to adopt a multilaterally negotiated and non- discriminatory juridical instrument of negative security assurances.

The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons had been moments of significance, she said. However, that was only the beginning

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of the process towards the elimination of those weapons of mass destruction. Also, when her country ratified the Convention, it noted it could not be responsible for any chemical weapons on Guantanamo Naval Base. That was the responsibility of the United States, which was illegally occupying that portion of Cuban territory.

On the Biological Weapons Convention, she believed that the work of the fourth review conference should be used as a basis for continuing to reinforce the Convention. Her country's suspicion concerning the disregard of the Convention's provisions by a State party to it were supported by recent evidence.

Her country shared concerns voiced by a number of States on the question of anti-personnel landmines and their indiscriminate use. However, those weapons were a means of legitimate defence for many countries. Thus, a solution to the problem of such weapons required an appropriate balance between humanitarian concerns and a State's genuine national security interests. Her country foresaw the use of such weapons only as a defensive measure, protecting the perimeter bordering the Guantanamo Naval Base. Once the United States withdrew its forces from that territory, her country would immediately remove its landmines. The amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons provided the best possible common ground towards reducing or eliminating the risks associated with such weapons.

She said the dilatory manoeuvres carried out by a nuclear Power created uncertainty about the holding of a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Such a session should take place as quickly as possible, by the year 2000 at the latest.

MAHMOUD H. JABIR (United Republic of Tanzania) said that while he welcomed the recent progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament, much remained to be done in order to achieve complete and general disarmament. The proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement to conclude a universal, legally binging multilateral agreement committing all States to the total elimination of nuclear weapons would accomplish that goal.

He said that he attached great importance to the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Regrettably, some major permanent members of the Security Council and some major maritime users had not participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which created serious implications in the region. All concerned were called upon to cooperate and support that zone of peace.

While the adoption of the CTBT last year held some promise, the Treaty lacked an explicit commitment towards a definite end to the nuclear arms race, he said. Even under that Treaty, nuclear-weapon States were allowed to advance technology and modernize and upgrade their nuclear-weapon systems through laboratory simulations. Less than one year after the Treaty's

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existence, one nuclear-weapon State had announced its plans to conduct a series of sub-critical underground nuclear tests. The Conference should commence negotiations to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, a necessary measure to reduce the availability of that material.

While the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its verification organization broke ground in the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons remained an important feature of the military postures of nuclear-weapon States, he said. The bilateral efforts between the Russian Federation and the United States through START I and START II intended to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals. But, such bilateral processes were prone to fragility, even more so because of the prevailing political environment. Nuclear disarmament efforts needed to be based on a time-bound framework leading to the ultimate elimination of those weapons.

Concerning the proliferation of conventional arms, the international community should focus its attention on greater transparency and accountability in the manufacture and transfer of those weapons, he said. He supported a total ban on landmines, as negotiated through the Ottawa process. The landmine Convention should not be treated independently of other processes targeted at eliminating all types of weapons of mass destruction. Rather, the question should be approached in a "holistic manner".

ZAMIRA B. ESHMAMBETOVA (Kyrgyzstan) said the step-by-step progress that had been achieved in the field of disarmament and international security was important, but the need for further negotiations remained. The progress made was encouraging, but it was still necessary to agree on such efforts as a fissile cut-off treaty.

While such agreements as the CTBT needed broad international cooperation, progress had also been made in regional efforts, she said. Nuclear-weapon-free zones now covered almost the whole of the southern hemisphere. Her country supported the establishment of such zones, as well as the establishment of single-State zones for countries -- such as Mongolia -- where the nuclear policies of neighbouring States prevented regional agreements. She supported moves to establish such a zone in central Asia and she called for United Nations assistance in setting up a conference next year in her capital to work towards the establishment of such a zone.

She applauded recent efforts to limit or ban certain tactical nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and anti-personnel landmines. She supported the Ottawa process and said there should be more assistance to States in implementing the provisions of the Treaty agreed to in Oslo.

Small arms remained a deadly force, responsible for the vast majority of casualties in conflicts around the world, she said. States could not stop the flow of such weapons without international cooperation. The Register of

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Conventional Arms should be extended and other efforts should be made to promote transparency and cooperation on arms, both at international and regional levels. Her country had entered into regional agreements to that end, which rendered conflict less likely. States should not have to spend a large portion of their resources for weapons. They should, instead, be able to invest in peaceful development projects.

ALI AL-SAEID (Kuwait) said cooperation and solidarity in international relations must be strengthened. The proliferation of conventional weapons required serious international cooperation towards steps aimed at curbing that trend. In that regard, the Register of Conventional Weapons was the most important initiative leading to the reduction of military expenditures, which could then be channelled into development action in the developing countries.

Concerning the problem of anti-personnel landmines, the people of Kuwait were still suffering from mines laid by the Iraqi regime during its invasion of Kuwait, he said. He, therefore, supported all international efforts to curb the manufacture and export of those weapons and to impose upon the violators the full responsibility for the mine's effects. The conclusion of an agreement banning their use, stockpiling and transfer negotiated in Oslo was very important and he looked forward to its signing and speedy entry into force.

As a party to the CTBT, he appealed to all States to ensure its entry into force as quickly as possible. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones had been impeded by Israel's refusal to respond to the wishes of countries in the Middle East, and by its refusal to accede to IAEA safeguards. Israel should be further pressured into favouring the idea of such a zone, in order to lessen the dangers to regional peace and security. He appealed for the removal of all weapons of mass destruction -- including biological and chemical weapons -- from the Middle East. With regard to the use of such weapons in the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, efforts towards non-proliferation in the Middle East and efforts by the United Nations Special Commission set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in connection with the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction towards regional peace and security were to be commended.

ARIANE SAND-TRIGO, of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), said that seldom, if ever, had a resolution of the General Assembly been implemented as rapidly or in such a determined manner as last December's call for a new international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines. In support of the Convention agreed to in Oslo, she congratulated the coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Jody Williams, on being awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.

The adoption of the new international norm prohibiting anti-personnel landmines was a milestone event, she said. The new treaty, which would be open for signature in Ottawa in December, marked the first time that a weapon

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in widespread use was being prohibited because of its appalling humanitarian effects. She particularly welcomed the absolute and unambiguous nature of the treaty. She appealed to all States to sign it and to make its ratification a top priority. She hoped that States not able to sign it now would make the military adjustments necessary for them to do so at an early date.

However, the treaty marked only the beginning of the end of the humanitarian crisis caused by such weapons, she said. "Being maimed by an illegal weapon will bring little solace to future victims of uncleared mines." She urged all governments to mobilize resources for long-term programmes of mine awareness, mine clearance and for the care and rehabilitation of landmine victims. She called for the adherence of all States to Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons concerning anti-personnel landmines.

She also welcomed the historic entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and urged States that had not done so to adhere to the Convention. No less urgent, she said, was the need to equip the Biological Weapons Convention with its own compliance monitoring system. She called on all governments to exercise strict oversight in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology.

In the coming decades, the potential for the development of particularly heinous and indiscriminate arms would continue to outpace the ability of mankind to respond to them, she said. A great deal of the suffering from the use of currently prohibited arms could have been avoided if the norms of humanitarian law had been considered before such weapons had been developed and deployed. Potential weapons should be examined not only in the light of treaty law relating to specific named weapons, but also in the light of basic rules of international law.

Right of Reply

Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, ROKAN HAMA AL-ANBUGE (Iraq) said that the representative of Israel had falsified facts regarding Iraq's compliance with the obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

He said that Iraq had complied with the fundamental requirements in that resolution, as indicated in the report of the Chairman of the Special Commission, as well as in the report of the IAEA. The Chairman of the Special Commission acknowledged that Iraq had made progress in various important disarmament areas. The Director-General of the IAEA had expressed the hope that the Security Council would acknowledge such progress. The Commission Chairman said that it should be able to expect further cooperation from Iraq.

While there were gaps in the available data, nothing had indicated that Iraq had succeeded in producing nuclear weapons, he continued. He, thus, wished to put an end to such statements. If the Israeli delegate "is

First Committee - 15 - Press Release GA/DIS/3087 10th Meeting (AM) 22 October 1997

bemoaning insecurity in the region and seeking disarmament", then what could be said about Israel's acquisition of hundreds of atomic bombs and huge stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic weapons? What did the Israeli delegate say about his country's refusal to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear installations under the guarantee system of the IAEA? By those measures, Israel was "unilaterally rejecting" Security Council resolutions, thereby posing a tremendous danger and threat to international, as well as regional peace.

GHOLAMHOSSEIN DEHGHANI (Iran) said that he "categorically rejected" the "baseless points" raised by the representative of Israel against his country. Israel tried to divert attention from its nuclear threat and its militaristic policies by using some unfounded stories. It was ironic to hear allegations from someone whose Government had neither ratified the NPT, nor accepted IAEA safeguards. Iran had ratified the NPT and had opened its activities to IAEA inspection. Israel should reconsider raising such baseless allegations against others, given its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

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