RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION RATIFICATION 'LITMUS TEST' OF DISARMAMENT LEADERSHIP, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD
Press Release
GA/DIS/3083
RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION RATIFICATION 'LITMUS TEST' OF DISARMAMENT LEADERSHIP, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD
19971016 Director-General of Convention's Verification Mechanism Says Russian Presence Essential for Convention's Ultimate SuccessThe Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the verification mechanism triggered by the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention last April, told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this afternoon that, with the Russian Federation finalizing its ratification debate, the next few days would be the "litmus test" of whether it intended to live up to its leadership role on matters of international security and disarmament, or whether it would choose "the dangerous path of isolationism".
Jose Mauricio Bustani speaking as the Committee continued its general debate, said that ratification by the Russian Federation would have a dramatic impact on the prospects for the Convention's ultimate success, paving the way for ratifications by other countries awaiting a political signal from Moscow. With 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, Russia was the largest declared possessor of those weapons and, therefore, its presence in the Convention was essential, he said.
As a testament to the importance of the participation by the Russian Federation, a number of States had offered to assist in destroying those weapons once Russia was on board, he continued. So far, there did seem to be clear desire on the part of Russia to join the Convention. And, with four of the five permanent members of the Security Council already States parties, the overall prognosis was good.
Several other speakers today acknowledged the importance of the Convention and ratification by the Russian Federation. The representative of Sir Lanka expressed hope that the Russian Federation would be able to overcome the difficulties that were delaying its ratification. The representative of Norway urged all States, particularly those States which possessed chemical weapons, to sign the Convention and speed up their ratification process.
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The representative of the Russian Federation thanked the Director- General for the attention he had devoted to his country. Such attention demonstrated that isolation posed no threat for Russia, which could expect similar attention from the international community once it joined the Convention, he added.
Statements were also made by the representatives of Côte d'Ivoire, Viet Nam, Algeria, Republic of Korea, Malta, Paraguay and Egypt. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply were the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea.
The First Committee will meet again at 3 p.m., Friday, 17 October, to continue its general debate.
Committee Work Programme
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.
One such agreement is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention). The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), scheduled to address the Committee this afternoon, became responsible for implementing the complex verification mechanism upon that treaty's entry into force last April.
The Committee will also consider the multilateral efforts under way to strengthen the verification mechanism of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).
Also under discussion will be the treaty agreed to in Oslo following the so-called "Ottawa process" -- the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. The Committee will also consider ways to further negotiations on that weapon in the Conference on Disarmament, namely Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).
Concerning nuclear disarmament, the Committee will discuss the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by 148 States in the past year, and implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. Such zones have already been created by: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok); and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of similar zones in the Middle East, Central Europe, and South Asia.
Another matter to be debated is the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, subject to the emergence of a consensus and agenda. Other issues before the Committee include regional transparency measures, such as the United Nations Register of
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Conventional Arms, and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the international non-proliferation regime.
(For more background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3079 of 9 October.)
Statements
LEIF ARNE ULLAND (Norway) said that the ban on anti-personnel landmines was an important achievement as a humanitarian and disarmament effort. The Convention negotiated in Oslo in September would serve as a practical tool in the efforts to end human suffering. In addition, it demonstrated what could be achieved through close cooperation between non-governmental organizations and governments.
The Convention set out an unequivocal ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of those weapons without exemptions, rights of reservations or transitional periods, he continued. Another important aspect was the obligation to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiles and emplaced landmines within a certain time limit. In recognizing the enormous challenge faced by mine-affected countries in meeting the Convention's commitments, it provided a political framework for international assistance and technical cooperation. It also explicitly recognized the needs of landmine victims, for whom his Government was prepared to allocate $100 million over the next five years.
He said that the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation during the Helsinki summit to embark on negotiations to reduce strategic arsenals beyond the parameters of the 1993 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) showed that the nuclear- weapon States were taking seriously their specific responsibility for nuclear disarmament, as set out in the NPT. While thousands of tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn, those weapons should be destroyed, not merely stored.
The international disarmament agenda should encompass a programme for managing disarmament, including the secure and environmentally safe handling of fissile material, he went on. His Government had drawn up a plan of action on nuclear activities and on chemical weapons in areas adjacent to its northern borders. Its goal was to achieve safe and cost-effective operations under independent control and inspection, in keeping with international guidelines. While the signing of the CTBT last year was a milestone achievement, it was not the end of the road. Nuclear proliferation would continue to be an important topic on the global multilateral disarmament agenda.
On the issue of achieving a ban on the use of fissile material for nuclear weapons, he made several recommendations, including the international
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inspection of the stocks held by nuclear-weapon States and the creation of an international accounting mechanism. Turning to other weapons of mass destruction, he said efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons took a major step forward with the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the process towards establishing a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention was slowly moving in the right direction. While he understood that verification of that Convention was more difficult than for other traditional weapons of mass destruction, due to the nature of biological weapons, sensible measures to secure compliance and to prevent non-compliance with the Convention could be established with the goodwill and pragmatic approach of all parties.
ERIC CAMILLE N'DRY (Côte d'Ivoire) said that the momentum towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a sign that the world was moving towards complete denuclearization. In addition, multilateralism was gaining greater prominence in the disarmament sphere. Such agreements were no longer the purview of nuclear-weapon States.
Despite such progress, the danger posed by landmines persisted, he said. Every 20 minutes, someone was killed or mutilated by those weapons and 27 per cent of the 110 million mines scattered throughout the world were planted in African soil. In addition to their humanitarian destruction, landmines curbed the economic recovery of infested territories. A political leader had rightly said that landmines represented a war without end. He was, therefore, pleased with the conclusion of negotiations for an international Convention prohibiting their use, and he would join the treaty's signatories next December in Ottawa. He hoped that those States that had not yet associated themselves with the decision would soon do so.
He said that the African continent, in particular south of the Sahara and the West African subregion, was experiencing a phenomenon of insecurity characterized by the illegal spread of small arms. Those weapons promoted serious banditry, the formation of armed groups and a trend towards widespread self-defence that threatened the newborn democracies in the subregion and led to regional instability throughout the world.
While the recently developed cooperation between the United Nations and Mali was welcome, the magnitude of the illicit circulation of small arms and the means to put an end to it required further measures, he said. In order to prevent conflicts through a concerted international security policy, his Government had recently stipulated that its forces could participate in peacekeeping operations. Further, it had encouraged the creation of an African peace force, for which there was an undeniable need. Such a subregional peace force could exist in a state of operational readiness, thereby being able to act on short notice at the request of the Economic Community of West African States' Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), or the United Nations.
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Turning to the reform process, he said that the reallocation of military resources could be used to serve socio-economic development and environmental protection. Unfortunately, that idea had not yet been accepted by all States. He remained convinced, however, that the United Nations could greatly contribute towards that goal.
PHAM QUANG VINH (Viet Nam) welcomed the progress recently achieved in the field of disarmament, noting the adoption of the CTBT, the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1995 Review Conference of the NPT. He also highlighted the emergence and consolidation of nuclear-weapon- free zones, established by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok. The efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States should be supported by the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, he said. He supported the approach of building a southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons, starting from the basis of existing treaties.
The end of the cold war had made it clearly unjustifiable to maintain arsenals of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, he continued. He called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons -- the sooner the better -- and supported the historic opinion of the International Court of Justice on nuclear disarmament.
Countries should make greater, constructive efforts in the forthcoming Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000 and all States should fulfil their obligations under the Treaty, he said. His country had joined the 28-State proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons and he renewed his support for the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.
He supported the important role played by the United Nations and multilateral mechanisms in the common endeavour for international security and disarmament and said their role should be strengthened. He also shared the belief expressed by the Secretary-General that the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific continued to serve as a useful instrument for fostering cooperation and disarmament in the region.
He shared the grave concern over the consequences caused by the indiscriminate use of landmines. Viet Nam had been a victim of the consequences of such weapons and, therefore, fully supported the strict prohibition on the indiscriminate use of landmines and the moratorium on their export. Mine clearance was of great importance and greater efforts should be made in that regard, he said. However, the central issue in question was their indiscriminate use. With regard to the defensive use of such devices for the sole purpose of protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity, any agreement on their use must take into account the legitimate security concerns of States and their legitimate rights under the Charter of the United Nations.
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ABDUL ABADI (Algeria) noted many new proposals in the field of disarmament. Aside from bilateral measures, for example START, he noted the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and progress on the CTBT. He also mentioned progress on the NPT, even though that had fallen short of his country's expectations. Despite the lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament, he said it had been comforting to note that bilateral negotiation could be complementary to multilateral negotiations.
There was no alternative to the achievement of genuine and complete nuclear disarmament, he said. It should be the absolute priority. He supported the proposal to develop a timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Nothing should stand in the way of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament. Measures related to the production of fissile material should be combined with other negotiations.
He said assurances to non-nuclear States should be binding on all nuclear Powers and he noted the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which now covered more than 100 countries. He supported the initiative to create such a zone in Central Asia, but said it had, thus far, been impossible to create one in his region, because of Israel, which continued to maintain its nuclear capability.
He said conventional weapons must also be addressed by the international community, especially because they fell into the hands of terrorists. There was no effective response to the scourge of international terrorism other than one that involved the effective cooperation of the entire international community. There was no room for complacency on the issue.
Economic instability also limited international security, he said. Asymmetry among economies inevitably jeopardized the security of all countries. For that reason, then, he demanded an integrated approach to the security of the Mediterranean, in particular because imbalances existed between the North and South of the region. There should be a partnership based on a balance of interests and a respect for differences.
He said the Secretary-General had confirmed the central role that the United Nations should play in achieving world security but the decision to form a special Department for Disarmament and Arms Regulation required clarification, particularly in terms of the priorities that would be allocated to it. Nuclear disarmament must remain the absolute priority. Also, such a Department should not affect the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament or the Disarmament Commission, which was open to the participation of all Member States.
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PARK SOO GIL (Republic of Korea) said that while the successful conclusion of the CTBT last year gave new momentum to the campaign to end nuclear proliferation, its objectives could not be fully realized without the broad participation of all States.
The new adopted Protocol to the IAEA safeguards would strengthen the non-proliferation regime by improving the Agency's ability to verify the compliance of States parties to the NPT, he said. He was working actively towards the implementation of that Protocol and urged other States to do the same. Nuclear-weapon-free zones could be an effective instrument for promoting nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building -- thereby enhancing peace and security at regional and global levels. He hoped that efforts to establish other such zones, including in Central Asia, would be successful.
On the Korean peninsula, he said that there had been progress in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in the context of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That agreement had now entered the implementation stage. However, once again, the North Korean nuclear issue could only be resolved when North Korea complied fully with the IAEA safeguards, as well as with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as agreed by the two sides in 1992.
The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the establishment of the OPCW were critically important milestones in the journey towards phasing out one of the most gruesome categories of weapons of mass destruction. His country had been fully implementing its obligations under that Convention and would continue to do its part for its overall effectiveness. However, he was deeply concerned that some declared possessors of such weapons, including North Korea, continued to refuse to join the chemical weapons non-proliferation regime. Only universal adherence would fully realize the aim of that Convention. He urged all States to accede to the Convention without delay.
Also pressing was the need to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, which was designed to prohibit the entire, awful array of biological weapons, he continued. He strongly supported that instrument and present efforts to adopt its verification measures.
The excessive accumulation of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, was a further destabilizing threat to international peace and security, he said. In that regard, attention should focus on conventional disarmament and transparency measures. While the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms offered an effective means of reducing mistrust and military tension, universal participation was critical for its effectiveness. Regional discussion on its operation should be encouraged. The guidelines on small
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arms developed by the Disarmament Commission last year should serve as a code of conduct to enhance transparency in international arms transfers and to eradicate such transfers. But, the success of those guidelines required the enactment of national legislation.
Concerning landmines, his Government had decided to extend for an indefinite period its moratorium on their export and had contributed financially to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. Any effort to curtail the deployment of landmines, however, should take into account legitimate national security concerns. For the people of his country, many of whom lived within shelling range of the most militarized border in the world, a total ban on anti-personnel mines would actually increase, rather than reduce, the possibility of civilian death and injury by diminishing the effectiveness of military deterrence against a recurrence of war. While he supported the spirit of the Convention negotiated in Oslo, he regretted that it did not duly take into account the legitimate security concerns of the Republic of Korea.
The divergence of views among Member States prevented the Conference on Disarmament from making tangible progress on the key issues, he said. Member States should show greater flexibility and willingness to compromise. In particular, he called for the immediate commencement of negotiations for a cut-off treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, starting at the next session of the Conference.
GEORGE SALIBA (Malta) mentioned several "landmarks on the long road towards a nuclear-weapon-free world", noting the indefinite extension of the NPT, progress on nuclear-weapon-free zones and the 1996 adoption of the CTBT. Another disarmament success was the establishment of the OPCW, of which his country was a member.
He noted that last month, the General Conference of the IAEA had approved Malta's application for membership in that organization. That underlined his country's commitment to policies opposing the production, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.
Exports and transportation of nuclear material must be controlled, he said. Far from being a restriction on trade, such control was a means to further enhance security measures related to such materials. An exchange of adequate information was essential in order to restrict exports and prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States.
He said he looked forward to the finalization of a verification protocol on the Biological Weapons Convention and urged the start of negotiations on a cut-off treaty on fissile material. Of equal importance, a sense of urgency was required to achieve universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
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The Preparatory Commission for a CTBT organization had recently concluded its third meeting, he noted. It had initiated work for verification of the Treaty, which included a worldwide network of monitoring stations, an international data centre and on-site inspections. That work had been encouraging. Along with such measures as the Register of Conventional Arms, it would contribute to transparency in armaments and enhance confidence and trust between States. Such work helped to promote a culture of peace and it was important that it be continued.
He said his Government had been foremost in supporting the Ottawa process and was looking forward to the opening for signature of the Convention agreed to in Oslo. It was equally important to stem the illicit flow of conventional weapons, given their link to destabilizing forces, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering. He would support any effort that sought consensus on that important matter. On the work of the Conference on Disarmament, he said that, although this year had been disappointing, he looked forward to substantive progress during next year's session.
Regional efforts were important in consolidating security and stability and his country was keen to develop an interregional approach to that end in the Euro-Mediterranean area, he said. The Mediterranean Sea should not be viewed as a dividing mark between North and South. The diversity of the region should be a tool for further intraregional networks of cooperation and understanding.
SAGUIER CABALLERO (Paraguay), on behalf of the Rio Group (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Honduras and Guyana), said that the Group would participate actively in the Ottawa process to ban landmines. The countries of the Group would work to make their region the first to be free of that type of weapon, and they could not fail to appreciate the response of the international community on that issue.
The Group had reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen confidence- building measures and measures to increase transparency in security in order to ensure a safer region, he said. Latin America was inspired by the idea of cooperation, building peace and a security based on international law. The Group had begun negotiations on an international convention that would combat the production and illicit transfer of firearms, explosives and other related materials.
He noted the thirtieth anniversary of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the region as the first nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Treaty had become an inspiration and a model for other countries wanting to establish such zones, he said. It would have achieved its goal when all the countries in the region had signed and ratified it. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important practical step in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The
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adoption last year of the CTBT had also been significant in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, there was still much progress to be made regarding controls on the production of fissile material.
BERNARD GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka) said that the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention was a landmark development. In that regard, he hoped that the Russian Federation would be able to overcome the difficulties that were delaying its ratification of that Convention.
He said that the NPT clearly expected the nuclear arms race to be ended and nuclear disarmament to take place at an early date. However, despite the passage of more than 25 years since the Treaty went into effect, nuclear weapons had not been totally eliminated. Given the obligation of nuclear- weapon States under that Treaty to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, the position taken by some of those States since the last Review Conference was rather disturbing. While there were reductions envisaged in the START treaties, it had to be pointed out that START II had not yet been ratified by Russia and that, even once it was ratified, thousands of nuclear warheads would remain in the hands of the two major nuclear-weapon States.
To make matters worse, he said, some nuclear-weapon States advanced the view that negotiations should first be conducted between the two major nuclear Powers, to be followed by the remaining three when the former's nuclear weapons were reduced to hundreds. They had also taken the position that nuclear disarmament should not be subjected to multilateral negotiation, thus turning the international community into mere spectators. That was despite article VI of the Treaty, which provided for each party to the Treaty to undertake negotiations.
Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States seemed to overlook their Treaty obligations, as well as the recent calls made by the Non-Aligned Movement of countries, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the Canberra Commission. Furthermore, they seemed to ignore the fact that the rationale put forth for retaining those weapons -- namely the theory of nuclear deterrence -- was being rejected by the same persons who had earlier embraced it. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament had been prevented from commencing work on the subject, due to the position held by some that nuclear disarmament was not a subject that could be multilaterally negotiated in the only forum available to the international community to negotiate such matters.
He urged those delegations to reassess their positions and permit the Conference to begin consultations on nuclear disarmament, as well as on a cut-off of the use of fissile material for weapons. While some delegations held the view that a cut-off treaty should be negotiated on a stand-alone
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basis, others felt it should take place as an integral part of nuclear disarmament negotiation.
Turning to the subject of security assurances, he said that the last Review Conference of the NPT determined that further steps should be considered in that regard, including in the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. Despite that decision, no step whatsoever had been taken for more than two years to satisfy that justifiable demand of the non-nuclear- weapon States. It was against this background that the States parties belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement and a cross-section of other States demanded that, at the next review conference, a legally binding security assurances regime be concluded. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament should take steps to commence immediate negotiations on negative security assurances.
The desire to conclude a convention to ban the use of nuclear weapons was universally shared, he said. Among recent popular calls for such a convention was the one made by more than 100 States belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, when they met at the ministerial level in Delhi last spring. If the eventual elimination of those weapons was to take a considerable period of time, it was logical to demand the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting their use. That would facilitate efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to address the question of total elimination at a pace that was comfortable to them.
The international community should not delay taking steps to minimize the devastating effects of conventional weapons, he said. Those weapons destabilized small and vulnerable countries. In that regard, he fully supported the view that all States and relevant regional and international organizations should intensify their cooperative efforts against illicit arms trafficking. The proposal for an international conference on such activity merited serious consideration.
Transparency, a subject which also evoked interest, could not be selective or limited to conventional weapons alone, while ignoring the weapons of mass destruction, he added. He regretted the failure to agree on any substantive measures to expand or strengthen the Register of Conventional Arms and was ready to support the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee in that regard within the Conference on Disarmament.
While he welcomed the Canadian initiative for a convention banning anti-personnel landmines, he said that such a measure should also take into account various aspects of defence, including alternative methods and the use of landmines by irregular forces. Given his country's security concerns, it would not be in a position to become a party to the landmine Convention in the immediate future.
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NABIL ELARABY (Egypt) said that the pursuit of nuclear disarmament -- previously accorded the highest priority by the international community -- should remain so, thus generating the momentum needed to pursue the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It was ironic that the efforts by the international community had not yielded significant results, despite several resolutions and legal instruments supporting such efforts.
In August 1996, Egypt, on behalf of 28 countries, had submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a programme of action, intended to overcome the inertia related to nuclear disarmament, especially by the nuclear-weapon States. That programme should be seriously studied on a priority basis by an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, in a time-bound framework within the Conference. Clearly, the lack of political will remained the major obstacle for any advance in that direction. The programme of action also took into account a comprehensive agreement to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Special attention should also be focused on securing adherence to the NPT, which obligated nuclear-weapon States to pursue, in good faith, negotiations on nuclear disarmament.
While the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the globe was a concept that promoted non-proliferation within the framework of the NPT, the General Assembly had been calling without success for such a zone in the Middle East since 1974. While that resolution had been adopted by consensus annually since 1980, the progress achieved was nil. While all the Arab League States had acceded to the NPT, Israel persisted in defying repeated calls to join that Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to full-scope IAEA safeguards. Its refusal to do so was the only serious obstacle preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and, thus, undermined efforts towards regional peace. To establish a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was essential, and endorsed by the Security Council in 1991.
While he supported the Register of Conventional Arms as a confidence- building mechanism, he said it was not an arms control measure. He was disappointed at the failure to broaden the scope of the Register to cover military holdings and procurements through national production and at its failure to include an eighth category on stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons, as well as conventional arms, were an important aspect of transparency. The international community could not expect the States of the Middle East to ignore reports of the existence of weapons of mass destruction, while continuing to support the Register. It was important to note that the conflicts examined by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms did not erupt because of the existence of those arms, but because of deep-rooted, historical differences.
Also in the conventional weapons sphere, Egypt had more than 22.7 million landmines planted in its soil by regional and extra-regional
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conflicts, he said. Measures aimed at curbing that weapon should be accompanied by serious and concrete steps towards clearance, particularly for those countries unable to undertake clearance on their own. The Convention concluded in Oslo contained vague language on that issue and did not acknowledge the responsibility of States in the deployment of mines. He was still studying the treaty and had yet to formulate his position.
He said he regretted the stalemate concerning the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Assembly should agree on a specific date for its convening, followed by the formulation of its agenda. The year for its convening should be 1999, since it would then serve as a catalyst for preparations for the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000.
JOSE MAURICIO BUSTANI, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), noted that in 1899, 26 nations attending the First Hague Conference had declared a prohibition against the use of poison gas, hoping that such weapons would be banned forever. Almost 100 years later, fulfilment of that dream had became a reality, as the Chemical Weapons Convention came into force. Why did it hold such promise when previous efforts had been unsuccessful? he asked. It was the first to be comprehensive, non-discriminatory and verifiable. It had provided for on-site inspections, including short-notice inspections.
The ground-breaking Convention, negotiated over 20 years, was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament at a time of hope and optimism at the end of the cold war, he said. That, in part, explained its impressive membership for so young a multilateral instrument. Eighty-seven States were party to the Convention upon its entry into force, and 100 had now ratified or acceded to it. A further 67 had signed it. The Convention was a key component in the further strengthening of a broader international regime to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to ensure confidence regarding their elimination.
At the heart of the Convention was its unique system to verify compliance with its provisions, which had seen solid progress, he said. During the preparatory phase, it had been assumed that for budgetary and planning purposes only three States would declare possession of chemical weapons. In fact, seven had already declared either possession of or the capability to produce chemical weapons, not including the Russian Federation, which had yet to ratify the Convention.
He noted that, so far, 80 initial inspections and visits had been conducted on the territory of 17 States. The Convention required that the initial inspection of facilities should be completed within six months of its entry into force. The OPCW had also been working to assist States in implementing the Convention nationally. It was also important to develop a
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culture of transparency in the work of the OPCW, despite the fact that the Convention required that confidential information be protected.
Another fundamental challenge was to promote the universality of the Convention, he said. The prognosis was good, with four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council already States parties, but some key States remained outside. His utmost priority was to facilitate ratification of the Convention by the Russian Federation. With 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, Russia was the largest declared possessor of such weapons, and its presence was essential. Reflecting the importance of Russian participation, a number of States had offered to assist in the chemical weapon destruction process, once that country was on board. There did seem to be clear desire on the part of Russia to join the convention.
Ratification by the Russian Federation would have a dramatic impact on the prospects for the Convention's ultimate success, paving the way for a number of other ratifications, from countries awaiting a political signal from Moscow, he said. "As the Russian Parliament is finalizing its debate on CWC ratification, the next few days will become the litmus test of whether Russia intends to live up to its leadership role on international security and disarmament issues, or whether it will choose what is, in my view, the dangerous path of isolationism."
The Russian Duma was weighing several concerns in its ratification debate, he added. One was funding for the destruction of chemical weapons and the possibility that Russia might not be able to complete destruction of its chemical weapons on time. Addressing that concern, he said many States had already announced offers of help. If Russia implemented its obligations under the Convention in good faith, and was still prevented from completing destruction of its stockpile due to reasons beyond its control, such force majeure circumstances would be taken into account. He noted Russia had already pledged it would destroy its chemical weapons anyway.
Russia was also concerned about financing the verification facilities under the Convention, he said. On that point, how the costs were to be allocated was still undecided. If it ratified the treaty, Russia would be a party to that decision-making process. The OPCW would also ensure it carried out its verification in the most cost-effective manner. The costs would be modest.
Being the largest declared chemical weapons possessor and a country with a sizable chemical industry, Russia deserved a prominent place in the OPCW, he said. Timely ratification of the Convention by Russia would ensure Russia could assume a position in the Organization commensurate with its status. It would be in the interests of Russia to be represented in that body. He urged those representing the Russian Federation to "send this sincere message back to Moscow now, today, immediately, before my Organization is left with no
First Committee - 16 - Press Release GA/DIS/3083 6th Meeting (PM) 16 October 1997
alternative but to give up on the matter of Russian participation in this noble cause". Timing was crucial, and it was necessary for Russia to ratify the agreement no later than 31 October.
The representative of the Russian Federation thanked the Director- General of the OPCW for the attention he had devoted to Russia in his statement. Such attention to one country demonstrated two things: first, that isolation posed no threat for Russia; and second, that when Russia became a fully-fledged participant in the Convention, it could expect similar or greater attention from the international community. His country's position on the Convention had been stated before the Committee on 14 October, and the decision would be taken soon, on the basis of Russia's national interest. He did not view the attention given as pressure on his country's decision-making process.
Right of Reply
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, RI JANG GON (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), said that South Korea had introduced the nuclear threat and chemical weapons onto the Korean peninsula. The nuclear question on the peninsula should be resolved between the Democratic People's Republic and the United States. If the nuclear issue was resolved, other issues would be settled also. His country had been affected by chemical weapons, which had been used indiscriminately there, but signing the Chemical Weapons Convention was a decision within the sovereign right of each country.
YOUNG SUN PAEK (Republic of Korea) said that arrangements such as the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States were intended to supplement, but not detract from the non- proliferation regime elaborated by the NPT. The Democratic Republic of Korea should not attempt to use the Agreed Framework as an excuse to avoid compliance with the non-proliferation regime. North Korea would do a great service towards peace on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere in the region if it abided by the commitment it entered into with the Republic of Korea.
Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said that the repeated political rhetoric of South Korea towards his country would not resolve matters. It was South Korea that had introduced nuclear weapons onto the peninsula. The nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula was a question between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States and South Korea should not attempt to poke its nose into that affair.
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