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GA/9291

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT RAZALI ISMAIL (MALAYSIA) AT UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS 15 SEPTEMBER

15 September 1997


Press Release
GA/9291


TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT RAZALI ISMAIL (MALAYSIA) AT UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS 15 SEPTEMBER

19970915

President: First of all, thanks to Mr. Sanbar, who has been with me for a year -— we have become very close friends; and to all of you for having to tolerate my idiosyncratic ways. But this is definitely the last day of the fifty-first General Assembly presidency, and I am very relieved that it is going to be over pretty soon. I am not going to spend time trying to summarize in any detail what has happened in the last year -— you have covered as much as you were interested in, and some of the things that I have been doing. Let me just say that I had a great year -— a very eventful year, in my own estimation. I can now give you some of those highlights, and you can ask questions after that.

I think the regular session of the General Assembly went off very well, from the time I took over in September to the end of December. In that time, a certain kind of work culture was modified. They spoke about "Razali time", and all that, and I am flattered that this has come into currency. I hope that this business-as-usual syndrome is a chapter of the past in the habits and ways of diplomats at the General Assembly.

I value the role of the General Assembly and the presidency in the appointment of the Secretary-General. There was a possibility that that process could have deteriorated. That would have affected the dignity and integrity of the institution, given unilateral action and blocks in the Security Council. Without having to go into details, I can say that the General Assembly and the presidency rose to the challenge and undertook actions that helped in some way to bring about a happy state of affairs, as you all know. There are many things about this that you already know, so I don't have to go into details. But to me it was a particularly fulfilling period, being able to passage the situation in such a fashion that it ended up being the right decision. It was done in a very dignified way, and the integrity of the General Assembly and of the United Nations as a whole was not affected.

In the five working groups that have been working all the time, a rigorous timetable was set by me. I even had to devise means to get ambassadors to the Malaysian Mission and feed them Malaysian food ad nauseam in order to get them to unlock some of the blocks in their minds to looking at some of the issues in the context of trying to get a consensus rather than insisting on national positions.

So there was some success. But, basically, the nature of negotiating in the United Nations is predicated entirely on stating first the national position, or a whole assembly of national positions, through a group. It becomes very difficult when you try to find a consensus. A genuine consensus, of course, is most precious and is of great value. The General Assembly has to deal with that but, in some instances, if there is no possibility of getting a consensus, one has to resort to the democratic way of voting.

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But, where the working groups are concerned, you have had results from all the working groups in varying degrees of success. It is up to you to look at it. You could say that the Agenda for Peace and the strengthening of the United Nations system -— and, of course, the Agenda for Development -— we have a consensus. But, what could have been achieved under those working groups continues to make the point that if only we can get all the ambassadors to think beyond national positions and look at multilateralism and allow it to grow, to take root, we could have had a much better result out of these working groups. But the ambassadors that worked hard at these working groups tried their best and it is indicative of how far down the road we are that we have not fully got everything that we wanted in some of the working groups.

Now, I would like to remember what happened out of the special session on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio + 5, to acknowledge that our original instinct not to try to add glitz or to put rose-tinted glasses on and deal with the special session, that instinct -— to be honest and to deal with courage with what was there or what was not there - — that was adhered to by me and the results prove that we did not paper over the cracks, that a lot of lessons will have been learned on how to deal with the results of major conferences in the future.

It was good to see NGOs sitting side by side with Governments in the special session, but on the issue of NGOs themselves and on the subgroup, it is a matter of some disappointment -— a great deal of disappointment -— to me that, after over 30 hours of negotiation there is not even a mandate agreed to on how to proceed in dealing with the subject of NGO participation with the United Nations and all the committees. I am sorry that a few Governments buckled down to national positions and suspicion about NGOs overtaking the running of the United Nations and all that, and we have not had a chance to get the mandate through. I look forward to seeing that issue resolved in the fifty-second General Assembly.

The special session. The emergency special session was a time that allowed the General Assembly to flex its muscle under the resolution of "Uniting for Peace". The inability of the Security Council to deal with the issue of the occupied territories on two occasions allowed the General Assembly to provide a modicum of justice to an issue that has been long neglected and that had been paralysed in the Security Council. I think in the future there should be more frequent recourse to coming to the General Assembly under this resolution if there is no due justice given to the issues in the Security Council.

On the Security Council reform: it is perhaps the most politicized of the working groups; it is surely the most politicized of the working groups. It has meandered along for three years without a chance of taking any shape and I had taken it upon myself to try to provide a picture of what would be a complete package. And early in the year -— in March -— I had put out what I thought would constitute a complete picture of a comprehensive reform, not

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just about expansion but about expansion and reform, about better representation, about legitimacy of participation and -— to a certain extent - — about democratization. So that document is still there.

There are problems from different sides. There are those that do not want any change to affect their rights and prerogatives, looking at the veto as something non-negotiable; looking at numbers only in the context of how they see efficiency. That is one side of the problem. And there is the other side that sees expansion in both categories as a problem, as a result of bilateral or subregional rivalries or as a result of principled positions they have taken since 1945. I believe we have come pretty close, tantalizingly close, to being able to have a package that could win the support of at least two thirds of the General Assembly members. It is up to the people directly involved with these efforts that will now have to run with the package and bring it as expeditiously as possible to the General Assembly.

Well, what else can I say? The United Nations continues to be gripped by a kind of reform fever and the Secretary-General has presented his two- track proposals which must be looked at, which to me represents a very courageous effort to deal with reform. And I hope the ambassadors will fully address this in an expeditious fashion and give the Secretary-General all the support possible. The United Nations is undergoing change. It has been buffeted by all aspects of change. But how it is all going to turn out is not anything that I would wish to predict.

On United States-United Nations relations, which is a huge determinant in the context of looking at change in this institution, the portents are not good. If you look at the messages from Congress and at the high media profile -— how positions in the United Nations are repackaged through the press in such a fashion as it is -— it looks very much like United States initiatives are gaining ground here. There is an attempt -— at least in the press here in New York itself -— to try to provide a favourable impression of what the United States is trying to do in the United Nations. I think it is necessary to put the picture in a better balance than that.

The issue of non-payment is perhaps the most disappointing part of the fifty-first General Assembly. That over one year we have not gone very much farther in trying to overcome the huge arrears of $1.5 billion the United States owes is a matter of disappointment that should be felt by all members of the General Assembly. And as a result of that the momentum of reform has been affected. One cannot look at any other aspect of reform, whether it is the Security Council or elsewhere, except in the context of these huge arrears that are hanging over everything else. So in some ways it adds to the tension when one goes to deal with other aspects of reform.

A kind of offer has been made by the United States -— I'm not sure whether it is officially an offer -— of some $800 million, which is far short of the amount that is needed. And in my last day I think I should be

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permitted to say that Members should consider very seriously whether this half a loaf is acceptable or not. There is no reason why a special arrangement has to be made for the most powerful country in the world in terms of what it has to pay, which is actually a part of its legal obligation. And I don't think, given the present state of flux, that any country will come to the rescue to try to pick up the tab as a result of the United States inability or unwillingness to pay its arrears in full.

On the Secretary-General's proposals, I have said that I support this. Most of the package has to do with what he can do himself. I think only about 25 per cent is what Governments will have to do to take the necessary effort to help him. Of course the intergovernmental process can prove to be a very slow process. But I hope that in this case it will not be. But the details will have to be looked at. The Fifth Committee will have to be brought into the picture on the costing, and we will go from there. And this also includes, of course, the post of Deputy Secretary-General.

I have no way of characterizing, finally, what my presidency has been. It has moved at times, I have felt, in slow time and some times at the speed of light. So somewhere in between a slow time and a flash of light for a whole year, I hope some good things have happened. For Malaysia and for me it has been a particularly fulfilling stint of duty. I am glad as the Malaysian representative to have served as President and to have served the Members.

Question: The press of the United Nations has very much welcomed your inventive approach. So, on behalf of the United Nations Correspondents Association, I thank you for a very good year of cooperation, and we hope that you give us more controversial positions whatever else you do from now on.

Regarding the emergency special session -— the "Uniting for Peace" session -— you said that it was an opportunity for the General Assembly to flex its muscles. Was this the end of the road: only flexing the muscles? Or are there, in your opinion, any teeth to these resolutions? And when are we supposed to hear something as a follow-up in the General Assembly in terms of actions that were demanded in the resolutions to really materialize?

President: In the fifty-first General Assembly, I am satisfied that the General Assembly on this issue was able to command the situation so as to be able to flex its muscles on the issue. I think the effect has been salutary. The Security Council is aware, or at least certain countries in the Security Council are aware that they can be politically embarrassed by the General Assembly. And where we go from here, this is entirely up to the proponents of this resolution on the issue of the occupied territories.

But the Assembly must always provide the place of recourse -— this is the point I am trying to make -— for justice in the event that due justice is not done in the Security Council.

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Question: Just a quick follow-up. Where do things stand right now, to your knowledge? Weren't there supposed to be meetings of the Geneva Convention, the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention? Was there any action that you thought should be taken and has not been? Or is there any action to be taken that is forthcoming?

President: Well, the resolution has given the General Assembly certain undertakings. As far as I know, this has not taken place. So it is up to the advocates of the resolution to come and bring the matter again to the General Assembly.

Question: On the Security Council reform, it is said that you've been working feverishly on a framework draft resolution. Could you say what's in it exactly and where you'd like to see it go from here?

President: Well, it's not been feverish, but I have been involved in informal consultations with several countries, countries that are actively supportive of expansion in both categories, permanent and non-permanent. We have been trying to put together what will constitute a reasonable package to offer to the general membership to look at. There is no draft resolution as such at this moment. Although I know what are the necessary steps that one would have to put into that package to make it appealing to at least two- thirds of the general membership.

But there are problems among those that are actively involved in the package. There are permanent members that still have not moved very much from their basic original position. I'm talking about numbers, and I'm talking about the issue of decision-making and the veto. To me, the issue is not just about expansion. It's not a question of bringing two or three countries to become permanent members and about forgetting the rest of the package.

So I'm very interested, and I would only lend my support to any product that deals with numbers that would gain credence and be accepted by a two- thirds majority of the house and a formulation on decision-making that indicates that the general universal concern of a lot of countries all over the world about the utilization of the veto in the past will be looked at, will be examined. We are not going to go through the next so many years continuing to allow five countries to have the veto without having this veto in some fashion or other being made more accountable to the general membership and without also underlining that there cannot be serious discrimination between the present permanent members and the incoming permanent members.

Question: Looking at the overall scene of reform, is your sense that the United Nations is going to be strengthened or is going to be weakened? Without predicting what is going to happen, what is your sense of it? In the Economic and Social Council you had something fairly direct and critical to say about the Secretariat, about the strength of the Secretariat. How do you see the reform process affecting that?

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President: The reform process of the United Nations must move with caution, taking into account what has been around for the last 50 years, and with innovation. We have to marry both as much as we have to marry vision with practicality. Of course that doesn't mean anything very much in actually dealing with the specific issues. But I am on the side of those who believe that the United Nations will undergo reform. If, for example, you have changes in the Security Council, there will be a situation, a political situation that will be dynamic enough to move the United Nations in a certain direction. And when all was said and done, that would be a changed United Nations, positively, definitely more representative and more legitimate. So, our side of the house, the governmental side of the house, should look into such prospects as well as the strengthening of the role of the General Assembly in that fashion.

Now, as far as the Secretariat is concerned, I believe that the Secretary-General has put in a lot of effort, again within the context of caution and innovation, to move the question of reform. How far he has gone, I think, in the area where he has been allowed to move without dealing with the Governments, he has done pretty well; in the areas where Governments are concerned, we will have to see. He has given the proposals to us and I hope we will respond expeditiously. Otherwise, the whole momentum is going to flag.

Question: If I correctly understand, you want to have an upper hand for the General Assembly comparing to the Security Council. If this is so, do you propose anything in the coming General Assembly to change the Charter of the United Nations?

President: No, it is not my intention. I have never had a political programme to try to get the General Assembly to have an upper hand. I think there are three distinct bodies in the United Nations and all three must cooperate and coordinate. There is the Security Council, there is the General Assembly and there is what I call the "secretary-generalship". All three are major organs of the United Nations and they have to work together in the context of their responsibilities, which are in the Charter, and not in such a fashion that their efforts subsume one or two of the others.

In the last 50 years, we have seen a lot of battles because of the discordant tendencies of how things operate in these three institutions. In the last one year as President, I have tried without any kind of partisanship to get the three bodies to take into account the need to coordinate their work together. To some degree, there has been some success.

Question: Concerning the reform of the Security Council, you said that the permanent members are not moving much to promote the reform. So how do you see the new initiative of the United States? Do you think it stops short of putting new momentum in the discussion?

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President: It was important, it was very important that the United States made this pronouncement to support the idea of five more permanent members, three of which would be coming from the developing regions of the world. That was important. That was not done before and the fact that now it has been put out does move the momentum ahead.

But we are still looking at 20-21, which in my mind doesn't do the job. It will not get the support of two-thirds of the majority and will not give anything to the numerous countries that are not going to gain from just having permanent members increase, but who want to see the membership of the Security Council include an expansion of non-permanent members. You cannot have a Security Council of 10 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members. If the number is 20, that will be absurd. By any yardstick, it would be quite absurd to have 10 permanent and 10 non-permanent. You have to have more non- permanent members.

Question: [inaudible] members whether the reform of the Council must go together with the overall reform, or that reform should be done piece by piece -— you know, one before the other?

President: Well, reform in the last one year has gone in a matter of sequence. Some were agreed to earlier, some later. But we are coming to the more difficult areas where, definitely, there are linkages. I mean, I cannot see the scale of assessments being solved, being agreed to, unless and until here is a clear position on the expansion and reform of the Security Council.

Question: You said you are relieved to leave that job. Was there any disappointment during your presidency and what is your advice to the President Designate?

President: I have no advice to give to the incoming President. This is a situation that he must go through himself -— the agony and the ecstasy of being President. I shouldn't take the fun away from him by telling him what to expect.

But I have had a very fulfilling one year. My disappointment is in the context of what we have tried to do with the inability to move clearly on the issue of finance. We have to come to grips with this issue, a scale of assessments, by the end of this year. There are something like seven or eight proposals on the table, of which one is the United States proposal. I don't know how it is going to be looked at.

Question: You talked about how it's up to the Member States to decide whether to accept this half a loaf, as you characterized it, that the United States is offering. But realistically, what leverage do the Member States have in this case?

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President: Well, that's a strange question. We accept that the United States has leverage because it is a very important player in the constellation of States within the United Nations, but surely a collective position of many together as Members can deny -— this is a hypothetical question, but if that half a loaf is not considered good enough, one can deny that and say all right, we will live at the edge of survival for the next so many years, but the United States will be politically embarrassed that it will become the #1 miscreant in not paying its dues.

Question: But it already is not paying its dues. What further action could be taken?

President: Well, I don't know. I see a certain sense of alienation between the United States and the European Union now. Quite a number of the automatic supporters of the United States before are no longer that supportive. There are prices to be paid for taking such a unilateral position.

Question: Do you mean including the voting rights of the United States in the General Assembly? Is that what you mean in terms of measures?

President: It creates a consciousness of how to deal with this unilateral position. And how this is going to be dealt with, I'm not going to predict, but anything can happen.

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For information media. Not an official record.