PRESS BRIEFING BY UN COORDINATOR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

3 April 1996

Press Briefing

19960403 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

Iqbal Riza, Assistant Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sarajevo and Coordinator of United Nations activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this afternoon briefed correspondents on the situation there.

Mr. Riza said most of the assets of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had been transferred to the International Implementation Force (IFOR) to allow IFOR to become operational as quickly as possible. That left very little for the United Nations operation. He had been there for just over six weeks, and his major concern had been to activate the new mission, which should be reaching operational level in about 10 days.

The major operation in which they had been involved was the transfer of authority in the suburbs of Sarajevo, Mr. Riza said. Under the Dayton Agreement, the leading military responsibilities and authority were with IFOR. The leading political responsibilities and authority were with the High Representative, Carl Bildt, who was visiting United Nations Headquarters today. He was responsible for coordinating all civilian activities.

It was within that framework that the United Nations had very defined responsibilities, he said. Those included: the civilian police, which was the major component of the mission; civil affairs, which was essentially political reporting from the ground; and a mines action centre, which would plan, advise and coordinate, but not conduct, demining operations. Those demining operations would be conducted independently, under financing by governments and the World Bank.

Mr. Riza said there were regional headquarters at Sarajevo, Tuzla and Banja Luka. Civilian police would be deployed in 50 locations. The civil affairs component would be co-located in 20 of those places. The United Nations mission, like all the missions there, was dealing with the authorities of three governments: the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was a Member State of the United Nations; the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the Republic of Srpska.

A correspondent said the civilian police seemed to have gotten off to an inglorious start. They seemed to have been totally ineffectual in dealing with the arson throughout the Serb suburbs and the widespread reports of intimidation and bullying, amounting to "auto-ethnic cleansing" by the Republic of Srpska. Was that going to be the pattern for the rest of the mission?

"That is the impression that has been conveyed by the media", said Mr. Riza. Unfortunately, the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not quite appreciate the nature of the mandate given to the civilian police. The United Nations was not part of the Dayton process, which formed the framework for the policing role. That role had simply been assigned to the United Nations.

Mr. Riza said the annex detailing the responsibilities of those civilian police made it very clear that they were there to monitor, to advise, and to help in the training of local police forces. They were not there to undertake law and order responsibilities or duties. They had neither the mandate, legal authority nor resources for that task.

The responsibility for maintaining order had been with the local Serb police forces, who were to hand over authority to the Federation police forces, he said. However, they abdicated their responsibilities for ensuring law and order until the transition date and stood by as arson and destruction took place. At that time, there were United Nations police distributed among five suburbs in Sarajevo, amounting to 30 in each suburb. That left some 15 on duty at any one time during any 24-hour period. "They were simply not expected to, mandated to, or able to perform law and order functions."

Mr. Riza said there were two major aims of the exercise. One was to prevent an exodus of the Serbs. Neither the United Nations nor IFOR could hold them back in the absence of assurances from the governments concerned. That had not occurred. In fact, the government of the Republic of Srpska actively encouraged, instigated and even pressed for the exodus. The government of the Federation did not give adequate assurances to assuage the genuine fear, uncertainty and apprehension of the Serb population. "If anybody is to be held responsible, it is they."

The correspondent said that it seemed to be time to reconsider or enhance the mandate of the civilian police or to increase its cooperation with IFOR. In response, Mr. Riza said that was a critical situation which was not likely to be replicated. Governments had made their forces available on the basis of the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. "If we had told them that these forces are required to enforce law and order in the conditions that prevail in Bosnia and Herzegovina -- tensions, violence, weapons -- I don't think we'd have got many police."

The IFOR had now made it clear that they would be there in support, Mr. Riza went on to say. At the Moscow Conference 10 days ago, Admiral Layton Smith said, "We are now the '911' for the civilian police". It must be remembered that those police are unarmed.

Asked what progress had been made in purging the police of "bad guys" and training and bringing in new people, Mr. Riza said that a little over 1,700 police had been authorized, and the half-way mark was now being approached. Several legal and constitutional questions had yet to be taken,

Riza Press Briefing - 3 - 3 April 1996

to clarify the responsibilities of the Federation and try to move it to become effective and separated from the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only then, when the police forces were clearly established and identified, could efforts focus on reducing their level and ensuring that the proper people were retained and the remainder demobilized.

"Isn't the presence of potentially scary policemen walking around representing law and order thwarting the attempt to establish a condition of trust and prevent these exoduses?" a correspondent asked. Unfortunately, those were the realities, Mr. Riza said. There were points of tension, where police observers were strengthened. They did more than merely observe -- for example, using good offices and persuasion -- but they could not use coercion or force. Those situations had to be dealt with while efforts continued to help governments set up credible and viable police forces.

Asked to assess the quality of the police that were being provided, Mr. Riza said the United Nations must depend on resources provided by governments, whether military or police. However, while military units were on stand-by and could be made available in a matter of days, if a government so decided, the police were embedded in the day-to-day life of every society. It was, therefore, not a simple matter for governments to make large numbers of police available.

"We depend on governments to make the selections", he went on to say. As a result, the quality was very uneven in terms of quality, training and language. It was, thus, completely unfair to judge United Nations police forces by the standards one would apply to the Mounties in Canada or to state police in the United States.

Asked about plans regarding mine clearance, Mr. Riza said it came down to a question of resources. He had arrived in the country six weeks ago, and there was now a small demining assistance group in place. However, the actual demining operations would be carried out by contractors or groups supplied by governments. Those operations were expected to begin at the end of April or the beginning of May. To another question, he said the aim of the group was to train local personnel and to hand responsibility over to the governments of the two entities within a year.

The Secretary-General had recommended that the civilian police pull out by the end of the year if IFOR did so, a correspondent said. Would they be able to carry out "enough" by the end of the year? she asked. "Well, that is the over-arching question", Mr. Riza replied. It applied as well to such daunting tasks as the return of refugees, the conduct of elections, and the establishment of governmental institutions following the elections. All of that was expected to be completed by the end of December. While thought was being given to the question of a military presence after IFOR, any decisions taken would depend on the governments involved, through whatever forum they chose to use.

Riza Press Briefing - 4 - 3 April 1996

Asked if he expected the local police to be trained in time for the elections, to be held in August or September, Mr. Riza said the police were fairly well trained. However, they had been caught up in the events of the past few years. It was a question of bringing in human rights awareness and training programmes and trying to keep the best as police forces were reduced, particularly in the Federation.

A correspondent asked about the role of the domestic radio and television stations in the upcoming Bosnian elections. Mr. Riza said that was a definite problem, and it was the responsibility of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). That body had drawn up the rules and was supposed to conduct the elections. There would be a review of the entire process at the six-month mark, in June. Around then, the OSCE would have to determine whether conditions existed for the elections to go ahead, as was expected.

One of the OSCE's concerns involved access to the media, Mr. Riza said. The media was dominated by the ruling parties, which were the nationalist parties. Opposition parties were at a distinct disadvantage as far as access to the media. The OSCE had undertaken efforts to try to correct that situation.

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