PRESS CONFERENCE BY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

28 March 1996

Press Briefing

PRESS CONFERENCE BY BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

19960328 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

The Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhamed Sacirbey, told correspondents at a Headquarters press conference Wednesday afternoon that "Dayton allowed ethnic ghettos created by the war to persist". His Government wanted "a multi-ethnic, pluralistic, open and tolerant society", but the Dayton Agreement had seemed to favour a concept of ethnic stratification. There was no risk of domination by Muslim fundamentalism in Bosnia, but there was a risk of Bosnia becoming ethnically and religiously divided. If Islamic fundamentalism should come to Bosnia, it would not be because of the Iranians, but because the architects of Dayton had not provided for a multi-ethnic society.

He said the Dayton Agreement called for extradition to The Hague of all those indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. His Government would cooperate with the Tribunal on any case, regardless of the nationality of the alleged perpetrator or the victim, as any war crime committed against a citizen of Bosnia was a crime against Bosnia itself.

He said it was important that the sanctions regime not be terminated until the terms of the Agreement relating to the Tribunal were implemented. Up until now, those demands had not been met. The requirements of the accords must be fulfilled by the parties concerned and by the international community, which gave lip service to the goals of the Tribunal, but was less inclined to give the necessary funding. It was disconcerting that despite new evidence of massacres and other war crimes being uncovered every day, the consequences of ethnic cleansing were being consolidated on the ground.

In response to a question concerning the establishment of a permanent war crimes tribunal, he said that if the tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda could not be made to work, he would question setting up a tribunal to try crimes that had not yet been committed in some unidentified land. The Dayton Agreement would fail if the Tribunal was not supported in its effort to bring about a minimum level of justice, he added.

A correspondent asked why the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been present when the Council decided to lift sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Foreign Minister replied that his Government had argued behind the scenes against lifting the sanctions, in particular with the United States Government. When he realized that "the table had been set" between the permanent members of the Council, it was clear that his Government's argument would be ignored. Inasmuch as the

terms for lifting the sanctions had not been implemented, the matter should be re-addressed. He stressed that he did not want to see sanctions imposed, but to have the region return to normality.

Asked about the success of the Implementation Force (IFOR), Mr. Sacirbey said IFOR had succeeded because its mandate was very narrow. When success had not been forthcoming, the problem had been defined as being part of someone else's mandate. In truth, however, the responsibility was on those who had the best capacity to undertake the task. He urged that the efforts to find a scapegoat be ended.

Also, he said, IFOR had been successful because of events in November 1995. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had shown the will to bring about order. It was inconsistent to have Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Serb military commander General Ratko Mladic now moving freely through the streets. Moreover, he saw no effort to investigate mass grave sites.

He said that he said the number of personnel in IFOR and in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) -- 60,000 and 2,000 respectively -- had been predetermined. He was concerned that IFOR had avoided responsibility with regard to looters and had not ensured the freedom of movement.

In response to a question about how bringing the Serb leaders before the Tribunal would save the Dayton Agreement, he replied that having them brought to justice would provide satisfaction in itself. He hoped that the Agreement would not fail.

Replying to a query about the presence of foreign Muslim fighters in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he said "a few dozen fighters on our soil would not serve any purpose except the purpose of our enemy". He had been assured that there were no foreign forces in the country and he demanded that those who made such charges provide the evidence. He recalled that in one instance in which he had asked for evidence, an IFOR representative had pointed to the existence of an Iranian information centre. He had asked the representative if he meant to imply that the centre was a cover for foreign fighters. The response had been no, but "it just isn't very helpful".

What agenda could be served by bringing in foreign fighters? Mr. Sacirbey asked. To keep a constant balance of the sides or to prepare for failure so that each side could be blamed equally? If that was the case, those responsible "were preparing our population for another brutal war", he said. He went on to say that a multicultural society would have rock groups as well as religious groups with a conservative view on life.

Bosnia had done nothing to encourage the Serbs to stay, a correspondent asserted. Mr. Sacirbey said he did not agree with the sentiment of that

Bosnia Press Conference - 3 - 28 March 1996

statement, which was meant to produce an equality of blame. The Bosnians had done more than any other government in similar circumstances could have been expected to do. His Government had seen it as an important test, feeling that if the Serbs could stay safely in Bosnia, then Muslims could return to places from which they had been ethnically cleansed. Those opposed to that logic would want to make sure that the Bosnians failed the test to determine whether Bosnians and Serbs could live together.

The results of the test were partial failure and partial success, he said. Many Serbs had stayed and were attempting to find their new identity in the new situation. Sarajevo was no longer besieged and efforts had been made to ensure that Serbs were respected. President Alija Izetbegovic had been quick to say that looters, fascists and mafiosi would not be allowed to operate, but Karadzic and the Serb police had worked to make sure that the Serbian population around Sarajevo was "self-ethnically cleansed", he said.

Replying to another question, he said he was not sure why accusations were being levelled against the Bosnians. Perhaps the accusers were attempting to wash their own hands of responsibility. He did not understand why the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, and the Secretary-General "found it necessary to blame us", he said.

Asked if it had not been a mistake to sign the peace accords before its requirements had been implemented, he said that peace requires trust and good faith. Unfortunately that was not being given now to the Bosnians.

In response to another question, he said his Government had called on the international community to release all the available evidence regarding war criminals and their links to the Belgrade regime. The United States had such evidence. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had been a key player in Dayton, but he and the Belgrade regime should be held accountable and brought before the international community for their involvement in war crimes. They were implicitly responsible for allowing war crimes to continue.

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