First Committee Sends Six Texts on Weapons of Mass Destruction to General Assembly, Including New One on Bolstering Biological Weapons Convention
The General Assembly would condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances as unacceptable and an international law violation, and express its strong conviction that those responsible for their use must and should be held accountable, according to one of six drafts on mass destruction weapons approved today by the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security).
The text on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction was approved by a recorded vote of 155 in favour to 9 against (China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Niger, Russian Federation, Syria, Zimbabwe), with 16 abstentions. It would also condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons, since 2012, in Iraq, Malaysia, Syria and the United Kingdom, as reported by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations.
Prior to the draft’s approval as a whole, 11 separate recorded votes were taken, thereby retaining certain provisions. The draft (document A/C.1/79/L.65) makes clear that the Convention’s objectives will not be fully realized as long as there remains even a single State not party to it that could possess or acquire those weapons. It thus calls for its universality without delay and reaffirms that States parties’ obligation to complete the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and of destruction or conversion of chemical weapons production facilities is vital for realizing the Convention’s goals.
A new draft resolution was approved today, without a vote, on strengthening and institutionalizing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/79/L.73). According to the text, the Assembly would recognize with appreciation that, in order to strengthen the Convention’s effectiveness and improve implementation, the Ninth Review Conference established a working group open to all States parties. The text calls for active participation and engagement in the treaty’s continued implementation and the outcomes of its Review Conferences.
Further to the text, the Working Group on the strengthening the Convention would be encouraged to further consider the measures aimed at strengthening and institutionalizing the Convention, in particular on how to proceed on organizational matters within the Working Group, including the possibility of an international agency for biological security and other institutional arrangements.
Acting without a vote, the Committee approved a traditional text on that Convention (document A/C.1/79/L.54), which, among its many provisions, notes with appreciation the working group’s aim to identify, examine and develop specific and effective measures, including possibly legally binding measures, and to make recommendations to strengthen and institutionalize the Convention, which is to be submitted to States parties for consideration and any further action. The text notes the possible establishment of a mechanism to review and assess scientific and technological development relevant to the Convention and to provide States parties with advice.
Another traditional text, titled Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (document A/C.1/79/L.51), was approved by a recorded vote of 177 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Israel, United States). By it the Assembly would renew its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and reaffirm the vital necessity of upholding its provisions. It would call upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw them.
Also approved was a draft on preventing terrorists’ acquisition of radioactive sources (document A/C.1/79/L.64) by a recorded vote of 178 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (Iran). It would urge all States to maintain effective security of radioactive sources, including storage facilities, that may pose a significant risk to individuals, society and the environment throughout their life cycles, and it would encourage all States to make political commitments to the non-legally binding and voluntary Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
Acting without a vote, the Committee approved a text on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (document A/C.1/79/L.44/Rev.1), by which the Assembly would urge all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.
Several delegations delivered general statements prior to the action on the weapons of mass destruction cluster, including the representative of Poland, who, as the sole sponsor of “L.65”, said the Chemical Weapons Convention is a unique instrument created to eliminate an entire category of mass destruction weapons and to free the world of the scourge of those weapons. Undisputedly, much has been accomplished to make this come true over the years, including promoting the Convention’s universality. It must never be forgotten that its full implementation and continued compliance with its provisions must remain a top priority for every State party, he said.
He said his country has recently been confronted by worrying security-related incidents, including attempts to undermine the existing international security architecture, in which the Chemical Weapons Convention plays a crucial role. When the norm prohibiting the use of those weapons is put in jeopardy, the international community must stand united and react swiftly and decisively to any threats of chemical weapons’ use, whether in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Syria or elsewhere in the world. There must be zero tolerance for those weapons’ use, and all perpetrators must be well aware that the “no impunity” policy is the only one that will be deployed.
The European Union’s speaker, on “L.73”, expressed appreciation for the efforts aimed at strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, including addressing the need for institutionalization within its framework. Protection against biological threats remains a priority for the Union, which strongly supports the current Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention process established at the Ninth Review Conference in 2022 as the most appropriate and inclusive forum for addressing the issues. It would be premature to endorse one specific solution before the Working Group completes its mandate. He recalled that the Conference urged the Working Group to complete its work preferably before the end of 2025. Convening a special conference in 2025 could serve as an important stepping stone towards a stronger Convention. Until then, he urged all Member States to support the process in its existing consensus-driven form.
The delegate for France, also speaking on behalf of Germany, on “L.64”, recalled that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was a point of departure for this current draft as it calls on all States to “abstain from delivering support in any form for non-state actors” who might try to obtain, transfer or use nuclear weapons or their delivery vehicles for terrorist purposes. This year’s text draws attention to the protection of radioactive sources, not only in situations of armed conflict but also during their transport. These updates should not change the text’s basis, which remains very close to that adopted by consensus in previous years. She regretted, however, that unity among the international community cannot be preserved, which is an “alarming signal” for the authority of these instruments, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the tools that enable strengthening international cooperation in this area.
Kazakhstan’s delegate, also speaking on behalf of Kiribati and Saudi Arabia, said that “L.73” encourages the Working Group to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by considering measures for institutionalizing it. This is a crucial aspect of the ongoing discussions. He recognizes the milestones that will be met in 2025 — the centennial of the signing of the 1925 Geneva protocol and the fiftieth anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention’s entry into force, which provide an opportunity to reflect on progress and reaffirm commitments. The draft does not duplicate others but strengthens resolutions on the Convention submitted annually by Hungary. It is imperative to unify efforts and present a cohesive stance, and it is possible to reinforce commitments and advance the shared objective of a world free from biological weapons. The international community should seize the chance to demonstrate its collective resolve in addressing this pressing global challenge, which will escalate with new developments via technology.
Syria’s speaker expressed regret that, for the tenth consecutive year, the Polish delegation has submitted a draft resolution, “L.65”, which is more politicized than ever, adopting a selective approach that ignores important aspects of the OPCW’s work and focuses on specific aspects that serve certain States’ political agenda. The draft should prioritize the Convention’s effective and balanced implementation and address the broad spectrum of issues governed by the Convention, including, among others, the promotion of economic and technological development, cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemical technologies, and assistance and protection. It is filled with technical details about the OPCW’s work and lacks any reference to the constructive cooperation between Syria and the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat, ignoring the fact that terrorist groups are using chemical weapons and chemical agents against civilians and Syrian Arab forces. The draft takes a biased approach that runs counter to the spirit of multilateralism. It is selective, names specific States and dedicates nine paragraphs to issues that are being discussed within the OPCW relevant to those States. He called for a negative vote on it and certain provisions.
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