First Committee Sends Last of 57 Drafts to General Assembly at Close of Session After Record Participation in Thematic Debates
Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today approved a draft resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention that would reaffirm the obligation of States parties to destroy their stockpiles.
Also by that text, “L.27/Rev.1”, among six adopted at the close of the session, the General Assembly would underline the fact that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of all articles of the Convention would make a major contribution to international peace and security.
That text, approved by a recorded vote of 167 in favour to none against, with 4 abstentions (China, Iran, Russian Federation, Syria), would also reaffirm condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances, emphasizing that any use of those weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, was unacceptable and violated international law.
Prior to approval of that draft as a whole, recorded votes were requested on two separate provisions. Preambular paragraph 5, by which the Assembly would reaffirm broad support for the decision of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to send a fact-finding mission to Syria to investigate allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, was retained by a recorded vote of 141 in favour to 4 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela), with 17 abstentions.
Another provision, operative paragraph 10, would have the Assembly underscore the substantial unresolved issues, including the gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies identified by the OPCW, and stress the importance of fully verifying that the Syria’s declaration and related submissions were accurate and complete, and that efforts were expedited to resolve those gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies. That clause was retained by a recorded vote of 136 in favour to 4 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela), with 20 abstentions.
Also approved today, without a vote, was a draft, “L.36”, introduced by Afghanistan, Australia and France, on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, which would have the Assembly strongly urge States to develop and implement all necessary national measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their those involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of materials that could be used to make improvised explosive devices.
Also by that text, the Assembly would express grave concern over the devastation caused by the increasing use of those devices by illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients, which had affected a large number of the world’s countries and had resulted in thousands of casualties, both civilian and military.
That text would also express concern at the serious harm that such improvised explosive device attacks had caused to United Nations staff and peacekeepers, and to humanitarian workers by threatening their lives, increasing the cost of their activities, limiting their freedom of movement and affecting their ability to deliver on their mandates.
Acting without a vote, the Committee also approved texts on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, “L.48”; the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, “L.39”; developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, “L.45”; and the thirty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), “L.30”.
Prior to action on the various clusters, representatives of Poland, the Russian Federation, Afghanistan and France delivered general statements.
Speaking in explanation of vote were representatives of Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, India, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Republic of Korea, Norway, Iran, Pakistan, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syria, Venezuela, South Africa, Nicaragua, Algeria, Ecuador, China, United States (on behalf of Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Croatia, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), Belarus, Turkey, Nigeria, Austria, United States (on behalf of Japan and the United Kingdom) and the Netherlands.
The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Committee Chair also spoke.
The representatives of Syria, Turkey and Israel spoke in exercise of the right of reply.
The Committee also approved its draft provisional programme of work and timetable for the 2016 session.
Background
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue taking action on all draft resolutions and decisions before it. For more information see Press Release GA/DIS/3541.
Cluster 1, Nuclear Weapons
Speaking in explanation of the vote after yesterday’s vote on “L.13/Rev.1”, Japan’s representative said that the positive engagement of nuclear-weapon States in disarmament negotiations was essential. Based on that, he supported exploring basic measures for such talks, including an open-ended working group. Japan placed importance on making that forum as inclusive as possible, to allow close collaboration between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, and it was regrettable that that goal was not achieved. He had expected that discussions at an open-ended working group would contribute to steady progress in nuclear disarmament. Thus, Japan had abstained from voting on “L.13/Rev.1”.
The representative of New Zealand, explaining her abstaining on “L.52/Rev.1”, said she admired Kazakhstan’s longstanding efforts to forge common ground on the universal declaration document, which had elements strongly supported by New Zealand, including the paragraph in the draft universal declaration regarding the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as paragraph 13. But it remained unclear how the declaration would advance the cause of a nuclear-weapon-free world. If it had been more ambitious, New Zealand would have been less concerned about operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the main text, which requires resources for dissemination and reporting.
The representative of Sweden, in explanation of her vote in favour of “L.52/Rev.1”, noted that her support was based on the principles outlined in her country’s general statement and the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion. The resolution emphasized the fundamental role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation recalling the milestone Review Conference outcomes. The goal of the total elimination of those weapons was unequivocal and should be pursued as such.
The representative of India explained his vote on several resolutions. On “L.13/Rev.1”, he attached priority to nuclear disarmament and shared the objective of taking forward multilateral negotiations on that topic. However, it had abstained on that text because the Conference on Disarmament was the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The establishment of an open-ended working group with an unclear mandate outside of that body might not lead to an inclusive process that advanced disarmament. Given the divisive nature of the current discourse on that topic, there was an urgent need for dialogue involving all Member States. He had hoped that the text’s co-sponsors would be open to such dialogue and that that would have been reflected in the draft.
On “L.41/Rev.1”, he remained committed to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, sharing the view that disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing. He had voted against the text as a whole as well as operative paragraph 13 because India could not accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Urging India to do so without condition was against the idea of free consent, as laid out in the Vienna principles.
Turning to “L.52/Rev.1”, he said he appreciated Kazakhstan’s initiative in formulating a draft universal declaration and felt the draft resolution sought to reach common ground on some basic issues. It referred to the NPT, but was not restricted to the Treaty’s framework, since nuclear disarmament was an issue for both nuclear-possessing and non-nuclear-possessing States. The appropriate scope was a universal declaration. The text contained therein recalled the unanimous opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, no explicit prohibition of those weapons existed, and further discussions on the declaration would have to keep that in view. Divergent approaches, such as in paragraphs 4 and 6, also needed to be addressed in future discussions. Notwithstanding that, India had voted in favour of the draft resolution, and he noted that it was the only country possessing nuclear weapons that had done so.
On “L.58”, India had joined in its approval without a vote. He respected the sovereign choice of States to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone, consistent with the General Assembly’s first special session on disarmament and other guidelines. India enjoyed friendly relations with all States in the South-East Asian region, and would respect the region’s nuclear-weapon-free status.
Speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, the representative of the United Kingdom spoke in explanation of position on “L.35”. He said that nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to global security provided they were subjected to appropriate treaties and satisfactorily concluded in consultation with the nuclear-weapon States. Those delegations wondered whether the real goal of the draft was not in fact the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the high seas, and for that reason, he had voted against the resolution.
He said the above delegations had voted against “L.41/Rev.1” for reasons that were founded on the same concerns as those about last year’s text. While the group agreed with some of the language in the resolution, they regretted that the text had not achieved an equitable balance among the NPT’s three pillars. Furthermore, new elements and language in this year’s text departed further from a common understanding and introduced new concepts that were not a part of the NPT. A comprehensive and global approach to disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was required. The United Kingdom, the United States and France were more than ever concerned about the increasing focus on parallel processes. Measures should improve, and not detract from, strategic stability and security.
On “L.52/Rev.1”, also speaking for the United States and France, he reaffirmed the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general complete disarmament, and in that regard, those countries remained steadfast in their commitment to seeking a safer world for all and one without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the NPT. Those countries continued to achieve concrete steps towards that goal in a way that promoted international peace and security. They continued to believe that an incremental step-by-step approach was the only practical option, and all States could contribute to that goal by resolving regional tensions and making progress in all areas of disarmament. As had been explained to the delegation of Kazakhstan, the text contained a number of elements and assertions with which those States did not agree and which were not compatible with their national security policies and doctrines. Thus, they had voted “no”.
On “L.4/Rev.1”, the representative of Germany said his delegation agreed with the goal of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons, and an open-ended working group could contribute to that. Germany had abstained on the text because it did not believe the mandate in the resolution was drafted in a comprehensive and inclusive fashion. The participation of nuclear-weapon-States was indispensable, and the group should pursue its work based on a comprehensive and balanced mandate, as that would provide the best chance for recommendations to be translated into concrete action.
The representative of Australia, explaining the vote on “L.13/Rev.1”, said his country had been a strong supporter of an open-ended working group initiative that was inclusive but which would allow for a robust debate on nuclear disarmament. An important criterion was to ensure that the rules of procedure for any open-ended working group would be crafted in a way to encourage the participation of those that actually possessed nuclear weapons. Australia had abstained. Without sufficient reassurance, it was clear that nuclear-weapon-States would not participate. His delegation remained ready to work with willing partners to shape an inclusive but robust process whose mandate covered effective measures that would truly advance nuclear disarmament.
The representative of Cyprus said her delegation wished to clarify its abstention on resolution “L.13/Rev.1”, due to the lack of reference to the need for enlargement of the Conference on Disarmament. That abstention was in no way related to the establishment of an open-ended working group in Geneva, which Cyprus fully supported.
Explaining his vote in favour of “L.13.rev.1”, the representative of Egypt said that the Conference on Disarmament was the sole multilateral body for nuclear disarmament negotiations and progress on that issue should be geared towards making that body function. Lack of political will was the major obstacle in the Conference to addressing its four core issues. The establishment of a working group as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly would contribute to advancing the work of the disarmament machinery. He called for efforts to be made towards a comprehensive convention banning nuclear weapons and on all Member States to participate in the working group in good faith to achieve those goals.
The representative of Israel, explaining her abstention on “L.25” regarding a fissile material cut-off treaty, said that in the Middle East, several States had a poor track record of compliance with non-proliferation obligations. The notion of a fissile material cut-off treaty was subsumed in the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, efforts towards which were still far from being realized.
Explaining her vote against “L.41.rev.1”, the Republic of Korea’s representative said her country shared the international community’s concern about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and also its quest to achieve a world without them. But that goal was only attainable within a practical and constructive process in which all States were able to engage in a balanced manner. Regrettably, the Republic of Korea had been unable to sustain its support for the draft because of its concerns about some provisions that were added this year.
The representative of Norway, explaining his abstention on “L.41.rev.1”, said that while he recognized progress made on disarmament, he shared the impatience that more had not been made. That shared goal needed initiatives to mobilize and inspire States towards common steps. Norway had encouraged the United States and the Russian Federation to start new rounds of negotiations for further reductions of their arsenals, and also had called for the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. However, a ban on nuclear weapons would not move the world closer to their total elimination, but might in fact further polarize and undermine the NPT. Norway had supported the draft in recent years, but it now contained some language that was problematic.
The representative of Iran, speaking in explanation of his vote on “L.25”, said the principal position of his country with regard to banning fissile materials was clear, and the most serious threat to international peace and security was the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their vertical and horizontal proliferation. No legal or security reasons could justify such weapons, and their total elimination was the only guarantee against their intentional or accidental use. The best practical measure towards that goal was the urgent commencement of negotiations and conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning them, under strict international verification. He strongly supported calls in the Committee for the adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament, and negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention must be at the top of its agenda.
Any instrument to ban the production of fissile material, he went on, should be comprehensive and non-discriminatory, and its scope should cover past, present and future production. Such an instrument should oblige all nuclear-weapon States without exception to completely end their production of fissile material for weapons and to declare and destroy their stockpiles, within a specified timeframe. Operative paragraph 2 of “L.25”, regarding the report of the Group of Governmental Experts, was not factual, and a thorough review of its report revealed that it was replete with differences of opinions among experts. On operative paragraph 4, whether and how the Conference would consider any report or proposal was its prerogative and no other body could decide that.
The representative of Pakistan, explaining the vote on “L.13/Rev.1”, said his country had always supported disarmament and achieving a world without nuclear weapons. His delegation understood the frustration with the lack of progress, however, it did not support efforts that sought to undermine the Conference on Disarmament through United Nations General Assembly processes not agreed by consensus. Pakistan had therefore abstained on that draft resolution.
On “L.52/Rev.1,” he said Pakistan supported the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and believed that adherence to the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the United Nations Charter was essential. His delegation greatly valued Kazakhstan’s efforts to engage on the text over a couple of years, and as a result of broad consultations this year, the text of the draft resolution had become more streamlined. However, despite those efforts, some key conceptual divergences could not be breached in the draft declaration. Pakistan, in line with its well-known position on the NPT, was not in a position to support proposals that emanated from treaties to which it was not a party, or which did not take into consideration the rights of States. It therefore had to abstain on “L.52/Rev.1”.
On “L.41/Rev.1”, he said Pakistan appreciated efforts made by the draft’s sponsors to streamline the text and to take out some if not all of the controversial elements. Pakistan agreed with the importance of several aspects of the draft; however his delegation was dismayed by the ritualistic and unrealistic assertion for Pakistan to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon-State. As a non-party to the NPT, Pakistan did not subscribe to the Treaty, including its universality. His delegation had abstained on the draft as a whole and had voted against operative paragraph 13.
The representative of Cuba said her delegation had voted in favour of “L.13/Rev.1”. Considering the consternation found in the Conference on Disarmament, which had been stagnant for several years, it was understandable that a growing number of States were calling for negotiations to begin in the General Assembly, given the moribund Conference. The draft resolution reflected the desires and concerns of the international community. Cuba would have preferred that the General Assembly working group, established under that resolution, could have had a better-defined and clearer mandate, aimed at achieving agreement on concerted and effective legal measures to deliver nuclear disarmament. Moreover, as Cuba had shared with the text’s co-sponsors, it was important that the working group be situated in New York, which was the only duty station where all Member States were represented; several delegations would be put at a disadvantage, particularly those from developing countries including Non-Aligned Movement members, if negotiations were held elsewhere. Further, 15 working days in one year, as the maximum set, was not sufficient for the body to fulfil its mandate.
The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea welcomed “L.58” and “L.55”. He said his country respected the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon-States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones when freely arrived at among regional States. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea enjoyed long-standing relations with countries of South-East Asia and Africa, and was a signatory of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as well as an active member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It would respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia and Africa.
Explaining position on “L.13/Rev.1” and “L.52/Rev.1,” the representative of the Russian Federation said that in those documents, one could see a “very dangerous illusion” marked by heightened expectations, such as that proposed in “L.13/Rev.1” on the open-ended working group. In his view, that group had no chance of being successful and simply ignored the most fundamental principles of the consensus negotiating process on arms control. The Committee had heard many statements on the need to accelerate nuclear disarmament. There was a famous saying that if one wanted to move quickly, one had to move alone. If the international community really wanted to move forward in the right direction, it needed to move forward on that path together, carefully checking every single step taken. Movement purely for the sake of movement was movement to nowhere. Movement was needed in the direction of strengthening international stability, and that included the disarmament process and concluding nuclear disarmament, as was enshrined in the NPT.
The current picture was an unfortunate one, he said. The Committee’s session had shown that a number of States were blindly moving away from real, genuine preparation for comprehensive disarmament negotiations, and the Russian Federation was left with the impression that some simply did not understand, or refused to understand, how negotiations that were free from double standards needed to be led. There was a very dangerous trend wherein a number of States not only failed to listen to each other, but they did not even want to hear what their partners were saying to them. Yesterday, after a resolution that had been criticized by the five nuclear Powers had been removed, a very curious thing had taken place: one State all of a sudden began to strongly criticize that resolution and the State that had sponsored it, not even paying attention to the fact that the text had just been withdrawn. It seemed that some delegations received instructions to exacerbate tensions, regardless of what was happening in the real world. That was a very dangerous symptom.
He said that the serious shortcomings that had been witnessed at the 2015 NPT Review Conference were worsening. At that review, one Government that possessed a great deal of influence had simply destroyed the process for the benefit of another State that was not even a member of the NPT. That situation reflected what was happening in the First Committee, where there was a fertile breeding ground for voluntary, liberal interpretations of the NPT. Those that did not like certain of its provisions simply decided that they did not exist. Some States did not seem to know the preambular paragraphs or article VI. He asked delegations to “open the little booklet containing the Treaty and look at the preambular”.
The Russian Federation had voted against “L.13/Rev.1” and had abstained on “L.52/Rev.1”, the delegate said. Significant attention was devoted in those drafts to humanitarian consequences, by which States continued to play with very serious topics. One was left with the impression that this was not November 2015 but October of 1945, and that States had not had the opportunity to learn the lessons of the nuclear bombing of two Japanese cities by the United States. He asked delegations to return to reality; whether or not they “liked something”, it was still necessary to reach agreements and take mutual interests into account. There were no other paths towards general disarmament, arms control and nuclear disarmament, and he urged all present to look at Russia’s proposal. Only in those conditions could the international community expect results.
Cluster 2, Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
In a general statement on that cluster, BOGUSŁAW WINID (Poland) said that, as the sole sponsor of the Chemical Weapons Convention draft resolution, “L.27/Rev.1”, his country considered it of paramount importance to introduce this text. Support of the Convention was particularly necessary as questions had mounted over Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reports about the use of chemical weapons. Poland had tried to reflect in the text as accurately as possible the current state of that body’s findings and implementation. It had also referred to ongoing activities of the international community on cases of chemical weapons use in Syria. Achieving consensus on the issue had proved extremely challenging. There had been progress in the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and Syria had made significant strides in that regard just before joining the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. At the same time, recent uses of such weapons struck at very base of the Convention. He called on all relevant bodies to investigate and clarify the matter, and that call was captured in the draft resolution. Its main objective was still to express support for the full and universal implementation of the Convention and appreciation for the work of the OPCW.
Next, explaining his vote before the vote on “L.27/Rev.1”, the Russian Federation’s representative said that he would be forced to abstain. He underscored that his country had consistently advocated the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and for the full destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles as rapidly as possible. He noted the importance of good-faith implementation of the Convention’s obligations by the Syrian Government. Undertaken under very difficult conditions of international terrorism, the State military chemical programme had been eliminated. That represented a common achievement and should have been reflected in “L.27/Rev.1”. Instead, at the last minute and under strong pressure exerted by one of the partners, the paragraphs about Syria eliminating its weapons had disappeared, and new paragraphs had arisen. Those included operative paragraph 10, regarding remaining technical questions about Syria. Such questions could and should be resolved in an orderly fashion, in the framework of the OPCW, in keeping with its established procedures. There was no need to give a topic any political resonance by referring to or removing it from the resolution.
He went on to recall the commencement of the process of the Convention 20 years ago when the sponsors assured everyone that with their assistance, by 2007, the world would be free of chemical weapons. Back then, the Russian Federation had stated that technically, that was impossible. He called for objectivity. Chemical weapon demilitarization within very short established timelines with the full cooperation of the OPCW, China, United States, his own country and others remained an enormous achievement. But the Syrian Government had achieved that. The representatives of the civilized world did not want a repetition of heinous cases where someone here stepped up and held up papers, waved around those papers and after that, fabricated pretexts and eliminated one of the major States in the Middle East. Over 1 million people in that State had been killed. He questioned whether anyone was ready to consider the issue. The Russian Federation considered such scenarios unacceptable for a civilized community. The attempt had been made to adopt the resolution by consensus this year, and he was puzzled that other partners preferred another path; that of increasing tension around Syria and undermining the Convention itself. The Russian Federation disagreed with that dangerous approach and would be forced to abstain.
The representative of Syria, in explanation of his vote on “L.27.rev.1”, said that Syria had acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention based on his Government’s conviction and wise initiatives from the Russian Federation, that the use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, was immoral and condemnable. That accession was also based on seeking to free the Middle East of all forms of weapons of mass destruction, at the forefront of which were nuclear weapons, and to prove to the world that Syria was against all such weapons. It was a fully qualified State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and participated in its meetings and discussions like any other State. It had continued since its accession to commit to the decisions of the OPCW’s Executive Council, had implemented all commitments required and had constructively cooperated with all OPCW activities.
He said that the Syrian Government strongly condemned chemical weapons and demanded that the United Nations exert pressure on Arab, regional and international parties that were sponsoring terrorism in Syria to cease their support of such organisations active in the country and to stop supplying them with chemical weapons, which had been used against Syrian civilians and its army more than once. He reiterated his demand to cease politicization of the issue and unfounded accusations levelled against his Government. There were no longer any chemical weapons or programmes in Syria, as they had been eliminated. Remaining technical issues were being followed up by Syria with the OPCW in a cooperative manner.
Syria, he went on, had exerted efforts to arrive at a balanced consensus. However, other delegations, at the forefront of which was the United States, had neglected everything achieved until now and had dealt in double standards. The United States and others following its lead were claiming once again that they were eager to free the Middle East of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, but reports and studies indicated that Israel was the State in possession of the largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East. However, that had not been enough to motivate the United States and its allies to pressure Israel to join the related treaties. Reports confirmed that Israel had used chemical weapons more than once since 1948. Most recently, the Goldstone Report of 2009 confirmed Israel’s use of white phosphorus and uranium in the Gaza Strip. But that had not been enough for the United States and other protectors of Israel to condemn its actions as a threat to international peace and security. The policy of fabricating accusations against certain States in the Middle East had become a game of manipulation known to everyone.
He said that “L.27/Rev.1” was politicized and was no longer a technical resolution consensually adopted. Instead, it targeted certain countries to serve political interests to attack the Syrian Government. That biased approach against Syria forced him to abstain from voting on the resolution as a whole and to vote against preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10.
Explaining position on “L.27/Rev.1,” the representative of Cuba said it was regrettable that for the second time in a row since that resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention was presented in the Committee, it required a recorded vote, whereas it previously had not. Scrapping that consensus benefitted nobody. Cuba attached a great deal of importance to that convention, and, as a State party, actively participated in the OPCW. The General Assembly was not the appropriate forum for rehashing discussions that had taken place in the OPCW in The Hague. Quite the contrary, the Assembly was the forum in which States should and must promote and consolidate unity in support of that Convention.
He said that his country had worked actively with the sponsors of “L.27/Rev.1” to see if a better balance could be found. Unfortunately, Cuba’s opinions had not been taken into adequate account. As it stood, the draft contained politicized elements and did not reflect the work carried out under the Convention in the past year. In preambular paragraph 5, an unnecessary reference was made to Security Council resolutions that did not link to the core objective of “L.27/Rev.1”. The balanced paragraphs previously in the text, on the process of chemical weapons destruction, were now gone. In their place, other provisions had crept in, which were not balanced. For those reasons, his delegation would abstain on the separate votes on preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10.
Also on “L.27/Rev.1”, the representative of Venezuela said her country was a State party to the Convention and was fully committed to it principles. The use of chemical weapons constituted a war crime and a crime against humanity, and she condemned their use by anyone, anywhere in the world. For those reasons, her delegation would vote in favour of “L.27/Rev.1”. However, it was disappointed by preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10, because they sought to undermine the noble history that had underpinned the record of consensus. The inclusion of those two paragraphs had politicized the draft, and opened the door to disunity. A small group of countries should not be able to sow disharmony and discord in areas that had previously enjoyed consensus. For those reasons her delegation would vote against those two paragraphs.
The representative of South Africa, also on “L.27/Rev.1”, said his delegation wished to place on record the unequivocal commitment and support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and its full and effective implementation. However, he regretted the decision to re-open the draft resolution tabled by Poland, which had been balanced in providing an accurate reflection of the issue being dealt with in the context of the Convention. He particularly regretted the decision to delete references in the original draft to the significant progress made in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and the successful efforts by all those involved in the destruction process, which illustrated the vital importance of international cooperation. That was unfortunate. The resolution should also have acknowledged the unprecedented short time within which the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons programme had been achieved. His delegation was concerned by efforts to politicize the OPCW’s work. It would nevertheless vote in favour of “L.27/Rev.1”, given the importance of the Convention and the ongoing work of the OPCW.
Explaining her vote in favour of “L.27.Rev.1”, the representative of Nicaragua said that her country supported the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the destruction of all existing arsenals of such weapons. She welcomed progress made in those processes and new States parties to the Convention. However, she would abstain on the paragraphs on Syria because they negated the balanced nature of the resolution. Those provisions recognizing the progress made by Syria had been omitted. That politicized a resolution that should instead have recognized progress. As a nation in a zone of peace, Nicaragua roundly condemned the use of chemical weapons wherever it occurred. But the resolution singled out a country that had demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, especially when other elements had been omitted from the resolution, including the terrorism to which that country had been subjected. She made an urgent appeal to the co-sponsors to reconsider their position so that, in future, they did not fall into a biased approach to a significant resolution.
The representative of India said that he would vote in favour of “L.27/Rev.1”, despite his concerns about way it had evolved. That was in keeping with India’s longstanding support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the resolution, which had traditionally been adopted without a vote. Poland had traditionally been the lead sponsor of the resolution and Hungary was the chief sponsor of the Biological Weapons Convention resolution. Those special resolutions had been on the books for a very long time and a tradition has been built to adopt them by consensus. Because of that, they had remained in the hands of those delegations. The co-sponsors bore a special responsibility to see that there was consensus. If that tradition was broken repeatedly, alternative resolutions might come forward on the same subject, which would be a great pity. He urged the Committee to return as quickly as possible to consensus in future meetings. While underlining that, India would, for this year, continue to vote in favour of the resolution.
Algeria’s representative, explaining his vote on “L.27/Rev.1”, said that it had been revised. He wanted its content to be generic and focus on those positive elements that had characterized the global implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention which, year after year, was coming closer to its objective of a world free of chemical weapons. Algeria would abstain from voting on those two paragraphs in the resolution, which did not serve the resolution or any party or the Syrian chemical weapons issue as per the reports on the destruction of such weapons. He urged avoiding the politicization of the issue.
Also in explanation of his vote on “L.27/Rev.1”, the representative of Iran said that, as the main victim of chemical weapons use in recent history, it attached great importance to the full implementation of the Convention. The total destruction of those stockpiles remained the objective of the Convention; their continued existence undermined its credibility. Major possessor States parties should accelerate their efforts under the Convention. The General Assembly resolutions regarding the Convention had been adopted without a vote for two decades. This year, they would fail to achieve consensus as a result of politically motivated attempts by the United States to highlight a specific State party to the Convention in an unbalanced manner. That could have been avoided if the sponsor had taken everyone’s views into account. He called on Poland as the sole sponsor of the draft to alter its approach and keep the resolution from politicization. Its main aim was to reflect global consensus, promote the Convention’s implementation and uphold the norm against those weapons. Technical issues related to the Convention’s implementation should be addressed within the OPCW. He welcomed the progress made in Syria, which would not have been possible without the cooperation of its Government. It was unfortunate that the resolution had overlooked that fact without due regard for the views expressed by many delegations. He would vote against those provisions and abstain from the resolution as a whole.
Next, the Committee turning the draft resolution, introduced by Poland, on the Chemical Weapons Convention (document A/C.1/70/L.27/Rev.1), by which the General Assembly would urge all States parties to meet in full and on time their obligations and to support the OPCW in its implementation activities.
Prior to action on the resolution as a whole, the Committee voted to retain preambular paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 141 in favour to 4 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela), with 17 abstentions. That provision would have the Assembly reaffirm the broad support for the decision of the OPCW’s Director General to send a mission to establish the facts surrounding the allegations of the use of toxic chemicals, reportedly chlorine, for hostile purposes in Syria. It would also have the Assembly reemphasize its unequivocal support for the decision of the Director General to continue the mission, while stressing that the safety and security of mission personnel remain the top priority.
The Committee also retained operative paragraph 10, by a recorded vote of 136 in favour to 4 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela), with 20 abstentions. That provision would have the Assembly underscore the substantial unresolved issues, including the gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies identified by the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat in its report, stressing the importance of verifying that the Syrian declaration and related submissions were accurate and complete. It would note that the Executive Council had requested the Technical Secretariat and Syria to expedite their efforts to resolve those gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies and further request the Director General to provide a report to the Council at its eighty-first session, which detailed all unresolved issues, in particular, specifying those on which no further progress had been possible.
The text as a whole was then approved by a recorded vote of 167 in favour to none against, with 4 abstentions (China, Iran, Russian Federation, Syria).
The representative of Ecuador said his country had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 14 January 1993, the second day after it was opened for signature. Ecuador did not, nor had it ever, possessed chemical weapons and had always condemned them. Although Ecuador had voted in favour of “L.27/Rev.1” as a symbol of its continued commitment and support for the Convention, his delegation had felt obliged to abstain from preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10, out of its belief that those introduced a lack of balance into the purposes and objectives of the resolution, the goal of which was not intended to refer in a detailed way to specific situations; those issues should be addressed in the OPCW context. He deplored the fact that, for the second time in a row, the resolution, which dealt with universal instruments, required recorded votes. Ninety-eight per cent of the world’s countries were party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and all had the right to see their criteria reflected in the resolution, which should not focus on one State, nor reflect only the views of a handful.
The representative of China said his country was a staunch supporter of the Convention and the work of OPCW, but it had been compelled to abstain on “L.27/Rev.1”. It was regrettable that the resolution failed to place sufficient emphasis on certain countries that had left chemical weapons behind after the Second World War. The resolution failed to fully acknowledge the important headway achieved in resolving the issue of chemical weapons in Syria, and instead had highlighted some technical questions, which was neither balanced nor fair.
The representative of Egypt said his delegation had wholeheartedly participated in the negotiations establishing the Convention and had always supported its aim. Egypt had voted in favour of “L.27/Rev.1”, despite discomfort regarding particular paragraphs, language and wording, and some important elements that were omitted. He also pointed out that there was only one State that was not party to any of the three treaties on weapons of mass destruction.
The representative of Pakistan said the Convention represented a success story of multilateralism and disarmament and had contributed to international peace and security. It was therefore unfortunate that the longstanding consensus had broken down. The Convention covered a number of issues, and Pakistan would have liked to see balance maintained in the draft. Even though Pakistan had voted in favour of the resolution, he nevertheless registered concern over the failure to bridge gaps, and urged the draft’s sponsor to make every effort to take into account the need for balance and conciseness.
The representative of the United States explained her position on “L.27/Rev.1” also on behalf of Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Croatia, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. She said those countries had joined consensus because they believed the resolution reflected the objectives and goal of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the extraordinary work of the OPCW. Equally important, the resolution accurately reflected the current realities and state of play on Syria’s obligations under the Convention, as well as the efforts of the international community to identify who was involved in chemical weapons use in Syria through a Joint Investigative Mechanism.
The international community, she continued, had been clear in its response to and condemnation of chemical weapons, including by supporting efforts to hold perpetrators responsible. The Mechanism sent a clear message to all those involved with chemical weapons attacks in Syria that the international community had “tools to identify you”. The Mechanism would soon be fully operational and would begin its important work to identify individuals, groups or Governments that were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons in Syria.
She said that the group of countries would continue to express strong support for the Mechanism, the OPCW and the declaration assessment team, to address the gaps and discrepancies in Syria’s declaration. Any effort to ignore those issues risked undermining the work of the international community to date, detracted from the work of the OPCW, and called into credibility the Convention. She remained deeply concerned that two years after the adoption of the 27 September OPCW Executive Council decision on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons in 2013, the world was still facing serious issues of chemical weapons use and undeclared chemical weapons. The international community must confront that reality and finish the work that had been started. The extraordinary situation in Syria was a test of that goal, and now, for the sake of all people everywhere, but especially for the Syrian people, the world must exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons.
Speaking in explanation of the vote “L.27/Rev.1”, the representative of Belarus said he had abstained from preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10 and voted in favour of the resolution as a whole. It was an “alarming trend” that a resolution that had been adopted by consensus until last year was increasingly becoming a politicized document. That was against the backdrop of the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme in a very complex situation with the cooperation of the Government. The provisions had a political subtext, narrowing the scope of a resolution devoted to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a virtually universal document. Concrete positive results achieved in a short period of time were being interpreted in an ambiguous way. He asked what signal would be sent to the General Assembly by the international community through the adoption of this resolution. Fewer chemical weapons were on the ground, which was the main thing. The politicization of arms control and creation of artificial tension was counter-productive and unacceptable.
The representative of Turkey said he had voted in favour of “L.27/Rev.1” to demonstrate strong support for the OPCW. He was also in favour of preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 10. However, he believed that the facts on the ground in Syria were not sufficiently reflected in the text. The repeated use of chemical weapons and barrel bombs by the Syrian Government against its own people was a violation of international norms. The destruction of chemical weapons in Syria should remain the OPCW’s top priority. The use of chlorine gas in Syria was an established fact, documented by that Organisation’s fact-finding mission and the Joint Investigative Mechanism. It was established that the regime was responsible for chemical weapon attacks against its own people, and that should not be tolerated. Turkey firmly believed that inaction with regard to chemical weapons in Syria was not acceptable. There was an emerging need for the Mechanism to become operational and prevent impunity for purveyors of such inhumane practices.
Also explaining his vote, the representative of Nigeria said that he had abstained from operative paragraph 10 because he did not see its relevance in the draft. That matter fell clearly and directly under the OPCW’s purview. He also failed to understand the provision for request by the General Assembly to provide a report to the Executive Council. It was an unnecessary provision because the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons already reported to its Executive Council and did not require the First Committee to tell it what to do. The resolution had now become politicized. He had voted in favour of the text as a whole but might reconsider that position if the sponsors continued to politicize it.
The representative of Israel said her country’s long-standing support for “L.27/Rev.1” was consonant with Israel’s signature to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, its strong support for the goals and purposes of that significant treaty, the close dialogue that Israel maintained with the OPCW, and the fact that Israel was a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Israel was concerned by the erosion of the absolute norm against the use of chemical weapons. Regrettably, on its border, a new and more lenient standard had evolved, which included Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention while retaining residual chemical weapons capabilities, such as research and development, the continued use of chlorine as well as other chemicals as means of warfare by the Syrian regime, the development of tactical uses of chemical weapons and the spread of chemical weapons to additional actors and areas. Under no circumstances could that abhorrent behaviour be accepted as the “new normal”. Israel welcomed the condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the ongoing and systematic use of chemical weapons in Syria in Security Council resolution 2209 (2015). It was unfortunate that of the 41 members of the OPCW’s Executive Council, that Iran chose to object to that resolution.
Cluster 3: Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)
VLADIMIR YERMAKOV (Russian Federation) said it was a good tradition that draft resolution “L.48” always enjoyed expanded co-sponsorship. He welcomed his United States’ colleagues and their constructive approach to transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space. It was important to continue work in that regard at the United Nations, but that work was at a standstill in the Third and Fourth Committees. In the First Committee, the effort should not replace the priority of preventing an arms race in outer space. Transparency and confidence-building measures should be part of the effort towards a legally binding treaty on preventing weapons in outer space and preventing force or threat of force against objects in outer space. He asked what could be clearer than taking on a legally binding commitment not to deploy weapons in outer space. The Russian transparency and confidence-building measures on no-first placement would provide a guarantee that outer space would remain free of any form of weaponry. That was a complex task, but he viewed those measures — and especially not being the first to place a weapon in outer space — as a significant step. The draft submitted by the United States, the Russian Federation and China could be considered a consensus document, as it enjoyed the co-sponsorship of more than 50 States.
The Committee proceeded to take action on a draft resolution, introduced by China, the Russian Federation and the United States, on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (document A/C.1/70/L.48), by which the Assembly would encourage Member States to continue to review and implement the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts.
The resolution as a whole was then approved without a vote.
The representative of India said his delegation had joined consensus on “L.48”, but regretted that India was not included in the Group of Governmental Experts. He said that more inclusive participation of space-faring nations would make a more meaningful contribution to international efforts.
Cluster 4, Conventional Weapons
In a general statement on that cluster, MAHMOUD SAIKAL (Afghanistan) said his delegation was honoured to table, for the first time, resolution “L.36” on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices. Those weapons, known as IED’s, had become an increasingly significant threat in recent years and had impacted a significant number of countries across all regions. Their effect on the security and stability of affected States was profound. Those weapons killed thousands of people every year, inflicted grievous physical harm, and spread fear and suspicion across communities. Their attacks hindered those countries’ political, social and economic development. As a country seriously affected by those weapons, Afghanistan hoped the focus on them could be strengthened. It also sought a comprehensive and holistic approach at the international level to address that growing threat. He thanked all co-sponsors of the draft and invited all other delegations to support its adoption.
Acting without a vote, the Committee then approved the draft resolution on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, introduced by Afghanistan, Australia and France (document A/C.1/70/L.36).
By its terms, the Assembly would urge States to develop and implement all necessary national measures to exercise vigilance over the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of precursor components and materials that could be used to make improvised explosive devices. It would also encourage States to develop and adopt their own policies to counter those devices, including civilian-military cooperation, strengthening their counter-measure capabilities to combat illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients’ use of such devices. Finally, the Assembly would encourage States to voluntarily share information on the illicit trade and transfers of commercial-grade explosives and commercially available detonators to illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients.
The Committee next took up a draft resolution on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (document A/C.1/70/L.39), by which the Assembly would encourage all relevant initiatives to successfully implement the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and would call on all Member States to contribute towards its continued implementation at all levels. The Assembly would also call on all States to implement the International Tracing Instrument by including the necessary information in their national reports.
That draft resolution was then approved without a vote.
Speaking in explanation of vote after the vote, the representative of Pakistan said his delegation had joined consensus on “L.36”. He shared the concerns over on the indiscriminate effects arising from unauthorized use of improvised explosive devices, however, he thought that could best be resolved through existing frameworks. The drafting process of the resolution was largely consultative, but some valuable proposals were regrettably not taken on board, and it would have been better to pursue a graduated approach in terms of reporting. Also, Member States should have been afforded an opportunity to express their views beforehand.
The representative of Austria said his delegation shared the concern over improvised explosives expressed in “L.36”, but said that those devices should not be seen in isolation from the challenges of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. His delegation wished to see that element included in the text.
The representative of Cuba said her delegation had joined consensus on “L.36” because it believed it was an important resolution, however, it did not necessarily support the text’s entire content. In operative paragraph 6, an appeal was made to Member States to support initiatives and decisions, the scope and content of which Cuba was not entirely familiar. That should not in any way prejudice Cuba’s national position with regard to those initiatives and decisions. On operative paragraph 10, although she appreciated the gesture made by Afghanistan to mention certain Security Council resolutions, Cuba did not believe they were directly linked to the issue at hand. While she supported the requests made in operative paragraph 16 for the Secretary-General to prepare a report, it was nonetheless premature that the first such report should already include recommendations, given that it would be based on the opinions of Member States.
Iran’s representative said that he would deliver his delegation’s explanation of vote on “L.36” in the General Assembly.
Cluster 5, Other Disarmament Measures and International Security
Acting without a vote, the Committee approved a draft on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (document A/C.1/70/L.45), which the Assembly would call on Member States to be guided in their use of those technologies by the 2015 report of the Group of Governmental Experts. It would also call on them to promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible strategies to address them.
Speaking in explanation of his vote after the vote on “L.45”, the representative of Cuba said that the hostile use of telecommunications with the concealed or expressed intention to undermine the political or economic system of a country was a violation of international norms and standards in that area and could give rise to tension and undermine international peace and security. The draft underscored the need to prevent the use of information and telecommunications for terrorist purposes. There was a strong potential for international conflict if such technologies were misused. Despite efforts undertaken, radio and television transmission of the United States still targeted Cuba, and that ran counter to the United Nations Charter and other norms and was an attack on Cuba’s sovereignty. The use of those broadcasts for propaganda was an act of meddling in the domestic affairs of a country. Illegal radio and television broadcasts falsified facts for destabilizing purposes. He hoped that the renewed diplomatic ties between the two countries would see an end to those policies.
Cluster 7, Disarmament Machinery
KIM WON-SOO, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, thanked the First Committee for putting the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on the path to more secure funding and for supporting “L.30”. The Institute’s budget had lost most of its purchasing power because it had not been adjusted for inflation, among other problems. The Department had been asked to prepare an assessment of the Institute’s staffing requirements by mid-2016, with the help of an internal expert. The outcome of the assessment would inform the Secretary-General’s proposal for additional requirements UNIDIR. That internal assessment would be separate from the independent third-party assessment in 2019. He thanked the Committee chair for his patience and persistent leadership and all members for their hard work and spirit of compromise. He hoped that spirit would guide the disarmament discourse into the future.
In a general statement, ALICE GUITTON (France), speaking on behalf of 23 Member States, said her country had presented “L.30” in 2010. Since the creation of UNIDIR by the special session on disarmament, it had made contributions to shared expertise within the framework of the disarmament community. It was independent, but also an integral part of the disarmament machinery. The Institute was facing several challenges, including the implementation of new accounting tools. Another challenge was its small structure and that its funding models differed from those of other United Nations agencies. Implementing a modernized management model was critical, as the Institute’s budgetary challenges were well known to all. It was financed by voluntary contributions. She strongly encouraged partners to increase their support and contribute to the created fund. There was a need to thoroughly rethink the Institute’s model to ensure its long-term viability. The resolution aimed not only to support it during this difficult time but, to prepare for the future as well so that did not happen again.
Action
Next, the Committee took action on a draft introduced by France on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (document A/C.1/70/L.30), which would have the Assembly reiterate its conviction that the Institute should continue to conduct independent research on problems relating to disarmament and security and to undertake specialized research requiring a high degree of expertise.
That draft was then approved without a vote.
In explanation of its position on “L.30”, the representative of the United States, speaking on behalf of Japan, United Kingdom and her own country, said she had joined consensus on this resolution. Their position also underscored a continued commitment to support United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and its transition to Umoja and International Public Sector Accounting Standards. The long-term support of the Institute would need more than an infusion of funds. She called attention to operative paragraph 10 which called for commissioning an independent assessment for a sustainable model and funding structure. The results of that assessment should guide the 2018-9 budget discussions. She expressed disappointment that the resolution did not require it to be completed before the 74th session. She highlighted the need for an independent assessment before the 2018-9 budget cycle, to provide better understanding and give the Secretariat an opportunity to explore all options.
The representative of the Netherlands, explaining his position on “L.30” said that United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research had fulfilled a role in the past and could do so in the future. It had a long history of working together with the Netherlands, and the Institute’s work was of high quality and benefitted Member States in different disarmament forums. Its challenges extended beyond its financial situation. In view of the need for an efficient and result-oriented organization, it would benefit from an assessment. It had to deal with institutional and structural challenges. An assessment should also look into the Institute’s management model.
Right of Reply
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Syria said he wished to respond to the baseless allegations of the Israeli and the Turkish regime, saying that the delegate from Israel had an extremely short-term memory. Yesterday, she and her delegation had fully disregarded the fact that a draft resolution had been withdrawn and had insisted on attacking a Member State that had recently signed one of the most successful nuclear weapons agreements in history. The way she talked, one would think that her regime was a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the NPT, when in fact her country was a member of neither. He said he could not understand why her regime did not join those conventions first. Her country was the first to have used chemical weapons in the Middle East, in 1948.
As for the statement made by the Turkish regime, he said the OPCW fact-finding mission had visited Syria once and had produced three reports that were full of professional and scientific mistakes. That fact-finding mission had worked from Turkey, which provided terrorists with all kinds of weapons, including chemical weapons and toxic materials.
Also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of Turkey said he rejected the allegations of the Syrian regime and would continue to stand with the Syrian people.
The representative of Israel said that perhaps she should not be surprised that a country with so many inconsistencies and discrepancies in its report to the OPCW should be stating untruths and fabrications to the First Committee.
Closing
The Committee then adopted the provisional programme of work for its 2016 session.
In closing, the Chair thanked the Committee for its intensive discussion and lively debates and noted the increase in participation. During the general debate, 112 speakers had taken the floor, which was five more than last year. Some 273 statements had delivered during the thematic clusters, compared to 191 two years ago, amounting to a 40 per cent increase in participation. The First Committee covered a broad spectrum of challenges, and he said he was heartened by the commitment of the Committee and all Member States to address them. In the words of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, he said that everyone in human history shared a common destiny, and it could only be mastered if it was faced together.