Nuclear Weapons Retention Cedes Moral High Ground to Non-State Actors, First Committee Hears in Thematic Debate, following Briefings by Agency Chiefs
Any peace based on deterrence was akin to peace between two persons pointing guns at each other’s heads with their fingers on the trigger, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) heard today as it began its thematic discussion on nuclear weapons, with briefings by the heads of the relevant organizations and agencies.
The representative of Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), rejected the faulty logic that underpinned the cold war deterrence framework, and said that scenario reflected an unstable peace that was fraught with danger and prone to miscalculation. Nuclear weapons constituted a crime against humanity and a violation of international law and were, paradoxically, of no use in addressing contemporary security threats. Moreover, their existence and threat of use ceded the moral high ground to rogue States and non-State actors.
Setting the tone for the debate, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament said the ongoing stalemate at his Geneva-based Conference was damaging for its image and an affront to the millions of people around the world who were looking to the United Nations for action on that “primordial issue”. The Conference could play a pivotal role in disarmament as it was the only standing multilateral forum on that topic.
“Enough of the excuses already,” declared Mexico’s representative, agreeing the scaling up of the cold-war rhetoric was cause for concern. Of the Conference, he said that it was designed to deliver results only when the two “super-Powers” decided to agree. The Conference had fulfilled its mandate only at the end of the cold war and the short honeymoon period that followed. It remained a body with restricted membership, excluding two-thirds of the United Nations membership, including the great majority of the Non-Aligned Movement countries. Although that might have been acceptable at one time, it certainly was not now.
“We are no magicians,” the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs said of the United Nations. It welcomed the challenge of its expanding role, but without dependable resourcing and political support, its efforts would be futile. On the positive side, he highlighted the re-energizing of the United Nations’ relationship with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) preparatory commission, and called on all States that had not ratified it to do so urgently; every ratification strengthened the norm against testing.
In that connection, the Executive Secretary General of CTBTO said operationalizing the Treaty would greatly increase capacity to address proliferation and advance prospects for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Action was still needed to secure the future of the Treaty as a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing and the nuclear arms race. National security decisions were made in good faith, with the expectation that the Treaty would become legally binding. Countries should finish the job done by the experts.
While responsibility for ensuring nuclear security lay with national Governments, said the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there was wide recognition of her Agency’s central role in that regard. The most important area of unfinished business in nuclear security was the need to bring into force the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which had been adopted 10 years ago. Doing so would expand the Convention’s coverage to include the protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, and of nuclear facilities from sabotage.
The Deputy Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) said that by this time last year, the OPCW had overseen the removal of chemical weapons from Syria and verified the destruction of 98.8 per cent of its chemical arsenal. Since then, it had focused on three areas of activity in Syria: clarifying its initial declaration; coordinating the destruction of 12 chemical weapons production facilities; and establishing the facts regarding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.
“Never before has the OPCW operated at such an active tempo under such intense international scrutiny, and at a time of transition for the Organisation, as it sought to recalibrate its priorities and operational posture for the post-chemical weapons destruction phase. That stage was rapidly approaching with more than 90 per cent of declared stockpiles destroyed, overall.
Also speaking today were representatives of Austria (on behalf of the Humanitarian Initiative), Indonesia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Uruguay (on behalf of the Union of South American Nations), Jamaica (on behalf of the Caribbean Community), South Africa (on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition), Mexico, Switzerland, United States, Chile (on behalf of the De-Alerting Group), Algeria, France, Austria (national capacity and on behalf of the Humanitarian Initiative), Portugal and Israel.
The First Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, 20 October, to continue its thematic debate on nuclear weapons.
Briefings
KIM WON-SOO, Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, spoke of the expanding role of the United Nations with respect to its work on weapons of mass destruction. As examples, he recommended examining the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as engagement with the Nuclear Security Summits, in which the United Nations coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Interpol and others to share best practices and mobilize resources. He highlighted the re-energizing of the United Nations’ relationship with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) preparatory commission, and called on all States that had not ratified that Treaty to do so urgently, because “every new ratification strengthens the norm against nuclear testing”.
He also emphasized the need to improve outreach and public education on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. In that vein, he expressed excitement about the United Nations Poster for Peace Contest being launched today by the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Though a “modest endeavour”, the contest aimed to encourage younger generations in particular to be motivated by that important global issue, and he supported the Secretary-General’s call on the world’s peoples to “rise up and demand action”. While the United Nations welcomed the challenge of increasing capacities, out of its belief in the mandate to create international peace and security. However, he added, “we are not magicians”. He called for dependable resourcing and political support, without which “our efforts will be futile”.
LASSINA ZERBO, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, said it was necessary to reignite the spirit of the 1990s and go beyond the “business-as-usual” approach of recent years. It was necessary to further disarmament, because they would lead the process and see it through. Operationalizing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would greatly increase the capacity of the international community to address proliferation and advance prospects for those weapons’ eventual elimination. In the current millennium, there had only been one county that had violated the moratorium on nuclear testing. Action was still needed to secure the future of the Treaty as a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing and the nuclear arms race.
He said that nuclear weapons and nuclear testing had a dangerous and destabilizing impact on global security, as well as a negative impact on the environment. More than $1 billion had so far been invested in the most sophisticated and far-reaching verification regime ever conceived. Significant national security decisions were made in good faith, with the expectation that the Treaty would become legally binding, in line with international law. Countries should finish the job done by experts. The challenges of disarmament and non-proliferation required bold ideas and global solutions, as well as the active engagement of stakeholders from all corners of the world. Equally important was building capacity among the next generation of experts, who would carry the endeavours forward.
MICHAEL MØLLER, Secretary General of the Conference on Disarmament, expressed frustration at the limited progress of the Geneva-based body. The ongoing stalemate was damaging for its image and an “affront” to the millions of people around the world who were looking to the United Nations for action on that “primordial issue”. There was little reason for optimism on multilateral disarmament, with the inability of the recent Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to reach an outcome, and the non-entry into force of the CTBT after 20 years. The Conference could play a pivotal role in disarmament as it was the only standing multilateral forum on that topic, and if it was abolished, it would be difficult to reinvent it in the current climate.
There were some areas of agreement and common ground on some of the issues, he said, citing the Chemical Weapons Convention and the in-depth discussions that had recently taken place in the Conference on matters of substance, despite its long-time impasse. In order to move forward, the Conference did not need to aim exclusively at negotiating legally binding instruments, even though that was the ideal goal; voluntary politically-binding regimes could eventually evolve into legally-binding ones. Also, the rule of consensus central to the Conference had become a matter of unanimity, which caused much of the blockage, and he disagreed with that interpretation. He insisted that progress could be made with agreement on less stifling interpretations.
He also discussed his concerns about the future of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), noting that the Institute had supported the disarmament community with policy-relevant work, and made an indispensable intellectual contribution to disarmament discussions in Geneva and beyond, at a time when other parts of the disarmament machinery were underperforming. The “Institute punches far above its weight”, and he was concerned at its financial difficulties. The Institute’s funding could no longer be postponed.
HAMID ALI RAO, Deputy Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, said at this time last year, the Organisation had successfully overseen the removal of chemical weapons from Syria and verified the destruction of 98.8 per cent of the country’s chemical arsenal. Since then, it had focused on three areas of activity in Syria: clarifying its initial declaration; coordinating the destruction of 12 chemical weapons production facilities; and establishing the facts regarding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon.
Those processes were continuing and had produced tangible results, such as the destruction of 10 of the 12 production facilities, he said. The Security Council had adopted resolution 2235 (2015) in August, which authorized the creation of an OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mission to identify the perpetrators or sponsors of chlorine and other attacks in Syria. “Never before has the OPCW operated at such an active tempo under such intense international scrutiny, and at a time of transition for the Organisation, as it sought to recalibrate its priorities and operational posture for the post-chemical weapons destruction phase. That stage was rapidly approaching with more than 90 per cent of declared stockpiles destroyed, overall.
Two factors needed to be considered, he went on. First, was that much destruction-related work remained to be done, and abandoned chemical weapons could create a challenge beyond 2013 as old such weapons were discovered. OPCW also had to plan for the possibility of new members declaring a stockpile. Secondly, the threat horizon had changed dramatically as non-State actors sought to acquire and use such weapons. Persistent reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had several implications for the Organisation’s future responsiveness and effectiveness. Regarding technical capabilities, the organisation needed a mechanism to retain the expertise of inspectors and analysts as they completed their 7‑year tenure or retired. Universality and implementation must be both qualitative and quantitative. However, more than 50 States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention did not have implementing legislation in place or effective enforcement capacity.
Regarding the threat of non-State actors, OPCW’s open-ended working group on terrorism had met three times this year and established a sub-working group earlier this month to develop recommendations on how to best further the global terrorism efforts. Regarding resources for contingency operations, the OPCW was arranging to support the work of the Joint Investigative mechanism in Syria. “What all of these four issues point to is the imperative to maintain the effectiveness of the OPCW’s verification regime,” he said.
TRACY BROWN, Acting Representative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said that since its establishment in 1957, the IAEA had worked tirelessly to fulfil its mandate to advance the contribution of atomic energy to peace while guarding against its misuse. It was through the implementation of safeguards that the Agency was able to independently verify the correctness and completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear programmes. Safeguards were meant to provide credible assurances that States were fulfilling their international obligations, and were currently in force in 182 States, of which 174 were non-nuclear-weapon States with comprehensive safeguards agreements under the NPT. However, 12 non‑nuclear‑armed States had yet to conclude and bring into force their NPT safeguard agreements.
It was encouraging that the number of States with additional protocols in force now stood at 126, she said. The global nuclear landscape continued to change. More countries were considering or already preparing to build new nuclear power plants. The safeguards, since their inception, had continually evolved, taking into account changes in technology. The IAEA had engaged extensively with member States on the conceptualization and development of safeguard implementation at the national level. The Agency also stood ready to contribute to the certification of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons programmes and, upon request, to international verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.
Since 1995, the IAEA’s member States had reported nearly 2,800 incidents involving radioactive material escaping regulatory control, she said. A relatively small amount of radioactive material could be combined with conventional explosives to produce a dirty bomb. Such a weapon could be capable of killing many people, contaminating large urban areas and sparking mass panic. Responsibility for ensuring nuclear security lay with national Governments, but there was wide recognition of the Agency’s central role to help strengthen the global nuclear security framework. The most important area of unfinished business in nuclear security was the need to bring into force the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which had been adopted 10 years ago. Bringing the amendment into force would expand the coverage of the Convention to include the protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, and the protection of nuclear facilities against acts of sabotage.
Statements
THOMAS HAJNOCZI (Austria), speaking on behalf of the Humanitarian Initiative, said that the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation, irrespective of the cause, would not be constrained by national borders and could have regional and even global consequences, causing destruction, death and displacement as well as profound and long-term damage to the environment, climate, human health and well-being, socioeconomic development, social order and could even threaten the survival of humankind. The scope, scale and interrelationship of the humanitarian consequences caused by the nuclear-weapon detonations were catastrophic and more complex than commonly understood; those could be large scale and potentially irreversible.
As long as nuclear weapons existed, she said, there remained the possibility of a nuclear-weapon explosion. Even if the probability was considered low, given the catastrophic consequence of a detonation, the risk was unacceptable. The risks of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized or intentional use of nuclear weapons were evident due to the vulnerability of nuclear command and control networks to human error and cyber-attacks, the high-alert levels of nuclear arsenals, forward deployment and modernization. As nuclear deterrence entailed preparing for nuclear war, the risk of nuclear-weapon use was real. No State or international body could adequately address the immediate humanitarian emergency or long-term consequences caused by such a detonation in a populated area, or provide adequate assistance to those affected. The catastrophic consequences of a detonation event and the risks associated with the mere existence of those weapons raised profound ethical and moral questions that transcended legal discussions and interpretations.
KAMAPRADIPTA ISNOMO (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Non‑Aligned Movement, said that the international community had waited too long for the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. Advancing nuclear disarmament should not be held hostage to progress on non-proliferation or the perceived notions of strategic stability. As such, the Movement underscored the importance of General Assembly resolution 69/58, which provided a concrete pathway to realizing nuclear disarmament. It also welcomed the growing focus on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, including at the three conferences held at Nayarit, Oslo and Vienna. The Movement reiterated its concern over the military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that set out rationales for the use or threat of use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
He recalled the opposition expressed by the United States, United Kingdom and Canada at the concluding session of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and expressed disappointment that, as a result of that opposition, consensus regarding the process to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction had not been achieved. The Movement reaffirmed the inalienable right of each State to develop, research, produce and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and called for the immediate removal of any limitations or restrictions on exports to them of nuclear material, equipment and technology, consistent with the provisions of relevant multilateral treaties.
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, he went on, were positive steps towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, the Movement demanded that Israel, which alone in the region had not joined the NPT, renounce any possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without precondition or delay, and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. While the Movement remained ready to engage constructively with all countries to fulfil the collective vision of a world free from nuclear weapons, that vision could only be realized if all parties demonstrated the required political will and action.
CRISTINA CARRIÓN (Uruguay), speaking on behalf of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), said that group joined the efforts of the international community in moving towards the negotiation of a universal and legally binding multilateral instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons, as their total elimination was the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. She was deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, and congratulated Mexico for holding the Nayarit Conference. She reiterated the Union’s commitment to the NPT and to the balanced implementation of its three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The States of the Union also deeply regretted the failure to implement the agreement reached at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to hold a conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
As members of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, UNASUR, she said, urged all nuclear-weapon States to withdraw all interpretive declarations to the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s Protocol, which would help to eliminate the risk of the use of nuclear weapons against the countries of that region. She called on nuclear-armed States to eliminate the role those weapons played in their doctrines, security policies and military strategies, in order to reach the complete elimination of those lethal weapons, regardless of their type and location.
COURTENAY RATTRAY (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that nuclear weapons constituted a crime against humanity and a violation of international law and were, paradoxically, of no use in addressing contemporary security threats. They served no purpose in combatting transnational organized crime, preventing terrorism, violent extremism or curbing cyberwarfare. Rather, they bred a climate of insecurity that heightened the risk of proliferation. Moreover, their existence and the threat of their use ceded the moral high ground to rogue States and non-State actors, which sought a convenient argument to excuse their own excesses. There was a growing and palpable sense of dissatisfaction among most non-nuclear-weapon States with the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to live up to their obligations under the NPT’s article VI.
He rejected the faulty logic that underpinned the cold war deterrence framework, and agreed that any peace created by deterrence was akin to peace that existed between two persons pointing guns at each other’s heads with their fingers on the trigger. That scenario reflected an unstable, tense peace that was fraught with danger and prone to miscalculation. The world could not continue to ignore those realities, which served to undermine the efficacy of the NPT. CARICOM States had joined efforts to place humanitarian concerns at the forefront of the discourse and actions on nuclear weapons, as well as its inclusion on the First Committee’s agenda. Eliminating nuclear-weapons tests remained a critical element in the overall process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and he urged the eight remaining Annex II States to enable the CTBT’s entry into force.
MICHIEL COMBRINK (South Africa), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), introduced the group’s draft resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. That text, he said, reiterated deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons use and welcomed the compelling evidence presented at the Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, especially research findings regarding the strongly disproportionate and gendered impact of exposure to ionizing radiation for women and girls.
The draft resolution also emphasized that each article of the NPT was binding on all States parties, and it called on their full compliance with commitments and obligations made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. He underlined the recognition by the NPT States parties of the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in constraining the nuclear-armed States in the development and qualitative improvement of their nuclear weapons, and in that context, to end the development of advanced types of such weapons. The draft resolution stressed the NPT’s fundamental role, and urged India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions, and place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
The text, he went on, also called on nuclear-weapon States to implement their nuclear disarmament commitments in a manner that enabled States parties to regularly monitor progress, including through a standard detailed reporting format, thereby enhancing confidence and trust. He closed by encouraging all States to show their commitment to nuclear disarmament by supporting the draft.
JORGE LOMÓNICO (Mexico), condemning the existence of the more than 16,000 nuclear warheads, said the Committee was meeting under the shadow of the failure of the ninth NPT Review Conference. However he was encouraged by the undeniable success of the humanitarian initiative, which had the support of almost 80 per cent of the United Nations membership and had built unpreceded momentum, offering the chance to take a qualitative leap towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence did nothing for the security of non‑nuclear‑weapon States and those not protected under others’ doctrines. Pope Francis had reminded States that ethics and law-based mutual destruction was self‑contradictory and an affront to the entire framework of the United Nations. That, he had stated, would result in nations united by fear and mistrust. Although a nuclear war had been avoided, that had been in spite of, and not thanks to, nuclear weapons.
The scaling up of cold-war rhetoric was cause for concern, he said. The growing tensions between nuclear-weapon States justified renewed action on an urgent basis to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all. “Enough of the excuses already,” he said. The institutional arrangement of the Conference on Disarmament was designed to deliver results only whenever the two “super-Powers” decided to agree. The Conference had fulfilled its mandate only at the end of the cold war and the short honeymoon period that followed. It remained a body with restricted membership, excluding two-thirds of the United Nations membership, including the great majority of the Non-Aligned Movement countries. Although that might have been acceptable at one time, it certainly was not in today’s very different world.
BENNO LAGGNER (Switzerland) said that the agreement between Iran and E3+3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom, China, Russian Federation and United States) and similar nuclear disarmament successes should be a reminder that diplomacy and compromises worked. However, he also observed the “worrisome trend of polarisation” in that field. The 2015 NPT Review Conference was characterized by “rigid positions” and an emphasis on national security threats instead of global security concerns. That was illustrated by the increase in and qualitative improvement of nuclear-weapon States’ arsenals and recent repeated threats of use, which ran counter to key commitments and the legitimate security interests of non‑nuclear‑weapon States. Fact-based discussions on the humanitarian impact and use of nuclear weapons should be a unifying factor in advancing nuclear disarmament. Those discussions had indicated that a nuclear detonation would constitute a humanitarian disaster of such magnitude that “we would have no adequate response”.
ROBERT A. WOOD (United States) said that since President Barack Obama’s commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy, his country had concluded a Nuclear Posture Review in 2010, and the United States and the Russian Federation had concluded and brought into force the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START. The United States would continue to pursue every avenue available, but the “hard truth” was that the final goal of disarmament would “not be realized overnight” or in a single negotiation. Understanding the deep concern about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, he stressed that his country’s “pragmatic, sustained” approach had resulted in major reductions in the role and number of nuclear weapons and in fissile material stocks and infrastructure.
He said that the United States and the Russian Federation continued to successfully implement the New START, which was the most comprehensive nuclear arms control agreement in more than 20 years. The United States’ stockpile had been reduced by 85 per cent from its cold-war high point in 1967. The United States remained ready to negotiate further reductions with the Russian Federation of all nuclear weapons, but that would require a willing partner and conditions conducive to progress. The Nuclear Posture Review had made clear that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, which were in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.
The United States was neither developing new nuclear weapons nor was it pursuing any new nuclear missions, he stressed. Its stockpile stewardship and management activities were intended only to sustain existing designs, modernize their safety, security and use-control features as well as modernize facilities. His country was also working to actively reduce its holdings of fissile material stocks removed permanently from its nuclear-weapons programme, having down-blended more than 146 metric tonnes of its highly enriched uranium — enough material for more than 5,800 nuclear weapons. More than 50 metric tonnes of that material was down-blended under IAEA monitoring. Another success story in that regard was the recently completed
He also highlighted the recently completed 1993 United States-Russian Federation HEU — highly-enriched uranium purchase agreement — under which 500 metric tonnes of Russian weapons-origin highly enriched uranium, enough for approximately 20,000 warheads, were down‑blended to low‑enriched uranium and used for peaceful purposes as fuel in United States’ nuclear power reactors.
CRISTIÁN BARROS MELET (Chile), also speaking on behalf of Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland — the De‑Alerting Group, said those countries remained deeply concerned that some 1,800 warheads were ready to be launched within a matter of minutes. Reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons had been recognized as a concrete measure contributing to progress on nuclear disarmament. In addition, de-alerting could contribute to diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. Since 2010, the focus on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons had led to a widely shared understanding that the risks associated with those weapons were higher than previously understood. That further underlined the unacceptable risks associated with high levels of alert. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States must constructively engage on the issue of de-alerting and take urgent and concrete action to further reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons systems, thereby diminishing risks and advancing global security.
He said that w wide range of possible practical steps had been discussed by various experts and commissions, including technical measures to reduce readiness or storing warheads separately from delivery systems. The group had put forward a number of recommendations in working paper 21, which had been submitted to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The paper had called on nuclear-weapon States to implement measures with regard to their nuclear doctrines, postures and force structures so as to enable further reductions in the level of alert. It also recommended further measures towards confidence-building, risk reduction and transparency. While the group was not tabling a resolution on de-alerting during the present session of the General Assembly, it would be doing so in the future.
MUSTAPHA ABBANI (Algeria), associating with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group, reiterated the constant position that nuclear disarmament was a priority, and said peace could only come when the world was rid of those weapons. Their continued existence represented the main danger to the annihilation of humankind. Although the NPT had managed to limit possession to a certain number of countries, regrettably, there had been only limited progress under that regime. A legally binding international instrument with negative security assurances was needed. He was fully committed to nuclear non-proliferation, which was one of the pillars of the multilateral system, and he welcomed the accession of the State of Palestine to the NPT, however, the chance had been lost to make concrete progress at the recent Review Conference. Nuclear non-proliferation was an obligation for all States parties, he reiterated.
He encouraged States to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which was their right under the NPT in order to ensure their economic development. He supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the entire world, which was a factor of stability both regionally and internationally. For that reason, Algeria had been one of the first African States to ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, or Pelindaba Treaty. The international community must redouble its efforts to rid the world of the danger of those weapons.
ALICE GUITTON (France) said that her country was a “power of peace” that did not intend to give up on the goals of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. France shared that long-term goal, the prospects for which could only advance when undiminished security of all was ensured. That was why the framework for general and comprehensive disarmament was important; it was necessary to make progress in all areas of disarmament, including biological, chemical and other weapon categories. The recent signing of a long-term agreement on the Iranian nuclear question was a very important first step. France had been involved in those negotiations for the past 10 years, and had spared no effort. However, it remained vigilant, and noted that the accord was just the start of a long process to restore trust.
At the same time, she said, that progress should not take away from concerns over actions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. France was particularly disturbed by the repeated threat from North Korea to conduct major new provocations. Those actions required a reaction from the international community. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should step back from the path of confrontation and show a willingness to re-establish dialogue with the international community, leading to lasting and verifiable surrender of its nuclear programme. She understood the frustrations that nuclear disarmament was not going fast or far enough, however, nuclear disarmament was not “some sort of buzzword”. Disarmament could not be ordered; rather it needed to be gradual and based on pragmatic and concrete steps. France had dismantled its facilities for fissile material, had been implementing extensive disarmament measures, and would continue to make efforts towards the full ratification and entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty.
Mr. HAJNOCZI (Austria), speaking in his national capacity, said his country had been closely involved for many years in several efforts and initiatives to promote progress on both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and would be introducing two draft resolutions. The first, submitted together with a large group of co-sponsors, was entitled “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”. It would stress that it was in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons were never again used, under any circumstances. It would also emphasize that the only way to guarantee that would be their total elimination. The text would stress that the catastrophic effects could not be adequately addressed. It would further urge all States to exert all efforts to totally eliminate the threat of those mass destruction weapons.
He said that the second draft resolution, entitled “Humanitarian Pledge for the Prohibition and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”, would urge all NPT parties to renew their commitment to the urgent and full implementation of existing article VI obligations, and call on all States to identify and pursue effective measures with all relevant stakeholders to fill the legal gaps to eliminate nuclear weapons. It would advocate cooperation to achieve that goal, as well as to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate those weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks.
ÁLVARO MENDONÇA E MOURA (Portugal), associating with the Non-Aligned Movement, said that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear detonation would dramatically challenge mankind’s way of life and, in the end, put at risk its very survival. That was why his country fully shared the frustration of many others about the slow pace of effective nuclear disarmament. In order for nuclear disarmament to be effective and global, it was necessary to forge a truly cooperative and collective set of conditions, including the establishment of broad international mechanisms to ensure verification and irreversibility. However, that should not be construed as justification for delaying or, even worse, defending the absence of any concrete step on nuclear disarmament.
The NPT remained the cornerstone of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation endeavours, he said, adding that being part of a treaty required its full and faithful implementation. He, therefore, regretted persistent situations of non-compliance with the NPT in its non-proliferation pillar. He urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fully abide by its international obligations. The entry into force of the CTBT was of key importance to the advancement of nuclear non-proliferation. Despite the fact that the negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet started, the report of the Group of Governmental Experts deserved full support.
MICHAL SEHAYEK-SOROKA, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, said his country had a policy of responsibility and restraint in the nuclear domain, in line with the goals and principles of non-proliferation. Israel valued the NPT and recognized its contribution to that goal, as well as to international peace and security. At the same time, the Treaty clearly had shortcomings. Those were reflected, inter alia, in its inability to fully address the deliberate advancement of clandestine military nuclear programmes by States with little or no regard for their international legal obligations. Nowhere was that more apparent than in the Middle East, where four out of five cases of non‑compliance with the NPT had occurred, namely, in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya.
He said that Iran, which remained the most significant threat to the Middle East and beyond, even after the agreement reached between country and the P5+1 (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Germany) was an illuminating case in point. The NPT had been inadequate in preventing the advancement of Iran’s nuclear programme in light of that country’s acts of concealment and duplicity. When those violations were ultimately discovered, the Treaty had lacked the tools to recognize and address them properly. At the same time, “universality of the NPT cannot be a goal in itself and cannot guarantee compliance with its obligations”; it would not assure the global community that Member States were sincere and forthcoming in implementing their obligations.
Israel, he noted, had always endorsed a pragmatic and realistic approach to regional security and arms control, rooted in its belief that the security concerns of all regional members should be taken into account and realistically addressed within a direct regional dialogue. Peaceful relations, reconciliation, good neighbourliness, open borders and trust among regional parties, could not be cast aside. To think that the goal of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region could be achieved through “shortcuts and detours”, without attending to the core security challenges there, was misleading. Regrettably, the Middle East countries at present had no regional forum in which all could directly communicate about core issues that affected their individual and collective security. One-sided resolutions in international forums were no substitute for direct, comprehensive regional security dialogue and cooperation.
Right of Reply
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said France was confused over who was responsible for the continuing tension on the Korean peninsula. It was France who was pursuing the path of confrontation there. The French delegation was still unaware of how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had come to possess nuclear weapons. If the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had not been threatened by the United States with nuclear weapons, then the nuclear-weapon situation would not have been created on the Korean peninsula. The United States persistently pursued provocation against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, chilling the atmosphere of all negotiations. The United States should respond to the call for concluding a peace treaty with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the United States said his country had not threatened the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which needed to come into compliance with international obligations and contribute to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The exercises carried out by the United States in the region were not a threat to the north, and that delegation should take the steps necessary to get back into the good grace of the international community. Until that time, the United States would continue to call for the north to do what it needed to do. The United States did not and would not recognize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a nuclear-weapon State.
Speaking on a second intervention, the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said there were two ways to bring about peace on the Korean peninsula. The first was the “cold-war” way, including with a nuclear deterrent to cope with the increased nuclear threat from the United States. Thanks to that deterrent, war was deterred on the peninsula. The second way would be for the United States to roll back its hostile policy against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The issue of replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty was a matter on which the United States should make a bold decision, and there should be a principled agreement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States based on confidence-building measures.