First Committee, in Draft Resolution, Seeks Cooperation of Syrian Authorities, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, on Outstanding Issues
Approves Other Texts on Preventing Terrorists’ Use of Radioactive Sources, Combating Illicit Brokering of Conventional Weapons, Implementing Mine-Ban Treaty
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today approved a draft resolution noting several remaining actions to be taken in the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), including destruction of chemical weapons removed from Syrian territory and of the 12 remaining declared production facilities, as well as inspections of the remaining declared sites.
In one of seven texts, the Committee asked the General Assembly to urge all States parties to the CWC to meet in full and on time their obligations and to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in its implementation activities. The draft resolution was approved by a recorded vote of 175 in favour to none against, with no abstentions.
Prior to taking action on the draft as a whole, the Committee retained preambular paragraph 4 concerning those remaining actions to be taken in Syria. The provision was retained by a recorded vote of 158 in favour to none against, with 9 abstentions (Bolivia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Venezuela, and Syria).
Preambular paragraph 5 was then retained by a recorded vote of 159 in favour to none against, with 9 abstentions (Bolivia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria, and Venezuela). By its terms, the Assembly would urge the OPCW and the Syrian authorities to continue to cooperate on outstanding issues regarding Syria’s declaration.
Acting without a vote, the Committee approved a draft resolution by which the Assembly would express deep concern about the potential threat to human health and the environment that would result from terrorists’ use of radioactive sources, and urge States to enhance their national protections to prevent that acquisition.
The Committee also approved, without a vote, a draft resolution on illicit brokering of conventional arms and materials, equipment and technology that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, in a manner consistent with international law. By its terms, the Assembly would call on Member States to establish appropriate national laws.
That text was approved by a recorded vote of 174 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran).
Prior to action on the draft resolution as a whole, the Committee approved preambular paragraph 8, which would have the Assembly recognize the importance of States parties to the Arms Trade Treaty taking measures to regulate brokering in their jurisdictions. The provision was retained by a recorded vote of 159 in favour to none against, with 8 abstentions (Egypt, Cuba, India, Iran, Sri Lanka, Syria, Zimbabwe, and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).
In the cluster on conventional weapons, the Committee approved a resolution on the Mine Ban Convention, by a recorded vote of 160 in favour, none against, with 17 abstentions. That text would have the Assembly reaffirm its determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines.
Acting without a vote, the Committee approved draft resolutions on information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms, and strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region. Also without a vote, it approved a draft decision on maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe.
Speaking in explanation of vote on the previous day’s action on nuclear weapons-related texts were representatives of Brazil, Syria and Iran.
Providing general statements on the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction were the representatives of Poland, Syria and Egypt. Speaking in explanation of vote on that cluster were representatives of the United States, Cuba, Ecuador, Israel, Turkey, Russian Federation, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Egypt and Syria.
Delivering general statements on conventional weapons were the representatives of Mozambique, United States and Morocco. Speaking in explanation of vote on that cluster were the representatives of India, Pakistan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Cuba, Egypt, Singapore, Republic of Korea and Libya.
Providing a general statement on other disarmament measures and international security was the representative of the Republic of Korea. Speaking in explanation of vote on that cluster were the representatives of Cuba, India, Iran, and Egypt.
The representative of Algeria delivered a general statement on the cluster on regional disarmament and security.
Exercising their right of reply were representatives of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The representative of Syria spoke on a point of order, following which the Committee Chair said the statement was a right of reply.
The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. on 4 November to continue its consideration of the remaining texts before it.
Background
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its consideration of all draft resolutions and decisions before it, across the whole spectrum of its agenda items. For further background, please see Press Release GA/DIS/3513 of 29 October.
Explanations of Vote on Nuclear Weapons Cluster
Speaking in explanation of vote after the vote, the representative of Brazil said his delegation had abstained on “L.25”, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Although Brazil was not a party to the Code, it had voted in favour of the resolution in past years. Brazil agreed with efforts to curb ballistic missile systems as a contribution to international peace and security, as contained in preambular paragraph 3 of “L.25”. Nevertheless, the substantial changes made on operative paragraphs 2 and 3 prompted the Brazilian abstention on the resolution. An initiative such as the Code of Conduct should evolve and become a legal instrument of universal character, establishing prohibitions and, at the same time, rights, for all States.
The representative of Syria said he wished to explain his delegation’s votes on “L.25” and “L.56” on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). On “L.25”, Syria was fully committed to the United Nations Charter and the Organization’s collective work when it came to the effective implementation of disarmament mechanisms. However, some parties were trying to reach outside the United Nations to elaborate non-proliferation and disarmament instruments. The Code was discriminatory and did not stop the deep-rooted causes of proliferation, and, thus, his delegation had abstained. Turning to “L.56” he said he had abstained because Syria had continued to reiterate that a Treaty “so very sensitive” should bear in mind the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty was no guarantee when it came to, among other things, eliminating their stockpiles or production of new weapons.
The representative of Iran, explaining his position on “L.25” and “L.56”, said that on “L.25”, the Hague Code of Conduct was drafted and endorsed outside the United Nations and did not represent a negotiated text. Rather, it sought to preserve the status quo and was silent on vertical proliferation. It was also silent on cruise missiles, and had not provided a definition of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the Code did not distinguish between missiles and space-launch vehicles. His delegation had been obliged to vote “no” on that resolution. On “L.56”, he dissociated his delegation from references to resolutions of the Security Council; he rejected some of the language as well as the way it had been drafted.
General Statements on Weapons of Mass Destruction Cluster
BOGUSŁAW WINID (Poland) said his country was the sole sponsor of “L.63” and was presenting it as it had every year in the Committee. Consensus confirmed the international community’s “firm and common” approach towards a chemical-weapon-free world. There had been several recent milestones, including the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programmes. In 2014, as in previous years, his delegation had followed the same principles in its work, taking on board all amendments and suggestions with the aim of achieving the text’s consensus. His delegation did not go beyond the issues agreed and discussed in The Hague, but the text was forward-looking and would be reviewed again the following year. He urged that a positive message be sent on the United Nations prohibition of such weapons.
Action on Texts
The representative of Syria, speaking on “L.63”, said his country was a State party to the CWC and had participated in the meetings and discussions. Since becoming a member, Syria had respected all of the treaty’s obligations and had been cooperative with the United Nations mission, despite a challenging climate. Syria had shown complete transparency in its chemical weapons programme and had respected all of its international commitments. Israel was the only country in the region with a chemical weapons programme, he said, urging the international community to push it to eliminate its stockpiles, in a way that was not politicized. In that regard, he urged all to refrain from non-objective statements regarding Syria’s Government. There were no chemical weapons; that was part of the past. Syria was now working with the OPCW in a constructive spirit.
The representative of Egypt, speaking in a national capacity on “L.34/Rev.1”, said his country shared its objective remarks on the draft with its two sponsor States. Egypt also had reiterated its remarks in open-ended consultations convened to discuss the draft. He noted that the text had annulled certain contentious wording. The Egyptian delegation supported its approval without a vote, but until it could study all technical issues in the new version of the draft by all international Government agencies, its final position on the draft would be clear when it was transmitted to the General Assembly in December.
The Committee first took action on the resolution Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources (document A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1), approving it without a vote.
By its terms, the General Assembly, deeply concerned by the potential threat to human health and the environment that would result from the use of such devices by terrorists, would urge States to enhance their national protective measures in that regard. It would urge all States to follow the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
The Committee next took up a draft resolution entitled Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/69/L.63), by which the Assembly would urge all States parties to the Convention to meet in full and on time their obligations and to support the OPCW in its implementation activities.
Prior to taking action on the draft as a whole, the Committee retained preambular paragraph 4 by a recorded vote of 158 in favour to none against, with 9 extensions (Bolivia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Venezuela, and Syria).
That provision would have the Assembly note that the following actions remained to be taken: destruction of chemical weapons removed from the territory of Syria; destruction of the 12 remaining declared chemical weapons production facilities; and inspections of the remaining declared sites.
Separate recorded votes were also taken on preambular paragraph 5, which would have the Assembly urge the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and the Syrian authorities to continue to cooperate through technical discussions on outstanding issues regarding Syria’s declaration. That provision was retained by a recorded vote of 159 in favour to none against, with 9 abstentions (Bolivia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria, and Venezuela).
The Committee then approved that text as a whole by a recorded vote of 175 in favour to none against, with no abstentions.
The representative of the United States explained the vote on “L.63”, on the Chemical Weapons Convention, on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Demark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovenia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Those countries intended to join consensus on the resolution to support the objectives of the Convention and the OPCW. Their position had underscored their continued commitment to eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons programme. On the latter point, however, the resolution should have gone further to address the uses of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Syria. Those were very serious concerns, which posed a fundamental challenge to the Convention, he said, calling for the cessation of chemical weapons’ use in Syria.
On 10 September, the OPCW fact-finding mission had concluded that the testimony of primary witnesses and supporting documentation constituted compelling conformation, with a high degree of confidence, that chlorine was used as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly, in attacks against three villages in northern Syria in April and May. In describing the incidents, witnesses invariably connected the devices to helicopters flying overhead. It was well known that only the Syrian military possessed that capability. The countries on whose behalf he was speaking also remained deeply concerned by the gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies in Syria’s chemical weapons declaration. The Syrian chemical weapons file remained open and would not be closed until all of those issues were fully addressed.
The representative of Cuba, explaining her position on “L.63”, said it was unfortunate that traditional consensus on that text was unachievable; that affected everyone negatively. Cuba accorded a great deal of importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention and participated actively in the work of the OPCW. Cuba had abstained from the voting on preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, and she called on the primary co-sponsors to reflect upon what had happened that year, and reconsider the manner in which the draft resolution was handled. She hoped that that day’s vote would not become a negative precedent for the future.
The representative of Ecuador said his country was a firm supporter of the CWC and the full implementation of its provisions. Ecuador had signed the treaty in 1993, on the second day it was opened for signature. It did not, nor would it ever, possess chemical weapons, whose use he condemned by anyone. It had constantly called for respect of the functioning and authority of the various United Nations bodies. Although his delegation had voted in favour of “L.63” as a whole, he had to abstain from the voting on preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, as they introduced an imbalance in the purposes and goals of the resolution — namely the implementation of the Convention in its entirety, and not in a “broken down” way. Additionally, he said his delegation deplored a growing trend towards inclusion in drafts, which had been traditionally adopted by consensus, of new and controversial elements that risked that manner of adoption.
The representative of Israel said it had voted in favour of draft resolution “L.63”, and the delegation’s ongoing support was consonant with its strong support of the goals of the convention. While the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria was a major achievement, that work had not been concluded and threats were still valid in many respects. The chemical weapons issue was part of an ongoing tragedy, she said, noting that the OPCW fact-finding mission had found that toxic chemicals were used in Syria, most recently, chlorine gas. The repeated use of chemicals further eroded the norm on the use of chemical weapons and was particularly concerning because of the presence of terrorist groups and non-State actors. Until Syria completely and accurately fulfilled its obligations, the international community must insist that all outstanding questions were fully addressed.
The representative of the Russian Federation, speaking on “L.63”, said his country supported the resolution itself, but abstained from voting on preambular paragraphs 4 and 5. His delegation was not against the actual content of those provisions. In the context of references on the remaining issues of the chemical demilitarization of Syria, he agreed that addressing the situation, in close cooperation between Damascus and the OPCW, was justified. That also applied to the destruction outside Syria of the removed components and precursors of chemical weapons as well as clarification of all aspects of Syria’s initial announcement to the OPCW of its military chemical programme and the continuation of the work of the fact-finding on the potential use of chlorine as a chemical warfare agent.
However, the representative believed that all those issues were of a technical nature and could be successfully resolved by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. He regretted that the Russian Federation’s proposal had been ignored regarding the reference to the provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), requiring States to inform the Council of cases of acquisition of chemical weapons by non-State actors. The Russian Federation did not understand why that proposal had been ignored. That situation was unjustified, particularly in light of the growing number of reports on use of toxic chemicals by radical Islamists in the Middle East. The growing threat of potential terrorist use of toxic chemicals required the world community’s attention.
The representative of Turkey said that, while his country had voted in favour of draft resolution “L.63”, the writing in preambular paragraph 6 ran counter to facts on the ground, as the country had not fulfilled its obligations. Flagrant violations of international law were a threat to international peace and security. The use of chlorine gas in Syria had been established by independent bodies and Syria’s regime was responsible. Another major issue on the implementation of the CWC was the dismantlement of Syria’s chemical weapons programme — the objective of the OPCW mission. After one year, that mission had yet to be fully achieved. He commended efforts of the United Nations, OPCW and States in the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria, but said it could not be effective because of the regime’s approach. That regime had not fully cooperated with the mission. Until inconsistencies were addressed, the case remained open. Turkey shared the ultimate objective of the CWC and remained fully committed to it.
Explaining his country’s position on “L.63” and “L.34/Rev.1”, the representative of Iran said on “L.63” that it was the first time in two decades that the United Nations General Assembly had failed to adopt the resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention without a vote. That year it had failed to achieve consensus, due to ill-intentioned attempts to highlight the issue of the implementation of the obligations of a specific State party to the Convention in an imbalanced manner. That could have been avoided if the sponsor had concluded consultations in an unbiased manner. The main aim of the resolution reflected the global consensus and the need for the full implementation of that Convention and to uphold the international norm against chemical weapons.
Explaining the position on “L.34/Rev.1”, he supported the main objective of the text, but felt that, in order to preserve global consensus on that issue, it was necessary to avoid overloading it with unrelated matters. When the initial draft was circulated, Iran had expressed concern about some of its language. He was pleased that the sponsors chose to put the draft back on the right track and modify their initial ambitious approach. He called on the sponsors to refrain from bringing in issues of a technical nature, which should be considered exclusively within the IAEA. His delegation reserved the right for further comments on that text at a later stage.
The representative of Saudi Arabia said his country aligned with the statement made by the United States. The Syrian regime had killed its own people with all manner of weapons, including chemical. Those weapons, used by the “hands” of the Syrian regime, had killed more than 300,000 people. “Can you imagine that?” he asked; a regime that killed that many of its own people, because they had asked to live in dignity and freedom. A regime that killed that large number of its own people had no moral deterrence that prevented it from using chemical weapons again, lying, or falsely accusing other countries about what was going on in Syria. The Syrian regime had lied to the entire world by denying its use of chemical weapons, as the reports of the OPCW proved the contrary. His delegation had a feeling that the Syrian regime might be providing terrorist organizations with chemical weapons. Those groups, which had been classified as terrorist groups and been condemned by Saudi Arabia and the entire international community, were waging war.
The representative of Venezuela said that his country fully supported “L.63” aimed at the implementation and universalization of that Convention. His delegation had voted in its favour. However, it had abstained from the vote on preambular paragraphs 4 and 5. His delegation lamented having been compelled to express its discomfort with the tenor of those paragraphs. That was a resolution that had so far enjoyed consensus. Unfortunately, his delegation could not support paragraphs 4 and 5, as it felt they brought imbalance to the objectives and purposes of the text and sought to transform a common and universal goal into covering one country specifically. That type of concern should be considered in the right venue, and it seemed that this Committee was not the appropriate forum.
The representative of Nicaragua said his country fully supported the universalization and implementation of the CWC. It had voted in favour of “L.63”, but had abstained on preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as it believed those provisions focused on one State party to the Convention in an unbalanced manner. That had brought imbalance to the text, which also included technical issues that were already being addressed by the OPCW.
The representative of Egypt, also speaking on “L.63”, said his country had been wholeheartedly involved in the negotiations on establishing the Convention. Egypt had voted for “L.63” despite discomfort regarding particular language and concerns that important elements were missing. Only one State in the region was not party to any of the three multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction. Egypt had invited States in the region who had not ratified those instruments to do so. All States in the region had answered that call, except one. He reiterated the call for a Middle East free from all weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological. It was up to that State to respond to the renewed call.
The representative of Syria, speaking on a point of order, said that the representative of Saudi Arabia had made a political statement in which he wanted to declare his regime innocent, even though it was involved in terrorism. The representative had tried to politicize the discussion and protect terrorist organisations that had committed heinous crimes against the Syrian people. Saudi Arabia was a leading State supporter of terrorism. Of the 19 terrorists who had waged terror on New York, 15 were Saudi citizens. And yet, that representative was trying to declare that his regime was innocent.
General Statement on Conventional Weapons Cluster
ANTÓNIO GUMENDE (Mozambique) presented the draft resolution “L.5/Rev.1”on the implementation of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction. He said the proposed draft resolution retained the spirit and essence of last year’s text, with a few minor changes to reflect the results of the Third Review Conference in Maputo. Many actions had been undertaken in the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines in mined areas, as well as transparency measures and national implementation. However, much remained to be done to ensure a world free of landmines, and he invited all States that had not yet signed the Mine Ban Convention to accede to it without delay.
Action on Texts
Speaking in explanation of vote, the representative of the United States said her delegation would abstain on “L.5/Rev.1”. As many were aware, the United States had announced a number of important changes to its anti-personnel landmine policy. In Maputo, her delegation had announced that the United States would not produce or otherwise acquire anti-personnel munitions that were not in compliance with the Mine Ban Convention, including replacing such munitions as they expired in the coming years. Outside the Korean peninsula, the United States would not use anti-personnel landmines and would undertake to destroy stockpiles not required for the defence of the Korean peninsula. That was to bring the United States defence in closer alignment with the Mine Ban Convention. The unique circumstances in the Korean peninsula precluded the United States from joining that Convention at present, and it was for that reason her delegation must continue to abstain from the resolution. The United States had provided more than $2.3 billion for conventional weapons destruction programmes since 1993, and would continue to support that important work, she said.
The representative of Morocco, speaking in explanation of vote before the vote on “L.5/Rev.1”, said his country had actively contributed to the Convention’s preparatory process, and had decided to vote in favour of the resolution as it had done since 2004. Morocco had also ratified the amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, in 2002. In that connection, Morocco voluntarily applied the provisions of the Mine Ban Convention in mine clearance, stockpile destruction, outreach and training and assistance to victims. He highlighted the “remarkable” mine clearance efforts by Moroccan armed forces, which had destroyed thousands of those weapons. The Moroccan authorities had also made efforts to provide for victims and address their needs for medical, social and economic recovery.
The Committee then approved the resolution, introduced by Algeria, Belgium and Mozambique, on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1), by a recorded vote of 160 in favour to none against, with 17 abstentions.
By its terms, the Assembly, reaffirming its determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, would invite all States that had not signed the Mine Ban Convention to accede to it without delay. It would urge the one remaining State that had signed but not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay.
The Committee next approved, without a vote, a draft resolution entitled Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms (document A/C.1/69/L.50), by which the Assembly would encourage States to adopt and apply such measures in the conventional weapons field.
The representative of India said that his delegation abstained on “L.5/rev.1”. India supported the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines and believed the use of alternate technologies could facilitate the full elimination of those weapons. India had fulfilled its obligations on the issue and had addressed humanitarian concerns in accordance with international law. Moreover, it was willing to contribute technical assistance and expertise.
The representative of Pakistan said his country had abstained on “L.5/rev.1” as landmines continued to play a role in the defence requirements in regions of dispute. Given the need to protect its long borders, the use of landmines formed an important part of Pakistan’s self-defence strategy. Hence, his delegation could not support the resolution. Pakistan was part of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; it regulated the use of landmines and continued to implement the protocol in earnest. It was prepared to provide training facilities to landmine-affected countries within its resources.
The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that his delegation had also abstained on “L.5 rev.1”. While it shared the humanitarian concerns on the use of anti-personnel landmines, the country had abstained in the vote, owing to its right of self-defence, given the security situation in the Korean peninsula. With imminent threats and deployment of United States forces there, under such circumstances, his delegation was not in a position to support the resolution.
The representative of Cuba said that, while the country fully shared the legitimate concerns on the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, it had abstained on “L.5 rev. 1”. Cuba was part of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, including its protocol II, and had complied with the text. However, it had been subjected to a policy of aggression by a military super-Power. Hence, it was not possible to forego landmine use, owing to its self-defence right.
The representative of Egypt said his delegation had abstained on “L.5/Rev.1” due to the unbalanced nature of the instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations. The Mine Ban Convention lacked balance concerning countries that faced extraordinary security challenges and had long borders. It also did not oblige States to remove mines placed in the territories of other States. That had made it impossible for some States to comply, due to mines they did not place within their own borders. That was the case in Egypt, which still had mines leftover from world Powers during the Second World War.
The representative of Singapore, explaining his position on “L.5/Rev.1”, said his country continued to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of landmines. With that in mind, Singapore had declared a two-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. The country later expanded that to include all landmines, and extended the moratorium indefinitely. Like several other countries, Singapore firmly stated that legitimate State concerns regarding their right to self-defence could not be disregarded.
The representative of the Republic of Korea said that with regard to “L.5/Rev.1,” her delegation had expressed on many occasions that it sympathized with the spirit of the Mine Ban Convention. However, due to the situation in the Korean peninsula, it had to give priority to the security concerns there and needed to abstain from the resolution. The Republic of Korea would continue to contribute to global mine-clearance efforts and assistance to victims.
The representative of Libya, explaining the vote on “L.5/Rev.1”, said the transitional Libyan Government was not in a position to address that issue. Libya shared the humanitarian concerns on the use of those weapons and, above all, their damaging effects and the obstacles they posed to development. Libya itself suffered from that problem, and had since the Second World War. That was all the more pressing after the “Gaddafi brigades”, which worked to proliferate those mines. Work was under way in Libya to put an end to that problem, and he thanked civil society organizations for their help in eliminating mines and assisting the victims. Libya had changed its vote on the draft: Libya would no longer abstain, but had voted in favour.
General Statement on Other Disarmament Measures and International Security Cluster
KIM HYE-JIN (Republic of Korea), speaking on behalf of her country and Australia, introduced draft resolution “L.48” on preventing and combating illicit brokering activities. The draft had been sponsored by 62 countries, and had been updated from its predecessor to include references to the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty and Security Council resolution 2117 (2013). Two new preambular paragraphs, 8 and 9, had been introduced in that regard. She thanked the co-sponsors of the draft and delegations for their continued support.
Action on Text
The Committee then took action on the draft resolution on Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities (document A/C.1/69/L.48). That draft would have the Assembly call upon Member States to establish appropriate national laws and/or measures to prevent and combat the illicit brokering of conventional arms and materials, equipment and technology that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, in a manner consistent with international law.
Prior to action on the resolution as a whole, the Committee retained preambular paragraph 8 by a recorded vote of 159 in favour to none against, with 8 abstentions (Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Zimbabwe). That provision would have the Assembly recognize the importance of Arms Trade Treaty States parties to take measures, pursuant to their national laws, to regulate brokering in their jurisdiction, in accordance with article 10 of the Treaty, which will enter into force on 24 December 2014.
The Committee then approved “L.48” as a whole by a recorded vote of 174 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran).
The representative of Cuba said her country had voted in favour of “L.48” as a whole. Although the draft was positive, it was a far cry from being perfect. The inclusion of Security Council resolution 2117 (2013) was not a step in the right direction, as it had not been the result of an agreement by all Member States. Moreover, references were made in L.48 to the nuclear summit, which had been open only to a limited number of States. In addition, there was an imbalance in preambular paragraph 8 as it referred to an instrument that did not enjoy consensus by Member States. Cuba abstained on the vote on that paragraph.
The representative of India said his delegation had voted in favour “L.48” as it fully supported its objectives. However, India abstained from the vote on preambular paragraph 8 as it referred to the Arms Trade Treaty. India was undertaking a review of its position on that Treaty, and until its completion, it would refrain from joining any references to that Treaty.
The representative of Iran said his delegation had abstained on “L.48”. The Committee had already dealt with elements included in the resolution in other venues. Regarding the reference to the Arms Trade Treaty in preambular paragraph 8, Iran’s position was well known; the Treaty was full of legal flaws and his delegation was not in a position to support it. Iran had proposed amended language to join consensus on the draft, but the sponsors had not accommodated its major concerns.
The representative of Egypt said that his delegation had voted in favour of “L.48”, but abstained from the vote on preambular paragraph 8. Egypt’s Arms Trade Treaty position was well known and delegates could refer to its previous explanation of vote. Egypt considered that any reference in the draft to that Treaty’s entry into force would be applicable only to States party to it.
Regional Disarmament and Security Cluster
DJAMEL MOKTEFI (Algeria), concerning “L.54” on strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, said the general goal was to make the Mediterranean a zone of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, and to guarantee its peace, stability and prosperity. The resolution also called on the States of that region to accede to all relevant disarmament and non-proliferation instruments arising from multilateral negotiations. He encouraged States in the region to bolster mutual confidence-building measures, and noted that security in the Mediterranean region was closely linked to that of Europe, as well as to world peace and security.
Action on Texts
Acting without a vote, the Committee approved “L.54” entitled Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, by which the Assembly would, among other provisions, recognize that eliminating economic and social disparities, as well as respect and greater understanding among cultures in the area, would contribute to enhancing peace, security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries.
Also approved without a vote was the draft decision entitled Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (document A/C.1/69/L.62), by which the Assembly would decide to include the item in the provisional agenda of its seventy-first session.
Right of Reply
The representative of Saudi Arabia said he wished to respond to what was said by the representative of Syria. “May God help our friend,” he said, as he was not in an envious position. The atrocities committed by the Syrian regime were plain for all to see. In regard to the incidents in New York, the Syrian representative said that many of those who perpetrated the attacks were Saudi nationals. As the “terrorists from the Islamic State” came from all parts of the world, could their acts be blamed on their country of origin? Obviously the answer was no. Saudi Arabia was one of the countries that had suffered the most from terrorism. It had taken national measures to criminalise all those who had participated in terrorist groups or provided them with aid. The facts and figures showed that Saudi Arabia was one of the countries that had participated most actively in combating terrorism. Moreover, his country had provided $100 million to the counter terrorism centre established by the United Nations.
The representative of Qatar said he would use his right of reply to respond to the representative of Syria as well. Qatar was well aware of the danger of terrorism, and it had no common interests with it. The truth was that the Syrian regime did not combat terrorism, but was rather its main cause. The Syrian regime had been using chemical weapons against its own people, and that was a terrorist act. It was also a crime that the international community could not ignore.