Sixty-third General Assembly

Fifth Committee

4^th Meeting (AM)

Secretary-General’s Proposals on Accountability, Risk Management,

Results-Based Management Taken Up By Budget Committee

 

While stressing the importance of strengthening the accountability of the United Nations as a vital and integral part of the reform process, several members of the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) expressed disappointment with the Secretary-General’s “three-in-one” proposal on accountability, risk management and results-based management that were presented to the Committee this morning.

A number of speakers focused on the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in that regard, which pointed out that the Secretary-General’s report neither explained, in concrete terms, how the stated objectives would be realized, nor clearly demonstrated the relationships between various proposals or their linkage to existing structures.  Other comments also related to the fact that the expertise available within the Secretariat had not been solicited for the preparation of the proposals and that no information had been provided on the concrete cases where accountability measures had been applied.

The representative of Antigua and Barbuda, speaking on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing countries and China, agreed with the Advisory Committee that the Secretariat’s working definition of accountability was unclear, noting that the General Assembly had requested a specific definition of accountability, along with clear measures for its application and enforcement, in return for agreeing to the ongoing experiment on limited budgetary discretion.  Accountability and budgetary flexibility went hand in hand.  Accountability also entailed having managers responsible for ensuring that their units carried out their mandates effectively and efficiently.  Any proposal on administrative issues should state clearly who is accountable to whom.

The United States’ representative said that, in view of the Advisory Committee’s comments, it was not surprising that the ACABQ did not recommend approval of the proposed changes in the Secretariat’s organizational structure, or the resources requested for them.  The accountability framework and risk-based management were, by nature, ongoing issues that must keep pace with current operating requirements.  But, while there was clearly more work to be done, the United States considered the reports before the Committee to be a first step towards improving the basic approach to strengthening internal controls and linking results to management and budgeting throughout the Secretariat.

Singapore’s representative stressed that the concept of accountability should go hand in hand with responsibility for performance and compliance, for all managers up to the level of under-secretary-general.  He regretted that the Secretary-General’s proposal had entirely neglected the aspect of sanctions for poor performance.  That was an integral part of any personnel management system and a basic requirement for any organization that purported to become a world-class international civil service.

It was even more troubling, he said, that the Secretary-General’s proposal contained no specific measures on improving performance monitoring and integrating past experiences to benefit future decision-making.  It would appear that the proposal had chosen to emphasize the form, rather than the substance of results-based management, which rendered the policy useless.  Until that issue was addressed, results-based management would remain a paperwork exercise, and inefficient programmes and managers would elude censure.

While endorsing the Secretary-General’s proposal in principle, the representative of Switzerland said that he was under no illusion that it would produce a return on investment overnight.  The proposed frameworks required significant cultural change within the Organization, which would take years to materialize.  Nonetheless, Member States had the responsibility to set the course for greater accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in the Organization by giving the Secretariat additional guidance that addressed the weaknesses that had been voiced.  The proposal before the Committee was complex, its benefits not obvious at first glance.  Nonetheless, the proposals made were critical for ensuring that senior managers and staff were:  held accountable for their actions or lack thereof; knew and managed the risks associated with the Organization’s activities; and were guided by the objectives in the Charter.

Flagging another issue, Singapore drew attention to the Volcker Report on the oil-for-food programme, which he said had degenerated into “a sorry tale of bribery and fraud on a global scale”.  No other issue had served quite as well to expose the hollowness of the debate on accountability and the inadequacy of measures to ensure the Organization’s credibility.  The Volcker Report had been released almost three years ago, but what had been done since?  He proposed that the Assembly discuss that matter in the coming weeks.  The Report had raised issues that definitely merited discussion in an open setting, an essential step if the United Nations was to maintain its reputation and credibility as a truly accountable Organization.

That position was supported by representative of Costa Rica, who recalled that her country had called for a follow-up on the oil-for-food investigation, asking that the results of that investigation be made known.  In that connection, she suggested that at least the conclusions and recommendations of the Volcker Report be made known to the Fifth Committee, since they would have bearing on the discussions on accountability.

Also this morning, the Committee approved a draft resolution, under which the Assembly would allow the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Tajikistan to vote until the end of its sixty-third session, agreeing that their failure to pay the minimum required to avoid the application of Article 19 of the Charter was due to conditions beyond their control.  [Article 19 stipulates that Member States lose their right to vote in the Assembly if the amount of their arrears to the Organization equals or exceeds their dues for two full preceding years.]

Also participating in the debate were the representatives of France (on behalf of the European Union, Mexico (on behalf of the Rio Group), Russian Federation and Iran.

The reports before the Committee were introduced by Angela Kane, Under-Secretary-General for Management; Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services; Even Fontaine-Ortiz, Chairman of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU); and Collen Kelapile, Acting Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).

The Committee will continue its work at 10 a.m. Thursday, 9 October, when it is scheduled to take up the report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, as well as the report by the Independent Audit Advisory Committee.

Background

The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) met this morning to take up the Secretary-General’s proposals to address the issues of accountability, internal control and management practices.  It was also expected to act on a draft resolution on the exemptions under Article 19 of the Charter, which stipulates that Member States lose their right to vote in the Assembly if the amount of their arrears to the Organization equals or exceeds their dues for two full preceding years.

In his report on the accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control framework, and results-based management (document A/62/701), the Secretary-General proposes a comprehensive accountability architecture, comprising three pillars:  performance, integrity, and compliance and oversight.  The new architecture would build on the existing accountability framework, under which the Secretary-General delegates authority to his senior managers to implement the mandates and achieve expected results within a given resource level.  The Secretary-General reports these results to Member States, which can then hold him accountable for the achievement of results.

The proposals are aimed at achieving a fully results-oriented Organization that plans for and mitigates risks, and that holds managers and staff at all levels accountable for the achievement of results.  The architecture would include a new dimension for enterprise risk management and internal control and reflect a developed results-based management framework, including improved monitoring and evaluation.

The Secretary-General invites the Assembly to endorse the concept of an integrated framework for enterprise risk management and internal control and approve a pilot project to begin developing standards for Secretariat-wide application of risk management.  The Assembly may also wish to endorse the results-based management framework, as well as the proposal for a dedicated capacity responsible for supporting departments to ensure complete implementation of results-based management.  The latter would also report on critical performance information, on which decisions regarding accountability can be made.

The addendum to the Secretary-General’s report (document A/62/701/Add.1) presents revised estimates in connection with the proposed system, which amount to some $3.01 million for the current biennium.  The report outlines the proposal to establish within the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management a new Division for Accountability and Results Management, which would replace the Office for Policy, Analysis and Oversight Support.  The new Division would comprise:  a Results Management Section, a Performance Management Section and an Oversight Support Section, as well as a pilot project on enterprise risk management.

According to a report of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on results-based management in the context of the United Nations reform process (document A/61/805), the impact of successive reform initiatives has not been sufficiently evaluated before new ones were launched.  The latest proposals in the Secretary-General’s “Investing in the United Nations” report bring a new set of good intentions, which supersede some previous initiatives.  Although that document proposes many well-thought-out actions, it lacks intrinsic coherence and a clear “specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound” road map for implementation.  It also lacks an accountability commitment and assurances of transparency.

The Inspectors could not find either information on phased implementation or any evidence of different initiatives’ interdependency.  For instance, they believe the reform of the internal administration of justice system should precede other initiatives, such as the reform of contractual arrangements and further phases of the mobility policy.  All of these initiatives have nonetheless been launched in parallel.

According to the report, the JIU benchmarking framework for results-based management could be used to determine the order of implementation of various initiatives and to draw up a coherent reform road map.  The Unit makes a recommendation on the need “to establish a golden rule” whereby new reports on the same reform or management processes should be accompanied by an evaluation of previous processes. The Secretary-General should develop a results-based management corporate conceptual framework and a time-bound implementation strategy for consideration and approval by the Assembly; provide clear definitions; harmonize results-based management tools and terminology; and adapt results-based management to the business and operations at all levels.

The report highlights the need to elaborate concrete proposals, together with transparency and accountability commitments, and to promote a fair division of labour between various bodies.  While stressing the need to work out an operational doctrine, rules of engagement and guidelines, the Inspectors also recommend the elaboration of a long-term planning instrument for the implementation of results-based management, along with medium-term programmes and a biennial “rolling” budget to appropriate resources linked to specific activities, as well as a single annual performance accountability report on programme implementation.

The Inspectors agree with the Secretary-General regarding the need to replace the present information systems with an enterprise resource planning system, which should be able to cope with all planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring, evaluation and reporting functions.  They also stress the need to assign responsibility to a defined entity within the Organization; develop a training strategy to promote change management; develop a comprehensive strategy for knowledge management; and address the issues of delegation of authority, accountability and monitoring.  A set of regulations for planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation should be an integral part of results-based management, with additional provisions on delegation of authority.

Among other issues addressed in the report is the need for a transparent and equitable system of the administration of justice; an improved e-PAS system; an incentive system and pay-for-performance scheme; and review of the current recruitment, placement and promotion process, as well as contractual arrangements within the Organization.  The Inspectors propose a two-tier system of indefinite contracts for career staff performing core functions and fixed-term contracts for staff working in other functions (short-term assignments, projects, etc.).

In his comments on the report of the JIU (document A/62/704), the Secretary-General expresses his commitment to full implementation of a Secretariat-wide results-based management strategy in accordance with the Assembly’s mandates and within available resources.  According to the document, the recommendations of THE JIU were taken into consideration for the development of the proposed results-based management framework.

According to the report on the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) review of results-based management at the United Nations (document A/63/268), “results-based management at the United Nations has been an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making”.  The shortcomings of results-based management go back to the original design, in resolution 55/231 on results-based budgeting, which barred the use of indicators of achievement for adjustment of resources and reiterated limitations on the authority of the Secretary-General to shift resources between post- and non-post-budget lines.  An inherent constraint of the new methodology is a formalistic approach to codifying how to achieve outcomes.  The introduction of results-based management in the Secretariat has been dealt with as an addition “to the myriad rules and procedural requirements that govern inputs, activities, monitoring and reporting” and has not been accompanied by any relaxation of the volume or detail of regulatory frameworks.

Other findings of the OIOS relate to the vague statements of results, as well as the fact that the determination of success does not lend itself to impartial, transparent and precise measurement.  Outcomes are influenced by multiple actors and external risk factors, and many of the planned results are expressed in a self-serving manner, lack credible verification and rest upon subjective judgement.  “Expected accomplishments” largely relate to individual sections or divisions and do not contribute to higher-order policy prioritization or laying the ground for strategic debate.  Although aspirational results are utilized to justify approval of budgets, their actual attainment is of no discernable consequence to subsequent resource allocation or decision-making, and reporting on results does not feed into the budgeting calendar.

The Oversight Office concludes that if results actually produced do not guide the decision-making and if there is no relaxation of process controls, results-based management will continue to be an administrative chore of no real utility.  The OIOS offers recommendations to establish a policy framework to outline the eventual extent and limitations of results-based management, to be accompanied by an internal control framework that addresses delegation of authority and decision-making criteria.  The Office also recommends a review of the rules and regulations pertaining to programme planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation; consolidation of the Secretary-General’s reporting obligations; integration of programmatic results frameworks within the first phase of the enterprise resource planning strategy; and an update of the range of output categories subject to planning and monitoring.  The OIOS also points out the need to strengthen the Organization’s technical and methodological capacities.

The Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC), in a related report (document A/63/328) supports the implementation of an enterprise risk management and internal control framework.  In deliberating on the approach to those elements, consideration should be given to the fact that their implementation would mean a change in the organizational culture and more than simply an implementation of technical concepts.  The implementation is dependent on unwavering support from management at the highest level, as well as clear and sufficient communication with staff.  The report outlines the need for an executive-level document that describes in clear terms for senior management what the benefits are to adopting enterprise risk management and an internal control framework.

The IAAC also recommends a structured training programme and a communication strategy targeting all staff.  It agrees with the Secretary-General’s comments on the role of the OIOS in this context, but considers that, for reasons of independence, the OIOS should have the ability to conduct its own risk assessment for the purposes of planning, while giving full consideration to management’s assessment.  The implementation of the Secretary-General’s “accountability architecture” needs to reflect full cost implications, as well as the time that it will take to complete.  Project oversight should be assigned to a high-level entity, such as the existing Management Committee, in order to demonstrate senior management’s commitment.

The proposal to launch enterprise risk management in a few organizational units as an initial step is a sound approach, the IAAC states.  However, it advises that, instead of a pilot, enterprise risk management should be initially implemented in a few selected units as the first phase of a multi-phase project.  Also recommended is the development of a detailed project plan, with a reasonable time frame for completing all the phases and clearly-identified outputs, results and the full cost of implementation, as well as specific steps for monitoring and evaluation.  The IAAC recommends the establishment of a Chief Risk Officer post, but states that the proposal for the establishment of a new Division for Accountability and Results Management should be revisited, as its responsibilities would overlap with those of that official.

While noting the efforts to address accountability, internal control and management practices, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), in a related report (document A/63/457), insists that the issues should be further discussed with oversight bodies and organizations within the system.  Reiterating its recommendation that use should be made of expertise available within the United Nations system, the ACABQ expresses dissatisfaction, among other things, with the explanation provided by the Secretariat that the expenditure of $1.32 million on the consultancy for the enterprise risk management recommendations has resulted in value added commensurate with the cost.

According to the ACABQ, the Secretary-General’s report on the accountability framework does not clearly demonstrate the relationships between various proposals or their linkage to existing structures.  It focuses primarily on only one of the six points set out in the governance report, namely assessment of the current policies and identification of weaknesses that need to be addressed.  It also does not respond to the Assembly’s request for annual reports on measures to strengthen accountability and the results achieved.  The Advisory Committee would have expected information on concrete cases where accountability measures had been applied and remedial action taken.

As identified by the ACABQ, one of the main weaknesses of the Secretary-General’s accountability architecture relates to the lack of clarity in the definition of accountability, which should go further than responsibility to “explain and justify” by establishing responsibility for action or lack thereof.  The Advisory Committee stresses the importance of timely implementation of oversight bodies’ recommendations, as well as the need for a concrete set of measures to ensure implementation by senior management.  It also recommends developing specific measures to ensure that Member States have “unfettered access to timely and reliable information on decisions and performance”.

The Advisory Committee states that, while identifying nine areas for improving accountability, all relating to personal accountability, the Secretary-General does not identify specific measures to bring about intended improvements, or to improve institutional accountability.  Concerning the selection of senior managers, the Advisory Committee had expected concrete progress, but discerned no enhancement in the transparency of the process.  Viewing the senior manager compact process and the posting of compacts on iSeek as useful measures for promoting transparency, the Advisory Committee emphasizes that such measures must be further developed.  A set of specific sanctions (up to termination of employment) should be put in place to deal with failure to perform on the part of senior managers.  The report also stresses the need for reforming performance appraisal and developing links between various monitoring and evaluation systems.  It urges the Secretary-General to proceed with his intention to improve the system of delegation of authority.

In connection with enterprise risk management, the Advisory Committee agrees that the Organization should be able to assess and manage risks systematically.  Given the fact that the OIOS and other entities of the Secretariat are involved in risk assessment, their respective roles should be clarified.  The ACABQ recommends that the Secretary-General continue his work in this area in the light of updated information and the results of consultations with other entities of the United Nations system, and report thereon in the context of the proposed budget for 2010-2011.

On results-based management, the Advisory Committee considers the “golden rule” proposed by the JIU, whereby new reports on reform or management processes should be accompanied by an evaluation of the impact of previous processes, to be a sound approach.  But, while a number of specific actions are proposed for strengthening self-evaluation, the Advisory Committee regrets that no similar actions are proposed for improving performance monitoring.  Effective results-based management should be based on reliable and integrated information systems capable of producing high-quality and up-to-date performance data.  Programme managers should have effective systems to track and analyse results.  In this connection, the ACABQ draws attention to the issues raised by the Board of Auditors and its recommendations on information and communications technology.  It also reiterates that consideration should be given to improving the timeliness of performance reporting to allow programme managers to incorporate lessons learned into new plans and budgets.

On the need to build cost-effective and user-friendly results-based management information systems, the AdvisoryCommittee observes that no further information has been provided on the scope, parameters or time frame for such systems or on how compatible they will be with the existing and projected ones, in particular, the enterprise risk management.  In this connection, the ACABQ draws attention to the Board of Auditors’ recommendation on the need to adopt a decision on the Secretary-General’s proposals related to the enterprise resource planning system of the Secretariat.

Action on Draft

The Committee approved, without a vote, a draft resolution (document A/C.5/63/L.2), by the terms of which the Assembly would allow the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia and Tajikistan to vote in the General Assembly until the end of its sixty-third session, agreeing that their failure to pay the minimum required to avoid the application of Article 19 of the Charter was due to conditions beyond their control.  [Article 19 stipulates that Member States lose their right to vote in the Assembly if the amount of their arrears to the Organization equals or exceeds their dues for two full preceding years.]

Introduction of Documents

The Secretary-General’s report on the accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control framework was introduced by ANGELA KANE, Under-Secretary-General for Management.  She said that, as international organizations and national Governments were being increasingly called on for increased accountability by their constituencies and stakeholders, the Secretary-General had also made accountability one of his priorities.  And that was what the report before the Committee was all about:  creating an accountability architecture within the United Nations that would convert the current framework from a broad collection of loosely-integrated regulations, rules and procedures into an integrated system where results would be monitored and evaluated and every programme manager and staff member would be responsible for the consequences of their actions.

One of the new dimensions of the proposed architecture was an enterprise risk management and internal control framework, she continued.  The risks the Organization faced were varied -- from reputational to financial to operational to governance.  Risk mitigation needed to be incorporated into the Organization’s processes to increase the probability of achieving its mandates and objectives.  That required a change in the planning culture in order to identify risks and the means to deal with them, as well as creation of a simple model that could be applied consistently by all departments, units and peacekeeping missions.  The resources requested for the project would enable the United Nations to test the methodology of risk management, which would be shared with all offices and peacekeeping missions to begin to develop standards and guidelines for all to use.

Another dimension of the proposed architecture was results-based management, she added.  As the Secretary-General had stated, “We must instil a results-oriented culture at all levels of the Secretariat, while also adhering to the Organization’s rules, regulations and ethical standards.”  To become fully results-oriented, managers needed better tools and guidance on how to tie together planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation aspects in their work.  The proposed action plan was practical, based on in-house expertise and best practices and provided a road-map on how the actions could be implemented.  The pillars of performance, compliance, oversight and integrity, together with the two new dimensions of risk management and internal control and enterprise risk management, would lead to a better-managed and more accountable United Nations.

INGA-BRITT AHLENIUS, Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, introduced the OIOS report on results-based management review, saying that it was the Office’s understanding that when the Assembly decided to introduce results-based budgeting through its resolution 55/231 in 2001, it was intended as a step towards results-based management.  Indeed, those were concepts that could not be separated.  The introduction of results-based management represented a shift from a focus on the delivery of inputs, activities and outputs, with a preoccupation with rules and regulations, to another paradigm of governance and oversight, wherein the focus was on the effects of those activities.  That presupposed a fundamental change in the surrounding framework of accountability and control -- and a degree of trust between governors and managers.  The Oversight Office found, however, that amongst Secretariat staff, results-based management had been set up and regarded as yet another reporting and compliance requirement, a paper exercise unconnected to how United Nations decision-making in reality occurred.

The OIOS also noted that the results orientation was ultimately shallow, inconsistent and frequently based on very poor data quality, she said.  As currently conceived, the enterprise resource planning strategy did not provide for planning and reporting on resources against programme results.  The logical frameworks for the results that gave justice to budgets in the first place was scheduled to be monitored separately from enterprise resource planning.  Until enterprise resource planning could show how much money and manpower had been put behind “results” pursued, it would do nothing for those who tried to analyse the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization.

Results-based management was an enterprise that could not be simply dealt with by delegating responsibility to the Secretary-General, she continued.  The role of the General Assembly in the accountability equation could not simply be that of placing demands onto the Secretariat.  If there were no constraints to the mandate-giving process; if the Secretary-General was unable to hold back against the significant number of mandates and requests for reports; if the Assembly could not accept that results-based management needed to involve recognition of failure as well as success when decisions were made -- if all that were true, then it would remain inevitable that much of Secretariat staff’s time and efforts would rather be spent on the performances that could be measured, not necessarily the relevant ones.  The Oversight Office noted that the Secretary-General’s report had not provided a clear idea on how to bring a coherent analytical or operational framework for integration of results-based management with accountability, internal control and enterprise risk management.

EVEN FONTAINE-ORTIZ, Chairman of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), introduced that body’s report on results-based management in the context of the United Nations reform, saying that the Unit had taken the time to make a comparative analysis between the benchmarking framework proposed by the JIU and approved by the Assembly, the JIU report on results-based management and the two frameworks proposed by the Secretary-General on results-based management and accountability.  All nine proposed improvement areas for accountability and five principles for results-based management had been duly discussed and approved by the Assembly in the series of reports on managing for results, with concrete guidelines for implementing them.  The approved framework was not only more comprehensive and specific, but contained other crucial elements for the implementation of results-based management lacking or not duly elaborated in the Secretary-General’s proposals, in particular, issues like delegation of authority, performance management and a rewards and sanctions system.

The fact that the Secretary-General concurred with most, if not all, of the findings and recommendations of the JIU report raised the question of whether or not the new study was justified.  “You have before you four frameworks on the same subject:  the one you already approved, two new ones proposed by the Secretary-General and a new one proposed by OIOS”, he said.  “It is up to you to decide to reconfirm, change or replace the benchmarking framework approved in resolution 60/257.”

The note by the Secretary-General transmitting his comments on the JIU report was introduced by Ms. Kane.

The Acting Chair of the ACABQ, COLLEN KELAPILE, introduced that body’s report, saying that closer interaction between the management and oversight bodies would have resulted in a better presentation of the issues under consideration.  The lack of clarity in the definition of accountability was one of the fundamental weaknesses in the Secretary-General’s accountability architecture.  The Advisory Committee believed that the definition of various aspects of accountability, as currently available within the United Nations system of organizations, could form the basis for a common comprehensive definition.

The Advisory Committee recommended that the Assembly take note of the Secretary-General’s reports.  It also recommended that the Assembly endorse the proposals contained in paragraphs 104 (b) and (c) of the Secretary-General’s report, subject to its comments and observations.  The ACABQ did not recommend approval of the proposed establishment of a dedicated capacity as contained in paragraph 104 (d) of the report.  Accordingly, it did not recommend approval, at this stage, of the proposed changes to the organizational structure of the Secretariat contained in the report or any of the resources requested in document A/62/701/Add.1

Speaking on behalf of the “Group of 77” developing countries and China, CONRAD HUNTE (Antigua and Barbuda) reiterated the Group’s support for strengthening the accountability of the United Nations, noting that a lack of accountability in the past had led to a variety of crises, such as the oil-for-food scandal and the failure to fully implement its development mandates.  A fundamental point of departure for all discussions on accountability was the need for the Secretariat to faithfully follow the mandates it was given.

He raised several points of concern regarding proposals on the accountability architecture.  They included the use of in-house expertise versus consultants whose work sometimes overlapped.  In that regard, he noted that the use of consultants, who were not necessarily familiar with the unique character of the United Nations, had presented some difficulties in the report itself.  Further, he said that, while the report presented conceptual points, it was short on concrete proposals for implementation.  He was also concerned that it did not appear to establish a clear relationship among the various frameworks.  He said that the measures adopted by the Secretariat to strengthen accountability, mentioned in the report, did not illustrate coherence in how that was being done.

Further, he agreed with the ACABQ that the Secretariat’s working definition of accountability was unclear, noting that the General Assembly, in resolution 60/260, had requested a specific definition of accountability, along with clear measures for its application and enforcement, in return for agreeing to the ongoing experiment on limited budgetary discretion.  Accountability and budgetary flexibility went hand in hand.  Continuing, he said that accountability entailed managers who would be responsible for ensuring that the work done by their units effectively and efficiently carried out their mandates.  He found troubling the establishment of a dedicated unit on accountability in the absence of a clear proposal to ensure that those responsibilities were retained by managers.  Any proposal on administrative issues should state clearly who is accountable to whom.

GREGORY CAZALET (France), speaking on behalf of the European Union, welcomed the Secretary-General’s report, saying that the implementation of results-oriented management which held managers accountable would allow for better allocation of resources and better results.  However, it could only succeed if Member States gave the Organization clear objectives that could be easily evaluated through reliable, measurable indicators.  Human resources mechanisms should be put in place that rewarded attainment of results and punished failure to do so.

The success of this new accountability management would require a change in organizational culture, if it were not to become an administrative exercise that wasted the Organization’s time and human resources, he continued.  The European Union shared the concerns of the ACABQ regarding implementation the Secretariat’s proposals, so that the Organization and Member States would receive maximum benefit.  A permanent structure seemed premature at this stage, he said, and requested clarification on that point.

Speaking on behalf of the Rio Group, CARLOS RUIZ MASSIEU ( Mexico) said that staff at all levels must work to the highest standards of transparency, efficiency and effectiveness to make better use of resources and achieve results.  The report, however, neither explained specifically how the proposals for the accountability framework within the Secretariat, enterprise risk management, and results based management would be carried out, nor provided benchmarks or a timeline for their implementation.

Also, he noted that no clear view was provided for the role of existing oversight entities and regretted that no such bodies -- internal or external -- had been consulted during the report’s preparation.  Instead, external consultants with limited knowledge of the Organization had been hired at considerable cost.  He called for a comprehensive proposal containing analysis by the OIOS, the JIU and the IAAC, among others.

He went on to say that accountability had yet to be clearly defined, despite requests from the General Assembly and the ACABQ.  Accountability required staff to explain and justify actions, but also meant that there should be consequences for both action and inaction.  In that connection, he said that there must be greater transparency in the selection of senior managers.  Their annual compacts should include measures against insufficient performance, which should be reported to the General Assembly.

Regarding enterprise risk management, he noted that some entities of the Organization were engaged in the process, but not in a coordinated manner.  There needed to be a uniform methodology for identifying, evaluating and responding to reported risks.  He stressed that the United Nations was not comparable to any private enterprise.  Its unique characteristics must be taken into account before approving the proposal.

Further, the concept for implementing results-based management required further definition, as well as clarification on the role of oversight bodies such as the OIOS and the JIU.  He noted that the Secretariat was not authorized to suggest changes in the role and responsibilities of intergovernmental bodies.  Agreeing with the OIOS, he emphasized the importance of providing a global policy for results-based management implementation that included an internal control framework to establish direct links between different result levels.

LOY HUI CHIEN ( Singapore) supported the position of the Group of 77 and China and stressed the importance of strengthening accountability of the United Nations as a vital and integral part of the management and administrative reform.  Only an accountable and transparent United Nations that was efficient and effective could respond adequately to the collective needs of Member States.  In that context, he had expressed his delegation’s disappointment at the lack of depth and clarity in the Secretary-General’s proposal.  The concept of accountability, as outlined by the Secretary-General, must go beyond answerability.  It should explicitly go hand in hand with responsibility for performance and compliance, for all managers up to the level of under-secretary-general.  It must also go further, to consider repercussions.  There must be a system of sanctions to deal with poor performers.  That was an integral part of any personnel management system.  It was also a basic requirement for any organization that purported to become a world-class international civil service.  He, therefore, regretted that the Secretary-General’s proposal had entirely neglected that essential aspect of accountability.

His delegation would also like to see serious efforts made to translate the concept of a more results-oriented accountability regime into reality, he said.  It was troubling to learn that managers saw results-based management as an administrative chore of little value to accountability or decision-making.  It was even more troubling that the Secretary-General’s proposal contained no specific measures on improving performance monitoring and integrating past experiences to benefit future decision-making.  It would appear that the proposal had chosen to emphasize the form, rather than the substance of results-based management, which rendered the policy useless.  Until that issue was addressed, results-based management would remain a paperwork exercise, and inefficient and ineffective programmes and managers would elude censure.

He also emphasized the need to clarify the role of various oversight bodies, saying that his delegation had tried, but failed, to find concrete measures to ensure timely and rigorous implementation of the recommendations of oversight bodies in the proposal before the Committee.  In addition, the proposal made no significant effort to leverage on the existing in-house expertise with regard to internal controls and risk assessments.  “How is the Organization supposed to be accountable if it continues to work in silos and cannot reconcile the work of its various units?” he asked.  More effort could be made to improve the proposal, in that regard.

Flagging yet another issue, he referred to the Volcker Report on the oil-for-food programme, which had degenerated into “a sorry tale of bribery and fraud on a global scale”.  No other issue had served quite as well to expose the hollowness of the debate on accountability and the inadequacy of measures to ensure the credibility of the United Nations system.  The Volcker Report had been released almost three years ago, but what had been done since?  Had Member States been officially given the copies of the Report?  Had investigations been started into the matters described in it?  His delegation believed that the Assembly should discuss that matter in the coming weeks.  The report had raised issues that definitely merited discussion in an open setting, an essential step if the United Nations was to maintain its reputation and credibility as a truly accountable Organization.

THOMAS GUERBER ( Switzerland) said that the three-in-one proposal on accountability, risk management and results-based management was complex, its benefits not obvious at first glance.  He found it difficult to understand why, for example, expertise available within the Secretariat and the advice of internal and external oversight bodies had not been solicited for the report.  Nonetheless, the proposals made were critical for the Organization, to ensure that senior managers and staff were held accountable for their actions or lack thereof; knew and managed the risks associated with the Organization’s activities: and were guided by the objectives in the Charter.

He went on, “accountability means more than just `explain and justify’”.  Rather, it must include the possibility of sanctions for non-achievement of results on an individual level, as well as consequences for resource allocation, if the concept was to be taken seriously by managers and staff.  He said that enterprise risk management would go a long way towards effectively meeting the challenge of determining how much risk the United Nations should accept in striving to fulfil its mandates.  Results-based management must not be “an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making”, he said, citing the OIOS on the matter.  He urged revisiting the policy framework on which results-based management was currently based and strengthening the Organization’s technical and methodological capacities to implement it.

He endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal in principle, but was under no illusion that it would produce a return on investment overnight.  The proposed frameworks required significant cultural change within the Organization, which would take years to materialize.  Nonetheless, Member States had the responsibility to set the course for greater accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in the Organization by giving the Secretariat additional guidance that addressed the weaknesses that had been voiced.

CHERITH NORMAN ( United States) reiterated her country’s strong commitment to the principles of accountability, transparency and efficiency throughout the United Nations.  It was critical that the Organization had strong control mechanisms and oversight capabilities in place to monitor the achievement of results and ensure that mandated activities were carried out responsibly and economically and, when they were not, to take corrective action.

Almost 15 years ago, the United States had joined with other Members to establish the OIOS, which had proven to be one of the most important United Nations management reforms, she continued.  A few years later, nations had joined in a consensus to implement results-based budgeting.  Most recently, Member States had affirmed their commitment to strengthening accountability and the achievement of results.  Her delegation continued to believe that all United Nations structures and staff needed to be keenly focused on achieving the best results in the most economical way.

On the issues of risk assessment and internal control at the United Nations, her delegation had been looking closely at the experience of other organizations of the system, she continued.  In particular, she highlighted the perspective of the World Health Organization (WHO), which emphasized the need for strong preventive internal control measures.  That organization had concluded that such policies and procedures were necessary both to mitigate the risk of fraud and to protect staff from the risk of suspicion.  That example reinforced the IAAC observation that successful implementation of enterprise risk management, accountability and internal controls would depend on “clear, simple and sufficient communication to United Nations staff on what the concepts mean, what is required of staff members and what benefits this change can bring to their work and how it will foster the achievement of results”.  The WHO example also showed that concerns that such preventive measures might appear duplicative or send a signal that staff was not trusted were easily addressed and remedied.

Turning to the details of the proposals before the Committee, she said that since the ACABQ report was comprehensive and clear, her delegation would use it as a basis for its own analysis.  In addition, OIOS’s recent evaluation of results-based management and the observations of the IAAC on enterprise risk management were also useful.  Her delegation had been struck by some “rather strong” conclusions reached by the ACABQ.  In view of those, it was not surprising that the Advisory Committee did not recommend approval of the Secretariat’s proposed changes in the organizational structure or the resources requested for them.  The accountability framework and risk-based management were, by nature, ongoing issues that must keep pace with current operating requirements.  While there was clearly more work to be done, the United States considered the reports before the Committee to be a first step towards improving the basic approach to strengthening internal controls and linking results to management and budgeting throughout the Secretariat.

During the discussions in the days ahead, her delegation would seek answers to the Advisory Committee’s and its own questions.  For example, she would be interested in learning the views of the Secretariat and the ACABQ on the proposal made by the IAAC to create a Chief Risk Officer in the Secretariat.  She would also like to know whether the Secretariat had taken into account the recommendations of the OIOS on results-based management as it developed its proposals.

MANUELA URENA ( Costa Rica) agreed with the statements made by the Rio Group and the Group of 77.  She noted that Costa Rica had called for a follow-up on the oil-for-food investigation, asking that the results of that investigation be made known.  While she understood that the cost of widely publishing the full report might be prohibitive, she requested that its conclusions and recommendations be made known to the Fifth Committee, since they would have bearing on the discussions on accountability.

DMITRY S. CHUMAKOV ( Russian Federation) said that his delegation attached great importance to the efforts to improve the system of accountability and management at the United Nations, which should correspond to the growing challenges.  Based on the results of a recent staff survey, the need to strengthen the effectiveness of management mechanisms was clearly enjoying broad support.  The view from inside confirmed the existence of certain difficulties in the effective implementation of Member States’ decisions.  He supported the Secretary-General’s position regarding the United Nations reform, which needed to be based on the three pillars of transparency, effectiveness and accountability and should be geared towards concrete results.  He stressed, in this regard, that the actions of the Secretariat should be transparent, and managers should be fully accountable to Member States.  The changes to the management structure should not lead to unjustified inflation of budgetary expenditures or the staffing table.

Continuing, he called for caution in introducing risk management -- the method derived from world business practices -- to the work of the Secretariat.  That was undeniably a fashionable innovation, but its fruits were not so clear to see.  He also drew attention to the fact that surveys by PricewaterhouseCoopers had indicated that only 23 per cent of company directors believed that ever-increasing resources spent on risk management were justified.  There were a lot of questions about whether risk management provided for more effective decisions.  Changes to the thinking of managers required a balanced, phased approach.

The Russian Federation was concerned over a significant volume of additional resources being requested outside the regular budget cycle in respect of management reform, he said.  In particular, that related to the risk management and internal control framework.  In keeping with previous rounds, when those items were discussed, his delegation truly agreed to the changes within the Department of Management, including its restructuring with internal transfer of resources.  However, his delegation did not agree to the allocation of new resources, in addition to that.  There was a clear need for a more careful study of the capacity of the OIOS.  Perhaps, that capacity could be strengthened, because its mandate already included risk management questions.  He was concerned over the possibility of duplication of management structures within various structures of the Secretariat.  During the consideration of the reports submitted to the Committee, his delegation would also be devoting particular attention to enhancing personal accountability of staff for poor performance.

JAVAD SAFAEI ( Iran) supported the position of the Group of 77 and the Rio Group.  He understood “accountability” to mean the accountability of managers to Member States, not of one department within the United Nations to another, or of staff to managers.  The Organization was meant to be accountable to Member States for the mandates given.  Accountability also required that there be consequences both for action taken and for lack of it, or for poor performance.  The scope of the Secretary-General’s report seemed to address only the action element.  Lack of action or poor performance was of equal importance and should be taken into account during discussions.  He also joined Singapore and Costa Rica in requesting information resulting from the oil-for-food investigation.

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For information media • not an official record