GA/AB/3804

BUDGET COMMITTEE TAKES UP REVIEW OF SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS

1 June 2007
General AssemblyGA/AB/3804
Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Sixty-first General Assembly

Fifth Committee

55th Meeting (AM)


Budget committee takes up review of special political missions


The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) considered the results of a recent review of the logical frameworks of the Organization’s special political missions this morning, which was undertaken to ensure that those missions’ programmatic aspects and resource requirements were consistent with the mandates assigned to them by the Security Council and the General Assembly.


Introducing the Secretary-General’s report on the matter, Director of the Programme Planning and Budget Division, Sharon Van Buerle, said that the review of the logical frameworks for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2007 -- authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/252 -- had demonstrated that the frameworks of all but three special political missions were in full compliance with relevant provisions of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and that the programmatic aspects and resource requirements were consistent with the missions’ mandates.


Following the review, adjustments had been made to the logical framework for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), and two outputs had been added to the logical frameworks for the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), she said.  [In the report, the Assembly was requested to approve the proposed revisions to the logical framework for 2007 for the three special political missions mentioned above.]


Commenting on the document, Pakistan’s representative said that defining special political missions was a problem because, by their very nature, they were “anomalous structures”, representing a hybrid between political missions and peacekeeping operations.  The process of translating the mandates of Security Council and General Assembly into “actionable shape of outputs and achievements” in the context of results-based budgeting was an area where improvements were needed.  Given the status of implementation of results-based budgeting in the Organization, about which serious questions had been raised by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), there was credible reason to doubt that everything about every mandate was fine.


He added that there were some political initiatives -- including the “1540 Committee” dealing with the implementation of the resolution on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) -- where considerable work was required, and the Fifth needed to look at them accordingly.  While a general framework was in place, adjustments would be required.  His delegation would have difficulty in accepting the report as presented and was closer to taking note of the Secretary-General’s report, as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).

The Committee also had before it a letter from the Permanent Representative of Syria to the Secretary-General, which contained that country’s observations concerning the mission of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), whose logical framework -- according to the letter -- expands the Special Envoy’s mandate to include elements of the provisions of Council resolution 1701 (2006).  Such an expansion, the letter states, led not only to the duplication of work in the United Nations Secretariat -- as another Special Envoy of the Secretary-General concerned with implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) had been appointed -- but also to the interpretation of resolution 1701 (2006) outside its context and principal substance, which was the cessation of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon.


The Permanent Representative wrote that, for some indicators of achievement, the logical framework was contrary to the commitments set forth in the Charter, which prohibits any intervention by the United Nations in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.  The issues of diplomatic relations and the delineation of borders between Syria and Lebanon, which were mentioned in the logical framework, were bilateral matters bearing on national sovereignty and were to be resolved by agreement between the two Governments.  They thus fell outside the framework of resolution 1559 (2004) and outside the mandate of the Special Envoy.


“It is difficult to understand why the logical framework, proposed for review, should ignore Israel’s ongoing occupation of parts of southern Lebanon, its continued breaches of Lebanese airspace, and its threat to United Nations forces in southern Lebanon, despite the fact that they all constitute a threat to, and a genuine violation of, Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and are therefore an ongoing violation by Israel of resolution 1559 (2004),” the letter states.  The logical framework also disregarded the undercover activities of Israel in Lebanon.  Syria expected the Secretariat, in reviewing the logical framework for the budget of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), to treat its concerns with the required seriousness by amending the logical framework in an objective and non-selective manner, so as to ensure its conformity with 1559.


The representative of Lebanon said the Assembly had, in resolution 60/255, requested the Secretary-General to submit his future budget proposals for all special political missions in full compliance with results-based budgeting “in order to take into account the concerns of one delegation”.  The Secretary-General presented his relevant report A/61/525/Add.1 during the main part of the Assembly’s sixty-first session.  At that time, all delegations of the Committee, except that same single delegation, had agreed that the logical frameworks provided by the Secretary-General for the special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the Assembly or the Security Council were in line with their relevant mandates.


The Assembly, again to satisfy that delegation, had called for the Secretary-General to present another report in its resolution 61/252 reviewing the logical frameworks of all the special political missions in order to ensure that their programmatic aspects and resource requirements were in line with their mandates.  That report was in front of the Committee today, he said, stressing that Lebanon had taken note of that report, which covered the period from 1 January to 31 December 2007, and the Secretary-General’s determination that three such political missions needed minor adjustments, including BONUCA, UNOGBIS and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).


He said that Lebanon had also noted that the report had been revised on 30 May, based on the request of the same single delegation.  Though it had serious reservations about the way the matter had been handled, Lebanon hoped that, after this latest revision, the concerned delegation was closer to joining the consensus of the Assembly on the matter.  He said that Lebanon considered Syria a friendly and brotherly neighbouring country.   Lebanon continued to strive to strengthen its already strong relations with Syria and, in that spirit had, nearly one year ago today, called for the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Syria.  All Lebanese factions and people had also called for the resolution of all pending issues between the two brotherly nations, including the delineation of common boarders.


The report of the ACABQ was introduced by its Chairman, Rajat Saha.


The Committee will meet again at a date to be announced.


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For information media • not an official record
For information media. Not an official record.