REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS VERIFICATION, CLUSTER MUNITIONS, AMONG ISSUES RAISED, AS FIRST COMMITTEE CONTINUES DEBATE

Sixty-first General Assembly

First Committee

14^th Meeting (AM)

REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS VERIFICATION, CLUSTER MUNITIONS,

AMONG ISSUES RAISED, AS FIRST COMMITTEE CONTINUES DEBATE

Iraq and Lebanon had shown the “tragic consequences of an excessive faith in what armed forces can achieve,” but the proliferation of nuclear weapons seemed likely only to bolster that faith, Hans Blix, the Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this morning, as it continued its thematic debate on conventional weapons.

Despite significant reductions in nuclear arsenals, what remained was ample enough to destroy the planet, he said.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty was not on the verge of collapse, but its safeguards needed strengthening.  A lack of implementation by nuclear-weapon States of their commitments to work toward disarmament had undermined their moral authority and had left non-nuclear-weapon States feeling frustrated and cheated.  Had those commitments been kept, negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran would be less difficult.

He called on all nuclear-weapon States to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals, with the United States and the Russia Federation taking the lead.  All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a policy of no first-use, and the United States and the Russian Federation should take their weapons off hair-trigger alert, he said.

John Barrett, Chairman of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Verification, told the Committee verification should be considered a toolbox, in which to put very useful instruments to enhance security.  He reviewed the work of the panel of experts on verification, which encompassed nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, as well as conventional weapons and verification in so involving non-State actors and States.  The draft report did not presume to tell sovereign Member States of the United Nations what they should or should not do in the area of verification, but rather tried to develop the basis for a broader consensus on the relationship between verification and the security of all States.

National legislation and institutional controls were not enough, when even minimal global standards on brokering controls for small arms and light weapons were absent, the representative of Lithuania told the Committee.  Illicit arms transfers to festering conflict areas and human rights abusers fuelled violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.  Middlemen organized arms transfers and services between two or more parties, often bringing together buyers, sellers, transporters and financiers to make a deal that was difficult to trace, monitor or control.  In that respect, the Programme of Action was vital, as it specifically promoted regulation of brokering activities to prevent illicit transfers, without impeding legitimate brokering activities.

The representative of Gabon said that it was imperative to combat the scourge of illicit trading, as armed conflict had harmed the economic fabric of countries.  Without such trade, the scope of such conflicts would be diminished, as would the problem of children engaged in armed conflicts.  There must be no weak link in the chain.  No country was immune to the effects, so it was incumbent on each to step up cooperation through the exchange of information.  Arms manufacturers had a moral duty to make sure those arms fell into safe and responsible hands and were used only for security reasons.

The representative of Austria expressed serious concerns about the consequences of the inhumane use of cluster munitions.  Existing general rules of international humanitarian law had not been adequately applied in many instances in which those munitions had been used.  Recent events had again shown that, in addition to the question of the reliability of such weapons, specific rules were urgently needed to address their use during conflict situations, particularly in, or close to, concentrations of civilians.  Negotiations should begin on a legally-binding instrument addressing the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions, though that instrument need not ban such munitions.

Statements in the thematic debate on conventional weapons were also made by representatives of Australia, Belgium, the United States and Belarus.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m., Tuesday, 17 October, to continue its thematic debate on conventional weapons, begin its debate on other disarmament measures and international security, as well as to hear the further introduction of draft resolutions and decisions.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its thematic debate on conventional weapons.  It was also expected to hear a briefing by the Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Hans Blix as well as the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on Verification, Mr. John Barrett.

Statements

HANS BLIX, Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, said that his comments would be made against the background of the analysis and recommendations contained in the report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, though the remarks would be his own.  The central message of the report was that global arms control and disarmament, which had stagnated in the last decade, must be revived and pursued with efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to further States and terrorist groups.

He said that, despite significant reductions in nuclear arsenals, what remained was ample enough to destroy the planet.  Several nuclear States had not given pledges against a first use of nuclear weapons.  The development of a missile shield by the United States was perceived by China and Russia as a threat, and countermeasures were expected.  Influential groups in the United States were urging the development and testing of new types of nuclear weapons, and in the United Kingdom, many expected the Government to renew its nuclear weapons programme.  If the United States were to station weapons in space, others might follow, creating threats to its peaceful use and the enormous investments there.

He noted that the international community’s early approach to weapons of mass destruction was in the form of bans on their use.  With the appearance of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War, two new avenues were followed.  First, the United Nations Charter prohibited the use of any force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any States.  There were two exceptions; the right to self-defence after an armed attack occurred until the Security Council had taken the necessary measures; and the use of armed force in situations which constituted “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression”.

He said that the second approach was based on the idea that the best guarantee against the use of weapons would be the absence of weapons, through bans on use, production and stockpiling.  Violations of a ban on the use of weapons of mass destruction would be visible, but violations of bans on production or stockpiling would not, so international inspections were required.  A convention, banning the use of nuclear weapons, had not been attainable and their elimination had instead been sought through a fragmentary approach, such as bans in various environments (for example, the Antarctic); bans on testing; limits on possession; nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security guarantees.

He said that the two approaches on the threat of nuclear weapons -- prohibiting the use of force and elimination of such weapons -- were related.  In many cases, perceived threats had been the incentive for access to nuclear weapons.  Libya, Iran and North Korea had convinced themselves that their security was threatened.  Iran had also faced a real threat from Iraq.  Incentives to acquire such weapons could be reduced by offers of normal relations and by assurances that military intervention would not be undertaken.

On whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was at risk of collapsing, he said that “the world is not replete with would-be violators,” and the overall commitment to the treaty remained of tremendous value.  Iran and Libya had been brought back into observance of the treaty, while solutions were currently being sought to the issues of North Korea and Iran.  There were no other problematic cases to his knowledge.  Safeguards needed to be strengthened.  Universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol would do much to help, and the NPT needed a standing secretariat.  “The world should not be without administrative support in handling one of its most sensitive treaties,” he said.

He said that a more momentous problem was the lack of implementation of the Treaty’s article 6, which called on nuclear-weapon States to work towards disarmament.  Mass withdrawals by non-nuclear-weapon States were not expected, yet there were strong feelings of frustration and even of being cheated.  The moral authority of nuclear-weapon States was undermined when they were easing their doctrines for the use of nuclear weapons rather than restricting them, and when they were in the process of deciding the development of new types of weapons.  Negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran would be less difficult if nuclear-weapon States could show that they were leading the world towards nuclear disarmament.  Iraq and Lebanon had shown the “tragic consequences of an excessive faith in what armed forces can achieve,” and the proliferation of nuclear weapons seemed likely to encourage that faith even more.

In relation to nuclear weapons, he said that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission recommended that the Security Council establish a subsidiary unit to provide professional and technical information and advice on weapons of mass destruction.  Such a commission could have been useful in determining the nature of the explosion recently set off by North Korea.  If the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been in force, it too could have kept the world well-informed.  To break the decade-long deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament, that body should be able to make administrative and procedural decisions by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the membership present.  The General Assembly should convene a world summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist-use of weapons of mass destruction.

“No measure could be more urgent, important in substance, and as a signal that arms control and disarmament are again on the world agenda, than signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by States which have not yet done so,” he added.  Without that Treaty, there would be an increased risk that some States might restart weapons testing.  To demand that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should ratify the treaty would be easier if all States participating in the six-party talks had themselves ratified the treaty.

He said that negotiations should begin on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons.  To be meaningful, it must provide for effective verification.  Further steps by all nuclear-weapon States towards reducing strategic nuclear arsenals would be a significant confidence-building measure.  The United States and Russia should take the lead, with Russia withdrawing its weapons from forward deployment to central storage and the United States withdrawing such weapons from Europe to United States territory.  All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a policy of no first-use, and the United States and Russia should take their weapons off hair-trigger alert.  He said that disposal of low enriched uranium fuel for nuclear power must occur in a manner that did not increase diversion of material, and highly enriched uranium should be phased out.

JOHN BARRETT, Chairman of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Verification, said that General Assembly resolution 59/60 had established the United Nations Panel of Government Experts to explore the question of verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification.  The final product of the Panel would be a short, action-oriented report, which would include some recommendations for consideration by United Nations Member States.

The Panel aimed to produce a consensus report for submission to the Secretary-General and hopefully one endorsed by this Committee.  Members of the Panel were acutely aware that its work should be as open as possible to the concerns and views of other United Nations Member States. This was both a matter of transparency and a genuine desire to be as inclusive as possible, he said.

He added that the work of the Panel encompassed nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery.  It also included conventional weapons and verification, in so far as it applied to activities involving non-State actors as well as States.  The first session had concentrated more on weapons of mass destruction verification, while the second shifted the focus more on conventional weapons and means of delivery.  The third session went into the aspects of United Nations sanctions and illicit transfers of conventional weapons and the role of verification in such circumstances.

During those three sessions, he said, the Panel received experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the 1540 Committee and the Preparatory Committee of the CTBT Organization, to name a few.  Seventeen countries also submitted their views for the Panel’s consideration on the subject of verification, including Iran, Lebanon, the Russian Federation, Japan, Serbia and Montenegro.

Furthermore, the Panel’s work was built on the 1990 and 1995 Reports.  In other words, the Panel had looked at what had changed during the decade in the international-security environment and the security needs of States, how verification had addressed those needs and how it could address those in the future.

On the Reports’ structure, he noted that it was not institution-centric, but it rather identified and examined themes relating to verification.  Also, the relation between verification and compliance was not neglected, as the conceptual relationship between the two formed the backbone of the Panels’ approach and draft Report.  During discussions, themes that consistently emerged were the following; the concept of verification; verification experiences; techniques and methodologies of verification; and the need to build synergies and complementarities among bodies or agencies with responsibilities in the area of monitoring and verification.  Other themes included capacity-building (both in weapons of mass destruction-related verification and non-weapons of mass destruction verification); the role of the United Nations; and the contribution of civil society in helping to build capacity in certain regions on specific kinds of monitoring.

The draft Report did not presume to tell the sovereign Member States what they should or should not do in the area of verification, he said.  Rather, it tried to develop the basis for a new and widening consensus on the relationship of verification to the security of all States and how its role could be enhanced in contributing to that security.  Verification was a toolbox, in which the international community could put very useful instruments to enhance security.

Though draft recommendations were presented to Members States at the completion of the second session, he said that the Panel had run out of time on the last day of its meeting, just as it was on the edge of a consensus text.  He underlined that the differences were in the narrative or descriptive part of the text and not in the recommendations.  While the Panel was unable to submit the Report to the First Committee during the session this fall, he was confident that the Panel would be able to present a Report, reflecting the consensus of all Panel members, during the course of the 61^st Session of the General Assembly.

CAROLINE MILLAR (Australia) said that the convention to ban anti-personnel landmines, which now had 151 States parties, had made significant headway in ridding the world, once and for all, of the suffering caused by those insidious weapons. Thirty three of the fifty states that manufactured mines had become parties to the Convention.  Thirty eight million mines had been destroyed and ten million more were scheduled for destruction, while 7 of 52 States parties affected by landmines had cleared their mined areas.  For the first time, a disarmament treaty was also addressing survivors’ needs.

She said that the international community had made far less progress at the review conference on small arms earlier in the year.  That was a disappointment to her country, which had witnessed the terrible consequences of the illicit production and transfer of such weapons in its region without regard to the vulnerability of small States.  The international community needed to take firm action to implement the Programme of Action.  She welcomed the proposed omnibus resolution on small arms, including its scheduling of a biennial meeting by no later than 2008.  States must ensure that that meeting was focused on practical steps for implementing the Programme of Action.

She said Australia was pleased to have co-authored the draft resolution on an arms-trade treaty.  The absence of common international standards in that area contributed to conflict, crime and terrorism.  A legally-binding instrument would help address those negative consequences.  Last year’s resolution on preventing the illicit transfer and unauthorized access to, and use of, man-portable air defence systems must still be implemented.  She detailed the outcome of a seminar, hosted by the Australian Permanent Mission in Geneva, on measures to combat proliferation of such weapons, as well as of other seminars hosted by Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. She added that such a seminar was planned in New York for 2 November.

MARKUS REITERER ( Austria) said that there had been growing interest in the issue of cluster munitions and cluster bombs.  Austria had serious concerns about the consequences of the inhumane use of cluster munitions.  Existing general rules of international humanitarian law had not been adequately applied in many instances in which those munitions had been used.  Recent events had again shown that, in addition to the question of the reliability of such weapons, specific rules were urgently needed to address their use during conflict situations, particularly in, or close to, concentrations of civilians.

He said that Austria’s proposal during last September’s Preparatory Committee meeting of the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons that negotiations should begin on a legally-binding instrument addressing the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions, was not a proposal for a total ban on such munitions.  He urged all States to support the proposal at the forthcoming Convention Review Conference in Geneva.

ALAIN VAN GUCHT (Belgium), aligning himself with the statement made by Finland on behalf of the European Union, said it was the first time that Belgium had taken the floor.  He voiced concern on the issue of cluster munitions.  Though legislation on cluster munitions had been put into place in Belgium last June, he noted that certain types of those weapons were excluded from that legal definition, as they did not pose the same problems, from a humanitarian perspective.

Evidence of Belgium’s commitment to the issue of cluster munitions came in the form of the Belgian military’s clearing of contaminated zones -– particularly of cluster munitions -- in Lebanon.  On the international level, his Government was now pressing for negotiation as soon as possible, so that there could be a communal response on cluster munitions.  It was imperative that the mandate of the Group of Experts on Explosive Remnants of War be extended, but also be more specific, he said.  The objective should remain to be the creation of a consensus that was as broad as possible.

DALIUS CEKUOLIS ( Lithuania) said that while Lithuania did not produce weapons, it had recognized that legitimate brokering activities required proper national legislation and institutional controls.  However, these were not enough when even minimal global standards on brokering controls were absent.  Numerous illicit arms transfers to festering conflict areas and human rights abusers were facilitated by illicit brokering, fuelling violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.  Those middlemen organized transfers or services between two or more parties, often bringing together buyers, sellers, transporters and financiers to make a deal.  It was difficult to trace, monitor or control them.

In light of that, the United Nations Programme of Action had been vital, as it specifically promoted regulation of brokering activities to prevent illicit transfers without impeding legitimate brokering activities.  He said that the formation of a group of experts provided a timely and welcome opportunity to discuss global measures on small arms and light weapons brokering and elements for effective national controls.  As a member of that Group, Lithuania hoped its work would allow the United Nations membership to constructively engage on how to further develop national and international norms against illicit brokering in small arms.

ROBERT LUACES ( United States) said that he wished to commend the Security Council for its unanimous adoption of Resolution 1718 (2006), imposing sanctions against North Korea in response to its claimed nuclear test of 9 October.  By enacting the resolution, the Council had sent an unambiguous message to North Korea that it must eliminate its nuclear-weapons programmes and halt its development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.  It was crucial that all States take concrete action to implement the resolution expeditiously.  Only in that way could they make clear to North Korea’s leadership that its provocative and destabilizing actions were unacceptable and that they would be countered.

He said that, by any measure, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms had been a resounding success, establishing a global norm of transparency and accountability in military matters and reinforcing civilian control of the military.  By reporting on both imports and exports, the Register had captured the vast majority of the international conventional arms trade, even from some States that might not participate in a given year, or might never have participated.  Annual participation in the Register should be universalized.

He said that the Groups of Governmental Experts had conducted periodic reviews of the Register’s operation.  The first 3 reviews concluded that the seven existing categories within the Register adequately covered the weapons of most concern to the international community.  However, feedback received from a series of regional and subregional workshops held between 2001 and 2005 propelled the last two Groups to make substantive changes to the Register.  Those workshops revealed overwhelming support for having the Register report transfers of small arms and light weapons.  He encouraged all Governments to consider or continue submitting annual reports to the Register as a global confidence-building measure.

On the issue of missiles, he noted that the Third Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles was to begin work next year.  The Second Panel had produced a final draft that represented near-consensus.  The work of the third Panel should be based on that nearly-completed final report, rather than beginning the process all over again, thereby repeating work that had already been conducted.  Despite its obvious value as a resource for the panel, the recent report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on missiles was not an appropriate basis for concern of the Panel’s work during 2007.

VALERY KOLESNIK ( Belarus) said that his country supported the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons.  The Review Conference’s failure earlier in the year to agree on an outcome document should not be grounds for inaction.  At the national level, Belarus continued to implement the Programme of Action, particularly in legislation on export control and on improving the system of weapons transfers.  Under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Belarus was working to improve security in the storage of small arms and light weapons and man-portable air defence systems.  It was open to cooperating with all countries.

He said that the absence of a review conference outcome document should not prevent additional measures against the trade in small arms.  The Group of Governmental Experts should work as soon as possible to strengthen control for brokerage in such weapons.  Discussions must also be started on controls over the transfers of such weapons to non-State actors and organizations.  Measures were also needed to control supplies of man-portable air defence systems.

He said that future agreements should not limit a Government’s right to self-defence and legal trade in arms.  Universally effective mechanisms for small arms and light weapons monitoring could only be achieved if all Member States participated, which involved confidence-building measures.  For that reason, Belarus supported the Group of Governmental Experts’ development of the Register of Conventional Arms.  His country had been submitting to that register since 1972 and would continue to do so.  He added that Belarus had begun implementing projects to eliminate its stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines and hoped that other countries would accede to protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

ALFRED MOUSSOTSI ( Gabon) said that on the issue of the illicit trade of small arms, his Government reaffirmed its commitment to the spirit of the Programme of Action and the related initiatives in fighting that scourge. The lack of an outcome document was no excuse for progress: the programme was still relevant and that should not be the end of the international community’s battle.

Gabon had taken measures to combat the illicit trade of small arms and would continue to do so with countries in its subregion, he continued.  From a security and development perspective, it was imperative to combat that scourge as armed conflict had harmed the economic fabric of countries.  Without the illicit trade, the scope of such conflicts would be diminished, as would the problem of children engaged in such armed conflict.  There must be no weak link in the chain.  No country was immune to the effects of small arms, so it was incumbent on each State to step up cooperation through the exchange of information.  Furthermore, a legally-binding instrument on brokering was also needed.

Land mines had also caused much suffering and were an obstacle to economic and social development, as they prevented the majority of people in developing countries from partaking in rural activities.  He reiterated his Government’s commitment to the Nairobi Protocol and the five-year action plan, while reminding arms manufacturers that they had a moral duty to make sure those arms fell into safe and responsible hands and were used only for security.

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For information media • not an official record