PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR BURUNDI

“Without sounding overly positive ... Burundi is well on track in its very long ongoing peace process”, Carolyn McAskie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi, told correspondents this afternoon at Headquarters.

Briefing on the third report on Burundi [document S/2005/149], which had been submitted to the Security Council this week, she said the mandate for the United Nations Office in Burundi (UNOB), established 1 June 2004, was up for renewal before 1 June.  The peace process was based on talks begun in Arusha in December 1995 to end the widespread unrest that had begun with the assassination of Burundi’s President after the 1993 elections.  Those talks had led to the Arusha Accord, which had lead to a series of ceasefires.  Only the Palipehutu/FNL, a small rebel group, still operated in the hills around Bujumbura, the capital.  Ninety-five per cent of the country was secure, although the proliferation of arms meant that criminality was on the rise.

She said the peace process allowed for new power-sharing agreements in the military, in Parliament and in Government at all levels, including the local level.  It allowed for elections, disarmament and demobilization and the total reform of the army, which, because it had engaged in the civil war, had been seen as part of the problem.  The army would now only serve to protect the borders and a substantive civil police force would be the Government’s law and order arm.

The elections were on track, she continued.  The National Electoral Commission was expected to publish a final timetable that would complete the elections over the next four months.  The first electoral process had been the endorsement by the Burundian people of the Constitution on 28 February.  That was “an extremely moving experience”, as Burundians for the first time since 1993 had participated in a democratic process.  It was a sign that a corner had been turned.  There would be five electoral processes:  one for the villages, the districts and for the Assembly.  Then the districts would vote for senators, and Parliament would vote for a President.

The disarmament and demobilization process was on track as well, Ms. McAskie said.  There were delays because every upcoming issue had to be negotiated.  The point, however, was that people sat down and did those negotiations.  They were going from a process whereby the Tutsi elite, presenting 15 per cent of the population, would share power with the Hutus:  50-50 in the army; 60-40 in Parliament, and one to two in local councils.  Burundi was different from Rwanda, as ethnically everybody shared blame.  Tutsis and Hutus had both been victims and perpetrators.  Another difference with Rwanda was that Burundians had decided to embrace ethnic diversity.

A “less positive side of the ledger” was that Burundi was one of the poorest countries in the world.  It was not a failed State, as there was a functioning government, but that government had nothing to back it up because of extreme poverty, brain drain and a total lack of capacity.  It desperately needed the attention of the international community.  Without humanitarian and development support from the international community, she believed the peace process could very well be in jeopardy.  Refugees were coming back.  There were some 250,000 refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania, and hundreds of thousands were elsewhere.  Moreover, Burundi was densely populated with one of the highest birth rates in Africa.

The United Nations had played an “extraordinary” role, she said in conclusion.  The Security Council had given the mission the tools it needed:  5,000 troops with a Chapter VII mandate was substantial, and the United Nations presence had helped in calming things down.  What was missing was development investment.  The other tools such as support for disarmament, elections and human rights were working extremely well.  The United Nations could take a lot of credit, “but the real credit belongs to the Burundian people.  It will be their success when success comes”, she said.

Asked what could be done to get the Palipehutu/FNL into the peace process, Ms. McAskie said the group had been reduced in capacity.  However, the problem in Burundi was a national one, and the solution had to be regional, as that group was resupplied in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  “If we had peace in eastern Congo, we could have dealt with the FNL a lot sooner”, she said.  That group had claimed responsibility for the Gatumba massacre of 14 August 2004, and as a result, had been declared a terrorist group, which discouraged communication with them.  That prohibition was wearing off.  The FNL had been making approaches to, among others, the United Nations.  She hoped the UN could sponsor talks about conditions for a ceasefire and then deliver them to the mediator of the conflict, Jacob Zuma, Deputy President of South Africa.

One of the problems was that, as the group had been isolated from the international community for so long, it had unrealistic expectations, she continued.  The job ahead was to send a coordinated message to them that Burundi had a peace process and that they should join it now.  There would be no special deal for them.  One condition would be for them to make a statement of regret for the Gatumba massacre.

Addressing a question about development help, she said the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was involved, and Burundi might qualify for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative for debt relief. In January 2004, there had been a donor conference in Brussels, Belgium, at which $1 billion had been pledged by bilateral donors and the European Commission.  A lot of that money, however, had not been forthcoming because of the ongoing conflict.  The European Union was there and several key donors were very supportive.  The World Bank was, among other things, involved in the demobilization programme.  Burundi had, however, no other resources than its soil and its people.  It had been self-sufficient agriculturally before the crisis and should be again.  Agricultural investments should, therefore, be a major focus.  Burundi needed help in all traditional social areas of health, nutrition and education.  All economic and social indicators were going down.

Asked about Burundi’s ability to deal with returning refugees, Ms. McAskie said there was nobody more intelligent than the refugee herself (80 per cent of the refugees consisted of women and children) as to when to return.  Once elections were out of the way, 250,000 people might be on the march from southern Tanzania to Burundi.  The Arusha accords provided for a commission for resettlement and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had a major programme.

She would, however like to see help for the communities in Burundi who received returnees.  The humanitarian appeal for Burundi offered a perfect vehicle for that kind of support.  She said she was, therefore, “extremely disappointed” by the fact that in 2004 only 45 per cent of the money requested ($130 million) under that appeal had been pledged.  The 2005 humanitarian appeal was $134 million, of which less than 5 per cent had been received.

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