WORLD COMMUNITY NOT RISING TO CHALLENGE OF DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION, SAYS SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS HEADQUARTERS TEST-BAN TREATY CONFERENCE OPENS

Conference on Comprehensive

 Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

1^st Meeting (PM)

WORLD COMMUNITY NOT RISING TO CHALLENGE OF DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION,

SAYS SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS HEADQUARTERS TEST-BAN TREATY CONFERENCE OPENS

Three-Day Meeting Intended to Facilitate Treaty’s Entry into Force

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, stressing that everyone should be gravely concerned that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had still not entered into force, said that the longer the Treaty’s operation was delayed, the greater the risk that “someone, somewhere, will test nuclear weapons”.

That possibility, the Secretary-General told the opening of the fourth conference to facilitate the 1996 Treaty’s entry into force, would be a major setback for the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament.  “Yet we are not, as yet rising to this challenge, as we saw at last week’s World Summit.  For the second time in four months, States could not agree a way forward on disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”  At a time of heightened global anxiety about mass destruction weapons, there was a collective duty to promote and strengthen the multilateral instruments, which reduced their threat. 

The Treaty opened for signature nine years ago, and while the vast majority of States – 176 – have signed it and 125 have ratified it, 11 more countries whose ratification is essential for the Treaty to enter into force have still not done so.  Those countries, known as “Annex 2” States because they are among the 44 countries listed in the Treaty’s annex whose ratification is required, are:  China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, United States, and Viet Nam. 

The newly elected Conference President, Alexander Downer, Australia’s Foreign Minister, told the Meeting that the failure of last week’s World Summit to achieve any outcome in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been an extraordinarily poor outcome, given the contemporary global security environment.  Australia had been a strong and consistent support of the CTBT, based on the practical view that a complete and effective nuclear-test ban would constrain nuclear weapons’ development.  He had heard many reasons why the 11 remaining countries had not ratified the Treaty, but the time for excuses was past; “it’s time for them to act”, he said. 

Pending the Treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) had been working since 1997 to ensure that the verification system was credible, functional and cost-effective, its Executive Secretary, Tibor Tóth, told delegates.  The unique feature of the verification system was that States, regardless of their size and wealth, could benefit from the data provided by the system.  States’ political and strategic choices and scientific and technological advances had brought States very close to a universal and verifiable regime.  All such activities were important, but they were only accessories to the political will needed to trigger the Treaty’s operation.

The first-ever Special Representative to promote ratification of the Treaty, Jaap Ramaker, said his appointment of a Special Representative was no magical formula, no substitute for a genuine and permanent political commitment from all countries at the highest political level.  Yet, the road to the eventual entry into force of the CTBT was “steep and full of hurdles”.  The objective remained -- to make, admittedly slow, but surely steady, progress towards banning nuclear weapon test explosions for now and forever.  The ratification question was often tied to wider regional security issues -- South Asia, the Middle East and the Korean peninsula -- which complicated matters.

Calling the Treaty “an unfinished piece of disarmament and non-proliferation business”, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Pierre Pettigrew, said that one way to encourage States in the same region to ratify the Treaty was for them to do so in a coordinated way.  By agreeing to ratify together at the same time, both “Annex 2” States and “non-Annex 2” States in a given region could help build security and confidence in regions that suffered all too often from insecurity and uncertainty.  Building confidence was often a leap of faith:  by ratifying the CTBT simultaneously, States could make a significant leap jointly for the benefit of the entire world.  After all, testing nuclear weapons would be an unparalleled risk to regional stability and security. 

Agreeing with previous speakers that regional tensions might drive proliferation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Jack Straw, on behalf of the European Union, stressed, however, that widely established disarmament and non-proliferation norms could frustrate that.  More States were now within reach of mastering nuclear weapon technologies, and there was also a growing risk that such weapons of mass destruction would fall into the hands of non-State actors who would not hesitate to use them to kill large numbers of innocent people.  In confronting those changing and emerging threats, it was more vital than ever that the entire international community work together.  

Statements were also made, including at the ministerial level, by the representatives of:  Finland; Turkey; Kazakhstan; Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement; Peru; Hungary; Croatia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Poland; Norway; Germany; and Argentina.

The Conference continues its debate at 10 a.m., Thursday, 22 September.

Background

The Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened this afternoon at Headquarters.  Following some organizational matters, the Conference was expected to hear an address by the Secretary-General or his representative, as well as by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), the Treaty’s Vienna-based technical secretariat.  An exchange of views, including at the ministerial level, was expected to follow for the remainder of the Conference until its conclusion on Friday, 23 September.

The last such Conference, held in Vienna from 3 to 5 September 2003, produced a Final Declaration, in which participants called on all States to maintain a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.  The States renewed their commitment to work for universal ratification of the Treaty and its early entry into force. 

The Treaty, which was adopted in New York on 10 September 1996, constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.  It also provides for the establishment of a global verification system to monitor compliance with the Treaty’s provisions.  Article XIV specifies the conditions of the Treaty’s entry into force.  The Treaty becomes operational 180 days after the 44 States, whose ratification is required under Annex 2 of the text, have all ratified. 

To date, 176 States have signed the Treaty and 125 have ratified it.  Of the 44 States needed for its entry into force, 33 have ratified it, including three nuclear-weapon States (France, Russian Federation and the United Kingdom).  The following 11 “Annex 2” States have not yet ratified:  China; Colombia; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Egypt; India; Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Pakistan; United States; and Viet Nam.  States parties that have ratified the Treaty are invited to participate in the deliberations.  Signatory States, non-signatory States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are invited to attend as observers. 

Statements

KOFI ANNAN, United Nations Secretary-General, said the Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was occurring at a time of heightened global anxiety about weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.  It was the international community’s duty to promote and strengthen existing multilateral instruments that reduced the threat these weapons posed, but, it had not risen to those challenges, as was made clear at last week’s World Summit.  For the second time in four months, States, in a significant failure, had not agreed on how to proceed on disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  States ought to follow Norway’s lead in finding a way forward.

It was necessary to put the CTBT into force as soon as possible, he said.  It would be an effective measure and would significantly contribute to international peace and security.  Since the Treaty was opened for signatures nine years ago, the vast majority of States -- 176 -- had signed it and 125 had ratified it.  Of the 44 States whose ratification was necessary for it to enter into force, 33 had done so.  Progress had also been made in establishing the Treaty organization and in setting up an effective verification mechanism.  But, it was of grave concern that after nine years, the Treaty was still not in force.  The longer it was delayed, the more likely someone would test nuclear weapons and that would be a major setback for disarmament and non-proliferation.

The major responsibility of delegations during the conference was to reaffirm their commitments to the treaty and to work for its early into force, Mr. Annan said.  States that had not signed or ratified the treaty, especially those States whose ratifications were required for the Treaty to enter into force, should do so without delay. He urged that all States maintain a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosions, and on any other actions that would undermine the Treaty’s purpose.  Delegates should not lose faith because progress was possible.  That was made manifest in the past week by the fact that an agreement had been reached in the six-party talks regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula.

ALEXANDER DOWNER, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, said that finding ways to address disarmament and proliferation threats was matter of utmost importance.  With international will and cooperation, progress could be made on the present dilemmas and challenges.  He had been deeply disappointed at the failure of the United Nations Summit to achieve any outcome in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  As he said earlier today in the General Assembly, that had been an extraordinarily poor outcome, given the contemporary global security environment, in which proliferation threats were so clearly evident.  He encouraged participants to put past failures behind and take all opportunities ahead to strengthen multilateral non-proliferation regimes.  The Conference and the period ahead was one such opportunity.

He said he had been a strong supporter of the CTBT and was determined to take the process forward, much as his delegation had done to overcome the deadlock nine years ago in the Conference on Disarmament.  Unable to achieve consensus, Australia’s delegation had taken a copy of the text to the General Assembly for adoption, by a vote.  The Treaty had been adopted.  He was also a strong and consistent supporter of the CTBT based on the practical view that a complete and effective nuclear test ban would constrain the development of nuclear weapons, thereby making a strong contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which was even more acute given terrorists’ interest in acquiring nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. 

In nine years, great progress had been made, as evident by the demonstration of near-universal support of the CTBT, but the goal remained elusive, he said.  At the same time, he welcomed the continued voluntary moratorium on weapons testing, but that could not be a substitute for the entry into force of a permanent and legally binding treaty.  That was the purpose of the Conference -- to trigger the Treaty’s entry into force.  Eleven countries needed for the Treaty’s operation, some of whom were attending the Conference, had still not ratified the Treaty.  He had heard many reasons why, but “the time for excuses is past; it’s time for them to act”. 

Ahead of entry into force, he said he was greatly encouraged by the work of the CTBTO Commission in establishing the international monitoring system.  That sophisticated global system was at the heart of the Treaty’s verification regime.  Once completed, it would comprise 321 monitoring stations and 60 radionuclide laboratories feeding an international data centre in Vienna, plus on-site inspections.  All of that would give the Treaty a powerful verification capacity.  “There will be nowhere to hide”, he said.  The CTBT verification system also had the potential to bring benefits for disaster alert warning.  It was essential that the momentum continue.  He called on States for their strong practical and political support of the global system.

In the current global security environment, he urged ratifiers to redouble their efforts to convince and assist all those who had failed to sign and ratify the Treaty thus far, and to do so without further excuse or delay.  The Conference had before it a draft declaration and a list of measures to promote the Treaty’s operation.  Hopefully, along with an action plan, it would be endorsed on Friday, and he hoped for its unanimous adoption.  He strongly urged those outside the Treaty to reconsider.  There should be no doubt that the Treaty would enhance their own, and global, security, and be a decisive contribution to world peace and stability for generations to come. 

TIBOR TÓTH, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization, said that when the Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly in 1996, States were aware that the success of the Treaty would depend on two crucial factors:  its universality and its verifiability.  Substantial progress had been made on both accounts since then.  Since the last Article XIV Conference in 2003, eight States had signed and 21 States had ratified the Treaty, bringing the total to 176 signatories and 125 ratifiers.  Those impressive numbers, he said, demonstrated the ever-growing commitment of the international community to the Treaty, and were a major source of motivation for those working on the ratification system.

Since 1997, the Preparatory Commission had been working on ensuring that the verification system of the Treaty was credible, functional and cost-effective.  The Commission was now entering a crucial transition phase, where close to two thirds of the system had been built.  In the coming years, the task of provisionally operating and maintaining the system would become more dominant.  Thus far, he said that 217 of the 321 monitoring stations provided for in the Treaty had been installed, and they substantially met the Commission’s specifications.  Over the last two years alone, 115 stations were installed.  The building programme was also continuing at the sustained pace.

The unique feature of the Treaty verification system was that it empowered each State signatory to make its own judgment about events based on the data and products provided by the organization.  In that respect, he said the Treaty enabled States, regardless of their size and wealth, to fully participate in the verification work and benefit from the variety of data provided by the system.  All of the activities were important accessories, but he said they were only accessories to the political will of the international community to bring about the entry into force of the Treaty.

In conclusion, he said that the purpose of the meeting was to strengthen that political will and create a new dynamism in pursuing the common objective.  The comprehensive ban of nuclear test explosions had been a dream for many decades.  The political and strategic choices of States and the scientific and technological advances had brought States very close to a universal and verifiable regime, and he hoped that States would get even closer in the period ahead.

TOM GRÖNBERG, ( Finland), said that at the previous Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT, in 2003, which Finland chaired, the participating States forcefully urged all States whose ratifications were needed to put the treaty into force to ratify it.  At the time, 12 such States had not yet ratified.  Currently, the number was 11.  However, the total number of signatories and ratifiers was more encouraging.  In the last two years, the number of signatories had risen from 168 to 176.  That showed a strong and widespread conviction that the treaty was of the utmost importance.  Indeed, because of its wide support, it could almost be considered “customary law”.  At the same time, the number of ratifiers had risen from 104 to 125.

Although it was regrettable that the Treaty was not in force, the fact that all States had refrained from nuclear-test explosions was tantamount to its being in force, he continued.  The call for the moratoria was not made in vain.  Among the 12 measures the 2003 Conference took to promote ratification of the treaty was to elect Finland as the coordinator of discussions to encourage other States to sign and ratify the Treaty.  Another measure was to appoint Jaap Ramaker, Ambassador from the Netherlands, as a Special Representative to assist the coordinating State.  His job was to visit States that had not yet ratified and convey the importance of the Treaty.  Yet another measure was to establish a contact list of States that had ratified and were willing to assist the coordinator in activities to promote the Treaty.  These regional coordinators kept the quest for ratification on the agenda of regional summits and other high level meetings.  The role of the coordinators should be reviewed, as they could be even more helpful in promoting the treaty.

The Secretariat had kept a record of the many efforts made to bring the Treaty into force and the list was impressive, he said.  However, there would have been much more done, had there been financing for such efforts.  A recommendation at the 2003 Conference that the ratifying States establish a trust fund comprised of voluntary contributions to be used for activities promoting the Treaty had not been implemented.  The final declaration of the 2003 Conference also called for cooperation with non-governmental organizations and civil society in promoting the Treaty.  There had been cooperation, but more could be done in that area.

JAAP RAMAKER, Special Representative to promote the ratification process of the CTBT, said his report was the first of its kind in a Conference facilitating the Treaty’s operation.  The decision to appoint a Special Representative was taken at the last such “Article XIV” Conference, held in Vienna in September 2003.  His mandate was “to assist the coordinating State in the performance of its function in promoting the early entry into force of the Treaty”.  Concerning the 44 States whose ratification was needed, he said there had been “a slow but steady increase in numbers”, including three of the five declared nuclear-weapon States:  France, Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom.  In April, he had been given the assurance that China was fully committed to the Treaty.  As for the ratification process itself, he had been told, in his visit to China in April, that the Chinese Government had completed its work and had sent the Treaty to the National People’s Congress to take further action.

At the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), he said he had been told by the Head of the Chinese delegation that China supported an early entry into force of the CTBT and was “now working actively on its internal legal proceedings” for ratifying it.  Regarding the United States, he said that the present Administration, unlike its predecessor, had fundamental objections to the Treaty.  Hopefully, in due course, that country would revisit the question and analyze whether or not, on balance, it would indeed be better off with the Treaty than without it.  In a number of cases of countries whose signature and/or ratification was required, the issue had to be seen in a wider regional context.  He had in mind South Asia, the Middle East and the Korean peninsula.   Pakistan, at present, did not give priority to issues relating to the CTBT.  Still, in a visit to that country, he conveyed the wish of the ratifying States to see Pakistan join their ranks before long. 

Unlike Pakistan, he said he had not been welcomed in India.  While that seemed to be a reflection of the long-standing critical attitude of India with respect to the CTBT, he noted, nevertheless, that India was on record for not intending to stand in the way of the Treaty’s entry into force.  The best way forward, under the circumstances, was for the two countries to continue their process of bilateral nuclear confidence-building and build on what they had agreed so far, including in the realm of nuclear-weapon testing.  In the Middle East, Israel, Egypt and Iran had all signed the CTBT.  Their ratification, too, was a prerequisite for the Treaty to take effect.  He was ready to assist if that could further their respective internal legal proceedings aimed at early ratification.  On the Korean peninsula, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea still needed to sign and ratify.  Once the six-party process reached the desired outcome, nothing should stand in the way for that country to do so.

In all of those cases, the question of ratification of the CTBT was, in one way or the other, tied to wider regional security issues, which complicated matters, he said.  That was clearly not the case, however, with the three other “Annex 2” countries whose ratification was still pending:  Viet Nam; Indonesia; and Colombia.  He was ready to assist those countries in eliminating any impediments that stood in the way of their ratification.  Just more than seven years ago, the world witnessed for the last time nuclear weapon test explosions.  The conclusion of the CTBT in 1996 and the absence of any nuclear weapon test explosions -- with the exception of those in 1998 -- illustrated the norm against nuclear testing that had taken hold even before the CTBT had taken effect.  That norm against nuclear-weapon testing, however, should not be taken for granted.  That was in permanent need of strengthening, and strengthening that norm was in the hands of all States represented here today.

He said that the appointment of a Special Representative was no magical formula.  The road to the eventual entry into force of the CTBT was “steep and full of hurdles”.  The common objective required a genuine and permanent political commitment from all countries, and sometimes at the highest political level.  A Special Representative could be no substitute for that.  Commitments earlier taken up, including on the test ban, could not command consensus at the last NPT review here in New York and at last week’s summit of world leaders.  He saw no bridging of the gaps that were already clearly visible last May.  He profoundly regretted that.  Despite all of that, the objective remained the same:  to make, admittedly slow, but surely steady, progress towards banning nuclear weapon test explosions for now and forever. 

JACK STRAW, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the European Union, said that when the Treaty opened for signature, it marked an important step in the global effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Nearly ten years on, stopping the spread of those terrible weapons remained one of the greatest challenges facing the international community.  Over the past decade, the difficulties facing States had broadened, rather than diminished.  An increasing number of States were now within reach of mastering nuclear weapon technologies, and there was also a growing risk that such weapons of mass destruction would fall into the hands of non-State actors who would not hesitate to use them to kill large numbers of innocent people.

In confronting those changing and emerging threats, it was more vital than ever that the entire international community worked together for collective peace and security, and the European Union remained committed to such a multilateral approach, he said.  The Union was disappointed that the NPT Review Conference was unable to agree to a substantive final document.  Regional tensions might drive proliferation, he said, but widely established disarmament and non-proliferation norms could frustrate it.

The European Union also remained disappointed, he continued, that the CTBT had yet to enter into force, and he called upon all States who had yet to sign or ratify it to do so as soon as possible.  The Union also reiterated its call on all States to observe a moratorium and, pending entry into force of the Treaty, to refrain from any measure that would be in conflict with the obligations and provisions of the Treaty.  By the time the Treaty entered into force, it would be necessary to have a fully functioning verification regime, which would provide assurance that all States were complying with their treaty obligations.

The Union was particularly encouraged by the positive steps made in establishing an international monitoring system, he continued.  However, he added that the Provisional Technical Secretariat could not fulfil its mandate to prepare for entry into force without the full support, both political and financial, of all States signatories.  He also emphasized that the primary purpose of the verification system was to verify compliance with the Treaty, but that he supported the continuing development of the civil and scientific benefits of the system.

ABDULLAH GÜL, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, said that today’s security challenges, especially proliferation of mass destruction weapons and terrorism, required concerted action by the international community.  Unfortunately, last week’s summit outcome had failed to address the pressing issues of non-proliferation and disarmament.  That should not discourage us, however.  Rather, that should enhance the resolve to work together to give new life and energy to those issues.  The CTBT was a fundamental pillar of non-proliferation, together with the NPT and its safeguards regime.  The CTBT’s entry into force would, no doubt, strengthen that regime.  That was all the more important today, given the failure of the NPT Review Conference last May. 

He said that, in the past nine years, the CTBT had covered remarkable ground.  Today, the Treaty was firmly entrenched in its path towards achieving universal adherence.  A global network of monitoring stations and facilities for verification purposes had also been developed, and he was pleased to announce that the monitoring station established in Turkey was now fully operational.  Despite those achievements, the Treaty had still not taken effect.  His country, located in a region of particular concern to global non-proliferation efforts, appealed, once again, to all States to sign and ratify the Treaty.  No effort should be spared to make sure that it entered into force as soon as possible.  Pending its operation, the moratorium on nuclear-test explosions should continue.  Needless to say, voluntary moratoriums could not provide a lasting substitute to the permanent, legally binding and internationally verifiable commitment offered by the test-ban Treaty. 

KASSYMZHOMART TOKAEV, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, said that the conference involved additional responsibility for actions that States were to take in the interests of peace and security.  He noted with great regret that it had been a difficult and disappointing year.  The seventh NPT Review Conference had failed to live up to the hopes and expectations of those States that had categorically rejected a nuclear option.  Despite extensive negotiations, the summit outcome document had omitted vitally important provisions on disarmament and non-proliferation.

The process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had become highly politicized, reflecting a deep crisis of the global security system.  Negotiations on those issues had been deadlocked -- practically since the very beginning -- due to the attempts by certain States to build their national security at the expense of the interests of other States, he said.  Such a position was highly irresponsible, because no State had the right to subordinate global human security interests to its internal policy considerations.

Challenges and threats today, including those involving the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons and the risk of them finding their way into the hands of terrorists, had grown manifold, he continued.  A real threat of a shift in the strategic balance was emerging, and that could trigger another round in the arms race.  The elimination of those threats required joint, well-coordinated and effective action at all levels.  The Treaty was an important agreement on international security and strategic stability, and a slowdown in its ratification process was quite regrettable.

He was convinced that all that was needed was political will for the remaining 11 States to ratify the Treaty and thus ensure its entry into force.  Such action would be a very important milestone in efforts to prevent the arms race and to ensure security for all human beings.  Until the Treaty entered into force, it was extremely important not to allow violations of the moratorium on nuclear explosions. An early start of negotiations on a cut-off treaty should become the next step in the multilateral disarmament process, he added.

This year was the tenth anniversary of the removal from Kazakhstan of the last nuclear warhead, he said.  His country had set a commendable example by voluntarily eliminating its nuclear arsenal and closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground, which had been the site of more than 500 nuclear test explosions that affected some 1.5 million people.  Vast areas would be hazardous for a long time to come, and he, once again, urged support for a General Assembly resolution on the rehabilitation of that region.  His Government had allocated considerable resources -- some $100 million from 1994 to 2005, but it was clearly not enough.

Further, he said, his country had been taking practical steps to help the entry into force of the CTBT by operating four seismic and one infrasound station, as an integral part of the international monitoring system.  The Government had prepared and submitted proposals to establish a regional seismic centre, as well as an international centre for training experts from CTBTO member states.    

PIERRE PETTIGREW, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, said he lamented that the Treaty remained an unfinished piece of disarmament and non-proliferation business on the agenda of the international community, nine years after it was opened for signature.  The Treaty worked by constraining the ability of States to develop nuclear weapons, while also constraining the ability of States with existing nuclear stockpiles to make qualitative improvements to their weapons.  It applied equally to all States, and the activities that the Treaty prohibited could be effectively verified.  Without question, the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament aspects of the CTBT provided security benefits to all States in all regions of the world, and constituted a crucial step in alleviating the threat of nuclear war.

Recalling the procedural wrangling and inflexible positions of delegations at the NPT review, he regretted that no progress had been made on building on the landmark Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.  The results of the 2005 review had been disappointing, but the lack of progress had motivated his Government to actively promote progress in other venues, which strove to further the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the present Conference.  Experts in countries worldwide had wrestled with the problem of the non-entry into force of the CTBT, and had proposed several innovative solutions.  Those had included urging officials of ratifying States to raise the issue at meeting with counterparts in non-ratifying States, providing legal and technical assistance to States, and undertaking regional outreach activities.  One especially innovative measure had been the creation of the office of the Special Representative to promote ratification.

Progress in gaining more ratifications had been steady, but entry into force remained elusive, he noted.  This year, the final declaration included yet more practical and innovative ideas.  One proposal, suggested by his delegation, was to encourage States in the same region to ratify the Treaty in a coordinated manner.  By agreeing to ratify together at the same time, both “Annex 2” States and “non-Annex 2” States in a given region could help build security and confidence in regions that suffered all too often from insecurity and uncertainty.  Building confidence was often a leap of faith:  by ratifying the CTBT simultaneously, States could make a significant leap jointly for the benefit of the entire world.  After all, testing nuclear weapons would be an unparalleled risk to regional stability and security.  He called on ratifiers to convince States that had not yet ratified the Treaty that it represented a “monumental step in shackling the nuclear genie and building a safe and secure world for everyone, everywhere”. 

SYED HAMID ALBAR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) State signatories and ratifiers to the CTBT, said that the Movement had taken several principled positions on the issues of disarmament and international security.  In that regard, he highlighted that the Movement expressed its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions.  In that context, it strongly underlined and affirmed that multilaterism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter, provided the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.

Reiterating the Movement’s position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing, he reaffirmed its support for the Treaty’s objectives, which, he said, were intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.  The Movement believed that, if the Treaty’s objectives were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all State signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament were essential.

Urging the two nuclear-weapon States in particular to ratify the Treaty without delay, he also urged those States in the Annex 2 that had not even signed the Treaty to do so without delay.  The Movement believed that early ratification of the Treaty by the two nuclear-weapon States would encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, especially the three States with nuclear capabilities that had not even signed the Treaty, to eventually sign and ratify it.  The Movement was, therefore, concerned and disappointed, he said, that one nuclear-weapon State had taken the position not to proceed with the ratification of the Treaty, and hoped that it would reconsider its position.

The Movement was also deeply disappointed that the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to reach any substantive conclusion.  He called on all States to continue to support the development of all elements of the verification regime, because the Movement believed that they were equal in their importance.  He believed that, besides its primary functions, the verification system could also bring scientific and civil benefits in conformity with the Treaty, including tsunami warning systems.  Finally, he said that the Movement believed that the early entry into force of the Treaty would pave the way toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which would make the world a safer place.

OSCAR MAÚRTUA DE ROMAÑA, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, said his country was proud to have been among the first to call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in its region.  Peru had also actively negotiated the CTBT, and had been the first Latin American country to ratify it, and the second on the so-called “Annex 2” list.  His country remained determined to progressively reduce nuclear weapons and prevent their proliferation.  As such, it had joined all international non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament instruments.  It had also shouldered its responsibility by adopting specific measures to render effective its conviction that it was possible to rid the world of nuclear weapons.  The CTBT must contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their forms, as well as furthering nuclear disarmament.

He said that, while the Treaty was on its way to becoming universal, efforts must be redoubled to see to it that it entered into force.  He would spur any measures as might be necessary to do so.  He also subscribed to the draft final declaration.  It was puzzling that countries that had contributed mightily to solving the problems of humankind could still cling tenaciously to their nuclear weapons and to outdated notions of power balances.  The enormous resources devoted to those weapons could be diverted to reduce the enormous inequities still suffered by so many millions of people globally.  The obstinacy of nuclear States to keep intact their nuclear power was a most terrible and unfortunate example for other countries.  The greatness of nations could not, and must not, be measured by their power to destroy. 

FERENC SOMOGYI, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, said Hungary agreed with the European Union statement delivered earlier by the United Kingdom.  The CTBT that opened for signature nine years ago demonstrated how the international community could seize on opportunities -- in this case the end of the cold war -- to make progress.  But, in the last nine years, events had intervened, such as the attempt by several States to acquire nuclear weapons, that had increased threats and challenges.  The risk that terrorists and other non-State actors could gain possession of weapons of mass destruction had added to the urgency to create international mechanisms to halt and reverse those developments.  These developments reinforced Hungary’s view that the CTBT was a critical instrument for achieving disarmament and non-proliferation.

He regretted that the Treaty was still not in force.  He called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.  Hungary was one of the first of the “Annex 2” States to sign and ratify the Treaty.  Although maintaining a moratorium on nuclear explosions was important, it could not be an alternative to the Treaty coming fully into force.

Despite his country’s disappointment that the Treaty was not yet in force, Mr. Somogyi noted that some progress had been made over the last two years.  Measures adopted at the 2003 Conference had been effective and the work of the Special Representative, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, had been particularly important.  Progress had further been made in establishing an international monitoring system by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO.  Its work made it probable that an effective verification system would be in place by the time the treaty went into effect.

The Preparatory Commission had undergone changes in its functioning and, because of recent natural disasters, it faced the question of whether its monitoring system should be used for civilian and scientific applications, the minister said.  Hungary supported the use of the system for such purposes, in addition to its being used for its primary purpose of monitoring nuclear explosions.  He urged the Preparatory Commission to agree to provide data to international tsunami warning centres.  In support of that, Hungary would make a special contribution to train staff for the national data centres in countries most affected by the tsunami last December.  Hungary had discussed with the Provisional Technical Secretariat a data-sharing project for those countries.  Using the CTBT for those other purposes would raise the profile and enhance opinion of the organization, and would hasten the Treaty’s entry into force.

KOLINDA GRABAR-KITAROVIĆ, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, said that political will was necessary to tackle the danger of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.  Further engagement in that field would improve efficiency in the prevention and suppression of the illicit trafficking and smuggling of those weapons and related equipment.  Universal adherence to international conventions and treaties aimed at thwarting those threats was essential.  Her country had ratified the CTBT and signed the 2004 Join Ministerial Declaration, as an additional contribution to the promotion of the Treaty’s early entry into force.  In addition, Croatia supported all regional and multilateral meetings that stressed the Treaty’s importance and accelerated the ratification process.  Despite additional ratifications, “bringing the Treaty to life” still seemed a distant aim.  Pending the Treaty’s entry into force, all States should abide by moratoriums and to refrain from any actions which might defeat the Treaty’s objective and purpose.

She said that Croatia, since its independence, had given particular importance to strengthening its legislative and administrative procedures governing non-proliferation, export control, nuclear safety and the import and export of weapons and other military equipment.  Her country had also adopted laws and regulations in that field, which were now in place and functioning.  In addition, Croatia had contributed to national, regional and global security by becoming a participating government to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and joining the Waassenaar Arrangement.  Meanwhile, maintenance of the CTBT’s international monitoring system was of special importance.  She welcomed the Preparatory Commission’s decision to explore and assess a possible contribution to a tsunami warning system.  Despite the uncertainty about the Treaty’s operation, she remained firm in her commitment to it and continued to promote it.  The Conference’s outcome text would be a qualitative step forward.

MLADEN IVANIĆ, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, said that, within a few weeks, his country would complete all necessary procedures for ratification of the Treaty.  Reaffirming his country’s determination that it had no intention to exercise nuclear tests or acquire nuclear technology, he said he believed that the Treaty, together with the NPT, was the main tool in creating a safer world and more secure future for mankind.  A nuclear- and weapon-free world should be the ultimate goal, and States should spare no effort in achieving it.

Calling upon all States to conclude the process of ratification of the Treaty, he welcomed the voluntary decision of nuclear States to impose a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing.  Non-nuclear States believed that when an internationally legally binding obligation replaced voluntarily decisions, the world would be on a path toward being nuclear-free, and everyone would be safer, he said.

In light of the devastation caused by the tsunami and hurricane Katrina, his country welcomed the intention to use more effectively for civilian purposes some facilities and resources that were already established for Treaty purposes, such as the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre’s products.  That would include rapid notification of the location and size of potentially damaging earthquakes and the early detection of volcano eruptions.

ADAM DANIEL ROTFELD, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, said his country agreed with the European Union’s statement regarding the CTBT Organization.  The growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery made it urgent that international agreements, non-proliferation norms and export control regulations be implemented right away.  That included the CTBT.  But, the effectiveness of all of those measures hinged on whether they could be adapted to new challenges and threats.  In that regard, it was important that export control regulations and verification mechanisms be strengthened to combat illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and illegal transfer of nuclear technologies.

His country reaffirmed its support for the CTBT and its conviction that it was an essential mechanism for the achievement of international peace and security, the Minister said.  The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO had raised awareness of the threat of proliferation and had made progress towards developing verification systems.  He called on the nuclear powers of the NPT, as well as States that had not signed the Treaty, to maintain a moratorium on nuclear explosions.

The Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat had strengthened the verification regime, he said.  That had been achieved through the provision of high-tech equipment to the International Monitoring System, the recruitment of skilled staff to the CTBTO and the provision of financial resources.  That work and the support should continue.  The Preparatory Commission should continue its work to promote the Treaty and to improve the verification system.  That would deter violations of a testing moratorium, as well as provide an early warning system for natural disasters.  “We should not make any distinction between the lives that could be saved from natural disasters by early warning or from nuclear explosions”, he said.  He also reminded delegates that Poland, in 1999, had proposed to the Executive Secretary that its two seismic stations be included in the International Monitoring System, once the CTBT was in effect.

The NPT and the CTBT were mutually reinforcing pillars of nuclear non-proliferation, the Minister said.   Poland had for years supported United Nations resolutions calling for bringing the CTBT into effect.  The CTBT, though, did not exist in a vacuum, and the fact that the Summit did not reach any agreements on disarmament or non-proliferation was indicative of where the world community stood on those issues.  The disarmament and non-proliferation machinery had to be entirely reformed, and his Government had made some suggestions in the general debate earlier in the day.  Poland looked forward to chairing the Conference on Disarmament in 2006 and hoped to overcome the Conference’s stalemate.  Finally, he supported the draft Final Declaration of the Conference.

JAN PETERSEN, Foreign Minister of Norway, said that multilateralism in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was under “severe stress”.  The NPT Review Conference had failed to respond to serious security challenges, and the Summit had proved unable to make clear commitments on nuclear non-proliferation or further progress on nuclear disarmament.  States must ensure that multilateralism remained a core principle, and that the negotiated instruments could do what they were designed to do.

Universal adherence and compliance with the NPT and the CTBT were vital if there was to be success, he continued.  Calling the entry into force of the test ban treaty a “crucial step” toward halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he said it was alarming that States now seemed further away from such action than they had been in a long time.  Countries that had not ratified the Treaty should do so without delay, and he urged the nuclear-weapon States in particular to commit themselves to the CTBT in a legally binding way.

Pending the entry into force of the Test Ban Treaty, States must do their utmost to further consolidate the existing test moratoria, he said.  Those moratoria had set a norm against nuclear testing, and the longer they lasted, the higher the threshold for conducting nuclear tests.  At the same time, it was vital that all States respect the integrity of the norms set by the CTBT.  While all practical steps to sustain the test moratoria were welcome, he said they could not replace legally binding obligations under the CTBT.

States were in a paradoxical situation:  while the spectre of nuclear terrorism was looming larger than ever, multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments were being eroded.  Calling on Iran to co-operate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all its nuclear activities, he urged the country to sign, ratify and implement, immediately and unconditionally, an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement.  He added that he expected the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to live up to its commitments.

More than ever, he continued, States needed to take a common approach when responding to matters vital to collective security.  Norway would continue efforts to forge international consensus on the basis of the cross-regional initiative it launched before the Summit.  States must overcome the last obstacles facing the CTBT, he added, and join forces and work together to do so.

KLAUS SCHARIOTH, State Secretary of the Foreign Office of Germany, said that, for his country, the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons remained the central goal of the political efforts to secure peace throughout the world.  Given the horror that weapons of mass destruction could unleash, humanity had an obligation to work towards their elimination.  That should be not only a contractual, but also a profoundly moral obligation for everyone, he said.

The Treaty was a key element of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and his Government gave its full support to all endeavours to persuade those States that had yet to demonstrate their backing for the Treaty’s aims to sign and/or ratify the Treaty.  Nuclear proliferation was a key challenge for the international community, as the growing proliferation of nuclear weapons increased the risk that those weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists.  If the international community was to be successful, it must react appropriately to the twofold challenge of nuclear proliferation risks and the commitment of the nuclear-weapons States to push ahead with disarmament.

His Government was following with concern the lack of progress made in efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the undeniable risk of the erosion of the NPT.  Indicative of that deplorable state of affairs, he said, was the fact that the Review Conference in May did not achieve a substantial result, and that the final document of the Summit last week did not address disarmament and non-proliferation.  An end to the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was not in sight, he added.  North Korea’s readiness to halt its nuclear-weapons programme and rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty, if implemented, would be a very important first step.  Nevertheless, further steps were necessary -- in particular, the signing and ratification of the CTBT.

A selective non-proliferation policy would not suffice if States were to master the challenges ahead, he continued.  Rather, States must use the existing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation instruments to the full.  Furthermore, an effective approach would require the avoidance of double standards.  Calling upon all States in Annex 2 to reconsider their position and help the Treaty gain universal validity, he said those States had a special responsibility to make their contribution and, thus, strengthen the credibility of the global non-proliferation policy.

ROBERTO GARCÍA MORITÁN, Undersecretary for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, said he viewed, with some concern, the lack of positive signs from certain States, particularly those having made nuclear proliferation a central part of their foreign policy.  Other States mistakenly continued to believe that access to nuclear weapons could allegedly guarantee them greater security or prestige.  He believed the Treaty was a key element in the multilateral architecture designed to fight nuclear proliferation.  States must strive to have no secret testing or development, as well as try to make the Treaty’s entry into force a reality.

The world today was going through a very important phase with regards to non-proliferation, but the last NPT Review Conference had ended without sending a clear-cut or substantive message.  However, the sad outcome of the Review Conference must not keep States from working to make that happen, he said.  States must continue moving toward non-proliferation, even when there was no progress in the international arena.  Some States persistence in maintaining nuclear arsenals might lead others to obtain their own such weapons.  Nuclear powers must take the most important steps expected from them, but also keep the door open for free access to nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful uses.

States must also reinforce the multilateral elements of machinery intended to fight against proliferation, and the CTBT was one of them.  He urged the 11 “Annex 2” States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, so that it might enter into force.  Unilateral moratoria were not enough, he added, because those countries who had signed and ratified the Treaty did not want to be dependent on nuclear powers or those who continued to want to acquire nuclear weapons.  The States who had ratified the Treaty wanted an international rule that would be applicable to all States, and which banned nuclear tests.

* *** *

For information media • not an official record