Fifty-eighth General Assembly

First Committee

21^st Meeting (PM)

RISK OF PROLIFERATION, UNAUTHORIZED USE OF ‘NON-STRATEGIC’ NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ADDRESSED IN ONE OF FIVE TEXTS APPROVED BY DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

Other Drafts Concern ‘Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World’,

Confidence-Building, African Nuclear Treaty, Central African Security

Concerned about the risk of the proliferation of non-strategic nuclear weapons and of their early, pre-emptive, unauthorized or accidental use, the General Assembly would stress the need for the nuclear-weapon States that possessed such weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types or rationalizations for their use, according to one of five draft resolutions approved today by the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security).

By further terms of that new draft resolution submitted by the New Agenda Coalition (Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Brazil), the Assembly would call for the prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that had already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms to verify their elimination.  It would call on the Russian Federation and the United States to formalize their presidential nuclear initiatives into legally binding instruments and to initiate negotiations on further reductions of such weapons.

The draft resolution was approved by a recorded vote of 118 in favour to 4 against (France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States), with 41 abstentions (Annex I).

Speaking after the vote, the United States’ representative said that, although France and the United Kingdom did not have strategic nuclear weapons in their arsenals, they wished to associate with the statement.  Those three countries could not support the draft resolution because it failed to take into account efforts under way to address concerns underlying the draft.  Nor did it recognize that alternative approaches had already borne fruit.  By bringing in the United Nations and continuing to insist on a formalized approach, the text risked complicating and interfering with more productive efforts.

Indeed, he said, the types and numbers of NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces had been reduced by approximately 85 per cent, including the elimination of entire categories of weapons.  A formal approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons would present problems of definition, fundamental verification problems, issues of access to sensitive facilities, vast force level asymmetries and other major obstacles.

Also submitted by the Coalition was the wide-ranging revised draft text entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world”.  Approved by a recorded vote of 121 in favour to 6 against (France, India, Israel, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States), with 38 abstentions, that text would have the Assembly call on all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could negatively impact nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to fulfil all their obligations under international treaties and law in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation field (Annex III).

Among the many terms concerning the nuclear-weapon States, the Assembly would call on them to implement their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as other nuclear disarmament or reduction agreements, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to possible redeployment.

It would call on those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which were not yet parties to the NPT and which operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition.  It would also call upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reconsider its recent announcements, with a view to complying fully with the provisions of the NPT.

Prior to approving the draft as a whole, a separate recorded vote was taken on preambular paragraph 20, which expresses concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and outer space, and stresses that no steps should be taken that would lead to the weaponization of outer space.

The Committee decided to retain the paragraph by a vote of 117 in favour to 6 against (Australia, Israel, Japan, Federated States of Micronesia, United Kingdom, United States) (Annex II).

Another new draft resolution, sponsored by Pakistan and entitled “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context” would have the Assembly urge, in the context of such measures, the maintenance of military balance between States in regions of tension consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments.  It was approved by a recorded vote of 68 in favour to 47 against, with 34 abstentions (Annex IV).

The representative of Pakistan, speaking after the vote in a “general statement”, whose timing was questioned by India’s delegation, said the initiative had been tabled with the best of intentions and with the desire to promote a process of peace and security in South Asia.  Its contents, contrary to what had been stated by some colleagues, was completely aligned with the decisions and positions of the General Assembly and other international bodies.  He asked his colleagues to look at the text of the resolution rather than at its sponsor.

Acting without a vote, the Committee approved a draft resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), by which the Assembly would call on African States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

Prior to that action, the representative of Spain said that, in order to achieve consensus, he had withdrawn an amendment that would have prevented the draft from singling out his country.

Also without a vote, the Committee approved a draft that would have the Assembly reaffirm its support for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

In related business, the representative of Malaysia introduced a draft decision on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which would have the Assembly request States to continue consultations and include the item in its provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session.  He announced that the draft resolution on the same matter would not be acted upon this year.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Germany, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, China, Canada, Italy (on behalf of the European Union), United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Colombia, Japan, Australia, Central African Republic, Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria and Kazakhstan.

The Committee will meet again at 2:30 p.m. Wednesday, 5 November, to conclude action on all drafts resolutions and decisions.

Background

When the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its third and final phase of work, namely action on all draft resolutions and decisions, it had before it texts related to nuclear weapons, and confidence-building measures, including transparency in armaments.

Expected to be acted on under cluster 1, which concerns nuclear weapons, are three draft resolutions dealing with the following topics:  the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba); reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; and a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Action is also expected on two draft resolutions from cluster 6, confidence-building measures.  Those texts involve regional and subregional confidence-building measures, and activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

Draft Summaries

A draft resolution on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) (document A/C.1/58/L.11), sponsored by Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States, would have the Assembly call upon African States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

The Assembly would also call upon the African States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

By the draft’s second operative paragraph, the Assembly would express its appreciation to the nuclear-weapon States that had signed the Protocols that concerned them, and call upon those that had not yet ratified those Protocols to do so as soon as possible.

The text’s third operative paragraph would have the Assembly call upon States contemplated in Protocol III to the Treaty that had not yet done so to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they were, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible and that lay within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

[The States contemplated in Protocol III of the Treaty are France and Spain.]

(By an amendment proposed by Spain (document A/C.1/58/L.58), the draft’s second operative paragraph would change so that the Assembly would express its appreciation to the States that had signed the Protocols that concerned them, and call upon those that had not yet signed and/or ratified them to do so as soon as possible. And the third operative paragraph would be deleted entirely.)

By a draft resolution entitled Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1), the Assembly, concerned about the threat posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons owing to their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict, and thus about the risk of proliferation and of early, pre-emptive, unauthorized or accidental use, would stress the need for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possessed such weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of those weapons or rationalizations for their use.

The Assembly would call for the prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that had already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of their elimination.  It would also call on the Russian Federation and the United States to formalize their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal, binding instruments and to initiate negotiations on further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons. 

In a related provision, it would stress the importance of enhancing special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, among other things, placing such weapons in physically secure central storage sites, with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as part of the nuclear disarmament process, to which they were committed under the NPT. 

The draft resolution is sponsored by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

By a draft resolution entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda (document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1), the Assembly would call upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could negatively impact nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

It would also call on them to fulfil all their obligations under international treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to pursue the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 NPT review conference.

Under a related term, the Assembly would call for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions, or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).  It would also underline the urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT in the context of the progress achieved in implementing the international monitoring system.

By a further term, the Assembly would call upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the NPT, as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reduction agreements or initiatives, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment.

It would also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapon arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures, and to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Assembly would also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

By further terms, the Assembly would call upon those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which were not yet parties to the NPT, and which operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, and upon those States which had not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

It would also call upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reconsider its recent announcements, with a view to complying fully with the provisions of the NPT, and in this connection support all diplomatic efforts for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation, and for the establishment of an area free of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

The Assembly would also call upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the IAEA to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that had been agreed upon and that was now available to be used in new verification agreements between the IAEA and each of the two States.

And it would call upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remained permanently outside military programmes.

The draft resolution is sponsored by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

Concerned that continuation of disputes among States might contribute to the arms race and endanger international peace and security and the efforts of the international community to promote arms control and disarmament, the Assembly would urge strict compliance with bilateral, regional and international agreements to which the contending States were parties, according to a new draft resolution sponsored by Pakistan on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context (document A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1). 

The Assembly would also urge, in the context of confidence-building measures, the maintenance of military balance between States in the regions of tension consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments.

In a related provision, it would call on Member States to refrain from the use or threat of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.  It would also call upon Member States that had not already done so to open consultations and dialogue in the regions of tension without preconditions. 

A draft resolution on the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (document A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1) would have the Assembly reaffirm its support for efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels, in order to ease tensions and conflicts in Central Africa and to further peace, stability and sustainable development in the subregion.

The Assembly would note with satisfaction the progress made by that Committee in implementing its programme of activities for 2002-2003, including holding a seminar in May on implementation in Central Africa of the United Nations programme of action on small arms.

At the same time, the Assembly would emphasize the need to make the early-warning mechanism in Central Africa operational so that it would serve as an instrument for analyzing and monitoring political situations in the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee and as a technical body through which the member States would carry out the Committee’s programme of work, adopted in 1992.  It would also appeal to Member States and organizations to make additional voluntary contributions to support the Committee’s work.

The draft resolution is sponsored by Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

General statements

TOMAS RODRIGUEZ-PANTOJA (Spain) told the Committee he had presented a written amendment (document A/C.1/58/L.58) to the draft on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (document A/C.1/58/L.11).  Declaring that such zones, when created by agreements that were freely arrived at by the States in question, represented a positive development, he expressed hope that the Treaty of Pelindaba would enter into force as soon as possible.  He added that each geographically well-defined zone faced diverse circumstances.

He had problems, however, with operative paragraph 3, which would have the Assembly call upon Spain, although not explicitly mentioning the country’s name, to take all necessary measures to ensure the speedy application of the Treaty to territories for which they were, de jure or de facto, internationally responsible and that lay within the limits of the geographical zone established in the Treaty.

He stressed that his country’s accession to the protocol would be redundant, since the Spanish territories in question already fell under the non-nuclear regimes of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the IAEA, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additionally, all Spanish territory had been denuclearized by the Treaty of Friendship, Defence and Cooperation, signed with the United States in 1976. Furthermore, non–acceptance of the introduction, installation or storage of nuclear weapons by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Spanish territory had already been included in 1981 in the parliamentary authorization to the Spanish Government to accede to the NATO Treaty.

Highlighting other Spanish efforts, he said that all Spanish nuclear facilities, which were only used for peaceful purposes, were already subject to control by the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) and the IAEA.  Furthermore, in addition to the NPT, Spain had ratified the CTBT, the Convention on Physical Protection of Fissile Material, and the Convention on Nuclear Security, and had implemented IAEA recommendations.  In short, his country abided by obligations well beyond those contained in the Treaty of Pelindaba.  It had even contributed to IAEA programs that financed peaceful nuclear projects in Africa.

Stating that his delegation had consistently joined consensus on the resolution since it was first tabled in 1997, he maintained, nevertheless, that his Government did not consider itself bound by operative paragraph 3, which was discriminatory since it singled out Spain.  His delegation had attempted, since 1997, to modify operative paragraphs 2 and 3, but had encountered an unacceptable stalemate.  He requested the withdrawal of his country’s amendment, in order to preserve consensus on the important draft, and he expressed confidence that a solution would be found, although the African Group had not made any conciliatory statements.  However, he advised the Committee that, unless an acceptable solution was reached by 2005, his delegation would not join the consensus again.

Action on Texts

The representative of Germany said he had been conducting very intense discussions on the two New Agenda Coalition texts.  He had done so with a view to supporting both the one on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1) and the one entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world:  a new agenda” (document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1).

He said he had submitted specific drafting suggestions, which had not required the sponsors “to walk the extra mile, but only the extra few yards”.  The sponsors, however, had not “seen themselves in position” to accept the few key amendments he had suggested.  That was why he was disappointed to say that he would not be able to support either draft and would abstain in the voting.  That was particularly regrettable, given that Germany fully shared the commitment to nuclear disarmament, which lay at the heart of the two drafts.  He understood the impatience with the pace of progress, which pervaded the language of the texts, particularly in the draft on a new agenda.

Indeed, he continued, all States parties to the NPT should live up to their responsibility to pursue, with determination and continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantive agreement reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  The Final Document of that Conference had spelled out practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the NPT.  That action programme remained a performance benchmark for the disarmament process.  It was of paramount importance that the credibility of that process was intact at all times and that it remained irreversible.  The text on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons raised an issue of particular interest to Germany.

In order to further the debate over the NPT process, Germany had presented a working paper devoted to that issue during the first preparatory committee meeting in 2002 for the 2005 Review Conference and had participated in subsequent discussions.  As part of the overall process leading to the common goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons must be reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner.  However, that goal “could not be achieved in one leap”.  A gradual, step-by-step approach, starting with ensuring the safety and security of existing stockpiles and transparency measures, was the only realistic way forward at present.

He added that his country was committed to an incremental approach, which gradually and irreversible led to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  All efforts should be devoted to continued and steady progress in that direction.  There was no reason either for complacency or undue pessimism.

Also speaking before the votes on the nuclear weapons-related drafts, the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said that, in previous years, he had voted in favour of the New Agenda Coalition draft aimed at a nuclear-weapon-free world, stemming from his position that nuclear disarmament should be realized and the planet denuclearized.  Regrettably, however, the paragraphs on the Korean peninsula, which were unduly added to the text, did not fairly reflect the nuclear issue between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States.

He said that the draft resolution also did not speak a single word about the United States’ nuclear threat against his country, but instead it had highlighted a unilateral and one-sided demand calling for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to give up its own self-defence rights, which were subjected to the constant nuclear threats of the United States.  Accordingly, it had become difficult for his country to support the text as a whole, as it had been able to do in the past.  The nuclear issue was, in essence, the outcome of the hostile policy of the United States to isolate his country.

The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was the general call of his country and had been his country’s consistent stand and the desire of its people, he said.  The United States, however, was standing in its way.  It was entirely due to that country’s hostile policy that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been “compelled to withdraw from the NPT” and opt for a strengthened nuclear deterrence.  If the nuclear issue was to be settled peacefully through dialogue, the United States should make a “radical switch” in its policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as a precondition for a settlement of the nuclear issue.

He said his country had abided by the principle that the means for denuclearizing the peninsula should be the implementation, on both sides of “simultaneous actions”.  He was concerned at the reality that it was becoming customary to put pressure on the weak and small countries, which were subjected to threats by the “super Power”, while being accused of nuclear threats.  Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 did not correctly reflect the situation.  For that reason, he had decided to abstain in the vote.

The Committee approved the draft on the Treaty of Pelindaba (document A/C.1/58/L.11) without a vote.

It then took up the draft on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1).  The text was approved by a recorded vote of  

118 in favour to 4 against (France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States), with 41 abstentions (Annex I).

Before the Committee took action on the twentieth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda” (document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1), the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in a point of order, said he had not suggested a separate vote on that paragraph, even though it dealt with his country.  He did, however, wish to know who had.  The Chairman responded that he could not release that information.

Also on a point of order, the representative of China asked what the content of preambular paragraph 20 was, since there appeared to be some confusion over the matter.

The representative of Pakistan, also on a point of order, asked the Chairman if the paragraph would have the Assembly express concern that the development of missile defences could negatively impact nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space, and stress that no steps should be taken that would lead to the weaponization of outer space.  The Chairman responded in the affirmative.

The Committee approved the twentieth preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 117 in favour to 6 against (Australia, Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Japan, United Kingdom, United States), with 39 abstentions (Annex II).

The text as a whole, on a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world, was approved by a recorded vote of 121 in favour to 6 against (France, India, Israel, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States) with 38 abstentions (Annex III).

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Canada said he had voted in favour of the draft and supported its objectives.  However, he had abstained on the vote on the preambular paragraph, because current developments in missile defences did not necessarily entail a negative impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  In fact, given the contemporary threats posed by missiles and weapons of mass destruction, cooperation in the area of missile defences could, in fact, complement disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Also speaking after the vote, the representative of Spain reiterated that his country did not consider itself bound by the consensus on operative paragraph 3 of the draft on the Treaty of Pelindaba (document A/C.1/58/L.11).  Referring to the amendment he had tabled, he said he had withdrawn it to preserve consensus.

The representative of Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its associated States, and about the Pelindaba draft, said he attached great importance to strengthening internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones based on agreements that had been freely arrived at.  Such zones enhanced regional and global peace and security and promoted stability and confidence.  He welcomed nuclear-weapon States’ efforts to sign the relevant protocols, and he looked forward to the Treaty’s early entry into force.

In that context, he welcomed the efforts to preserve consensus on the draft.  Nevertheless, every nuclear-weapon-free zone sprang from specific circumstances and involved well-defined geographical boundaries.  And the diversity of various situations had to be taken into account.  Thus, he shared the Spanish delegation’s wishes to avoid being singled out by the draft resolution.

The United States’ representative expressed support for the statement made earlier by the representatives of Spain, and also of Italy, on behalf of the European Union concerning the draft resolution on the Pelindaba Treaty.  Spain had a legitimate objection to being singled out in the operative paragraph 3 of that draft.  Furthermore, it had a legitimate concern about the status of its national territory, which the Pelindaba Treaty defined as falling within its area of application.  Those issues must be addressed.

He, therefore, urged the concerned parties to quickly establish a mechanism to resolve those concerns and to find a solution that took into account the specific circumstances and the diversity of situation that fell under the Treaty before the “Pelindaba resolution” was again considered by the Committee.  That would benefit not only the Treaty, but also the zone it sought to establish.

India’s representative, speaking on L.40/Rev.1, said that the only consensus document of the international community, as a whole, was the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.  That contained a programme of action, which remained only partially implemented.  Any future agenda should have to take into account, as the starting premise, implementation of that action programme.  It was evident that the international community had achieved little progress on the most important element, namely nuclear disarmament.  That raised the question of whether there was a need for a new agenda at all, when the most important element in the existing one remained relevant, yet unmet.

In addition, he said, certain paragraphs in the draft were not relevant.  India had already exercised its nuclear option and was a nuclear-weapon State with a minimum nuclear deterrent.  It was not a conferment of status that he sought, but that fact should be incorporated into an agenda that was realistic.  The reference in the second operative paragraph to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia not only bordered on the unreal, but also called into question one of the guiding principles for the establishment of such zones, namely that those arrangements should be freely arrived at among the States of region concerned.  Given the current reality, the proposal for such a zone in South Asia was no more valid than one in East Asia, West Europe or North America. 

His views on the NPT were well known, he said.  He sympathized with those States parties that had striven, over the years, to get the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to accept concrete steps for nuclear disarmament.  The draft resolution was silent on the multifarious sources of proliferation, which the NPT had failed to stem.  He also opposed the intrinsic inequality and discriminatory framework enshrined in the NPT.  A new agenda could not succeed in the old framework of the NPT.  There was a need to move beyond that Treaty towards a durable system of security based on the principles of durable and legitimate security for all. 

He said he shared the need to work for a nuclear-weapon-free world, but he remained unconvinced by an exercise bound by the flawed and discriminatory approaches of the NPT.  He, therefore, had cast a negative vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

The representative of China, speaking on both of those drafts, said China had always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons of all kinds, but both the concept and definition of non- strategic nuclear weapons, as mentioned in L.39/Rev.1 were unclear.  Therefore, he had abstained in the vote on that draft.  He just voted in favour of L.40/Rev.1 on a new agenda, because he supported its main thrust and objectives with regard to promoting nuclear disarmament and realizing a nuclear-weapon-free world at an early date. 

He added that States should also undertake not to use nuclear weapons, which was essential to nuclear disarmament.  Also, transparency should be considered in the context of an international environment of peace, security and trust, and discussed and solved in the process of nuclear disarmament negotiations.  The definition of non-strategic nuclear weapons lacked clarity and he, therefore, had reservations on that part of the draft.

The representative of the United States, explaining his negative vote on the draft on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.39 Rev.1), said that he was speaking on behalf of his own country, France and the United Kingdom, even though the latter two countries did not possess any non-strategic nuclear weapons in their arsenals.

He said he could not support the draft because it still failed to take into account reduction efforts that were currently underway, and it did not recognize that alternative approaches had already borne fruit.  To continue to insist on a formalized resolution on the topic was not helpful, as it interfered with more productive methods. 

He told delegates that, over the past two decades, the NATO substrategic nuclear forces had been reduced by 85 per cent, and such efforts included the elimination of entire categories of weapons.  The United States had also completed its implementation of pledges on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons.  All of that work by the United States, together with the Russian Federation, had been accomplished without a formal arms control agreement, which might have created problems of definition, verification, access to sensitive facilities, and asymmetries in force levels.  He added that current efforts by the United States and Russian Federation were directed towards achieving increased openness and predictability, and that would be more effective in dealing with non-strategic nuclear weapons than the draft at hand.

Also speaking in explanation of his vote on the same draft, the representative of the Russian Federation said his country had honoured its commitments to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons and had helped to eliminate an entire class of such arms, namely certain types of missiles.  He noted that his country had also reduced warheads through reciprocal measures with the United States, and would continue to do so.  Declaring that tactical nuclear weapons in his country were protected from accidental or unintentional use by a complex system, he added that there had never been a breakdown there in nuclear storage facilities, and that everything possible had been done to prevent unauthorized access to such weapons. 

He informed the Committee that he had decided to vote against the draft, instead of abstaining as he had last year, because it did not adequately reflect the actual situation.  It had also failed to take into account views expressed by his country and the United States.  Furthermore, given the fact that some nuclear weapons could be characterized as both strategic and non-strategic, the draft was often imprecise, unclear, and had failed to decide how, in principle, non-strategic nuclear weapons should be treated.  It was also not clear if it was possible to consider non-strategic nuclear weapons in isolation from other disarmament topics.

Maintaining that all of his country’s nuclear weapons were on its own territory and under control, he called on other nuclear-weapon States to be able to make the same assurance.  He said he understood the sponsors’ wishes to accelerate the reduction process.  However, it was difficult to achieve consensus on ways to achieve that goal.  In that context, because the draft was not practical, he did not wish to support it and be responsible for commitments that would not be undertaken.

Turning to the new agenda draft (document A/C.1/58/L.40), he said he shared and considered important many views expressed by the draft, such as its ideas on the prevention of the weaponization of outer space and a future treaty on the ban of fissile material production.  Nevertheless, some of the text’s provisions were untimely and impractical.  Because of that reason, as well as the repetition of other text’s ideas in the draft at hand, he had abstained.  However, since he supported nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, he would continue to support realistic and balanced texts on that matter. 

The representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of his country, the United States, and France, explained his vote against the same draft on the new agenda.  As he had stated last year, the three countries supported nuclear weapon reductions.  Nevertheless, the present text failed to take note of progress made in such reductions since 2000.  Additionally, although it acknowledged the Moscow Treaty, it implied that it was ineffective, despite the fact that it committed the Russian Federation and United States to significantly reduce their arsenals.  His delegation, as well as those of the United States and France, would have addressed the problem earlier if the sponsors had approached them in a receptive spirit. 

Also speaking after the vote on the new agenda text (A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1), the representative of Colombia said he had difficulties with certain paragraphs in the operative portion of that text, in light of his Government’s difficulties in ratifying the CTBT.  The obligations contracted under the Treaties mentioned in the text were only valid once those were ratified.  During the last Conference to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT, his delegation had reaffirmed, once again, its commitment to the Treaty and indicated its desire to overcome its constitutional obstacles to ratifying it.

The representative of Japan, explaining his abstention on the same draft said that it was his country’s fervent desire that nuclear devastation not be repeated and that continuous efforts should be made to rid the world of nuclear weapons.  With the sponsors of that draft, he shared the goal of the total elimination of those weapons.  The draft contained many useful and agreeable elements.  At the same time, Japan firmly believed that steps for nuclear disarmament should be “realistic and progressive”.

In that context, he said it was imperative to take into consideration the different interest and concerns of a wide range of countries.  He was also not convinced about some elements in the draft, such as the description of missile defence, on which a more careful examination was required.

The representative of Pakistan said he had opposed the new agenda draft, with a certain degree of difficulty because the text included several very important and valuable concepts.  The title itself was very appropriate, as it called for a world without nuclear weapons, an objective that Pakistan supported entirely.  Similarly, in the preambular and operational portions, there were some extremely important ideas, including the conviction that the retention of nuclear weapons carried the risk of their proliferation and possible acquisition by terrorists or non-State actors, to which he fully subscribed.  The best assurance against that was the total elimination of those weapons, through general and complete disarmament.

He said that the concept that non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing processes and that the promotion of non-proliferation and irreversible progress in nuclear disarmament were essential, was a very import concept, to which he also fully subscribed.  He was also very impressed by the declaration of the participation of the international community, as a whole, as central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and security.  That was “an undiluted, total, international” responsibility, he said.

Despite those extremely useful ideas, however, he said he was obliged to vote against the draft, for reasons that were familiar to all and reflected in the eighteenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 20, 22 and 23.  There was a certain reality in his part of the world, namely that Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons and had nuclear capability.  Not only had the text not recognized that reality, it had not recognized the factors that had led it to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.  It had not been the first to acquire nuclear weapons.  For   20 years, it had advocated the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and called for several measures aimed at achieving that goal.

He said his country had been “forced for self-defence and strategic balance”, to acquire an overt nuclear capability.  Those three paragraphs in the draft resolution had not taken that into account.  Thus, regretfully, he had voted against it.

[Preambular paragraph 18 expresses deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapon option by India, Israel and Pakistan.  Operative paragraph 20 calls on those three States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Operative paragraph 22 expresses concern at tensions in the Middle East and South Asia and renews support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones there.  Operative paragraph 23 calls on those States, which had not yet done so, to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA.]

The representative of Australia said that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the most serious challenges to global peace and security.  As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Australia was strongly committed to efforts to curb the spread of those weapons and advance nuclear disarmament.  In so doing, it had supported practical, realistic proposals capable of winning wide support, including, in particular, of the nuclear-weapon States.  Through that type of inclusive approach, further progress would be made to rid the world of all types of nuclear weapons.  While he could support many elements in the Coalition’s texts, he had significant reservations on others.  He was also concerned that the text on non-strategic nuclear weapons did not acknowledge either the substantive progress that had been made in reducing those weapons over the last decade or ongoing efforts.  For that reason, he had abstained.

In a general statement about the draft on the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (document A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1), FERNAND POUKRÉ-KONO (Central African Republic) lauded the significant progress made by that Committee.  Asserting that the events indicated in operative paragraph 4 should be recognized by the international community, he also noted that “Biyongo” had been misspelled there.

Speaking before the vote on the draft on regional and subregional confidence-building measures (document A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1), submitted by Pakistan, the representative of India said that, although the sponsor had “gone through the motions” of taking suggestions on board, the core objective of the resolution remained unchanged. It, thus, continued to use a text on confidence-building measures as a vehicle to introduce problematic notions of “regions of tension” and “military balances,” and to drag the Secretary-General into an ambiguous role.  Declaring that it was a pity that confidence-building measures were being put before the First Committee under dubious conditions, he lamented that their definition had been distorted and did not take into account definitions arrived at by the Disarmament Commission.

Stating that the draft did not recognize that confidence-building measures had already made a real difference on the ground, he added that such measures needed to be implemented gradually in order to be effective.  They should not involve a whole host of outsiders.  He also said that selective quotes from the United Nations Charter had been fused with concepts that were irrelevant to any consensus documents of the Committee.  Additionally, the idea of artificial “regions of tension” was advanced in operative paragraphs 7 and 8.  Furthermore, in advocating military balance, the draft unreasonably made the same demands on diverse States who faced different security concerns.  The concept of parity, after all, was an outdated one, better suited for the cold war.  Finally, the total absence of references to threats by terrorists showed the anachronistic approach of the draft.  Because the draft was unacceptable, in terms of its objectives and content, he would vote against it.

The representative of Argentina, explaining her abstention on the same draft, said it did not reflect the consensus that had been achieved on confidence-building measures in the Disarmament Commission.  It also failed to take into account additional work conducted by the same body in past sessions.

The representative of the United States said he would, with regret, vote against the same draft.  Although he attached importance to confidence-building measures among States that were distrustful of one another, the text at hand was flawed and advanced principles that had little to do with such measures.  It did not take into account the Disarmament Commission’s work on the issue and seemed to run contrary to the mutual and voluntary aspects that gave confidence-building measures their power.  He stressed that his stand on the draft did not signal that his country was taking sides in the dispute between India and Pakistan.  However, he did express concern that multilateral institutions would become irrelevant if they could not focus and address urgent security challenges.  In that context, endorsing the present draft would burden the Committee with yet another perennial draft and bring a bilateral dispute into an international body.

Next, the Committee approved the new draft resolution entitled “Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context” (document A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1) by a recorded vote of 68 in favour to 47 against, with 34 abstentions (Annex IV).

On a point of order, the representative of Brazil recalled his request to speak after that vote.

The Committee Chairman said those explanations would be allowed after action on the drafts in that cluster.

Acting without a vote, the Committee then approved the draft resolution on activities of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (document A/C.1/58/L.54/Rev.1).

Italy’s representative, speaking on behalf of the European Union on confidence-building measures, said the Union strongly supported the creation of confidence- and security-building measures, as an instrument to overcoming mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculations, especially in situations and areas of tension.  European countries had highly benefited from such measures, which had been introduced in Europe through the “CSCS/OSCE” process.  The Union, therefore, favoured the introduction of similar concepts in other areas and adapting them to the specific local or regional situations.

He said the Union, therefore, could accept some elements of the new draft, but could not ignore the outcome of the debate, that took place on that question in the Disarmament Commission just a few months ago.  Moreover, some provisions of the text seemed to reflect national views with regard to a specific area of tension, which were not in line with an overall and balanced approach.  The concept of military balance between States in regions of tensions, which was not in itself a confidence building measure, and the request of the involvement of the Secretary-General with the States of the regions concerned, acquired a special meaning if applied to the context of specific geographic areas.

Some Union Member States had brought those concerns to the attention of the sponsor, but those were not adequately taken into account, he said.  Given the Union’s view that the text was not balanced, it, therefore, opposed it.  That vote did not, in any way, imply taking a political position on any particular regional issue.

The representative of Brazil said he had voted in favour of the draft on confidence-building.  He supported its general thrust because he considered that confidence-building measures were a powerful instrument to generate trust among countries in all regions.  Their implementation had a positive impact on consolidating a more cooperative environment, which was essential to national and regional progress.  Brazil had consistently registered the largest number of confidence-building measures within the Organization of American States.

He said he had not been comfortable with some of the language in the text, but the sponsor had made an effort to take that into account, and he had been able to vote yes.  He hoped to work with the Pakistani delegation to achieve consensus on that item in the future, especially given his strong disappointment that consensus on the item had eluded the Disarmament Commission.

The representative of Nigeria, also speaking on confidence-building measures, said he attached great importance to such measures.  However, the call for maintaining military balance between States in regions of tension and conflict consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, could not be realized.  Nor would such a measure promote confidence-building among States.  For that reason, he had abstained.

Also explaining his position on the same text, the representative of Kazakhstan thanked the delegation of Pakistan for presenting that text and for its flexibility on the initial draft.  More than 10 years ago, his country had launched an initiative for a cooperative security structure in Asia.  The State participants continued to work on practical implementation of the relevant documents, including on eliminating terrorism and promoting dialogue among civilizations.  Confidence-building measures were an important aspect of global stability, but, at same time, that process could be successful only through consensus among States.  For that reason, he had abstained.  But, he was ready to continue the work with others to reach comprehensive agreement on that important issue.

In a general statement, MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said he strongly disagreed with two statements made this afternoon on the text on confidence-building.  That initiative had been taken by Pakistan with the best of intentions and with the desire to promote a process of peace and security in South Asia.  The contents of the draft, contrary to what had been stated here by some colleagues, was completely aligned with the decisions and positions adopted by the General Assembly and other international bodies at various stages.

He asked his colleagues to look at the text of the resolution rather than at its sponsor.  It called for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, it recalled Security Council resolutions, it underlined the importance of confidence-building measures, and it asked that resources from disarmament be devoted instead to development.

On a point of order, the representative of India sought clarification about the purpose of allotting that particular segment in the proceedings to a general statement.  Space had been given for delegations to make known their general positions, and here the Ambassador of Pakistan was referring to his own draft resolution.  He had the status of sponsor of the draft.  Was it the Chairman’s ruling that he had the right to make direct references to the resolutions adopted?  If that was so, that would be the first time that that segment was being put to that use and was a modification of his understanding of how that segment should be used.

The CHAIRMAN said that the procedure followed was that those delegations wishing to make general statements or introductions of revised drafts, other than explanations of vote, would speak first.  On previous occasions, he had given the floor to delegations wishing to make a general statement afterwards, when necessary.  As members well knew, sponsors of drafts were not supposed to make an explanation of vote, either before or after the vote.  But, sponsors may make general statements.  The representative of Pakistan had asked for the floor in order to make a general statement, which the Chair had granted.  He hoped the representative would proceed along those lines.

Continuing, Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan) said he was “used to Indian domination, used to Indian bullying”, but he was not used to being “muzzled” by India and the United Nations, and should not be muzzled either by India or anyone else.  He would make a general statement as he saw fit.  It was a general statement, and he would express the views that he wished to express.  His general statement would clarify Pakistan’s position, and, if he wished to respond to some remarks made in the Committee, he thought he had a right to do that.

When criticism was made of a draft that was submitted, it was quite clear that one should understand the motivations for such criticism, he said.  He had been told that there was an abstract confidence-building measure concept, which had not been reflected in the resolution.  There was also talk about a sterile concept of parity.  “When India goes shopping for arms, does it not talk about seeking balance with some other country?” he asked.  Did Pakistan not have the right of self-defence, to acquire weapons when India was acquiring $1 billion from others, as well as the right to talk about balance at the lowest level of armaments, so that resources were not wasted and instead were devoted to development?  Was that a sterile concept of parity?

India earlier spoke about artificial regions of tension, he said.  South Asia was not an artificial region of tension; it was an actual region of tension  -- a region where an Indian occupation army of 700,000 troops was brutally suppressing the rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, killing 80,000 of them over the last 10 years.  That was a region where India deployed its armies on Pakistan’s borders last year, in what it described as “an exercise in coercive diplomacy”.

He said he was glad India had admitted failure in that regard.  Theirs was a region where arms were being acquired at rate of $10 billion to 15 billion per year, and threats of use of force were “held out”.  It was certainly a region that required peace-building and confidence-building, and that was the purpose of the Pakistani initiative -- to promote peace in such regions of tensions.  He was puzzled at the negative vote of some of his friends, who themselves talked about regions of tension and about confidence-building.  Perhaps those were abstract concepts to them.  When those were applied to specific regions, such as South Asia, or other regions of tension, they had cast a negative vote.  Yes, he construed that vote as a “partisan” one, on behalf of a State or States, perhaps, which were occupying foreign lands and sought military domination and the suppression of peoples.

The representative of India, addressing the Chairman, said the time had been misused by a delegation.  It had obstructed constructive debate and tended to distort the views of other delegations.  It was not his intention to exercise the right of reply, nor was it his understanding that the time allotted for constructive debate should be used to “score propaganda points”.  He left it to the entire Committee body to draw its own conclusions.  Reference had been made to India’s earlier statement.  In it, he had not referred to any country or region, but if words and regions and countries were being read into his statement, he would seek the indulgence of the delegation concerned to read the text, or at least listen a little more carefully.

SYED HASRIN TENGKO HUSSIN (Malaysia) introduced a draft decision on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (document A/C.1/58/L.61).  He said he believed the session would provide an opportunity to discuss and review the current disarmament situation.  It would also allow for the revitalization of the First Committee.  Regarding the new decision, he said it had arisen when, following consultations with a number of delegations, he had decided that the draft resolution on the same matter (document A/C.1/58/L.25/Rev.1) would not be acted upon this year.  The new decision would have the Assembly request States to continue consultations and include the item in its provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session.

He said, on the draft resolution on the promotion of multilateralism in disarmament and non-proliferation (document A/C.1/58/L.26), he wished to orally amend preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, and operative paragraph 6.  In all three, he wished to add the words “and transparent” after the term “non-discriminatory”.

(annexes follow)

ANNEX I

Vote on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

The draft resolution on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1) was approved by a recorded vote of 118 in favour to  4 against, with 41 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining:  Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Federated States of Micronesia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX I)

ANNEX II

Vote on Preamb Para 20/Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

The twentieth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world:  a new agenda” (document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1) was retained by a recorded vote of 117 in favour to 6 against, with 39 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Australia, Israel, Japan, Federated States of Micronesia, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining:  Albania, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey.

Absent:  Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam.

(END OF ANNEX II)

ANNEX III

Vote on “Towards Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”

The draft resolution “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world:  a new agenda” (document A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1) was approved by a recorded vote of 121 in favour to 6 against, with 38 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  France, India, Israel, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining:  Albania, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Federated States of Micronesia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey.

Absent:  Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uzbekistan.

(END OF ANNEX III)

ANNEX IV

Vote on Regional Confidence-Building Measures

The draft resolution on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context (document A/C.1/58/L.18/Rev.1) was approved by a recorded vote of 68 in favour to 47 against, with 34 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom, United States.

Abstaining:  Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, South Africa, Swaziland, Turkey, Uruguay, Vanuatu.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam.

* *** *