DANGERS POSED BY PROLIFERATION OF ‘NON-STRATEGIC’ NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ADDRESSED IN DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE DRAFT RESOLUTION

Fifty-eighth General Assembly

First Committee

11^th Meeting (AM)

DANGERS POSED BY PROLIFERATION OF ‘NON-STRATEGIC’ NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

ADDRESSED IN DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE DRAFT RESOLUTION

Ten Texts Introduced on, among Others, Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,

New Disarmament Agenda, Ban on Fissile Material, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The General Assembly, concerned about the risk of the proliferation of non-strategic nuclear weapons and of their pre-emptive, unauthorized or accidental use, would stress the need for nuclear-weapon States that possessed such weapons not to increase their numbers, or to develop new types or rationalizations for their use, according to one of 10 draft resolutions and decisions introduced today in the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security).

The Committee began its thematic debate this morning and heard introductions of drafts on the following topics:  reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (also known as “mini-nukes” or battlefield nuclear weapons); a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; a new agenda towards a nuclear-weapon-free world; a ban on fissile material for nuclear weapons; and a United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

Also:  a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere; establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia; consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (treaty of Tlatelolco); and the holding of a conference of States parties and signatories to the nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaties.

Also by the text on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, the Assembly would call for a ban of those types of weapons that had already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States, and it would stress the importance of enhancing special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons and related materials, with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination.

The Assembly, expressing deep concern over the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear devastation, would stress the importance of further developing verification capabilities, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and call on all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of such weapons, according to the draft resolution on a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

By a draft resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda”, the Assembly would call on the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT), as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reduction agreements or initiatives, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment.

Under a related text, the Assembly, convinced that nuclear weapons posed the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization, would reaffirm the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.  It would appeal to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

The draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere, submitted for the eighth consecutive year, would have the Assembly affirm its conviction of the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that were nuclear-weapon-free.  With particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, it would call on all States to support nuclear disarmament and work for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Drafts were also introduced today by which the Assembly would urge the countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region that had not yet done so to ratify the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which sought to enable the Treaty’s full operation; decide to hold, before the 2005 NPT Review Conference, a Conference of States parties and signatories of the Treaties that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones; and urge the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

By two further texts, the Assembly would decide to include items on a United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament and establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia on the provisional agenda of its next session.

Drafts were introduced by the representatives of Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan.  Speaking in the thematic debate were the representatives of Argentina, Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Nigeria, Indonesia and Viet Nam.  The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again on Tuesday, 21 October, at 10 a.m. to continue its thematic debate.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to begin its thematic debate and hear introductions of draft resolutions.  The Committee was expected to hear introductions of drafts on the following topics:  reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and on a new agenda towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Also:  a ban on fissile material for nuclear weapons; a United Nations conference to eliminate nuclear dangers; a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere; establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia; consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (treaty of Tlatelolco); and a conference of States parties and signatories to the nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaties.

According to a draft decision sponsored by Mexico on a United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/58/L.2), the Assembly would decide to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an item dealing with such a conference.

According to a draft resolution on consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (document A/C.1/58/L.6), the Assembly would welcome the fact that the Treaty was now in force for the sovereign States of the region and that that would be officially acknowledged by the XVIII General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), to be held in Havana, Cuba, on 5 and 6 November.  The draft would urge the countries of the region that had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty’s amendments, which were approved by the General Conference.

[The preambular portion of the draft resolutions recalls that in 1990, 1991 and 1992, the general Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty, with the aim of enabling its full entry into force.]

The draft resolution is sponsored by Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Convinced that nuclear weapons posed the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization, the General Assembly would reaffirm the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, according to a draft resolution on that question (document A/C.1/58/L.).  It would appeal to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

The draft resolution is sponsored by Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.

By the terms of a draft decision sponsored by Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (document A/C.1/58/L.14), the Assembly, would decide to include the item on the agenda of its next session.

Another new draft resolution, sponsored by Mexico, on the Conference of States parties and signatories of treaties that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones (document A/C.1/58/L.19), the Assembly would decide to hold, before the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Conference of States parties and signatories of treaties that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Assembly would further decide to establish a Preparatory Committee open to the participation of all States parties and signatories of those treaties and instruments, which would hold two sessions, the first to be held in New York during the second quarter of 2004.  It would ask the Preparatory Committee to decide on the date and venue of the Conference and to make recommendations on all relevant matters, including the draft agenda, draft rules of procedure, the modalities of participation of States parties to the Protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaties and other interested States, as well as of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a draft final document, and to decide on background documents to be made available in advance.

According to a draft resolution sponsored by Brazil on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere (document A/C.1/58/L.38), the Assembly would affirm its conviction of the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that were nuclear-weapon-free.  With particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, it would call upon all States to support the process of nuclear disarmament and to work for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

It would welcome the continued contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba were making towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those Treaties from nuclear weapons.  It would call upon all concerned States to work together, in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaties by all relevant States that had not yet done so. 

By a draft resolution entitled Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.39), the Assembly, concerned about the threat posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons due to their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict, and thus about the risk of proliferation and of early, pre-emptive, unauthorized or accidental use, would stress the need for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possessed such weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of those weapons or rationalizations for their use.

The Assembly would call for the prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that had already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of their elimination.  It would also call on the Russian Federation and the United States to formalize their presidential nuclear initiatives into legally binding instruments and to initiate negotiations on further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

In a related provision, it would stress the importance of enhancing special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, among other things, placing such weapons in physically secure central storage sites, with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as part of the nuclear disarmament process to which they were committed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The draft resolution is sponsored by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

By a draft resolution entitled Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda (document A/C.1/58/L.40), the Assembly would call upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could negatively impact nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

It would also call on them to fulfil all their obligations under international treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to pursue the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

Calling for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), it would also underline the urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT in the context of the progress achieved in implementing the international monitoring system.

By a further term, the Assembly would call upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the NPT, as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reduction agreements or initiatives, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment.

It would also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapon arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures, and to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Assembly would also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated, legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

By further terms, the Assembly would call upon those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet parties to the NPT, and which operate un-safeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, and upon those States which have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol.

It would also call upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reconsider its recent announcements, with a view to complying fully with the provisions of the NPT, and in this connection supports all diplomatic efforts for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation and for the establishment of an area free of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

The Assembly would also call upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the IAEA to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that has been agreed upon and that is now available to be used in new verification agreements between the IAEA and each of the two States.

And it would call upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

A draft resolution on the Conference on Disarmament decision to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.49) would have the Assembly urge the Conference to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty, under the conviction that such a treaty would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

Expressing deep concern regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear devastation, the Assembly would invite the nuclear-weapon States to keep United Nations Members informed on their progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, according to a draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Côte d’Ivoire, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland and entitled A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.53).

Stressing the importance of further developing verification capabilities, such as IAEA safeguards, the Assembly would also call upon all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of such weapons.

It would also call upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials related to such weapons, so that they did not fall into the hands of terrorists.

Statements

MARTIN GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) introduced the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (document A/58/274).  Highlighting several points from the Group’s deliberations, he said it had discussed all statements submitted by governments over the years, illustrated its findings with graphs arranged by geographical area, and decided to reduce the threshold of artillery systems in category III to 75 millimetres, and to include man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) in category VII.

Despite the progress made and the fact that, so far, 164 Member States had submitted information, he refrained from calling the work done a total success.  After all, the Register still needed to be scientifically and technically updated to reflect modern military concepts.  For example, category II could be broadened to include capabilities related to reconnaissance and electronic warfare. In category IV, adjustments could be made with respect to military aircraft, such as the inclusion of force multipliers and air-to-air refuelling.  And tonnage could be lowered to 400 metric tonnes, and 50 in the case of submarines, in category VI.

MITSURO DONOWAKI (Japan) said his Government had been one of the strongest supporters of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms since its inception in 1992, because it was committed to transparency.  He added that, despite the fact that the Register was not legally binding and dependent on voluntary participation, the instrument had managed to encompass the majority of the global trade in seven categories of arms.  That was, in part, because the United States, which was the largest exporter of such weapons, participated.

He told delegates that the Group of Governmental Experts had recommended lowering the calibre of artillery systems to make the Register more applicable to Africa, and including MANPADS, to make it more relevant to terrorism.  He also lauded the fact that the Group’s report had recognized the value of regional workshops that promoted the Register.  However, he regretted that the Group had failed to agree on technical adjustments that reflected recent weapon-related developments, or expanding the Register’s scope to include national holdings and procurement.  Also, he found it problematic that certain volatile subregions were not participating.

PAUL MEYER (Canada) said that, with the establishment of the Register, Member States had shown their dedication to transparency and confidence-building.  Nevertheless, more work was required to get countries to submit reports.  Designating national contacts to facilitate reporting would help in that respect.  Telling delegates that the Group had decided to lower its calibre threshold to encompass the types of weapons most commonly used in Africa, he also remarked that it was the Group’s Canadian expert, who had argued to include MANPADS in the instrument, since they were frequently used by terrorists.

Lauding the fact that many regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), had considered how to incorporate the Register into their regional agendas, he called special attention to the initiation by the OAS of a legally binding convention, which required its member States to submit reports on conventional weapons.  In that regard, the United Nations Register had set an international example for new regional initiatives.

Mr. SANDERS (Netherlands) added that he appreciated the broad support the Register was receiving.  That showed that the instrument was “alive and kicking.”  Lauding the progress made in improving the Register, he added that his Government would continue to back it in whatever way it could.  Turning to the draft resolution on transparency in armaments (document A/C.1/58/L.45), he said that all delegations that had not yet co-sponsored it, could still do so.

Mr. MALZAHN (United States), reminding delegates that the Register had been set up in 1992 as a response to the first Persian Gulf War, said the instrument had been a success story that involved participants from every regional group.  Nevertheless, the instrument could be improved.  For example, its scope could be expanded to include military holdings.  Highlighting the importance of regional workshops, which were charged with understanding regional concerns, he said they had determined that small arms and light weapons needed to be addressed.  That was why the calibre threshold had been decreased in category III.  Turning to MANPADS, he expressed satisfaction that they had been added to the Register’s scope, since they could be used irresponsibly to disrupt the globally interconnected civilian air system.  He added that support for the Register should be maintained, not diverted to other missions.

Mr. BROUCHER (United Kingdom) briefly remarked that he also welcomed the reduction of the calibre threshold in category III and the inclusion of MANPADS.

Mr. HEINSBERG (Germany) added that his Government had actively participated in the Register.

Turning towards nuclear weapons in the thematic debate, ANN POLLACK (Canada) invited the nuclear-weapon States to make forward-looking suggestions towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  She reaffirmed the view expressed by her delegation during the general debate that there was no substitute for the basic norms and commitments embodied in the multilateral structure, whose cornerstone was the NPT.  Through its legally binding provisions, the commitment of the vast majority of its States parties to that near-universal Treaty had helped hold back the horrifying potential of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

She said that, since the end of the cold war, the numbers and types of nuclear weapons had been reduced, and most States benefited from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.  While continuing to work to reinforce the NPT structure, one must not lose sight of the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.  The viability of the NPT depended on continuing strong momentum in the reduction of nuclear weapons.  She urged the nuclear-weapon States to reduce and dismantle their nuclear arsenals, in an irreversible and verifiable manner, and she called on those outside the NPT to join it.

She said her country had contributed to a strengthened review process for the NPT, particularly in response to the practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, adopted in 2000, and in the area of reporting.  The reporting process had a real potential to contribute to implementing and fostering transparency with accountability.  There was a growing international awareness of the important role of reports, and a desire to make better use of them.  Reporting also reinforced commitments.  It could spur action and provide another means to demonstrate compliance and address related concerns.

Convinced that the nuclear-test-ban could enhance international peace and security, she said that the CTBT combated both horizontal and vertical proliferation and was the pillar of the NPT regime.  Its entry into force was the first of the 13 agreed practical steps at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  Nuclear weapons -– uniquely dangerous and indiscriminate -- must never be used.  The CTBT had been negotiated to ensure that they might never be demonstrated.  In many ways, that Treaty had already achieved “virtual entry into force”, but its legal operation was critical.  She called on the remaining “Annex 2” countries (those, among 44 States, whose ratification was required for the Treaty’s operation) to make possible that instrument’s objectives by ratifying it.

She formally presented to the Committee the draft resolution on the Conference on Disarmament decision to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.49).  The draft was identical to last year’s text, which had been adopted by both the Committee and the General Assembly without a vote.  While it was essentially procedural, it was anchored firmly in the expectations of the international community, and reflected the widespread support for beginning those talks.  It expressed determination to conclude a multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a treaty that would be fundamental to furthering both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.  Circumstances were now favourable for agreement on a programme of work in the Conference next year, which she would very much welcome. 

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil) introduced the draft resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world:  a new agenda” (document A/C.1/58/L.40).  Like its predecessor, the draft sought to engage the Committee, with a view to giving new impetus to nuclear disarmament.  The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference had fundamentally defined the context in which nuclear disarmament should be pursued, namely by the unequivocal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish nuclear disarmament, leading to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.  At the 2005 NPT review, it would be expected that effective progress was to have been made on those 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, adopted in 2000.  Perhaps more than ever, there was a widespread feeling that the debate on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must start producing tangible results. 

He then introduced the draft resolution on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.39), which sought to fulfil the priority embodied in its name.  The text called, in particular, for further reductions and eliminations of non-strategic nuclear weapons to be included in an integral part of the nuclear disarmament and arms control process, and to be carried out in a verifiable and transparent manner.  He said that during informal consultations, carried out by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa –- also co-sponsors of the draft), comments and proposals had been received for clarification and amendments, which it would consider in a constructive spirit.  He remained convinced that the Coalition’s ideas and proposals could positively influence international efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.  The two texts (L.39 and L.40) sought to advance and strengthen that common resolve. 

Also introducing the draft resolution entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (document A/C.1/58/L.38), he said he had the honour of being joined by New Zealand as initiators of a resolution that last year gathered 160 votes in favour, and only  3 against.  That result expressed the overwhelming acceptance of that resolution since 1996.  Hopefully, it would enjoy the same broad support.  The majority of the additional co-sponsors were members of the fourth existing nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaties.

He noted that the changes to the text had reflected the ratification of the treaty of Rarotonga by Tonga in December 2001, which had completed the list of original members of the Treaty.  Brazil and New Zealand had also decided to reflect, in a more precise way, the current status of the process of consolidation of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere.  The further development of such zones in some regions was one of the most significant measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.  Gradually, in various parts of the world, the nuclear option was being ruled out. 

The objective of eliminating nuclear weapons was reinforced by extending –- through new nuclear-weapon-free zones –- the geographical space where such weapons were illegal, he said.  Existing regional treaties, with the addition of the Antarctic Treaty, contributed to freeing the southern hemisphere from nuclear weapons, as well as the adjacent areas north of the Equator, where such treaties applied.    The States parties to those instruments, in close consultation with their neighbours, had renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and accepted stringent verification commitments to that effect. 

He said that the initiative sought to achieve recognition by the Assembly, for the eighth consecutive year, of the progressive emergence of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.  Such continuing recognition should be considered as a confirmation of the commitments of the international community towards non-proliferation and disarmament.  As in previous years, the draft did not create new legal obligations.  Neither did it contradict any norm of international law applicable to navigation, such as those contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Mr. STEPHENS (Australia) said the proliferation of nuclear weapons remained one of the most serious challenges to global peace and security.  In that context, he referred to the withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the NPT, and the dubious nature of Iran’s nuclear program.  Telling delegates that he was pleased to co-sponsor Japan’s draft resolution, entitled “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (document A/C.1/58/L.53), he remarked that he particularly welcomed those paragraphs that underscored the importance of implementing the outcomes of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  He also expressed hope that the draft would attract wide support, including from the nuclear-weapon States.

Turning to the IAEA, he said its safeguards system should be strengthened.  In that context, he expressed support for the additional protocol, which countries would need to adhere to, in order to obtain nuclear supplies for peaceful purposes.  Also stressing the importance of the CTBT, he said his delegation was a co-sponsor, along with New Zealand and Mexico, of the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (document A/C.1/58/L.52).  He also welcomed Canada’s tabling of the draft resolution to commence work in the Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.49), and hoped it would be adopted without a vote.

PAUL STEPHENS (New Zealand), speaking as co-sponsor of the drafts on the CTBT (L.52), a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere (L.38), reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (L.39) and the need for a new agenda towards a nuclear-weapon-free world (L. 40), called for the early entry into force of the CTBT, an essential element of which were the early nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.  Banning nuclear testing was important for ending the nuclear arms race.  It was also an essential component of the NPT regime, which was the cornerstone of non-proliferation and disarmament. 

That Treaty had been extended indefinitely in 1995, he said, largely on the basis of a renewed commitment by the nuclear Powers to complete the CTBT and implement their commitments under the NPT.  There had been agreement on the importance and urgency of signing and ratifying it, without delay or conditions.  States had been called upon, pending the CTBT’s entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the Treaty’s objective and purpose.

He recalled the widespread international reaction when India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, as well as the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1172 (1998), which sternly criticized the actions of those two States and called on all States to respect the norm against nuclear testing, a norm that had been formalized by the CTBT.  The Council had understood that violation of that norm would jeopardize the non-proliferation regime and endanger international peace and security.  Eighteen Foreign Ministers issued a similar statement to the United Nations in September 2002, which had now been endorsed by 50 governments. 

It was an issue of deep concern to his Government that the Treaty had not yet entered into force, as that would be the first line of defence against the resumption of nuclear testing, he said.  Today’s security environment continued to challenge established norms.  Nuclear posturing by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the continued nuclear instability in South Asia had underscored the need for universal adherence to the NPT.  Indeed, the widespread and hostile reaction of the international community to the events of 1998 had served as clear proof of the strength of the international norm against nuclear testing.  Acting against it might prompt a further arms race and incur further wrath. 

Adding that the onus was on the nuclear-weapon States to fully respect the moratorium on nuclear testing, he said that any move by the United States or any other nuclear-weapon State towards enhancing their nuclear weapons capability would be a negative development.  Violating the norm against nuclear testing would send a dangerous message to potential proliferators. 

He said he also strongly supported the draft resolution calling for a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere (L.38).  His own region, the Pacific, remained strongly committed to a southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons.  It had been disappointing that, in previous years, the draft had not achieved consensus and had been opposed on grounds of free passage on the high seas.  He fully respected the rights of all States parties under Law of the Sea Convention.  In fact, the resolution and its preamble had specifically recalled the principles and rules of international law regarding the high seas.  He, thus, rejected the implication that that Convention had been interpreted selectively with respect to the resolution.  Nuclear-weapon-free zones were largely non-proliferation measures, but they also promoted disarmament by providing a centre from which States could pursue a nuclear-weapon-free path.  The resolution was one step towards consolidating the nuclear-weapon-free regime and pulling the net more tightly against the spread of nuclear weapons. 

GUSTAVO ALBIN (Mexico) said that the existence of nuclear weapons constituted a serious threat to humanity, and that, therefore, preventing nuclear proliferation had to be an urgent task for the international community.  In that context, he introduced a draft decision, entitled “United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament” (document A/C.1/58/L.2), by which the Assembly would decide to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an item dealing with such a conference.

He also introduced a draft resolution on consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (document A/C.1/58/L.6).  Lauding the fact that his region had established the world’s first nuclear-weapon-free zone, he noted that all States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco had co-sponsored the draft resolution at hand.  He also called for the issue to be considered every two years.  In that regard, he highlighted a correction to operative paragraph 3.  Specifically, the Assembly would decide to include the matter in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth instead of fifty-ninth session.  He also expressed hope that the draft would receive the customary full support of the Committee and be approved without a vote.

Introducing another draft resolution on the Conference of States parties and signatories of treaties that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones (document A/C.1/58/L.19), he said its objectives were to improve dialogue and cooperation among such zones to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

KUNIKO INOGUCHI (Japan) introduced a draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Côte d’Ivoire, Italy, Switzerland, and her country, entitled “A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (document A/C.1/58/L.53).  Representing the only country in the world to have experienced nuclear devastation, she said it was her Government’s profound desire to usher in a world free of nuclear weapons.  However, such a world could only be achieved through concrete and realistic steps.

She said operative paragraph 3(a) called for the earliest possible signing and ratification of the CTBT by those States that had not yet done so, and she stressed that that paragraph’s significance should not be reduced by the current moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions.  Turning to operative paragraph 3(b), which called for negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material, she said such a ban was a priority for her country and the next logical step for nuclear non-proliferation.

She then told delegates that this year’s draft contained new elements, which reflected the world’s changing realities.  For example, it stressed the need for full compliance with the NPT, referred to terrorism, and affirmed the importance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  She concluded by expressing hope that the resolution would be adopted with overwhelming support and requesting interested States to co-sponsor it.

OLAMGIR RAZZOQ (Uzbekistan) introduced a draft decision on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (document A/C.1/58/L.14).  Telling delegates that the Governments of his region were currently in negotiations with the nuclear powers to make the zone a reality, he declared that a draft treaty, put together with help from the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament for Asia and the Pacific, had already been established.

Ms. LUNDEMO (Norway) said that, since the NPT was essential to preserving collective international security, its authority, which was currently being challenged, needed to be stressed.  In that regard, she called for the 2005 NPT Review Conference to strengthen safeguards, especially with respect to countries attempting to acquire nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.  Welcoming progress made regarding the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, or the Moscow Treaty, signed by the Presidents of the United States and Russian Federation, and by which both sides would reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads, she, nevertheless, called for further advances, such as irreversible reductions of non-strategic weapons.

Urging States to allow for the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT, she declared that self-imposed moratoria on nuclear explosions could not replace the legally binding commitments of the CTBT. That was why her delegation had decided to co-sponsor this year’s draft resolution on the CTBT (document A/C.1/58/L.52).

Also, since a legally binding instrument would be the best tool against the production of fissile material, she expressed support for the draft resolution tabled by Canada for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to that end in the Conference on Disarmament (document A/C.1/58/L.49).

ASIF ALI KHAN DURRANI (Pakistan) introduced a draft resolution on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/58/L.8).  Telling delegates that the demand for security assurances had been raised by non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s, he remarked that the response they had received from the nuclear Powers had been “grossly inadequate”.

He said that, at the end of the cold war, there had been a general expectation for the nuclear-weapon States to extend assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.  However, the situation had become even more complex because of several factors.  For example, the indefinite extension of the NPT had caused most nuclear-weapon States to presume they had a right to keep such weapons, and nuclear alliances had expanded the geographical scope for such weapons’ use.  Additionally, one major nuclear-weapon State, which had previously espoused a no-first use policy, had disavowed that policy, and the status and obligations of two additional nuclear States that had emerged, as well as another which was presumed to have such weapons, remained unclear.

He said co-sponsors of the draft resolution, which was similar to versions from previous years, sought to underline the sense of urgency, and, in that regard, he called for the draft’s adoption by the widest possible majority.

CHUKA CHIDEBELEZE UDEDIBIA (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the African Group on the subject of nuclear disarmament, said that today weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, remained an issue of grave concern.  The African Group was convinced that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to humankind.  The most effective means of achieving nuclear disarmament, therefore, was the commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a convention banning those weapons.  Among the first steps towards realizing that objective should be a commitment by nuclear-weapon States to immediately stop the qualitative improvement, development, production, and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems.  Pending their total elimination, a legally binding instrument should be established, which assured non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

He said the Group stressed the importance of ensuring that any nuclear disarmament process was irreversible, transparent, and verifiable.  It reiterated its resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving that aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear danger.  The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had been a turning point in the history of multilateral efforts to achieve disarmament, in particular, nuclear disarmament.  The Group regretted the non-implementation of that final document, 25 years after its adoption, and stressed the need to convene a fourth special session, in order to give real meaning to the nuclear disarmament process.

The Group reaffirmed its belief in the NPT as vital to maintaining international peace and security, and it endorsed the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, he said.  Reiterating the Group’s long-standing position for a ban on all nuclear weapons tests, he stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT.  If the objectives of that Treaty were to be fully realized, ratification by all signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, was essential.  Pending its entry into force, the moratorium on nuclear testing must be maintained.  Meanwhile, reductions in the deployment and operational status of nuclear weapons, while welcome, were no substitute for the total elimination of those arms.  He called for full compliance and effective implementation of exiting agreements in the field, as well as their universality.

The representative of Viet Nam took the floor to address a draft resolution on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (document A/C.1/58/L.43), which would have the Assembly invite all States that had not yet signed the Convention to accede to it, and urge all States that signed, but did not ratify it to do so without delay.  She said her delegation had been incorrectly listed as a co-sponsor.  That was problematic, since she found the draft to be discriminating and imbalanced.  She, therefore, asked for her country’s name to be removed from the list.

Rights of Reply

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, responding to delegations that had referred to his country’s nuclear activities, chided them for closing their eyes to the nuclear threats the United States had made against his country.  Declaring that he had clarified his position several times already, he reiterated that the hostile policy adopted by the United States had left his Government with no other choice but to maintain a defensive posture.  Since it was not realistic to discuss his country’s nuclear issues without acknowledging the actions of the United States, concerned States should instead occupy themselves with seeking a fair, impartial resolution to the issue.

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