NEW DISARMAMENT APPROACHES IMPERATIVE IN CHANGED POLITICAL CLIMATE FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD, AS GENERAL DEBATE CONTINUES
| Press Release GA/DIS/3251 |
Fifty-eighth General Assembly
First Committee
5th Meeting (AM)
NEW DISARMAMENT APPROACHES IMPERATIVE IN CHANGED POLITICAL CLIMATE
FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD, AS GENERAL DEBATE CONTINUES
Rapid global changes made it imperative to adopt new approaches to fulfil the disarmament agenda, especially in today’s completely changed political climate, the Russian Federation representative told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) today, as it continued its general debate.
He warned that the non-proliferation issue had acquired a dangerous dimension, because of the possibility that terrorists might gain access to weapons and materials of mass destruction. Everyone must rely on the time-tested rules of international law and accepted non-proliferation mechanisms, and work to improve them. In addressing such global security problems, there was no alternative to multilateralism.
Kazakhstan told the Committee that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been in existence for more than 30 years and in that period, compliance with the nuclear disarmament obligation had become one of the “thorniest” problems of the times. That had been aggravated by an emerging trend to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Current international agreements should be adapted to new realities, and the United Nations and its institutions should play a vital role in solving the nuclear proliferation problem. There was only one way forward -- to tighten control of the non-proliferation regime and improve the transparency of weapons development and testing.
The Jamaican representative said that increased militarization had increased the likelihood of a military response as a first option. That did little to enhance security and ensure lasting peace. Steadily growing arms expenditures by the “big spenders” had caused other nations to increase spending in response to perceived internal or external threats. The legal regime governing international disarmament had also been weakened by the resort to actions that fell outside the scope of the principles of collective security. The “will of the many has been overcome by the might of the few”, thus threatening the global, collective approach to disarmament, he said.
The representative of Namibia was similarly dismayed that nuclear-weapon-States and other key countries had been unwilling to implement their obligations under the NPT. Instead, they had continued to perfect both their conventional and nuclear weapons, ostensibly to meet new threats. The need for serious nuclear disarmament had been undermined by those claims, which provided a clear invitation to other States to acquire nuclear weapons under the same pretext. It seemed that those who possessed nuclear weapons were preoccupied with preventing other countries from acquiring them, and not with talks aimed at eliminating those weapons under strict and effective control.
Also addressing the debate was the Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization (CTBTO), Wolfgang Hoffman, who noted that the Treaty’s success depended on two crucial factors -- its universality, and its verifiability. On both counts, substantial progress had been made. The level and pace of signatures and ratifications had indicated the firm international support of the CTBT, and the Preparatory Commission, which was established six years ago to create a verification regime to monitor compliance, should be operational upon the Treaty’s entry into force and would be able to detect nuclear explosions underground, in water and in the atmosphere.
Statements were also made by the representatives of the Bahamas (on behalf of CARICOM), Guyana, Australia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, Ukraine, Norway, and Iceland.
The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Friday to continue its general debate.
Background
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general debate on all disarmament and related international security items.
Expected to be under consideration is the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, or the Moscow Treaty. On 24 May, the Presidents of the United States and Russian Federation signed the Treaty, by which both sides would reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 31 December
2012. It is significant because it commits two former adversaries with the world's largest nuclear arsenals to reductions of deployed weapons.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) will also be discussed. Opened for signature in 1996, 169 States have signed it, and 105 have ratified it. Of the States whose ratification is needed for its entry into force (the 44 Annex 2 States), 32 have ratified it. Two nuclear Powers -– the United States and China -– have signed but not ratified the Treaty, and the United States no longer supports it. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan have not signed it.
Attention will also be focused on the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization in the United Nations family that serves as a focal point for nuclear cooperation. Among its tasks is verifying, through its inspection system, that States comply with their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other non-proliferation agreements to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes.
The Agency's safeguards system comprises extensive technical measures for independently verifying the correctness and completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities. Since 1992 -- in the aftermath of the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme -- the Board of Governors of the Agency has adopted or endorsed measures to strengthen the safeguards system. Under a Model Additional Protocol adopted in 1997 that includes short notice inspector access to any place on a nuclear site, the IAEA has continued to negotiate Additional Protocols with States to strengthen that system by verifying not only declared nuclear material and activities, but also the absence of undeclared material and activities.
At its September meeting, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution deeming it “essential and urgent” that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and cooperate fully with it to ensure verification of compliance with its safeguards agreement by taking all necessary actions by 31 October. Those steps include a full declaration of all material relevant to Iran’s enrichment programme.
That action followed a report in June by the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, in which he states that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material imported into Iran and the subsequent processing and use of the material, and the declaration of facilities and other locations where the material was stored and processed.
Regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the countries of the Central Asian region -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan –- last year agreed on the text of a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and that the signing should take place as soon as possible. That zone is expected to be discussed.
On conventional weapons, the Secretary-General says in a note before the Committee “There is nothing ‘small’ or ‘light’ about the consequences of the uncontrolled spread and misuse of small arms and light weapons”. There are more than 600 small arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide and, of 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, 47 were waged with those weapons. Small arms are responsible for more than 500,000 deaths each year, including 300,000 in armed conflict and 200,000 more from homicides and suicides.
Opening the First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held in July in New York, the Secretary-General, in his message, said that those arms killed about 60 people an hour, or half a million people per year. More than 100 States have presented national status reports since adoption of the action plan.
Also in 2001, a Group of Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons was established by the General Assembly. It concludes, in its July report to the Secretary-General, that the development of an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons was feasible. It recommends that the Assembly take a decision at the current session on the negotiation of such an instrument.
The 2003 Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General to review the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which adopted its report by consensus on 1 August, recommended that Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) be included within the scope of the Register, particularly in light of recent reports of attempts by groups to acquire and use them against commercial airliners. The Register is a voluntary reporting instrument on the international transfers of major conventional arms –- namely battle tanks, large-calibre artillery systems, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and their launchers.
So far, 164 Member States have participated at least once in this voluntary reporting instrument, while a record number of 126 States submitted reports on arms transfers in 2001. To date, 117 countries have participated in 2003.
Discussions will also continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use: Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process", which entered into force on 1 March 1999.
(For additional background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3247 issued 3 October.)
Statements
PAULETTE BETHEL (Bahamas), speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that recent developments in the field of disarmament did not inspire much confidence. Declaring that disarmament was directly linked to maintaining peace and security and achieving peaceful solutions to international disputes, she lamented that 2003 had been a dismal year for disarmament, with stalemates in multilateral bodies and military expenditures rising throughout the world. In that context, she called for an examination and revitalization of the work of the First Committee. She cautioned, however, that in seeking to make the Committee more relevant, delegates should not eliminate topics of discussion that were considered too difficult to resolve.
Turning to weapons of mass destruction, she noted with concern that some critical legal instruments governing multilateral disarmament had been threatened or stalled. In that regard, she reaffirmed her commitment to the NPT and called upon all States parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligations. She also called for a renewed commitment to the entry into force of the CTBT. For their part, CARICOM States had participated in a regional seminar in Jamaica last December, designed to promote universal adherence to the CTBT. Expressing strong commitment to regional cooperation in promoting nuclear non-proliferation, she extolled the virtues of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially the one that existed in Latin America and the Caribbean.
With respect to small arms and light weapons, she said they posed the single biggest threat to the social and economic development of her region’s countries, since such weapons led to violent crime and fostered drug trafficking. In that context, she called for greater international commitments to transfer controls, the regulation of brokering, and reliable marking and tracing practices. She also urged producer States, in particular, to increase their scrutiny of end-user certificates and strengthen border controls. Turning to the shipment of nuclear waste through the Caribbean Sea, she called for a comprehensive regulatory framework to promote State responsibility with regards to disclosure, liability, and compensation in the event of accidents.
YERZHAN KH. KAZYKHANOV (Kazakhstan) said that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained one of the most serious challenges to global security. The NPT has been in existence for 30 years, and in that period compliance with the nuclear disarmament obligation had turned into one of the “thorniest” problems faced by the international community, aggravated by an emerging trend to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Many speakers in the Committee had already expressed their serious concern that the NPT had been slowly eroded as a result of a weakened international commitment.
He said he fully shared those concerns and called for a strengthened and universal application of the existing non-proliferation regimes. The current international agreements in that area should be adapted to new realities. The United Nations and its institutions should play a vital role in solving the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was only one way to go: to tighten control of and to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and improve transparency when it came to weapons development and testing.
As the site of the former Semipalatinsk nuclear-testing ground, Kazakhstan had first-hand knowledge of the horrendous effects of nuclear testing, he said. He, therefore, called for an early entry into force of the CTBT. A moratorium on test explosions was a basis for nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The CTBT’s entry into force would transform that political action into a legally binding commitment and legitimize a host of measures by the international community in support of such a ban. As a State that had voluntarily renounced its nuclear heritage –- the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world – Kazakhstan was actively involved in talks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.
He highlighted the importance of export control over nuclear material, equipment, dual-use technologies and weapons as an important element of the nuclear non-proliferation policy, to address the danger of possible access by non-State actors to such material. In addition to strengthening national export control systems, expanded cooperation between States to improve those systems was a very effective way to counter international terrorism. The seventh Non-Proliferation and Export Control Forum of the countries of Central Asia, hosted by Kazakhstan last June, developed mechanisms of interaction between customs, border guards and other services, in order to prevent diversion of dual-use technologies, materials and know-how that could be used to produce mass destruction weapons and their means of delivery.
NADIRA MANGRAY (Guyana) expressed her concern about the disastrous impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on the socio-economic fabric of societies throughout the world. Such weapons, which had claimed the lives of many innocent women and children, had led to serious human rights violations and the disturbing phenomenon of child soldiers. Additionally, they were plaguing countries that had a limited capacity to deal with them.
She told delegates that her Government, which had long had the legislative and administrative infrastructure to deal with the control of arms, ammunition, and explosives, was evolving to better address changing criminal patterns. It was also working more closely within CARICOM to tackle new security threats. Nevertheless, the brand of collective security offered by the United Nations remained of paramount importance to her country. Reminding delegates of her country’s diminutive size, she stated that “smallness must no longer be seen as an invitation to aggression, but rather as a virtue to be prized and protected”.
Turning to landmines, she emphasized her Government’s commitment to their complete elimination. That is why, two months ago, it had deposited its instrument of ratification of the Ottawa Convention and sent a delegate to the fifth meeting of the States parties to the Convention, held in Bangkok. Keeping with the theme of landmines, she called on all States to renew efforts to support and advance the care, rehabilitation, and social and economic integration of victims. She also urged countries to develop mine-awareness programmes and continue their removal efforts.
SERGEY LAVROV (Russian Federation), recalling President Putin’s statement to the General Assembly that the United Nations was duty-bound to become, and indeed was becoming, a basis for the global anti-terrorist coalition, said that meeting of that task could be facilitated by the implementation of the Russian initiative (General Assembly resolution 57/145) to work out a global strategy to counter new challenges and threats. He hoped a new resolution would be adopted at the current session that would specify further steps in that direction. Rapid global changes made it imperative that new approaches be adopted to fulfil the disarmament agenda. The political climate now was “completely different”, as “the age of confrontation has become a thing of the past”, he said.
As a result, he continued, broad opportunities were emerging for partnership-based approaches in the area of arms control and disarmament. A striking example of that was the Moscow Treaty, which entered into force on 1 June. Having undertaken the legal obligation to reduce strategic offensive potentials by two thirds, the Russian Federation and the United States had reaffirmed the continuation of the nuclear disarmament process, and had made a real contribution to fulfilling their commitments under Article VI of the NPT. The non-proliferation issue had acquired a new dangerous dimension, because terrorists might gain access to weapons and materials of mass destruction.
He said that time-tested rules of international law and accepted non-proliferation mechanisms would be relied upon, and work should continue to enhance and improve them, taking into account the interests of the entire international community. Success in that area could not be achieved unless two principal conditions were met, namely the cohesion of the international community, and the removal of motivation leading to the emergence of conflict potential in various regions. There was no alternative to multilateralism in solving such problems.
Among specific actions aimed at maintaining international security, he gave priority to strengthening the NPT. Another logical step in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament could be the start, at the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. He welcomed the accession to the NPT of Afghanistan, Cuba and Timor-Leste, and he called, once again, on those countries, that had not yet done so, to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty had recently faced severe, new challenges. The statement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT was a “mistake”.
He said his country had consistently favoured a nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, taking due account of the interests and concerns of all parties. The first step had been taken by the launching of the Beijing process. The most important thing now was to make sure that that process moved forward, with a view to the earliest possible settlement. As for strengthening the NPT, it was urgent to improve the effectiveness and credibility of its verification machinery, namely the IAEA safeguards system. He called on all States, which had not yet done so, to accede to the Additional Protocol as soon as possible, particularly those with major nuclear energy programmes. He supported the efforts by the Agency to clarify questions concerning Iran’s nuclear programme, and he hoped reciprocal efforts would make it possible to resolve the existing concerns in the nearest future.
Still “seriously worried” about the future of the CTBT, he said he was convinced that efforts should not diminish to have it enter into force. He, therefore, welcomed the plan of action of the international community and the political declaration in support of the CTBT, adopted by the Third Conference in Vienna. It was important, meanwhile, to respect moratoriums on nuclear-weapon tests. He hoped those 12 States, on which entry into force of the CTBT now depended, would realize their “special responsibility” for the Treaty’s future. He noted the responsible attitude of Afghanistan, Algeria and Kyrgyzstan, which had ratified the Treaty.
He said he also supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Security assurances by the Russian Federation now extended to more than 100 States, which had acceded to the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements. If a compromise was found on the issue of security assurances, in connection with the Bangkok Treaty, and if a well-known initiative by the Central Asian States was implemented, the list of countries covered by such assurances would become all the more impressive. He remained convinced that there could be no delays in resolving the issue of preventing the emplacement of weapons in outer space. Russia and China, together with a group of co-sponsoring States, had introduced at the Conference on Disarmament, a working paper on the issue concerning a possible legal agreement.
That paper was gaining increasing attention worldwide, he said. A preferred venue for further work on such an agreement was the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament. His country had taken the necessary steps to begin such work and to get the Conference out of its current deadlock. Its proposal to establish a moratorium on the deployment in outer space of means of combat, pending a relevant agreement, was also valid. Efforts to ensure the predictability of the situation in outer space could be facilitated, if the “outer space powers” provided the international community with information concerning forthcoming launches of outer space objects and their purpose, which Russia had been doing since 2003.
He said the Chemical Weapons Convention was an effective instrument for preventing the proliferation of those deadly weapons and reducing the risk of toxic chemicals being used as a means of terror. The best way to prevent leakage of chemical weapons was to eliminate them. Russia had started elimination of its stocks at the facility at Gorny, which had come into operation this year. Universal adherence to the Convention remained an urgent task and welcomed ratification by Afghanistan. On missiles, he reconfirmed Russia’s initiative concerning a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies, which were aimed at creating a global regime of missile non-proliferation. He supported the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, but that was only a first step towards elaboration of a legally binding multilateral agreement on such a regime.
PETER TESCH (Australia) said the spread of weapons of mass destruction represented the most serious threat to international security. That threat was not new, but the demand for the technology required for producing such weapons was growing. In that context, he expressed concern about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT, and the dubious nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. In order to properly address such menaces, the international community had to send an unambiguous message that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would not be tolerated.
Entreating all States parties to non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament treaties to respect and fortify verification mechanisms, he advanced the idea that acceptance of the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system should become an essential prerequisite for nuclear supply. He also drew special attention to the Biological Weapons Convention, which needed to be reinforced. Regarding the Hague Code of Conduct, which was dedicated to preventing ballistic missile proliferation, he expressed satisfaction that 109 States had subscribed to it. Nevertheless, he noted with concern that so few of those States belonged to the region of South-East Asia.
In order to combat weapons of mass destruction, he said the international community should make better use of existing tools. However, the existing regime that dealt with such weapons was not, by itself, sufficient. For that reason, his Government had joined the Proliferation Security Initiative. The interdiction principles agreed upon by members of that initiative complemented existing non-proliferation regimes, were entirely consistent with international law, and deserved the support of the global community.
MARTIN ANDJABA (Namibia) said that international peace and security faced profound challenges in the form of both nuclear and conventional weapons. While most of the non-nuclear-weapon States continued to meet their obligations under multilateral Treaties, such as the NPT, nuclear-weapon and other key States were unwilling to implement their obligations, and some had even refused to sign and ratify those instruments. Instead, they continued to perfect both conventional arms and nuclear weapons, ostensibly to meet new threats, in the name of national security. The need for serious nuclear disarmament was being undermined by those claims, which provided a clear invitation to other States to acquire nuclear weapons under the same pretext.
He said that the security to which everyone was entitled could only be achieved by complete disarmament. With the end of the cold war, there was no justification for some States to claim that exclusive right to possess those weapons indefinitely. Nuclear-weapon States repeatedly reminded other States not to acquire those weapons. If their demands were to be taken seriously, then they should demonstrate concretely their willingness to eliminate their nuclear weapons, within the shortest possible time frame. If the provisions of the NPT were to be respected, all States parties must be held equally accountable when they failed to comply with their respective obligations. It seemed that those who possessed nuclear weapons were preoccupied with preventing other countries from acquiring them, and not with talks aimed at eliminating those weapons under strict and effective control.
In that process, he said that nuclear weapons had become a means of exerting pressure on and “blackmailing” countries that did not have them. What nuclear-weapon States forgot was the fact that such behaviour fostered proliferation. So long as those weapons existed, nuclear terrorism and all its ramifications needed to be confronted. The only safe and effective way to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction was to completely eliminate them. Transparency in armaments and military expenditures was essential to minimize the risk of an arms race and armed conflicts between and among nations. He supported the expansion of the Register of Conventional Arms to include mass destruction weapons. He also called for a speedy implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms.
AMINA MOHAMED (Kenya) said that, in light of the two major terrorist attacks that had taken place in her country in 1998 and 2002, her Government was only too aware of the fact that global security was interconnected. In that context, she said that no country could address the multitude of security challenges in today’s world by itself. What were needed instead, were collective solutions in the field of disarmament and greater support for multilateral, legally binding, and verifiable arms control treaties. Referring to the bombing of the United Nations office in Iraq last August, she stressed that terrorism needed to be stopped.
Turning to her region, she said terrorism was exacerbated by the easy availability of small arms and light weapons. In that regard, she supported the idea of international assistance to help States implement the Programme of Action adopted at Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held in July 2001. For its part, her Government had hosted the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Conference on that issue. She told delegates that the Conference had been unique, since it had brought together countries that were, at the time, still involved in conflicts with each other. Keeping with the theme of small arms, she also called for reducing the number in circulation, discouraging their likely use in criminal practices, and improving the monitoring of transfers.
Regarding nuclear weapons, she supported the CTBT and urged those States that had not yet done so to unconditionally sign and ratify it. She also called on nuclear-weapon States to cooperate in any way possible to prevent the acquisition of such weapons by terrorists. With respect to the NPT, she reiterated its position as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and insisted that States adhere to it. She added that the IAEA’s international safeguards system must be promoted and strengthened. Before concluding, she offered a quote from former United States President Abraham Lincoln -– “I am a slow walker, but I never walk back” -– as a mantra for international disarmament.
STAFFORD NEIL (Jamaica) said that the goal of general and complete disarmament, including the elimination of mass destruction weapons, was a longstanding priority, yet efforts to achieve that objective had been less than encouraging, particularly over the past year. There had been evidence of a gradual weakening of the existing legal regime governing international disarmament, exacerbated, in part, on a reliance to resort to actions, which fell outside the ambit of the principles of collective security. That had led to situations where the “will of the many has been overcome by the might of the few”, thus threatening a global, collective approach to disarmament.
He said he shared the Secretary-General’s concern that the global disarmament norms should be strengthened. That must be based on adherence to multilateral principles and in an atmosphere of confidence, compliance and trust. He agreed with the need for decisive international action to deal with such trends as the possible access by non-State actors to mass destruction weapons, but urged that the search for solutions be based within a collective, non-discriminatory and transparent framework. Steadily increasing arms expenditures were of serious concern. While a few large spenders accounted for most of that expenditure, many other countries had deemed it necessary to increase spending in response to perceived internal or external security threats. Increased militarization increased the likelihood of a military response as a first option to the resolution of conflicts, and did little to enhance security and ensure a lasting peace.
Regarding the IAEA’s Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, he said his country signed it on 19 March. It also fully supported the aims of the NPT and attached particular importance to adherence to the Article VI obligations, concerning nuclear disarmament. It also supported full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. He thanked the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which had provided technical assistance to Jamaica, in order to allow for its effective implementation of the Convention. He urged early adherence to the CTBT. At the same time, he regretted the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. It might be appropriate for a review of its working methods and decision-making process.
SYLVESTER EKUNDAYO ROWE (Sierra Leone) said the current situation vis-à-vis international disarmament was rather discouraging, especially given the poor performances of the Conference on Disarmament and Disarmament Commission. Rather than focusing on the causes for the current stalemates, however, it was time to ask how delegations could surmount the impasse and move forward. After all, disarmament was not a game of chess, but rather a vital shield against self-destruction and total annihilation.
Addressing the NPT, he stressed that the perception of that treaty being solely directed at non-nuclear-weapon, and potential nuclear-weapon States, must be erased. Instead of only focusing on the attempts of certain States to acquire nuclear weapons, he maintained that the obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear Powers had to remain at the forefront. After all, the nuclear-weapon States had done little to diminish the symbolic importance of such weapons, and not enough to reduce their arsenals.
Acknowledging that the global community must seriously address non-compliance with international treaties, he maintained that it was necessary to find the most appropriate means of promoting universality. After all, it was not necessarily helpful to “use the big stick” against a few States parties who had already acceded to the treaties, while ignoring other States who had never joined in the first place. In that context, he stressed that failure to achieve universality for the NPT and CTBT only served to undermine those treaties and threaten international peace and security.
MICHAEL KAFANDO (Burkina Faso) said that in many debates it had become perfectly clear that peace and international security constituted the “alpha and the omega”-- in fact, the ultimate goal -- of all actions of the international community. No human action could be successful in a hostile environment or an atmosphere of insecurity or conflict. The balance of terror of the cold war had revealed the extreme vulnerability of human societies, indeed, of the danger of the arms race. Even the end of the cold war had been unable to dissipate that threat. Rather, it seemed to have exacerbated it by increased expenditure for weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of small and light calibre weapons.
He said that the emergence of global terrorism was of special concern. After the denunciation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), and the resulting lack of progress in the reduction of nuclear arsenals by the Russian Federation and the United States under the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), the Conference on Disarmament had become powerless. For five years, it had been unable to adopt its work programme as the foundation for an in-depth debate. Also, the CTBT was far from having the necessary ratifications for its entry into force. As for the NPT, the 2005 Review Conference would present a picture of its true “state of health”, although the measures emerging from the 2000 session had not been realized.
The situation was similarly disappointing in the conventional weapons sphere, he said. The conclusion of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines had raised immense hope for the populations of many developing nations, particularly those involved in armed conflict or emerging from it. Despite that effort, however, thousands of people around the world continued to be victimized by those weapons. In January 2004, Burkina Faso would host a subregional workshop on the universalization of the Ottawa Convention, which would make it possible for States parties to work towards its implementation, aimed at the goal of zero mines in West Africa. It would also make it possible to reach agreements on preparations for the first review conference of the Ottawa Convention, planned for 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya.
MARIO CASTELLON DUARTE (Nicaragua) expressed concern about the decrease of multilateralism in the area of disarmament. Stressing that it could never be replaced by unilateralism, he did, however, acknowledge the helpful role of bilateral agreements. Other developments in the field of disarmament worried him as well. For example, the stalling of the Conference of Disarmament, the failure of the CTBT to go into effect, and the fact that the NPT was being challenged by the stubbornness of some States, were all causes for concern.
Turning to landmines, he said that, as a result of his country’s civil war, they had been indiscriminately planted throughout the land. Complicating the situation was the fact that Hurricane Mitch, in 1998, had scattered them far and wide. He told delegates that mine-clearing procedures were currently underway. Nevertheless, a lack of helicopters for evacuation, the challenging topography, and the fact that the guerrillas who planted the mines had not always kept records of their locations, were not making things any easier. One positive development, however, was the gaining of demining expertise in his country. Declaring that his Government would send 40 deminers to Iraq, he said that in that manner, Nicaragua would pay back the humanitarian assistance it had received throughout its history.
He then highlighted a proposal that his President had put forth at a meeting of Central American Presidents, held last July. The proposal, which had been approved, outlined a programme that would institute confidence-building measures and harmonize arms control policies in the subregion. The programme also allowed for the modernization of Central America’s armed forces, in order to better equip them to handle terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. In conclusion, he told delegates that, by updating defence and security mechanisms, the peaceful solution of Central American disputes would be encouraged.
ANATOLIY SCHERBA (Ukraine) said that alarming signs in the field of nuclear non-proliferation dictated an urgent need to strengthen the NPT, as the bedrock of the global non-proliferation efforts. He emphasized the need of adherence, by all States parties, to the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Progress in that regard was falling far short of what was desired. Calling for restraint in conducting nuclear tests, he said his country, as a full-fledged party to the CTBT, urged the States that still remained outside of it to ratify or accede to it at an early date.
He said that the uncertain security environment increased the need to strengthen the IAEA’s capacity to verify declared nuclear activities, and especially to detect and deter clandestine nuclear activities. That could be accomplished only through faithful and universal application of its comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Ukraine’s preparatory activities for the ratification of the Protocol, which it signed in 2000, were underway. Legally binding security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear capabilities. He strongly urged nuclear-weapon States to review relevant policies and confirm the validity of the decisions made at the past NPT review conferences.
The nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation processes were closely linked. Positive trends in the field of nuclear weapons reduction contributed substantially to strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, and vice versa. That was why Ukraine, after giving up its nuclear arsenal, remained committed to attaining the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. He supported the activities of the New Agenda Coalition, and he welcomed efforts to bring the Moscow Treaty into force. That should pave the way for attaining the NPT disarmament goals. On 30 October 2001, Ukraine fulfilled its obligations under the first stage of START I, by destroying the last silo for the SS-24 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). It continued to carry out its START I commitments, despite difficulties with regard to receiving assistance in the liquidation of the loaded motor cases of SS-24 ICBMs.
JOHAN LOVALD (Norway) said that, given the fact that terrorists were taking advantage of weak and failed States and using them as launching pads for terrorist attacks, the international community needed to offer an adequate multilateral response to such new challenges. Such a response should entail universal adherence and compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. In that regard, he called for the strengthening of such treaties’ enforcement provisions. He also stressed that any nation seeking nuclear technology, such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran, must respect IAEA safeguards.
Noting that conventional weapons were sometimes described as “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion”, he told delegates that such arms were responsible for millions of deaths and injuries throughout the world. Therefore, it was necessary to fortify the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons with a new legally binding protocol on explosive remnants of war, as well as one, dealing with the humanitarian challenges posed by anti-vehicle mines. For its part, his Government had supported efforts to establish a new tracing and marking instrument, devoted considerable resources to combating the illicit brokering of small arms, and taken the lead in establishing the landmine-related Resource Mobilization Contact Group.
Turning to the work of the Committee, he said the current format of the general debate prevented delegates from addressing key security matters. After all, the agenda was crowded with items that required action, but were often forgotten soon after their related resolutions were adopted. For that reason, he announced that he was circulating a non-paper, containing suggestions on how to streamline the Committee’s work. Specifically, the paper called for fewer resolutions, better time management, and more integrated thematic discussions.
HJALMAR W. HANNESSON (Iceland) urged the Committee to look closely at ways of improving the tools at its disposal. It should consider a reduction of its agenda items and resolutions in favour of a more focused thematic debate on strengthening the multilateral approach to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Failure to do so in a timely manner risked its marginalization in today’s fast moving and dynamic security environment. A key element in the multilateral effort to slow the terrifying expansion of weapons of mass destruction was the NPT. He congratulated two new parties, Cuba and Timor-Leste, and called on India and Pakistan to meet all requirements set out in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), which condemned their nuclear tests.
He said that key to full compliance by all States with the NPT was transparency and the willingness of States with nuclear capabilities to take action to allay the concerns of other States. Iceland aligned itself with those who had expressed concern over the decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to revoke the NPT and to restart its nuclear weapons programme. In that context, he encouraged the Iranian authorities to fully comply with the IAEA’s requirements.
The risk of major environmental damage from possible nuclear dumping was of particular concern to Icelanders, whose livelihood was based largely on the resources of the sea, he said. He reiterated the importance of the Assembly’s resolution (56/24 L) of 29 November 2001 on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes. That item had again been included in the Committee’s agenda. It was not enough to avoid the destruction inflicted by nuclear war; it must also be ensured that appropriate measures were taken to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, which gradually, through carelessness or criminal activity, wreaked terrible destruction.
WOLFGANG HOFFMAN, Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization (CTBTO), reporting on the activities of the Preparatory Commission, said that when the CTBT was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 1996, everyone was aware that its success would depend on two crucial factors -- its universality and its verifiability. On both counts, substantial progress had been made. The Treaty had so far been signed by 169 States and ratified by 105. Thirty-two of those ratifications were by Annex 2 States, or the 44 States listed in the Treaty whose ratification was required for entry into force. The level and pace of signatures and ratifications indicated the firm support of the international community for the Treaty.
He noted that the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, which was held in Vienna, Austria last month, agreed on concrete measures to promote signatures and ratifications. It demonstrated the commitment of States to bring about the Treaty’s operation and to uphold existing testing moratoriums until then, and it provided new momentum to the common quest for a universal and verifiable Treaty. The Preparatory Commission, which was established six years ago, had, as its main activity, the establishment of the verification regime to monitor Treaty compliance. That global verification regime needed to be operational upon the Treaty’s entry into force. It would be capable of detecting nuclear explosions underground, in water and in the atmosphere.
He said that the verification regime comprised four elements: The International Monitoring System (IMS), with the International Data Centre; a mechanism to address non-compliance; the right of States parties to request on-site inspection to determine whether a nuclear-weapon test had been conducted in violation of the Treaty; and confidence-building measures. The IMS consisted of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories, which monitored the earth for evidence of a nuclear explosion. A Global Communication Infrastructure carried the seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide data from IMS facilities to the International Data Centre. That global satellite communications network was also used to distribute data and reports relevant to Treaty verification.
While the primary purpose of the CTBT verification regime was to verify compliance, the CTBT verification technologies, data from the IMS and the International Data Centre could offer a range of useful civil and scientific applications for sustainable development and the betterment of human welfare. Seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound data could be used in studies of the earth’s structure and for research on earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunami warnings, among other things. On 15 June 2000, the General Assembly adopted the agreement to regulate the relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission. Under that agreement, links with the United Nations and its programmes and specialized agencies were developing even further.
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