ANACHRONISTIC, COLD WAR-ERA THINKING IMPEDES DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD, AS GENERAL DEBATE CONTINUES

Fifty-eighth General Assembly

First Committee

3^rd Meeting (AM)

ANACHRONISTIC, COLD WAR-ERA THINKING IMPEDES DISARMAMENT EFFORTS,

FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD, AS GENERAL DEBATE CONTINUES

Disarmament had seen years of “disappointing drift and growing irrelevance”, with too many nations still orienting themselves by the anachronistic coordinates of past cold war-era thinking, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) was told this morning, as it continued its general debate.

Urging the First Committee to become, once again, an effective multilateral forum, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen Rademaker, said that the old direction had made it nearly impossible to deal with a given arms control or disarmament issue without facing demands that other unrelated subjects be dealt with on an equal basis and at the same time.  Some believed that the objective of consensus was to ensure that all proposals had equal weight, or were made to be equally acceptable.  That kind of thinking proved itself repeatedly during the cold war and beyond to be a “recipe for inaction and failure”.

In various relevant forums, the United States had raised its concerns about non-compliance and had “named names”, he said.  It had also consistently urged the Security Council to act on last February’s referral by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors of the violation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and it had been disappointed with the Council’s failure to act on that matter.  The United States was also working with the IAEA Board to support thorough inspections, given the mass of the IAEA’s evidence against Iran that showed it to be in violation of its Safeguards Agreement, and working hard to cover up that “pattern of covert non-compliance”.

Algeria’s representative told the Committee that only the total abandonment of nuclear weapons would counter the prevailing “obsolete and anachronistic” theories.  Maintaining a nuclear deterrent, as the best way of depriving one’s adversary from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, was groping for a pretext to preserve nuclear weapons indefinitely and put off their final elimination.  Although major global changes over the last decade should have boded well for the abandonment of nuclear arms as a security guarantee, it now seemed that those arms were here to stay.  Never had they been so prized and deified.  Indeed, keeping alive the concept of a nuclear deterrent, far from promoting disarmament, had only encouraged some countries to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Chinese representative, acknowledging that nuclear-weapon States had special responsibilities, urged that the role of such weapons should be reduced in international political and military affairs.  He condemned the emerging trend of developing new types of nuclear weapons, as well as the refusal by any nuclear-weapon-State to commit, in a legally binding manner, to not use or threaten to use those weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.  On 4 August, he noted one person had been killed and 43 injured in a leak from chemical weapons abandoned in China by Japan.  That tragic incident illustrated, once again, the urgency of the early and complete elimination of those weapons by Japan, under its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations.

The Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Rogelio Pfirter, said that destroying chemical weapons was an extremely complex and costly operation, yet the “chemical weapons front” seemed to have found common ground, and verification activities continued at a brisk pace.  No one would say that the mission had been accomplished, but widespread support had provided the strength and impetus to accomplish the demanding tasks set forth in the Convention.  Possessor States, which now numbered five, including Albania, continued to destroy their chemical weapons stocks, and India, the United States and another State party had met their obligations to destroy 20 per cent of their declared stocks.  After initial delays, the destruction programme in the Russian Federation was proceeding in accordance with deadline extensions, and by April that country had completed the destruction of one percent of its stockpiles.

Statements in the general debate were also made by the representatives of Malaysia, Japan, Republic of Korea, United Arab Emirates, Uganda, Romania, and Madagascar.  The representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Wednesday, 8 October.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general debate on the whole range of arms limitation and security arrangements.

Statements

RAFTAM MOHD ISA (Malaysia) said 2003 was a significant year in disarmament terms because it marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.  However, that was no cause for celebration, since so little had been achieved.  In that context, he referred to the United States’ war against Iraq, which had failed to uncover the alleged weapons of mass destruction; the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and the dismal performances of the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.

To counter the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, he suggested the building of mutual trust between States, and he stressed that such trust could only be achieved if States actually adhered to the treaties and conventions to which they were parties.  There was no room for selectivity and double standards.  Acknowledging that all States agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a serious threat to humanity, he emphasized that there was no such thing as “good proliferation.”  Recognizing that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had a verification mechanism at its disposal, he stated that political will was required to ensure that such mechanisms worked properly.

Turning to his region, he expressed its commitment to nuclear disarmament, and told delegates that his country would continue negotiations within the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone there.  After all, international peace and security could not advance without progress in the field of disarmament.  He also stressed that it was important for favourable conditions to exist, in order for States to follow the provisions of the United Nations Charter and actively work towards disarmament.  In that regard, an international commitment to multilateralism was essential.  Addressing the recent talk of revitalizing the General Assembly, he said the First Committee should also be energized.

STEPHEN RADEMAKER, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, said that the First Committee must shape itself into an effective multilateral body –- one that was relevant to the security threats of today and of the future, and that could meaningfully enhance international peace and security.  In order to do so, members must be prepared to make some hard choices regarding the agenda and the way in which they did business.  The session was taking place at a crossroads for multilateral arms control.  In one direction lay the old cold war-era thinking that had paralysed achievable and practical progress in the disarmament field for far too long.

He said that in today’s dangerous times too many nations still oriented themselves by the anachronistic coordinates of the past.  The results had been years of “disappointing drift and growing irrelevance”.  In seeking to address today’s challenges, too many nations continued to rely on the machinery endorsed a quarter of a century ago by the first special session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, with no consideration of how to adapt that machinery to address new and emerging threats.

The old direction had also led to impasses and deadlocks, which had become routine in some multilateral arms control forums, he said.  It had become nearly impossible to deal with a given arms control or disarmament issue without facing demands that other unrelated subjects be dealt with on an equal basis and at the same time.  Recently, the Conference on Disarmament showed signs that its work programme stalemate could be lifted.  That was encouraging.  Obviously, seven years of inactivity there had wrought damage to the reputation of the Conference. 

He said that some believed that the objective of consensus was to ensure that all proposals had equal weight, or were made to be equally acceptable.  That kind of thinking proved itself repeatedly during the cold war and beyond to be a “recipe for inaction and failure”, as subjects that did not enjoy consensus simply should not, and could not, be given equal standing, let alone priority over subjects that did enjoy consensus.  Attention should be paid to those issues that could command consensus now.  Both of those factors, cold war thinking and linkages to non-consensus items, contributed to the failure of the Disarmament Commission last spring to reach consensus on either of its two agenda items. 

Now more than ever, as the world faced the many new challenges to international peace and security, the question was whether the United Nations and the international disarmament machinery could still make a contribution, or whether it would be left behind.  “We must work to ensure that this Committee takes the road less travelled and becomes, once again, an effective multilateral forum”, he said.  The United States did not believe in multilateralism for its own sake.  Rather, it was committed to an effective multilateralism properly targeted at today’s security threats, contributing in real ways to enhancing international security, and free of political linkages or outmoded cold war icons.

Listing a few examples of the continued commitment of the United States to effective multilateralism in the field of arms control and non-proliferation, he sited support for efforts to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); its own meeting of obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which concerns nuclear disarmament; its leadership to pursue alternative approaches to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention; its very active role in efforts to ensure effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; its active participation in the 2003 Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; and a leading role in meetings to subject anti-vehicle landmines to the same restrictions as anti-personnel landmines.

He said that, in various relevant forums, the United States had raised its concerns about non-compliance and had “named names”.  It had consistently urged the Security Council to act on last February’s referral by the IAEA Board of Governors of North Korea’s violation of the NPT, and it had been disappointed with the Council’s failure to act on that matter.  It was also working with members of the IAEA Board to support thorough inspections that addressed the many serious outstanding questions regarding the scope and nature of Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities. 

Continuing, he said that the mass of evidence arrayed against Iran in the IAEA Director General’s past two reports led to the “unequivocal conclusion” that Iran was in violation of its Safeguards Agreement and was working hard to cover up that “pattern of covert non-compliance”, he said.  In September, the Board gave Iran a final opportunity to redress its behaviour before its non-compliance was reported to the Security Council.  The Board found that it was “essential and urgent” for Iran to remedy its failure and fully cooperate with the IAEA by the end of the month.  No one should doubt that it was hard cases, such as North Korea and Iran, which would ultimately determine the degree to which multilateralism would remain relevant to the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Terrorists and non-State actors seeking access to weapons of mass destruction, as well as the sponsors of such terrorism, was the other paramount threat to global security.  Unfortunately, no civilized nation was immune from the barbarity of terrorism.  Those who would direct attacks against innocent civilians with conventional weapons should be assumed to be equally willing to commit atrocities with weapons of mass destruction –- a prospect that convinced the United States that that problem must be challenged on every front and defeated in an effective, hopefully multilateral way.  The international community had no time to spare and no margin for error in that endeavour. 

HU XIAODI (China) said that with the development of globalization, security concerns were beginning to transcend borders.  Also, in addition to traditional security-related problems, such as conflicts based on territory, resources, and ethnic issues, there had been a recent surge in non-traditional problems, like global terrorism and transnational crime.  In such a context, international cooperation was more important than ever.  Nevertheless, it was crucial to refrain from imposing one culture’s standards on the entire world.  After all, excluding certain countries from the international community was never a helpful practice.

Declaring that international law had evolved to encompass a series of global norms, which addressed disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation, respect for national sovereignty, and the right of self-defence, he stressed that the rule of law should be the cornerstone of international relations.  After all, undermining international legal systems would only jeopardize global stability.  In that regard, he also stressed that multilateralism should be promoted as the best way to combat non-traditional security challenges.

Regarding weapons of mass destruction, he said that in order to create an environment better suited for non-proliferation, the legitimate security concerns of States should be respected and accommodated.  Second, non-peaceful solutions to proliferation problems were self-defeating.  Diplomatic and political efforts therefore, should be employed to advance peaceful responses to such dilemmas, he said.  Third, discrimination and double standards should be eliminated, in order to ensure universal participation in disarmament regimes.  Fourth, the legitimate right of all countries to peacefully use science and technology should be guaranteed.

Acknowledging that nuclear-weapon States had special responsibilities, he stated that the role of such weapons should be reduced in international political and military affairs.  In that context, he condemned the trend of developing new types of nuclear weapons and any refusal to commit, in a legally binding manner, to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.  Keeping with the theme of nuclear weapons, he also expressed support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Turning to chemical weapons, he highlighted the fact that Chinese citizens had recently suffered at the hands of such weapons, which had been abandoned in the country by Japan.  In that regard, he expressed hope that Japan would respect its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and intensify its efforts to remove that threat from China.  With respect to military reductions, he announced that his country would reduce its armed forces by 200,000 personnel by the year 2005.  That was in addition to its present reduction of 500,000 troops.  Such moves demonstrated his Government’s commitment to peace.

ABDALLAH BAALI (Algeria) said that the disarmament process today revealed some signs of exhaustion, with a particularly bleak outlook.  Major changes on the international scene over the last decade should have boded well for the abandonment of nuclear arms as a guarantee of security.  It seemed today that those weapons were here to stay.  Indeed, never had they been so prized and deified, and never had it been so clearly asserted that their value was measured on the basis of those who possessed them, rather than on their destructive capacities.  Nuclear weapons were bad, whoever possessed them.  It was absurd to think that it was good when nuclear weapons were held by certain countries, and bad when held by others. 

He said that humankind could not allow the world to be constantly divided between nuclear and non-nuclear countries.  Keeping alive the concept of a nuclear deterrent, far from promoting disarmament, had only encouraged some countries to acquire nuclear weapons.  That cold war legacy was essentially an obstacle to disarmament.  Maintaining a nuclear deterrent, as the best way of depriving one’s adversary from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, was groping for a pretext to preserve nuclear weapons indefinitely and put off their final elimination.  Only total abandonment of those arms would counter those “obsolete and anachronistic” theories. 

The emergence of new concepts, based on unilateralist and discriminatory logic and selective reasoning, might seriously destabilize the NPT, whose obligations related both to vertical and horizontal proliferation, as well as to nuclear disarmament, he continued.  It could accelerate the arms race.  Security could not be the privilege of some, to the detriment of others.  The objectives of nuclear disarmament must be reinstated.  That inevitably meant that commitments already entered into must be scrupulously implemented, in order to pave the way for treaties calling for the total elimination of those weapons.  Likewise, non-nuclear States also had obligations, starting with not to acquire nuclear weapons.  That obligation should not be shirked under any circumstances. 

The convening of a fourth special session devoted to disarmament, a United Nations conference on nuclear dangers, and the renewal of the Conference on Disarmament were best forums in which to resolve the global dimension of the nuclear disarmament problem.  Those forums must not be allowed to remain in a constant state of deadlock.  Unilateral and bilateral initiatives, however necessary and useful, should be used to buttress multilateral efforts, and not to replace them.  Further, respect for the principle of irreversibility would give even more relevance to those initiatives.  The CTBT should be both universal and operational.  Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was another considerable contribution to international peace and security.

In that regard, he said he was gravely concerned about the absence of a programme for such a zone in the Middle East.  That objective had not been achieved, because of Israel’s refusal to eliminate its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.  For its part, Algeria, on 18 July ratified the CTBT.  It had also decided to destroy, by next November, part of its stocks of anti-personnel mines, as part of discharging its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention). 

KUNIKO INOGUCHI (Japan) said disarmament was a major pillar in ensuring international stability.  And today, in light of the development of weapons of mass destruction and the increasing threat of terrorism, addressing disarmament was more important than ever.  In that context, she referred to the recent bombing of the United Nations office in Baghdad.  She also expressed concern about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s decision to withdraw from the NPT.  Urging that country to immediately dismantle its nuclear programme in a transparent, verifiable manner, she, nevertheless, emphasized that the issue should only be resolved peacefully and diplomatically.  She also called upon Iran to fully comply with all measures prescribed by the IAEA.

Given the growing possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists, international cooperation was extremely necessary, she said.  Coming from the only country that had experienced nuclear devastation, she told delegates that Japan subscribed to the “three non-nuclear principles” –- namely, no possession, no production, and no presence on its national territory of such weapons.  Regarding the CTBT, she urged all States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, to do so as soon as possible.  She also highlighted her country’s efforts to advance the Treaty’s entry into force.  For example, it had provided assistance in verification technology to developing countries.  She also declared that, with respect to the NPT, it was important to promote universality and compliance.

Turning to disarmament and non-proliferation education, she said her country had hosted around 450 participants in the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme over the past 20 years.  Including visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Programme enabled young diplomats to gain a deeper understanding of the issues at hand.  Having expressed her country’s fervent support for the Programme, her enthusiasm waned when she addressed the failure of the Conference of Disarmament to enter into negotiations.  Such a stalemate was truly regrettable, she said.  Before concluding, she stressed that in post-conflict societies, it was important to consider how the concept of reconciliation could be embedded into the process of reconstruction, and how the design of disarmament programmes could enhance such societies’ return to normalcy.

ABDULAZIZ NASSER AL-SHAMSI (United Arab Emirates) said that, while the First Committee was meeting, the world was witnessing the continued development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.  Additionally, many non-nuclear-weapon States, especially in South Asia, the Korean peninsula, and the Arab Gulf, were espousing their own theories of deterrence and engaging in declared and undeclared arms races, despite international agreements.  Additional challenges included drug trafficking, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and organized transnational crime.  In the context of the Middle East, he expressed disappointment that the “obstinate position” of Israel was preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

The significant and unprecedented increase in countries’ military expenditures reflected the state of pessimism, tension, and insecurity among States throughout the world, he said.  In addition to increased weaponry, such uses of national funds also reduced the resources that were being allocated to combat poverty, pestilence, and environmental degradation.  In that context, he called for a new binding global strategy, based on international law, which would enhance inter-State cooperation in the fight against such problems.

Such a strategy would encompass four parts.  First, nuclear-weapon States would be urged to fully comply with their legal and moral commitments, as laid out in the treaties and protocols that deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  Second, non-nuclear-weapon States, which were attempting to acquire such weapons, would be required to review their policies, act with more self-control, and solve regional disputes through peaceful means.  Third, efforts to strengthen international instruments, which would ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and guarantee their access to modern technology, would be put forth.  And finally, the Conference on Disarmament would establish specialized committees to follow up on the destruction of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. 

CHARLES W.G. WAGABA (Uganda) said that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as the arms of choice in the numerous conflicts in Africa, was a real and present threat to peace and security, not only in Africa, but also in the world as a whole.  The ease with which those arms were procured, transported and distributed had fuelled conflicts between and within States.  In the Great Lakes region, positive developments had been achieved through regional efforts to resolve the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and southern Sudan.  The potential peace dividend should not be lost through the illegal use of the vast arsenal of small arms.

He welcomed the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, which was before the Committee.  He stood ready to support all positive proposals aimed at elaborating an international instrument on the tracing and control of those weapons.  He also welcomed the successful conclusion of the United Nations first biennial meeting of States to consider the implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action on small arms.  Terrorism, one of the vilest scourges of the times, had added a new and urgent dimension to the need for an elaborate disarmament and arms control regime.  Acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists would bring the world to a deadly and terrifying precipice.

MIHNEA MOTOC (Romania) said international security and stability were presently being threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.  The events of 11 September had shown the world that more urgency and greater effort were required from the international community to ensure that such weapons did not fall into the hands of terrorists.  Nevertheless, there was no “one-size-fits-all” policy to counter that threat.  Each case had to be examined individually, and a variety of international tools needed to be employed, he said.

Declaring that the Security Council was responsible for maintaining global peace and security, he advised that body to broaden its definition of situations considered threatening, so that the world would be able to respond more quickly and effectively to situations concerning weapons of mass destruction. He also stated that States, in order to adequately protect themselves, should enact stricter national export control legislation and work harder to physically guard nuclear and radioactive materials.

Turning to small arms and light weapons, he said that despite some progress, there were many issues that still needed to be discussed and agreed upon.  Specifically, he called for stronger export controls, greater advances in marking and tracing, and more transparency with respect to arms transfers.  He also expressed his strong commitment to the Ottawa Convention.  In that context, he called on States parties to respect the strict deadlines that had been set forth by the Convention for the destruction of stockpiles and the clearance of mine-riddled areas.

ANGELINE MOHAJY (Madagascar) reaffirmed her commitment to multilateralism as the best method to achieve global disarmament.  In that context, she also stressed the central role of the United Nations in managing the world’s problems and promoting international peace and security.  Unfortunately, the end of the cold war, despite carrying with it a refreshing sense of hope, had failed to adequately promote multilateralism and international cooperation, she said.

Expressing regret that the Conference on Disarmament continued to be locked in a stalemate and unable to discuss substantive issues, she also criticized States that were refusing to adhere to treaties or withdrawing from international instruments.  Despite those letdowns, however, she lauded the Ottawa Convention and insisted that such initiatives must be encouraged.

Non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction were central issues in the field of disarmament, she said.  In that context, regional mechanisms, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, must be supported and complied with.  Turning to small arms and light weapons, she expressed the grave danger they presented.  In that regard, she stressed the importance of transparency with respect to the sources and destinations involved in arm trafficking.

ROGELIO PFIRTER, Director-General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), said the Organization was facing important challenges to the delivery of its core mission, namely verification of the chemical weapons ban.  In April, it had held its First Review Conference on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force on 29 April 1997.  Together with the political declaration, the Conference produced a second and more detailed document of outcomes and objectives, including the decision by Member States to prepare two separate plans of action –- one on universality, and the other on national implementation of the Convention.

He said that the “chemical weapons front” seemed to have found common ground and a firm consensus, and verification activities continued at a brisk pace.  No one would say, however, that the mission had been accomplished, but the widespread support had provided the strength and impetus to accomplish the demanding tasks set forth in the Convention.  Possessor States, which now numbered five, including Albania, had continued to destroy their chemical weapon stocks.  As at first September, almost 8,000 metric tonnes of chemical agents, as well as nearly two million munitions had been confirmed destroyed under OPCW verification.  India, the United States and another State party had met their obligations to destroy   20 per cent of their declared stocks.

After initial delays, he said, the destruction programme in the Russian Federation was proceeding in accordance with deadline extensions.  By April, that country had completed the destruction of 1 per cent of its stockpiles, and its campaign continued.  Destroying chemical weapons was an extremely complex and costly operation.  Billions were spent by possessor States parties on that obscure, but necessary task and by non-possessor States that had lent their support to destruction efforts.  Despite delays and difficulties, possessor States were firmly committed to destroying their stockpiles within the established time frames.  In the United States some delays were to be expected, but it had demonstrated enormous determination to get the job done through the allocation of financial and technical resources.

It would make little sense to destroy existing chemical weapons without an efficient scheme to prevent “would-be proliferators” from circumventing the will of the international community by developing new weapons, he said.  Despite progress, which had included 1,600 inspections and collaboration with national authorities, more must be done to ensure that the verification regime remained a credible deterrent.  The chemical industry was an important link in the chain of chemical disarmament and must not be overlooked.  Also, to be truly successful, the Convention must strive for universality.  Finally, the risk that terrorist might gain access to weapons of mass destruction required concrete actions by States and international organizations. 

Rights of Reply

Exercising his right of reply, the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea said Japan’s hostile policy towards his country was dangerous and aimed at a military clash.  Japan’s concern about its security was of its own making, and the solution lay in aborting its hostile policy.  Its policy of stifling the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was now becoming more pronounced.  Consequently, relations between the two countries were “inching close” to a clash.  Moreover, the fate of the Pyongyang Declaration -- in which both countries confirmed, in the context of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, that they would comply with all related agreements -- had been threatened by Japan’s recklessly hostile policy towards his country. 

The security issue could never be solved by accelerating an arms build-up under the pretext of a threat from elsewhere, he said.  If Japan truly wanted security and a peaceful atmosphere, it should stop cooperating with the United States in its efforts to antagonize and stifle the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and opt for redressing its behaviour and improving relations with his country. 

The representative of Japan said she was bewildered by those comments.  There were many things she would like North Korea to recall.  For instance, it was the initiative of the Japanese Prime Minister to make a courageous visit to Pyongyang a year ago, and to engage himself in very important, substantive talks with his counterpart in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  It was very unfair of that country’s representative, and she hoped he had not meant what he said about Japan upholding a hostile policy towards North Korea.  If that were so, her Prime Minister would never have visited North Korea in such a cooperative spirit. 

She said her country was committed to solving all its bilateral problems and nuclear proliferation issues in a peaceful, diplomatic, constructive, substantive, and meaningful way.  It was not Japan’s position to hold any hostile policies against North Korea.  It had repeatedly committed itself to engaging in constructive, peaceful efforts to solve the problems, and she had not accepted the allegations.  Japan had “concerns”, and it had expressed them and committed itself to addressing them.  But, it was not Japan’s position to hold hostile policies against North Korea. 

Japan was cooperating with the United States, with a view to resolving outstanding regional concerns peacefully and constructively, she said.          She believed her country had the commitment of all members of the six-party talks, as well as the support of the entire international community, to solve all outstanding issues in north-east Asia in a most peaceful manner.  She was sure the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea agreed that all outstanding issues should be solved peacefully.  It was not in the spirit of the United Nations to engage in a hostile exchange of words, she said.

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said the master key for Japan to settle its unhappy past was to respect the Pyongyang Declaration.  Such respect was an indispensable condition for the improvement of bilateral relations.  Additionally, if Japan did not act with a sincere attitude towards the Declaration, it would be difficult for his Government to implement it.

The representative from Japan responded that her Government was fully committed to implementing the Pyongyang Declaration in its entirety.

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