Fifty-seventh General Assembly

First Committee

19^th & 20^th Meetings (AM & PM)

COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR WARHEAD REDUCTION BY UNITED STATES, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

WELCOMED IN DRAFT RESOLUTION APPROVED BY FIRST COMMITTEE

18 Texts Approved Addressing Compliance with Disarmament Agreements,

Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, UN Arms Register, among Others

Agreeing that new global challenges and threats required the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, the General Assembly would welcome their commitment to strategic nuclear warhead reductions in the 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty), according to one of 18 draft resolutions approved today by the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security).

Acting without a vote, the Committee approved that new text entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic nuclear framework".  Among its terms, it invited all countries, as appropriate, to join the commitment of the Group of Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in June, to the non-proliferation principles aimed at preventing terrorists, or those that harboured them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons, missiles, and related materials, equipment and technology.

Several speakers explained their consensus position on the draft, including the representative of Pakistan, who said that States possessing the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons carried the primary and inescapable responsibility of safeguarding the human race from their fearsome destructive potential.  The substitution of strategic confrontation with strategic cooperation was gratifying, but real threat reduction required the destruction of nuclear weapons, followed by their universal and complete elimination, he stressed.

Also without a vote, the Committee approved a draft resolution on compliance, sponsored by the United States.  Under its terms, the Assembly would call on Member States to give serious consideration to the implications that non-compliance by States parties with any provisions of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements had for global security and stability.

Speaking before approval, Germany’s representative said that the events of the last two weeks, namely, the disclosure of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, had demonstrated the draft’s topicality.  Such a programme would be serious breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with serious implications, regionally and with respect to non-compliance.

Seized of the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in terrorist acts and the urgent need for concerted international efforts to control and overcome it, the Assembly would recognize that, in view of recent political developments, the time was now opportune for all nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of those weapons, according to a draft approved by a vote of 91 in favour to 40 against, with 19 abstentions (Annex IX).

Prior to approval of the draft as a whole, the Committee took a separate vote on operative paragraph 10, which concerns the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon-States towards total elimination of nuclear weapons.  It retained that paragraph by a vote of 139 in favour to 2 against (India, Israel), with

8 abstentions (France, Georgia, Monaco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States) (Annex VIII).

A draft entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, approved by a recorded vote of 136 in favour to 2 against (India, United States), with 13 abstentions, would have the Assembly call upon all States to maintain the highest standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, in order, among other things, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists (Annex VII).

Convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles as a contribution to international peace and security, the Assembly would welcome the report of the Secretary-General on the issue and ask him to submit another report to the next session, according to a draft approved by a recorded vote of 90 in favour to 2 against (Israel, United States), with 57 abstentions (Annex VI).

Stressing that the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development should be reviewed in order to secure the widest possible participation, the Assembly would ask the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2003, to prepare a report on that question, with a view to a decision at its fifty-eighth session, under a text on transparency approved by a recorded vote of 132 in favour to none against, with 23 abstentions (Annex III).

Prior to approval of the draft as a whole, separate votes were taken on operative paragraphs 4 (b) and 6.  The first, on operative paragraph 4 (b), concerned that request of the Secretary-General.  The Committee voted to retain it by 134 in favour to 2 against (Egypt, Syria), with 17 abstentions (Annex I).

The Committee voted to retain operative paragraph 6, by which the Conference on Disarmament would be invited to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments, by a recorded vote of 134 in favour to none against, with 20 abstentions (Annex II).

Following approval of that text, several countries from the Middle East voiced support for expanding the scope of the Register beyond the transfers of conventional weapons in seven categories to also include national reports on transfers of mass destruction weapons.  The representative of Kuwait, speaking in his capacity as chair of the Arab Group of States, said the Register could not meet the transparency requirements of those countries if it did not deal with the most sophisticated and deadly weapons, or meet security needs, particularly for the countries of the Middle East.

The Assembly would urge member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications, according to a text on the role of science and technology, approved by a vote of 93 in favour to 46 against, with 18 abstentions (Annex V).

A draft calling on States to adopt measures to ensure the application of scientific and technological progress in the framework of disarmament without detriment to the environment was approved by a vote of 153 in favour to none against, with 4 abstentions (France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States)

(Annex IV).

The Committee also approved a draft resolution on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) by a vote of  121 in favour to none against, with 21 abstentions (Annex X).

Acting without a vote today, the Committee approved drafts on:  the Disarmament Commission; United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education; Conference on Disarmament; United Nations Disarmament Information Programme; United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa; and the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services.

Also approved here texts on consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region; and good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe.

Prior to action on today’s texts, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) expressed his appreciation for the Committee’s approval yesterday of the draft resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention and provided a detailed accounting of progress made in the destruction of chemical weapons.

Statements were also made by the representatives of France, Kuwait, Algeria, Syria, China, Jordan, Cuba, Myanmar, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Mexico, Sierra Leone, New Zealand, Brazil, Uzbekistan, Chile, Republic of Korea, Ireland, Denmark (on behalf of the European Union), Japan, United States, Australia, India, Singapore, Myanmar, Armenia, Nepal, Libya and Lebanon.

Rights of reply were exercised by the representatives of Israel, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States.

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) will meet again at 10 a.m. Friday, 25 October, to continue taking action on all draft resolutions and decisions.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met today to continue taking action on draft resolutions and decisions from the following clusters:  confidence-building measures, including transparency in armaments; disarmament machinery; other disarmament measures; related measures of disarmament and international security; international security; nuclear weapons; and conventional weapons.

It had before it drafts on transparency in armaments and compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements.  Action was also expected on texts concerning the following topics:  a report of the Disarmament Commission; a report of the Conference on Disarmament; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa; and the United Nations Disarmament and Fellowship Training and Advisory Services.

The Committee was also expected to act on drafts addressing the following subjects:  a United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education; observance of environmental norms; the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme; and the role of science and technology in international security and disarmament.

Additionally, the Committee was expected to act on draft texts concerning the following themes:  consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures; strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region; good-neighbourliness, stability, and development in South-Eastern Europe; bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework; missiles; total elimination of nuclear weapons; nuclear disarmament; and implementation of the Ottawa Convention.

By a draft resolution on transparency in armaments (document A/C.1/57/L.37), the Assembly would reaffirm its decision, with a view to the further development of the Register of Conventional Arms, to keep the scope of and participation in the Register under review and, to that end, recall its request to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the Register's continuing operation and further development and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction.

Also, the Assembly would request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2003, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-eighth session.

According to a new draft resolution sponsored by the United States entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements" (document A/C.1/57/L.54), the Assembly, stressing that any violation of such agreements and obligations could adversely affect the security of States parties and create security risks for other States, would urge all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of all provisions.

The Assembly would call upon all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications that non-compliance by States parties with any provisions of those agreements had, for international security and stability, as well as for prospects for progress in those fields.  It would also call upon Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and international law, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all States parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements. 

A draft resolution entitled “Report of the Disarmament Commission” (document A/C.1/57/L.6), would have the General Assembly request the Disarmament Commission to meet from 31 March to 17 April of 2003 to continue its work in accordance with its mandate.  It would also request it to continue the consideration of ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament, as well as practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms.

Under a draft resolution sponsored by Hungary on the report of the Conference on Disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.13), the Assembly would urge the Conference to fulfil its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum for the international community, in light of the evolving international situation and with a view to making early substantive progress on priority agenda items.

By a draft resolution sponsored by Egypt on behalf of the Group of African States on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (document A/C.1/L.29), the Assembly would reaffirm its strong support for the Centre's revitalization and appeal once again to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen its programmes and activities.

The draft resolution on the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services (document A/C.1/57/L.38), would have the Assembly request the Secretary-General to continue to implement annually the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report thereon to the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.   

According to a draft resolution entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education” (document A/C.1/57/L.7/Rev.2), the Assembly would express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for providing Member States with the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, which contains a series of recommendations for immediate and long-term implementation.

A draft sponsored by South Africa on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement entitled “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control” (document A/C.1/57/L.12), would have the Assembly call upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress in the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development.

Under a draft resolution on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme (document A/C.1/57/L.20), the Assembly would stress the importance of the Programme as a significant instrument in enabling all Member States to participate fully in the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament in the various United Nations bodies, and in assisting them in complying with treaties, and in contributing to agreed mechanisms for transparency.

The Assembly would recommend that the Programme focus its efforts on, among other things:  generating public understanding of the importance of multilateral action, including by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament; and to maintain the Disarmament Internet Web site.

A draft resolution on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.50), would have the Assembly urge member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications.

According to a draft resolution entitled “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures” (document A/C.1/57/L.45), the Assembly would invite the group of interested States that was formed in New York in 1998 to continue to analyse lessons learned from previous disarmament and peace-building projects, as well as to promote new practical disarmament measures to consolidate peace, especially as undertaken or designed by affected States themselves.

It would also encourage Member States, including the group of interested States, to lend their support to the Secretary-General, as well as relevant international, regional, subregional and non-governmental organizations in responding to requests by Member States to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations.

A draft resolution on strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (document A/C.1/57/L.31), would have the Assembly call upon all States of that region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the necessary conditions for strengthening peace and cooperation there.

It would encourage all States of the region to promote genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating in, among other measures, the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

A draft resolution entitled “Maintenance of international security –- good neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe” (document A/C.1/57/L.47/Rev.1), would have the Assembly reaffirm the urgency of consolidating South-Eastern Europe as a region of peace.  The Assembly would also call upon all participants in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, as well as all concerned international organizations, to continue to support the efforts of the States of that region towards regional stability and cooperation.

According to the draft resolution sponsored by the Russian Federation and United States entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and new strategic framework" (document A/C.1/57/L.23/rev.1), the General Assembly would welcome the commitment of the two countries to strategic nuclear warhead reductions in the Moscow Treaty of 24 May, which was an important result of the new bilateral strategic relationship, and which would help establish more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability.

The Assembly would note with satisfaction the Joint Declaration signed by those countries on that date, through which they would strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.

It would recognize that the Group of 8 industrialized countries (G-8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by leaders at the June 2002 Kananaskis Summit, would enhance international security and safety by supporting specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues.

Under a related terms, the Assembly would invite all countries, as appropriate, to join the G-8 commitment to the non-proliferation principles endorsed by the G-8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit aimed at preventing terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons, missiles, and related materials, equipment and technology.

By a draft resolution sponsored by Iran entitled "Missiles" (document A/C.1/57/L.32), the Assembly, convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles, would welcome the report of the Secretary-General on the issue (document A/57/229) and ask him to seek the views of Member States and submit another report to the next session.  The Assembly would also ask him, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, to further explore the issue of missiles in all its aspects and prepare a report for consideration of the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.

According to a draft resolution sponsored by Australia and Japan entitled

"A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (document A/C.1/57/L.42), the Assembly would call upon States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons, while ensuring that such policies were consistent with States' obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Assembly would also call upon all States to maintain the highest standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, in order, among other things, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.

It would stress the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, that would be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The Assembly would also stress the central importance of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

Those steps include:  the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible in 2003 to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament; deep reductions by Russia and the United States in their strategic offensive arsenals; and steps by the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promoted international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

Also:  further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; increased transparency by them with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of related agreements under the NPT; the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that those weapons would ever be used and to facilitate their total elimination.

Under a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament" (document A/C.1/57/L.43), the Assembly, seized of the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in terrorist acts and the urgent need for concerted international efforts to control and overcome it, would recognize that, in view of recent political developments, the time was now opportune for all nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of those weapons.

The Assembly would also recognize that there was a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that those weapons would ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

It would urge the nuclear-weapon States to:  stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems; as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems; to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament; and to carry out further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. 

A draft resolution on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and On Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention)(document A/C.1/57/L.36), would have the Assembly urge all States that had signed but not ratified the Convention to do so without delay.  It would urge all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information as required under article 7 of the Convention, in order to promote transparency and compliance.

The Assembly would invite all States that had not ratified or acceded to the Convention to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to make global mine action efforts more effective.  It would renew its call upon all States and other relevant parties to work together to promote, support and advance:  the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims; mine risk education programmes; and the removal of anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world and the assurance of their destruction.

Statements

ROGELIO PFIRTER, Director General, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), said that the OPCW had been through an extremely delicate period, and that had affected its capacity to effectively carry out its mission.  Now, however, it had weathered the storm and was back on track.  He added that the recently completed seventh session of the conference of States parties demonstrated the continued commitment of all Member States to the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  He also expressed gratitude to the First Committee for having approved the draft resolution concerning the Chemical Weapons Convention (document A/C.1/57/L.48) yesterday.

As of 1 October 2002, approximately 7,050 metric tonnes of chemical agents, including category 1, category 2 and binary component agents, or more than 10 per cent of the total stockpile declared, had already been destroyed under OPCW verification.  Additionally, the United States and India had met their obligations to destroy 20 per cent of their declared chemical stockpiles within five years after the entry into force of the Convention.  The Russian Federation was also making significant progress, especially with its inauguration of a new destruction facility in Gorny.

He said that the OPCW’s inspection and verification activities would be adapting to current circumstances, as well as increasing.  For example, current verification procedures focused on monitoring the destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles, rather than detecting illegal new production.  He was pleased that Member States were cooperating with the evolution of the verification regime and opening more of their facilities for inspection.

He spoke in favour of international cooperation in the development of chemistry and chemical technology, and he encouraged trade in chemicals, chemical manufacturing equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.  In that context, he said that Member States had increased the provision in the OPCW’s budget in the area of international cooperation.  He admitted that it would not be easy to finance the requested extra spending in that field.  However, he would start saving in other areas to free up more funds.

He then turned to the use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups.  Explaining that few countries had the means or expertise to protect themselves from chemical attacks, he said that the OPCW was improving its level of preparedness to assist Member States that had been attacked with, or threatened with attack by, chemical weapons.  In addition to addressing emergency situations, the OPCW was dedicated to providing adequate support to the national authorities in charge of implementing the Convention in the Member States.  Through its associate programme, it was also training technical experts from around the world.

Turning to Africa, he said that the OPCW had launched a Programme of Action for Africa.  That programme had been designed to support the African Union as it promoted the implementation and universality of the Convention on that continent.  With respect to other regions, he said that the OPCW would also be focusing attention on South East Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.  He was also pleased to announce that the following countries had recently joined the OPCW:  Nauru; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa; and Uganda.

VOLKER HEINSBURG (Germany) said that the last two weeks had demonstrated the topicality of the draft on compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation agreements (document A/C.1/57/L.54), because of the work on a clandestine nuclear weapons programme being conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.  Such a programme would be a serious breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as other international agreements.  The breach was relevant, not only to the regional situation, but because of the serious implication of cases of non-compliance with the NPT.  The international community, therefore, could not but be actively seized with the issue.

Everyone should ensure compliance with international non-proliferation and arms control commitments; violations must be stopped and illicit activities must be eliminated in a verifiable manner, he said.  He co-sponsored the text on compliance, which addressed a key requirement for the implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements.  Non-compliance or doubts would undermine confidence in such agreements and could call into question the credibility and effectiveness of such agreements, and of the international legal system as a whole.  In order to enhance confidence in compliance, existing agreements and treaties should be strengthened.  Effective verifiability was a key aspect in that regard, and a fundamental element of security-related agreements.

He said he emphatically advocated the improvement and enhancement of verification provisions for all existing multilateral instruments and regimes.  In the face of the risk of a non-State actor gaining access to mass destruction weapons, national implementation should be strengthened and common standards should be created that ensured strict implementation.  At the same time, existing gaps in the current pattern of multilateral instruments in disarmament and non-proliferation should be closed.  That further work, in which the United Nations had a key role, should be done on an urgent basis.  The United Nations could count on unqualified German support, in that regard.

The representative of Zambia said that, had he been present yesterday for the votes on the draft resolutions on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (document A/C.1/57/L.9) and on the prevention of an outer space arms race (document A/C.1/57/L.3), he would have voted in favour.

HUBERT DE LA FORTELLE (France) said he fully endorsed the points just made by the representative of Germany, in particular, the emphasis on observing treaties and support for the related United States draft resolution.

Action on Drafts

The representative of Israel said he wished to add his name to the list of co-sponsors of the draft resolution on transparency in armaments (document A/C.1/57/L.37).

The representative of Greece also associated himself with the statements made by the German and French delegations concerning the draft resolution on compliance (document A/C.1/57/L.54).

The representative of Ghana also requested to be added to the list of co-sponsors to the draft on transparency.

It was announced that a series of votes would be taken on that text on transparency (document A/C.1/57/L.37).

First, operative paragraph 4 (b), which concerns a request that the Secretary-General prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register of Conventional Arms and its further development, was approved by a vote of 134 in favour to 2 against (Egypt, Syria), with 17 abstentions.  (For details, see Annex I.)

Operative paragraph 6, by which the Conference on Disarmament would be invited to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments, was retained by a recorded vote of 134 in favour to none against, with 20 abstentions (Annex II).

The draft resolution as a whole on transparency in armaments was approved by a recorded vote of 132 in favour to none against, with

23 abstentions (Annex III).

The representative of Kuwait, speaking in his capacity as chair of the Arab Group of States, voiced his support for expanding the Register.  Many members of the League did not believe that the Register was sufficient to meet the transparency requirements of weapons of mass destruction, or their security needs.   Including that category of deadly and sophisticated weapons in the Register would make it less discriminatory and more encompassing; not including them reflected an unbalanced approach.  Experts studying the Register over the last several years had not included the question of national production of mass destruction weapons, in particular, nuclear weapons.  That was not in line with the requirements of the Middle East, particularly since Israel had mass destruction weapons. 

The representative of Algeria said he fully subscribed to the statement just made on behalf of the Arab League.  Transparency was a key confidence-building measure.  As such, he had always supported initiatives to promote "authentic" transparency.  Nevertheless, he had been unable to support the draft because of its limitations and non-response to the expectation of many States seeking to remedy its unequal treatment.  Operative paragraphs 4 (b) and 6 were prisoners of a partial approach and had simply confined themselves to conventional weapons, taking no account of the frequently expressed need to cover other categories of weapons.  It was not possible to build confidence when that transparency instrument had deliberately confined itself exclusively to the transfer of conventional weapons.

Voicing similar concerns, the representative of Syria affirmed his total support for initiatives aimed at ridding the world from the use or threat of use of force.  The draft resolution on transparency had not taken into account the particular situation in the Middle East, which had been marked by the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  That conflict had endured because Israel continued to occupy Arab territories and refused to comply with Security Council resolutions.  Moreover, it retained mass destruction weapons and was capable of manufacturing sophisticated weapons, notably nuclear weapons, and stockpiling them.  All of that had confirmed that transparency, which Israel claimed to apply, reflected only one small part of its arsenal of deadly weapons.  He, therefore, had abstained in the vote. 

The representative of China said her country had always attached importance to the Register.  She wished it could contribute to it, thereby enhancing confidence and global and regional security.  China had participated in the Register since its inception in 1993.  Since 1996, in open defiance of the provisions of the draft resolution, a certain country had registered its arms sales to Taiwan in the form of a footnote to the Register.  By doing so, it had created in the United Nations "two Chinas -- one China/one Taiwan", which China could not accept.  It, therefore, had been forced to suspend its participation in the Register since 1998, pending rectification of the situation by that party.  She had also been unable to support the present draft resolution and had abstained in the vote. 

The representative of Jordan, also associating himself with the statement made on behalf of the Arab League, said Jordan had always been a strong supporter of the Register as an invaluable mechanism for achieving transparency, leading to confidence-building, especially in such conflict prone regions as the Middle East.  However, the Register might not be effective unless its scope was expanded to include military holdings and procurement through national production, including of mass destruction weapons, particularly nuclear weapons.  Regrettably, the panel of governmental experts had failed, in the past 10 years, to deal with that problem.  His country would continue to report regularly to the Register, despite its limitations.

The representative of Cuba expressed support for the transparency text.  It was positively balanced, and Cuba had reported regularly to it each year.  He also favoured fine tuning it to enlarge participation.  While he voted in favour of the draft as a whole, he had had reservations to operative paragraph 6.  As in past years, he had abstained in that separate vote, since the Conference on Disarmament had already completed its work on transparency.  A decision on whether to take up that issue in the Conference was up to it alone.  Cuba reserved the right to revise its position on that issue within the context of the Conference, which should adopt a balanced agenda that reflected the disarmament priorities.

The representative of Myanmar said that transparency should be universal, non discriminatory, and voluntary.  It should not be confined to conventional weapons only; transparency must also include mass destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons.  He respected the good intentions of the co-sponsors of the text, but felt that further achievable measure should have also been addressed.  He had a reservation about operatives paragraphs 4 (b) and 6. 

Regarding operative paragraph 4 (b), he said it was premature to ask the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the Register's continuing operation and further development in 2003.  To operative paragraph 6, he saw no reason to invite the Conference to continue to consider further work on transparency, since that body had been unable to agree on a programme of work overall for 2002, including on banning fissile material for nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, security assurances, and the prevention of an outer space arms race.  For those reasons, and because more time was needed to study transparency in depth, he had abstained in the votes.

The representative of Pakistan said he fully subscribed to the objectives of the Register and had been submitting data to it each year since 1993.  However, he had difficulties with operative paragraph 4 (b), especially the call for convening another panel of experts in 2003.  Given that the recommendations of the former panel were being studied by Member States, the establishment of another one seemed premature, if not entirely unwarranted.  The current Register should be universalized and contain information supplied fully and in a timely manner, before anyone embarked on its further expansion or development.  For those reasons, he had abstained in the voting.

The representative of Egypt reaffirmed that transparency measures were necessary mechanisms, and must be strengthened globally and regionally.  Unfortunately, the Register, which was created a decade ago as a first step, was still unable to fulfil its role and had not become fully viable.  Egypt had repeatedly stressed the need to further develop it, as it was not in step with developments in disarmament. 

The representative of Iran said he had abstained in the vote, because, against the letter and spirit of the founding resolution in 1992, the Register had insisted on covering only seven categories of conventional weapons.  That instrument should encompass other aspects of conventional and mass destruction weapons, the latter being the main source of threats and tension.  Its expansion should be seriously and positively considered during the next panel of governmental experts.  He had subscribed to the principles of the draft text.  Hopefully, expansion of the Register would lead to greater sharing among Member States.

The representative of Morocco supported operative paragraphs 4 (b) and 6.  Indeed, he supported all initiatives designed to enhance transparency in armaments and stood ready to participate in all related efforts.  Nevertheless, he still believed that the Register was incomplete and unresponsive to the aspirations of Morocco and the entire Arab Group.  He had abstained in the vote on the draft as a whole.

Associating himself also with the statement made on behalf of the Arab League, the representative of Libya said his country generally supported transparency as an early warning tool, but the Register had not met that concern. 

He unequivocally believed that, unless it was expanded in scope to include all kinds of mass destruction weapons, including nuclear weapons, and local production and high military technologies, and given the military imbalances in the Middle East, the Register was inadequate.  Mass destruction weapons, such as those possessed by Israel, were far more destabilizing than conventional arms. Unless those concerns were met, he would continue to abstain in the vote on the draft.

Before the vote on the draft resolution entitled “Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements” (document A/C.1/57/L.54), the representative of Mexico, also speaking on behalf of South Africa, said that they would vote in favour.  The draft recognized the fundamental role that arms limitation, disarmament, and non-proliferation played in the realm of international peace and security.  He was also pleased that the text, in addition to acknowledging obligations by States Parties to treaties, recognized other sources of obligation under international law.  He understood that new language had been added to the text, but maintained that it would not change or modify duties and obligations as described by international law.  He also believed that the draft, although lacking an explicit reference to international law, expressed a conviction to strengthen it.

      The representative of Cuba, also speaking before the vote, said that he deplored the draft presented this year as weak, in comparison to resolution

52/30, the version from 1997.  He was concerned about changes to operative paragraph 6.  Specifically, no reference was made to arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements currently being negotiated.  Additionally, in the seventh preambular paragraph, there was no longer a reference to specific agreements.  He said that no convincing arguments had been put forth to explain such changes.  Suggesting that the current draft was a step backwards from resolution 52/30, he assured delegates that he would not oppose consensus.  After all, he wanted to preserve and strengthen multilateralism.  He hoped, however, that when the topic was taken up again at the 59th session, his statement would be taken into account.

Speaking before the vote, the representative of Sierra Leone said he would vote in favour because he wholeheartedly shared the principles and concerns expressed in the draft.  He was of the understanding, however, that all States, especially those endowed with nuclear capabilities, would commit themselves to the total destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.  Such weapons posed a serious threat to mankind, and universal participation in existing multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements was needed.  He said his position was adequately expressed by operative paragraph 4 of the draft, which welcomed the role of the United Nations in restoring the integrity of and fostering negotiations on certain arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements.

The Committee approved the draft (document A/C.1/57/L.54) without a vote.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of New Zealand said she had co-sponsored the draft’s previous version, introduced in 1997.  She could not, however, sponsor this one.  In the present General Assembly, which had been dominated by talk of Iraq’s non-compliance with Security Council resolutions and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s possible non-compliance with the NPT, she would have preferred to co-sponsor a stronger text, urging countries to comply with arms limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements.

Her first concern with the current text involved its inclusion of the phrase “treaties to which they are parties”.  That phrase implied a weakening of customary international law.  Whereas the draft did acknowledge “other sources of international law”, it was ambiguous as to the emphasis it placed on those other sources.  Additionally, wording from the 1997 version, which would have acknowledged future work and the conclusion of additional agreements, had been omitted.  Also missing in the present text was the request for the Secretary-General to provide the assistance necessary to protect the integrity of disarmament agreements.  Also ,while agreeing with the sentiment expressed in operative paragraph 6, it did not go far enough.

      Also speaking after the vote, the representative of Brazil said he followed the consensus with respect to the draft in question.  However, he disagreed with certain aspects that separated it from its previous version, namely resolution 52/30.  For example, the absence of specific references in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs weakened the text.  Additionally, the new language in operative paragraph 6 failed to fully reflect verification as enhancing confidence and assessing compliance.  Verification was a necessary tool that had been more adequately addressed in resolution 52/30.

The representative of Egypt, also speaking after the vote, said he had joined the consensus, but did not agree with all paragraphs.  He wished that the United States delegation had remained more faithful to the language of resolution 52/30.  References to the future had been deleted from the present text.  Additionally, verification of compliance was essential, and yet had not been adequately addressed.  He voiced support for the positions presented by the delegates of Brazil and New Zealand

The Committee then turned to cluster seven, namely disarmament machinery.

The representative of Uzbekistan, speaking on behalf of the five Central Asian States, introduced a draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Central Asia (document A/C.1/57/L.24/Rev.1).  In previous years, the resolution had enjoyed unanimous approval.  The current text reflected new developments during the process of establishment.  He was happy to say that all five Central Asian States had agreed on a treaty text and continued to consult the five nuclear-weapon States for further advice.  Additionally, all five were committed to signing the treaty as soon as possible.  He expressed his appreciation to the Secretary-General, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament for Asia and the Pacific for their support.  He hoped that the draft would be adopted without a vote.

The Committee then turned to the draft concerning the report of the Disarmament Commission (document A/C.1/57/L.6).  It was approved without a vote.

Next, the Committee took up the draft resolution concerning the report on the Conference on Disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.13), introduced by Hungary.

Speaking before the vote, the representative of Chile said the draft was introduced every year.  However, no progress had been achieved in the Conference and there was subsequently nothing new for the report to include.  He agreed with the paragraphs in the text.  However, he expressed deep concern about the deadlock in the Conference’s multilateral negotiations and wanted to see the situation turned around.  He had been supporting the new initiative launched by five former chairmen of the Conference.  He hoped that initiative would break the impasse and allow the Commission to resume substantive work.

The draft (document A/C.1/57/L.13) was approved without a vote.

The representative of Germany, speaking after the vote, said, as usual, the draft was adopted by consensus.  However, he was also concerned over the current state of affairs in the Conference.  The deadlock, especially in light of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of access of terrorists to them, was alarming.  The international security environment was changing, but the Conference had failed to conduct substantive work related to issues on its agenda.

Despite the proposals put forth by the five ambassadors, he added, the Conference had failed to live up to its responsibility as a major multilateral forum on disarmament.  He expressed disappointment that there was still no fissile material cut-off treaty.  Additionally, Germany, during its presidency of the Conference, had initiated a discussion on radiological weapons.  In addressing it, as independent from other issues, he saw an opportunity for the Conference on Disarmament to respond in a timely fashion to new risks.

The Committee then turned to a draft on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (document A/C.1/57/L.29), introduced by Egypt.  It was approved without a vote.

Next, the Committee took up the draft on the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services (document A/C.1/57/L.38).

The representative of Nigeria, speaking before the vote, took the floor to inform delegates that the proposed amendment had been withdrawn.  The text, thus, remained as originally submitted and sponsored.

The draft was approved without a vote.

The Committee then moved on to cluster eight, namely other disarmament measures.

Turning to a draft on the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (document A/C.1/57/L.7/Rev.2), introduced by Mexico, the Committee approved it without a vote.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of France welcomed the results of the study.  However, he wanted to express reservations about the fourth preambular paragraph.  The selective list of arms, from which anti-personnel mines had been excluded, did not reflect the reality of the results of the study.  Additionally, the paragraph on weapons of mass destruction was unbalanced and one-sided.  Finally, the reference to terrorism was not relevant in the context in which it had been used.

The Committee then turned to the draft on the observance of environmental norms (document A/C.1/57/L.12), introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement.  It was approved by a recorded vote of 153 in favour to none against, with 4 abstentions (France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States) (Annex IV).

Next, the Committee took up the draft on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme (document A/C.1/57/L.20), introduced by Mexico.  It was approved without a vote.

The Committee then turned to the draft addressing the role of science and technology (document A/C.1/57/L.50), introduced by India.  It was approved with a recorded vote of 93 in favour to 46 against, with 18 abstentions (Annex V).

Speaking after the vote, the representative of the Republic of Korea said that, unlike in previous years, when his delegation had abstained, it had voted against the draft this year.  That was because the current draft lacked balance.  Specifically, it failed to acknowledge the export control regimes of dual-use goods, as well as those of weapons of mass destruction.

The representative of Israel said he wished to exercise his right of reply to the explanations of vote on the transparency text.  As in previous years, he had been forced to listen to a long list of baseless allegations against Israel's security policy.  Those accusations had nothing to do with the Register or with transparency.  Most of those countries had been unwilling to subject their own arms transfers to transparency instruments and had no intention of implementing their own ideas concerning the efficiency or scope of the United Nations Register.  The one important aspect of the Register was its modesty and its use, primarily, in a regional context.  That had been the reason for Israel's participation, but for some speakers the gradual building of confidence seemed to be a reason for concern. 

He said that those speakers had been especially unhappy about Israel's determination to defend itself.  Its self-defence policy was not a source of concern to global peace, whereas others in the Middle East were.  Neither should Israel be a source of concern for countries in the region that did not have aggressive intentions against it.  If those that did have such intentions were concerned about Israel's ability to defend itself, they should seek to contribute to regional stability.  Moving away from today's environment of heightened tension to a safer Middle East required a willingness to seek peace and reconciliation and mutual confidence.  Participation in the Register was an important step in the right direction.  He called upon his neighbours to adopt such measures.

Also speaking in right of reply, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said that the German delegation had expressed concerns of a one-sided nature about the current situation on the Korean Peninsula.  The concerns of the German delegation had resulted from the hostile policy of the United States towards his country.  If the hostile relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States were concluded on the basis of mutual respect and equal sovereignty, all issues would be resolved smoothly.  But, if the United States persisted in its moves to "apply pressure and stifle the DPRK by force", it would have "no option but to take a tougher counter-action".

The representative of the United States said he wished to point out that the United States, over the past several years, had attempted to engage in a dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.  It would continue to do that, and the events or actions, to which others had referred, in terms of compliance, had been the result of that dialogue.  That was the best procedure for trying to improve the situation on the Korean peninsula.

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said that when the time was ripe, his country's response to the current "fuss" created by the United States, would be published clearly. 

The Committee took up the draft concerning the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.45).  It was approved without a vote.

The Committee then turned to the draft on the strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (document A/C.1/57/L.31), introduced by Algeria.  Georgia had signed on as a co-sponsor.  The draft was approved without a vote.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Albania said her delegation had co-sponsored the draft, although she did not see her delegation's name on the list of co-sponsors. 

Next, the Committee took up the draft on the maintenance of international security and good-neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe (document A/C.1/57/L.47/Rev.1).  It was approved without a vote.

Next, the Committee turned to the draft resolution on bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework (document A/C.1/57/L.23/Rev.1).

Speaking before the vote, the representative of Cuba said the text was new and praised the results of talks between two nuclear-weapon States, culminating in the signing of the Moscow Treaty last May.  Cuba could firmly support the idea that all States must move forward with negotiations designed to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, and had followed the negotiations leading to the signing of the Moscow Treaty.  As a priority of nuclear disarmament, any step taken towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons was positive.  He had sought the preservation of and compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), which had played an overriding role in maintaining global strategic parity and had once guaranteed international peace and security.  He could not now accept a return to strengthening anti-missile defence, which might adversely impact disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race.

He said that the Moscow Treaty stipulated bilateral commitments for reducing the deployment capabilities, and moderate the operational status of, nuclear weapons, but those talks must not replace multilateral negotiations with the involvement of the five nuclear-weapon States, leading to an irreversible and definitive reduction in nuclear weapons.  Those talks were deadlocked, however, and there were no indications that the possessor States were prepared to resume them.  It was alarming that, ever more frequently, nuclear weapons were being assigned a growing roll in security strategies, including the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons and arguments in favour of their use.  The revision introduced in operative paragraph 5 had helped make it acceptable to Cuba and other delegations.  He would support the text on the understanding that multilateral negotiations and the application of total nuclear disarmament measures would proceed, thereby enabling the world to truly leave behind the nuclear threat.

[Operative paragraph 5 in the original draft, had called on all countries to join the G-8 commitment to the non-proliferation principles endorsed by the G-8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit, aimed at preventing terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons, missiles, and related materials, equipment and technology.  The text now invites all countries, as appropriate, to join that commitment.]

The representative of Malaysia said he fully appreciated the cooperative effort to promote security, peace, and economic stability, consistent with pledges by Member States at the Millennium Summit to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under the NPT. It was in that spirit that he had joined consensus on the present draft.  He appreciated the signing of the Moscow Treaty, but that had not incorporated the need for irreversibility.  That important principle, coupled with effective verification and transparency, would demonstrate the commitment of the nuclear powers to their obligations under the NPT.

The representative of Ireland, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said he supported that draft resolution, consistent with the Coalition's text on a nuclear-weapon-free world (document A/C.1/57/L.3/Rev.1).  The Moscow Treaty was a positive step in de-escalation between the United States and the Russian Federation, and he would follow with interest their continued work to ensure the destruction of mass destruction weapons and related materials.  He stressed, however, that reductions in deployment and operational status were no substitute for cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.  The 2000 NPT Review Conference had laid out a blueprint for nuclear disarmament.  The Coalition expected that real and urgent progress in achieving those commitments could be made. 

He welcomed the redistribution of the Coalition's draft on reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/57/L. 2/Rev.1), which contained a number of substantive amendments. 

The representative of Pakistan said he was happy to join the consensus.  Like others, he had welcomed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, which constituted a salutary first step in the direction of reducing the immediate threat posed by deployed nuclear weapons.  He also supported the objective of the draft resolution that the Treaty would provide the opportunity to "operationalize" the intention of the two co-sponsors to work together to promote peace and economic well-being throughout the world.  Those were particularly reassuring words for those who sought security within the multilateral framework. 

He said that the construction of a new strategic framework between the United States and the Russian Federation, proclaimed in the fourth preambular paragraph, should elicit the international community's support.  The substitution of "strategic confrontation" with "strategic cooperation" was clearly gratifying.  However, the continued presence of large inventories of nuclear warheads continued to pose a serious threat to international peace and security.  Real threat reduction required the destruction of nuclear weapons, which should now materialize, to be followed by their universal and complete elimination.  States in possession of the largest stockpiles of those deadly weapons carried the primary and inescapable responsibility of safeguarding the human race from their fearsome destructive potential. 

Continuing, he said that a mere change in their deployment status would not fulfil the ultimate goal of complete and general disarmament, unless the nuclear-weapon States foreswore the use and possession of nuclear weapons under international control.  Only then would the commitment in article VI of the NPT be redeemed.  Negotiations should therefore commence, at the earliest, on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament when it met next year.  The spirit of the present text and its message would deem to have been upheld by signalling a readiness to expeditiously open those talks in Geneva.

Acting without a vote, the Committee approved the draft resolution on bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework (document A/C.1/57/L.23/Rev.1).

Speaking after the approval of that text, the representative of China said he supported the draft only because he had agreed to giving positive appreciation to the Moscow Treaty. 

The Committee then turned to the draft resolution on missiles (document A/C.1/57/L.32), introduced by Iran.

Speaking before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said his delegation had consistently supported the drafts on missiles because it was committed to non-proliferation, especially when achieved through political and diplomatic methods.  Russia had been involved with the group of governmental experts that had worked on the United Nations report on missiles.  He was pleased that the organization had had its first experience in considering the issues revolving around missile proliferation.

His delegation supported the idea of a global system of binding agreements to monitor missile proliferation and technology.  In that regard, his delegation had introduced a memorandum of intent that contained specific proposals on how to maintain a missile non-proliferation regime under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.  Because a consensus had yet not been reached in this area, it was advisable to continue with work begun by the group of governmental experts.  It was also important to allow for the participation, in a non-discriminatory environment, of all interested States in the field.  At the same time, it was necessary to avoid infringements on the right of States to peacefully develop outer space.  He concluded by saying he would support the draft resolution on missiles.

Before the vote, the Secretary of the First Committee reminded delegates of operative paragraph 3 of the draft, which requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, to further explore the issue of missiles and prepare a report for the consideration of the General Assembly at its 59th session.

The draft was approved by a recorded vote of 90 in favour to 2 against (Israel, United States), with 57 abstentions (Annex VI).

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Cuba said he had voted in favour because the draft marked a major step forward.  He stressed that it was up to the United Nations to play a central role in dealing with missiles.  The group of experts’ report, mentioned in operative paragraph 1, had clear limitations.  As to those limitations, the Cuban delegation would refer to them in detail when it sent its opinion to the Secretary-General, as requested in operative paragraph

2.  The essential merit of the group’s work was that it was the first serious effort of the United Nations to deal with missiles.  He hoped that the second group of experts would be able to put forth specific recommendations.

The representative of Denmark, speaking on behalf of the European Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Iceland and Norway, said that the European Union had abstained, as it had done last year.  He did not want the abstention to be regarded as a lack of commitment to the issue.  On the contrary, the European Union remained deeply concerned about missiles that could carry weapons of mass destruction.  Additionally, European Union members had taken part in the panel of experts and contributed to the International Code of Conduct, whose final text had addressed missiles in the most concrete manner yet.

The draft at hand did not address the essential issue, namely the proliferation of ballistic missiles and their related technology, he continued.  The text also failed to refer to the multilateral and concrete initiatives of the Code of Conduct.  Additionally, the report put forth by the governmental experts did not have enough substance to warrant the convening of a second panel of experts.  More panels would only be meaningful in the future if added value could be offered.  With the launching of the Code, to take place on 26 November 2002 in The Hague, the first step to curbing missile proliferation would be truly taken.  In that regard, the European Union urged all States to join the effort and subscribe to it.  Once adopted, the Code could be of interest to the United Nations.

Also speaking after the vote, the representative of the Republic of Korea said he had abstained because he was not convinced of the merit of further deliberation on missile-related issues by a United Nations panel of governmental experts.  The report had some useful elements, but, because of diverging views, had failed to agree on specific recommendations.  The draft in question was also vague and unfocused.  Furthermore, it would be unrealistic to expect another panel to produce tangible recommendations.

The representative of Japan added that missiles were a matter of concern since they threatened international peace and security.  For its part, Japan had contributed to the panel of governmental experts.  However, her delegation had abstained because the draft made no explicit references to missiles as carriers of weapons of mass destruction.  Additionally, it failed to recognize international efforts, to which Japan had contributed, being made to address the topic.

The representative of the United States said the draft raised a number of concerns with respect to its political intent and overall direction.  The results of the previous panel showed there was insufficient consensus on missiles.  There was, thus, no justification for further study.  Until such time that consensus existed, he advised the United Nations to use precious time and money that would be required under this draft in other more promising areas.

The unfortunate net effect of the draft could be to divert attention from successful missile non-proliferation efforts.  The United States, for its part, had conducted many activities to curb missile proliferation, and he encouraged other States to cooperate in the common cause.  Past initiatives had been effective when carried out on a regional basis and involved affected and interested States.  Such initiatives would be more effective than the broad and vague draft resolution in question.  For those reasons, his delegation had voted against it.

The representative of Australia said issues related to missiles raised serious concerns for international peace and security.  He supported ballistic missile non-proliferation efforts, and he welcomed the constructive contribution made by the panel of governmental experts, which had included an Australian expert.  Nevertheless, he found the draft in question to be problematic because of its failure to highlight ballistic threats to international security.  He also questioned the usefulness of future meetings of the panel of governmental experts.  The current report did not provide a sufficient basis for further work and follow-up recommendations.  It was also incredible that the draft made no mention of the Code of Conduct.

The Committee then turned to the draft concerning the path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons (document A/C.1/57/L.42).

Speaking before the vote, the representative of Ireland, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the nuclear-weapon States under the NPT had already promised to work towards nuclear disarmament and the total destruction of their nuclear arsenals.  However, because of operative paragraph 3, (e), which stressed the central importance of that unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, the draft suggested that that was a step that still had to be taken.  There was also a contextual linkage between general and complete disarmament that he could not accept.  He did not question the commitment of the sponsors, but he did not feel the current language was accurately reflecting the outcome of the NPT Conference.  He would, therefore, abstain.

The draft was approved by a recorded vote of 136 in favour to 2 against (India, United States), with 13 abstentions (Annex VII).

Speaking after approval of that draft, the representative of China said he supported the total elimination of nuclear weapons, but there were still some deficiencies in the text.  For example, it made no mention of the basic principle that the countries with the largest arsenals bore the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament.  The text had also failed to recognize that nuclear disarmament measures could only be pursued in the context of the maintenance of global strategic security and stability for all countries.  It also failed to call for the abandonment of nuclear deterrence doctrines, characterized by first-use and pre-emptive nuclear strike.  In addition, some specific measures in the text were still premature.  For those reasons, he had abstained in the vote.

The representative of Austria said he had supported the draft since it contained many elements to which he fully subscribed.  He fully shared Japan's commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to the full implementation by States parties of the NPT.  He attached particular importance to the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and to the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI, as well as the decision agreed to in the final document in 1995.  Regrettably, however, in the present text, operative paragraph 11, on the IAEA safeguards system and protocols, had fallen short of his expectations. 

He said that, among the many measures to be taken to adequately address the threat of nuclear terrorism and undeclared nuclear activities, must be the strengthening of the Agency's verification activities by means of strengthening its safeguards system.  Hence, the conclusion of additional protocols and the integration of the safeguards system were key elements for enhancing nuclear non-proliferation.  Unfortunately, the language in operative paragraph 11 had not reflected the importance and urgency of measures that should be taken both by the Agency and its Member States, in order to accelerate the build up and full implementation of the Agency's integrated safeguards system.

The representative of Germany said he fully shared Japan's commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and full implementation of the NPT.  That Treaty remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament.  He attached particular importance to the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  Its adoption by consensus was an important step for the Treaty, as well as for the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

He said that the draft resolution might be misinterpreted, however, as it had not reflected the practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the NPT.  That concern, which he raised last year, had remained.  Knowing the sponsors' unwavering commitment to the cause, however, he had voted in favour of the draft, but had not wished selective quotation from the text to detract from the comprehensive commitment of States parties to the NPT to implement the conclusions of the final document in its entirety.

The United States representative said that, like last year, he voted no on the draft primarily because of the language it contained on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).  He could subscribe to the spirit of the text, but nuclear disarmament would not be achievable absent strong controls to preclude the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their technologies.  His country had made clear its commitment to the NPT and its readiness to contribute to the implementation of the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.  His negative vote on today's draft should, in no way, be seen as a repudiation of those parts of the draft that supported those same principles.

The representative of Pakistan found somewhat questionable several terms of the draft.  The text placed an inordinate emphasis on non-proliferation to the detriment of nuclear disarmament.  Also, he could not endorse the premises of the seventh and eight preambular paragraphs, and had some reservations on operative paragraph 1.  As a non-party to the NPT, Pakistan was not under any obligation to implement operative paragraph 3 and several of its sub-paragraphs, nor was he bound by any obligations under the NPT or in any forums in which it was not represented.  For those reasons, he had abstained in the vote, rather than having voted against it.

(Operative paragraph 7 welcomes the successful adoption of the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and operative paragraph 8 welcomes the constructive start of the strengthened review process.  Operative paragraph 3 stresses the central importance of several practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT).

The representative of India said she could not have voted in favour of the draft.  India's unwavering commitment to nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons globally was well known.  But, the instrument purported to have been intended to achieve those objectives, namely the NPT, had not been effective.  India, instead, looked beyond the NPT framework for equal security for all through global disarmament.  The draft was based on the "NPT philosophy", which made it flawed as a vehicle for the stated objective. 

Further, she said, the text welcomed the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, which was not balanced.  Operative paragraph 3(b) indicated a lack of responsiveness to reality, and the call for adherence to the NPT was unconvincing.  While she agreed with the basic objective of the text, namely the total elimination of nuclear weapons, she could not have supported it as a whole and, therefore, had opposed it.

(Operative paragraph 3(b) concerns the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee as early as possible in 2003 to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, with a view to the conclusion within five years, of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons).

The Committee then turned to the draft on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.43), introduced by Myanmar.

Speaking before the vote, the representative of Cuba said she would be voting in favour, since the text reflected the importance of nuclear disarmament.  It was clearly worded, and she hoped it would be taken into consideration by the nuclear powers.  She welcomed the idea of an ad hoc committee to begin negotiations with States to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  She also expressed the hope that it would be supported by the majority of Member States.

Prior to approval of the draft as a whole, the Committee took a separate vote on operative paragraph 10, which concerned the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States towards total elimination of nuclear weapons.  It retained that paragraph by a vote of 139 in favour to 2 against (India, Israel), with

8 abstentions (France, Georgia, Monaco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States) (Annex VIII).

The Committee then proceeded to take action on the draft as a whole.  It was approved by a recorded vote of 91 in favour to 40 against, with 19 abstentions (Annex IX).

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Japan said she had abstained.  It was her wish that nuclear weapons should never be used again.  In that context, she regarded the NPT as the conrnerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  However, the treaty was facing the reality of States Parties that were not complying with its terms.  She called for the ensurance of full compliance with the treaty.  She appreciated that the draft applauded the NPT.  However, it contained a reference to a specified time frame for nuclear disarmament and, in her opinion, the path towards such disarmament should be realistic and progressive, with engagement of the nuclear-weapon States at every step of the way.

The representative of China said he supported the objectives of the draft, as well as many of the positions of the Non-Aligned Movement.  He appreciated the allusions to the roles of strategic doctrines, including pre-emptive strikes.

The representative of India, said she had abstained.  Her delegation was committed to nuclear disarmament.  Additionally, until 2000, it had supported resolutions on nuclear disarmament.  The new draft, however, went against Non-Aligned Movement positions and also included elements of the NPT on which India’s stand was well known.  She did not approve of operative paragraphs 9 and 10, which welcomed the “positive outcome” of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.  She said that the NPT was not a balanced document.

The representative of Pakistan said he was committed to nuclear disarmament.  The draft contained several positive features, such as the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.  Unfortunately, however, the draft also contained provisions in the sixth and twentieth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs

6, 9, and 10 that were inconsistent with his delegation’s position.  He had, thus, abstained.  The sixth preambular paragraph noted the reiteration by States Parties to the NPT that the NPT was the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the twentieth preambular paragraph referred to the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction in terrorist acts.  Operative paragraph

6 called upon nuclear-weapon States to agree on legally binding instruments related to nuclear weapons.

The Committe then turned to the draft concerning implementation of the Ottawa Convention (document A/C.1/57/L.36), introduced by Belgium.  It was approved by a recorded vote of 128 in favour to none against, with 20 abstentions (Annex X).

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Singapore said she would always support initiatives against landmines.  She also gave examples of her government’s actions against those weapons.  She also believed, however, in States’ rights to self-defence and to address legitimate security concerns.  Thus, a blanket ban on landmines might be counterproductive.  She would continue to work for a truly global solution.

The representative of the Republic of Korea, also speaking after the vote, said he had abstained from the vote.  His Government, however, had taken initiatives to combat landmines and was working with its northern neighbour to clear their border zone of them.

The representative of Myanmar added that his Government was not a State Party to the Ottawa Convention.  However, he respected the decisions of the countries that had signed and ratified it.  He was in favour of banning the transfer, exports, and indiscriminate use of mines.  At the same time, every State had the right to self-defence.  The sanctity of this right was enshrined in the United Nations Charter.  In his opinion, sweeping bans on landmines were not effective.  Additionally, the proper forum to deal with the problem was the Conference on Disarmament.  Thus, he had abstained.

Also speaking after the vote, the representative of Armenia said he had voted in favour because he welcomed the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention.  His Government had not yet acceded to the Convention, but still supported it.  Armenia’s accession depended on the actions of other States in its region.

The representative of Nepal said he had voted in favour.  He further extended all support to efforts leading to complete disarmament.  However, a balanced approach to the problem was needed because of domestic security concerns.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Libya said that although the Convention sought a noble objective, he still believed that it had serious shortcomings.  Since the Second World War, his country had had many mines spread throughout its territory.  He wanted the Convention to be more comprehensive in dealing with mines, especially concerning the responsibility of the countries that had planted those mines to provide assistance in clearing them and compensating the people who had suffered from them.  The Convention was simple and limited.  Additionally, Libya relied on mines in part to defend its vast territory and porous borders.  He said that people trespassed upon mines; mines did not attack people.  Thus, it was more important to address weapons of mass destruction, instead of simple weapons like mines.  He had abstained for those reasons.

The representative of Lebanon expressed regret for having been compelled to abstain.  He emphasized that he had had no choice in the matter, because Israel was still declaring publicly that it had no wish to adhere to the Convention.  Lebanon was a country that had suffered greatly from landmines.  After the Israeli occupation, Israel had left behind more than 450,000 mines.  It was clear that Lebanon would continue suffering, before it succeeded in the total clearance of those mines.  The representative of Israel yesterday had said that his country was currently refraining from producing mines.  The representative of Lebanon hoped that was true.  He renewed his call on Israel to adhere to the Convention, in order to give it proper universality.

The representative of Cuba said her Government always supported the elimination of the indiscriminate use of mines, whether in domestic or international conflicts.  It was, thus, a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.  However, the ultimate objective of negotiations on mines was the maximum protection of civilian populations and not limiting States’ rights to preserve their territorial integrity.  The absence of clear distinctions

existed in the draft.  Cuba had been forced to abstain.  After all, it had been declared the enemy of the country with the greatest economic and military might in the world.  She could not, therefore, give up rights to self-defence.

The representative of India said she had abstained.  She remained committed to non-discriminatory and universal bans on landmines that balanced self-defence with civilian deaths.  However, States with long borders had to defend themselves.  Therefore, a complete ban had to come in phases.  Also, alternative non-lethal technologies that could replace mines had to be explored.  India would support a ban on the transfer of mines in the Conference on Disarmament.

Also speaking after the vote, the representative of Pakistan said he had abstained.  Legitimate security concerns and the need to guard long borders not protected by natural features had aided his decision.  Pakistan needed mines, in part, to guarantee its security.  It was the irresponsible use of mines that had caused misery.  His Government would, therefore, continue to exercise responsibility.  He believed that a truly universal standard should be set in the United Nations to balance civilian and security concerns.

The representative of Egypt also abstained.  He was convinced that the Convention had serious shortcomings.  It did not, for example, deal with the right to self-defence, the obligations of countries that adhered to the Convention, or assistance to countries attempting to engage in mine clearance operations.

(annexes follow)

ANNEX I

Vote on Op Para 4 (b)/Transparency in Armaments

Operative paragraph 4, concerning a report on the further development of the Register of Conventional Arms, of the draft resolution on transparency on armaments (document A/C1/54/L.37), was approved by a recorded vote of 134 in favour to 2 against, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Egypt, Syria.

Abstaining:  Algeria, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

Absent:  Bahrain, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

(END OF ANNEX I)

ANNEX II

Vote on Op Para 6/Transparency in Armaments

Operative paragraph 6, concerning the Conference on Disarmament, of the draft resolution on transparency in Armaments (Document A/C.1/57/L.37), was approved by a recorded vote of 134 in favour to 0 against, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  None.

Abstaining:  Algeria, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Mexico, Myanmar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

Absent:  Bahrain, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

(END OF ANNEX II)

ANNEX III

Vote on Transparency in Armaments

The draft resolution in transparency in armaments (document A/C.1/57/L.37), was approved by a recorded vote of 132 in favour to 0 against, with 23 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  None.

Abstaining:  Algeria, Bahrain, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

Absent:  Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

(END OF ANNEX III)

ANNEX IV

Vote on Environmental Norms

The draft resolution on the observance of environmental norms in arms control agreements (document A/C.1/57/L.12) was approved by a recorded vote of

153 in favour to 0 against, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  None.

Abstaining:  France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu.

(END OF ANNEX IV)

ANNEX V

Vote on Science and Technology

The draft resolution on the role of science and technology in security and disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.50) was approved by a recorded vote of 93 in favour to 46 against, with 18 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining:  Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Tonga, Ukraine, Uruguay.

Absent:  Afghanistan, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu.

(END OF ANNEX V)

ANNEX VI

Vote on Missiles

The draft resolution entitled "Missiles" (document A/C.1/57/L.32) was approved by a recorded vote of 90 in favour to 2 against, with 57 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen.

Against:  Israel, United States.

Abstaining:  Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Absent:  Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Liberia, Malawi, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

(END OF ANNEX VI)

ANNEX VII

Vote on Path to Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

The draft resolution on a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

(document A/C.1/57/L.42) was approved by a recorded vote of 136 in favour to

2 against with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  India, United States.

Abstaining:  Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ireland, Israel, Mauritius, Mexico, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa, Sweden.

Absent:  Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Liberia, Malawi, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zambia.

(END OF ANNEX VII)

ANNEX VIII

Vote on Op Para 10/Nuclear Disarmament

The operative paragraph 10, of the draft resolution on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.43) was approved by a recorded vote of 139 in favour to

2 against with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  India, Israel.

Abstaining:  France, Georgia, Monaco, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Absent:  Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Liberia, Malawi, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zambia.

(END OF ANNEX VIII)

ANNEX IX

Vote on Nuclear Disarmament

The draft resolution on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/57/L.43) was approved by a recorded vote of 91 in favour to 40 against, with 19 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

Against:  Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining:  Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cyprus, Georgia, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Sweden, Ukraine.

Absent:  Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Liberia, Malawi, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zambia.

(END OF ANNEX IX)

ANNEX X

Vote on Ottawa Convention

The draft resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) (document A/C/57/L.36) was approved by a recorded vote of 128 in favour to 0 against, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe.

Against:  None.

Abstaining:  Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syria, United States, Viet Nam.

Absent:  Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niger, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zambia.

* *** *