HEADQUARTERS PRESS CONFERENCE BY HEAD OF UN IRAQ WEAPONS INSPECTION TEAM

HEADQUARTERS PRESS CONFERENCE BY HEAD OF UN IRAQ WEAPONS INSPECTION TEAM

At a Headquarters press conference today, Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) said the greatest challenge facing the Commission was to carry out an "effective" inspection of Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament obligations and to report factually to the Council.

He said in response to questions that it would be up to the Security Council, not the Commission, to determine whether or not Iraq was in "material breach" of its disarmament obligations should there be any evidence of its

non-compliance.

Mr. Blix said a group of inspectors would be gathering in Cyprus over the weekend on their way to Baghdad, where they were due to arrive next Monday.  They would be joined in Cyprus by a team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  He would also be joined there by Mohamed ElBaradei, Executive Director of the IAEA, for the trip to Baghdad.

He told correspondents that the purpose of the trip was to initiate a new chapter of inspections to verify Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament obligations.  The inspectors had requested to see representatives of the Iraqi Government.  A team of logistics officers would stay behind in Iraq once the initial contact was made with the Iraqi Government.  The first group of inspectors from the Commission would arrive in Iraq a week after their departure, to begin their work on 27 November.  The group would, in the language of the recent Security Council resolution 1441, "resume inspections".  (The team from the IAEA would work alongside the UNMOVIC inspection team.)  The Commission would have 60 days within which to report to the Council.

He added that the Iraqi Government had up to 8 December to make a declaration of its weapons of mass destruction programme.  The inspectors would be on the ground before the Iraqi declaration was made, he said.  The Commission would analyse the declaration once it was received in New York.  Mr. Blix said that because of media interest, a media centre would be set up in Baghdad with Hiro Ueki of the Department of Public Information (DPI) in charge.

Asked what would constitute a serious violation of Security Council resolution 1441, he said common sense would still have to be used in judging whether or not the inspectors were being hindered in their work.  They would report factually whatever happened on the ground, and it would first of all be up to the Council to make an assessment on whether or not there was a material breach of its resolution.  One should not leap to the conclusion that action would follow, Mr. Blix said.  The Council, especially when it was united, would have a whole spectrum of measures at its disposal.

Asked whether an omission in the Iraqi declaration would constitute a serious violation, he said the declaration would have to be made before

8 December, and would then be analysed.  It would be the most important moment he presently foresaw.  He recalled that resolution 687 of 1991 had obligated Iraq to declare its weapons programme and the inspectors to verify it.  Some had described

it as “a hide-and-seek” game.  This time around, Iraq was being given a last opportunity to declare what weapons of mass destruction it might posses.  The Commission had “a great many questions”, he said.  It could not exclude the possibility that Iraq might have weapons of mass destruction.  “We are not saying that all the intelligence is wrong.  They may be right, but we are not confirming it.”

The Iraqi declaration would be a very important document, he said, and added that he hoped the Iraqi Government would consider the issue very seriously.

A correspondent commented that the Iraqi Government, in its letter accepting Security Council resolution 1441, reiterated several times that it had no programme of weapons of mass destruction, and might say the same thing in its declaration.  Would that constitute a falsification or an omission, and therefore “a material breach” of the resolution, as some United State officials think?.

Mr. Blix said that although Iraq had reaffirmed that it had no such programme, it would nevertheless have some time now to check its records.  There could be a change of position, he said.  If, on the other hand, Iraq maintained that position, it would be up to those who had evidence of such a programme to produce such evidence.  If the inspectors came up with evidence, that would be brought to the notice of the Security Council.

Mr. Blix told another correspondent that it was not for the inspectors to make a determination on whether something constituted a “material breach” of the resolution.  An omission would certainly be very serious, he said.  A denial of the access essential to the inspectors, even if for a relatively short time, would be of concern.  Anything that touched upon the Council’s call for unconditional and unrestricted access for the inspection, even if it were a short delay, could be a very significant matter to be evaluated by the Council.

He said the United States Government was determined that there should be

“no cat-and-mouse game”.  Certainly that was something the Council would not tolerate either, he said.

He told a correspondent that the Iraqi declaration would be compared with information from earlier inspections carried out in the country.  If there were suspicions, the monitoring and verification could be stepped up to be more intrusive and the inspections would be more comprehensive.

Asked whether it would be wise for the inspectors to be more provocative, as the Bush Administration would like, he said:  “My master is the Security Council”. To a question on the possibility of Iraqi experts being taken outside the country to be interviewed, he said he had expressed concerns about the practicality of doing that.  He had noted, he said, that the Commission had been given the authority to do it, but not instructions.  ”I think I have said enough of what practical problems there would be in this.  I have not received any instructions to do this.”

He said the inspectors perceived their task as carrying out effective inspection.  He reiterated that “cosmetic” inspections were worse than no inspection.  ”I think it is in the Iraqi interest, too, that there are effective

inspections, otherwise, they would not be credible, and that would be of no use to the Iraqis or anybody else.  This is how I see the Security Council instructions.” 

What would he do with the obstacle of translation into English if documents were to be presented in Arabic and Russian? a correspondent asked.  He replied that he would hire translators.  Would he report to the Council simply on the evidence of omissions?  He said he would, if any were discovered.

How concerned was he about Iraq hiding important weapons and materials underground or in mobile facilities?  He was indeed, he said, concerned, adding that that was why the Council wanted the inspectors to go after them.  The Commission did not assume that that was the case, but it was a possibility that had to be tested.

A correspondent said that Security Council resolution 1441 actually gave a Council member a right to report a violation on the part of Iraq, if there was one.  What would happen if the inspection team said there was no violation? 

Mr. Blix said the question should be directed to the Council.  He added, however, that the inspection team would report factually whatever they saw.  If a Member State had information, it should provide it to the Council.

In response to questions about unannounced inspections, he said that established procedures in the past might be followed.  There were no restrictions on the time or place inspections could be carried out.  They could be done at any time.  The value of the inspections was greater if there was no advance warning, he said.  The timing of visits to selected sites had to be kept confidential.

A correspondent asked whether special instructions had been given to the inspectors to be respectful towards Iraqis, and if so in what manner.  Mr. Blix said that in all the instructions and the courses they had attended, the inspectors had been told to be proper in their work.  That did not mean being timid, he said.

How significant was the task before him?  And how would he rank the present chapter as a milepost of his career?.  “I have my career behind me”, said

Mr. Blix, adding that he saw the task ahead as very significant.  He hoped he could carry it out in a way that would result in the avoidance of war.  He reiterated that the question of war or peace was not in his hands.  He could contribute, he said, but to a large extent, it was up to Iraq.  It was also up to the Council and its members.  “We are in-between, and we’ll try to carry out correct but effective inspections and report very factually to the Security Council.”

What was the greatest challenge facing him?  ”Effective inspection is the challenge”, he said.  “To carry it out on the ground in the best possible manner and with correct reporting.  We are not overstating our capacity, nor understating it.”

Correspondents asked if he was comfortable with the composition of the inspection team, and what percentage of the inspectors was from the United States. He replied that the Commission had trained and engaged people in accordance with

the guidelines given by the Security Council -– that they be competent experts in their field.  The Council had asked that recruitment should be on a geographical basis.  That had been complied with, he said.  The biggest single group on the Commission’s roster were Americans, who numbered over 30.  The French were next. The Russians were also fairly numerous, he said, and added that there was quite a number of Chinese, too.  It was in fact a United Nations mixture, and a balanced composition.  No one had criticized the Commission for it.  The League of Arab States had expressed interest in Arabs being recruited, he said.  There were some, from Jordan, but there had been no nominations from Arab States.  With the interest shown by the League of Arab States, he thought there would be nominations from its members for the next round in January.  The composition of the inspectors would then be even more balanced.

If a member of the Security Council offered information not in the Iraqi declaration, asked a correspondent, would the inspectors go back to verify it, or could the Council accept it as a fact?.  Mr. Blix said he hoped the information would be given to the Commission first.  He said resolution 1441 urged Council members to recommend sites in Iraq the inspectors could visit.

Were there parameters for inspections of mosques during Ramadan, or religious sites?  Had that been done in the past?  Mr. Blix replied there were no sanctuaries.  The Commission was aware of religious sensitivities, and would try to keep them in mind.  But that would not exclude it from going anywhere at any time.

Did he think it was possible for Iraqi experts to be interviewed adequately inside the country, or was the Commission prepared to take them outside if necessary?  He said interviews were an important source of information.  If there were a big weapons programme in Iraq there would be many people engaged in it. The UNSCOM and the IAEA had interviewed a lot of people in the past and learned a great deal.  He was also aware that most of the interviews had gone rather well and without great problems.  There was also quite a number in which the persons interviewed were clearly intimidated by Iraqi representatives.  Hence, there should be the possibility for interviews to be done in private, with the IAEA and the Commission deciding the modalities and the place for them.  The question would be whether in the present atmosphere the Iraqis would be willing to be interviewed alone.  He said he understood the need for the interviews to be carried out abroad.  Defectors had been a very important source of information, and would presumably continue to be so.  His concerns were about the practicality of taking people abroad if the Government was not willing to allow that to happen.

The first team of inspectors is scheduled to arrive in Baghdad on Monday armed with Security Council resolution 1441 which states:  “False statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq -– and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution -- shall constitute a further breach of Iraq’s obligations”.

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