In progress at UNHQ

PRESS CONFERENCE BY UNITED STATES ON SMALL ARMS CONFERENCE

19/07/2001
Press Briefing


PRESS CONFERENCE BY UNITED STATES ON SMALL ARMS CONFERENCE


Lincoln Bloomfield, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, said today that, “heading into the ninth inning on the Small Arms Conference”, he hoped for a political programme of action that responded to those countries seeking to put in place controls to curb the destabilizing and grave humanitarian consequences of the illicit flows of small arms and light weapons.  Each country had a unique political genetic code, he said, but hopefully the shared common interest would produce the desired result.


He told correspondents at a Headquarters press conference that the United States would not sign anything in a multilateral arena that conflicted with the product of its legitimate democratic process.  Any notion of changing the way the country did business was properly addressed in Washington.  That was not an unreasonable position.  By being clear, his delegation could keep the focus on a positive outcome of the Conference, namely, the combined will of several sovereign governments to unite in a commitment to respond to those countries seeking help in averting the instability and grave humanitarian consequences of the illicit arms flows.


The United States could at least say that its system of regulation was the product of a legitimate democratic process and, therefore, “it is content with it, such as it is”.  That was not regarded as an open issue in the present venue or even really as the subject of the Convention.  There had been much debate in Washington and around the country about various aspects of those laws and procedures, and the venue for considering any changes was Washington.  Each sovereign government would also probably take the view that it had the sovereign right to set its own laws and procedures.  A proposal that set the basis for cooperation and encouraged some other governments to return home and start putting in place their own laws and procedures would be acceptable to the United States. 


He said he was hopeful that his delegation could agree with fellow governments on a political programme of action that would help them work more effectively together to address some of the problems associated with the illicit arms flows.  Like many other nations and governments, the United States had been active in addressing sources of tensions and conflict around the world.  And, like many, it had often borne the burdens of seeking to ameliorate crises through political means -- sometimes through peacekeeping and, at times, through the use of force.  It was appropriate, therefore, for those countries to come together to see if they could point their compasses towards more effective cooperation.  That would lead to more success in preventing areas of instability from deteriorating to the point where civil societies found it difficult to function, where political processes broke down, where peacekeeping could not be safely conducted, and where forceful intervention was taken at a very high risk. 


Obviously, the humanitarian consequences of instability in regions of conflict were grave, he said.  There was a great deal of passion on that issue -– a passion, which the United States shared.  His country had come to New York, hopeful that everyone could work together and come away with an agreed political programme of action.  Since his arrival yesterday, he had heard the views of many delegations and tried to help them understand the American positions, which were

well known to the media.  In the end, although time was running out, he had hoped that the result of that important conference would be that the problem of illicit flows of small arms and light weapons could be more effectively addressed.  There were many elements of cooperation that could flow from a successfully concluded programme of action.


He said that his Government would, in any case, continue to work with other governments on a bilateral basis to provide technical assistance, training, and to show how its system worked.  “One size does not fit all”, but his delegation would try to share its Government’s experience with other governments, which were looking for both a mandate and specific advice on ways of curbing the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons.  There were many aspects to addressing that problem, and the United States was already engaged in many of them.  It had applauded similar efforts by other governments and would encourage still more.  That was why his delegation was “working into the wee hours” as the Conference neared its conclusion.  Hopefully, a programme of action could be agreed that was consistent with the well known policies and principles.


Asked for the position of the United States on certain practical measures, such as marking and tracing outlined in the draft outcome document, Mr. Bloomfield said his country’s position had been a reflection of existing laws and regulations.  The United States, like many other countries, had a well established set of laws and regulations, procedures and institutions.  Those had been the result of a democratic process that had reflected the legitimate will of the American people through their representatives in Congress and through the executive branch.  He was not an expert on marking and tracing, and being from the State Department, it was altogether sort of incongruous to talk about domestic matters. 


Nevertheless, he said, there were all kinds of timelines that had to do with record-keeping, particularly with respect to manufacturing, and transfer and sale records.  When it came to the export of weapons, “you’re looking at the guy who signs off on export of military goods and services”, he said.  If there was a question about a weapon that fell into the wrong hands or caused some harm, he was the person to be called.  If it was determined that an “end-user” had passed the weapons into the wrong hands, that buyer would no longer be eligible to receive United States military exports. 


Could he address the implication of the National Rifle Association that the United Nations, through the Conference, was trying to impose global gun control? another correspondent asked. 


He said that any private group that had important interests on any side of the issue could speak for itself.  He would not try to speak for it or any other private group.  He had not known how the programme of action would come out in the end, but the United States had hoped that it would reflect the legitimate purposes of the present endeavour and the commitment and the concern of all of the participants.  It was not easy to get so many countries to work on the same draft and have it come out in a way that clearly reflected those outcomes and intentions, but that was his hope, and he had remained hopeful. 


To a question about whether Mr. Bloomfield’s appearance had been intended to undo the damage caused by John Bolton (Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs of the United States), he said that Under-Secretary of State Bolton, to be straight about this, was part of what had been a very clear and consistent policy position of the United States.  Yes, there were many positions being advocated by different governments that might comport well with their own cultures and histories and experiences, but which might not fit the experiences of others.  That was the way multilateral diplomacy worked among sovereign States.  In the interest of a positive outcome, the United States had tried to signal from the outset its position and to ensure that there was no confusion about it.  Those positions had reflected nothing more and nothing less than a clear recognition of the result of a sovereign democratic process. 


To a question about whether the United States would remain vehemently opposed to the point of blocking consensus on some kind of a follow-up mechanism with a definitive date, he said that that was not the arena whereby positions would be worked out.  His country had stated its position on the notion of a mandatory conference, and had spoken for it.  His country’sview ofwhatthe Conference was abouthad comportedsubstantially with the views of most of the delegations in New York, namely, what could be done together to address the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons flows that contributed to instability and humanitarian grave consequences, mainly in the developing world. 


What was vital here was whether the participants could come together on a political programme of action that successfully captured that message with clarity and without confusion, he added.  What he desired to come next was a lot of action.  In many cases, the programme of action pointed to procedures and mechanisms, which had not existed in many countries.


Were there certain things the United States could and should do following the Conference, with respect to its laws and practices, or were those already at the appropriate level? another correspondent asked.


      He said thatPresident Bush had admonished the Administration not to express arrogance, but the United States had a fairly well established set of export control procedures and mechanisms, and an elaborate set of laws, some of which had been contemplated at his country’s founding.  So there was some history there, and settled law, and there was also a democratic mechanism, which had been the legitimate arena through which any modifications might be considered and agreed. Any sovereign country would certainly be entitled, if not expected, to hold a similar view of their own sovereign prerogatives to set their laws.  He was not boastful about his country’s system, but clear about the fact that it had a system and one that had “cracked down” on violations.  There was always room for improvement anywhere, but the focus legitimately was on those countries that were crying out for some help.


How far had deliberations come in the last couple of days towards addressing his country’s concerns? a correspondent asked.  He said he could not characterize the interior diplomatic process at the United Nations.  He was taking his counsel from the professionals on the delegation, but he was operating in good faith and held out the hope that there would be an action programme of the kind the United Nations had sought from the beginning.


Another correspondent said the perception was that even for non-binding suggestions the United States was willing to block consensus rather than stand back and make a few concessions of its own.  Was there going to be compromise on both sides and what was he asking the others to give up?

He said he would not go into all of the positions, adding that the correspondent was aware of the United States positions.  He had understood that the illicit small arms flows had caused grave harm, particularly in zones of tensions and conflict, and instability.  That had not been just an intellectual concern but a humanitarian one, which had evoked a lot of legitimate passion.  He understood why the atmosphere had been charged -– people were hopeful that from the Conference could come some momentum to do more about the problem than had been done so far, and that it could be a source of encouragement in other capitols.  For Washington, the Conference was a basis on which to engage countries into taking further steps.


Replying to a question about whether the United States had sent a puzzling signal to the world as to who exactly was representing the country here, and what it was trying to say, he said that was the first time he had heard about that confusion.  Regarding the public delegates, there was a long-standing tradition in the United States to invite prominent citizens to certain negotiations to allow them to contribute their perspectives to the delegation.  The head of his delegation was Ambassador Don McConnell, from beginning to end.  Under-Secretary Bolton had been available for the plenary address, while he, himself, had been in Asia.  There was no magic about who was here.  Mr. Bolton was in Italy this week with the United States Secretary of State and the President.  That was how it had been scheduled.


Mali was pursuing an agreement now on voluntary marking and tracing, which had been characterized as a fallback to reaching consensus, another correspondent noted.  Was that something that the United States would support? he asked.


He said his country’s views were already clear and consistent and on the record, and that was the answer to that question.  He looked forward to meeting with that group of countries to hearing their views on the issue.


Asked whether it was the position of the United States that the entire section in the draft outcome document on national measures should be deleted, he said he had not wanted to speak about the text with any specificity.  What was being discussed at the United Nations, however, was the voluntary coming together of Member States, each of which had a unique political genetic code and set of concerns.  The hope was that the shared common interest would enable the elaboration of a programme of action that would motivate productive cooperation in the areas of concern. 


He said there was a “need to keep our eye on the problem”, which was the horrendous consequences of instability and the role that illicit flow of small arms and light weapons could have in making it difficult to address the challenges posed by the instability.  His Government had very robust activities aimed at anticipating and addressing areas of crisis.  When things went wrong, his phone rang, and more often than not, his staff responded.  If the unfortunate ambiguities that had resonated in the process could be eliminated, “we could come to something, which everyone could support”, he said. 


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For information media. Not an official record.