PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL CONNOR ON LEBANON VIDEOTAPES

The Under-Secretary-General for Management, Joseph E. Connor, this afternoon briefed correspondents on the outcome of a United Nations internal investigation into the facts surrounding the videotape taken by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on 8 October 2000, a day after the abduction of three Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah; the subsequent handling of the videotape; and exchanges with the Israeli Government.

“Let me be clear” - he told the press at a Headquarters press briefing today –- “the United Nations did not find any videotape of the actual abduction.”  While mistakes had been made by United Nations officials in the subsequent handling of the 8 October videotape, they should be seen as lapses in judgement and failures to communicate -- not as conspiracies or bad faith.  No evidence had been found of a cover-up by high United Nations officials of the existence and content of visual records of 7 and 8 October, Mr. Connor said, but a proper balance had not been kept between the mission's operational and humanitarian responsibilities. 

Also responding to correspondents’ questions this afternoon were the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Fred Eckhard, and Keith Walton of the Department of Management and a member of the investigation team led by Mr. Connor.

A small team had conducted interviews in UNIFIL's area of operation, Ghana, and New York, and reviewed all relevant documentation, Mr. Connor said.  Written questions were sent to Indian peacekeepers who had returned to India at the end of last year.  The Governments of Israel and Lebanon were also invited to make submissions.

While the United Nations had not found any videotape of the actual abduction, he said, a videotape was filmed by the Indian battalion one day later, on 8 October, at a different location.  Also, during the investigation, the existence of another videotape was brought to the team's attention.  This tape, made on 7 October 2000, shows the shelling of Israeli posts a few kilometres from the abduction site, as well as activity in a UNIFIL shelter.  Headquarters did not know about the existence of this videotape until 16 July 2001.  The investigation was unable to determine who taped the video.  Also obtained by the team were a number of 35 mm and digital photographs taken by United Nations peacekeepers on

8 October.

Presenting the highlights of his report on the investigation, Mr. Connor further said that it contained a detailed reconstruction of events, as well as the team's analysis of how the tape was handled in the field and at Headquarters.

      Just after noon on Saturday, 7 October, he said, Hezbollah had launched a well planned, daring raid across the Blue Line to capture three Israeli soldiers, Adi Avitan, Benny Avraham and Omar Swaid, about three kilometres south of Shebaa village in southern Lebanon.  The abduction took place under the cover of a smoke screen and a 45-minute barrage of mortar and rocket fire directed against nearby Israeli positions.  Later that day, a UNIFIL patrol noticedtwo vehicles approximately seven kilometres from the scene of the abduction.  Neither vehicle

belonged to the United Nations.  Inside the vehicles, the patrol was able to seefake and unused UNIFIL number plates, a United Nations flag, antennae, United Nations stickers and other United Nations items.  The patrol also saw three explosive devices and traces of blood.

Early the next day, Sunday, UNIFIL’s Indian Battalion mounted a vehicle-recovery operation, Mr. Connor continued.  UNIFIL peacekeepers, under instruction from a senior officer, catalogued the items and filmed the retrieval of the two vehicles, using both videotape and photography.  As UNIFIL was transporting the vehicles, armed Hezbollah personnel stopped the convoy and demanded the vehicles.  The convoy was detained for over one hour.  On orders from the Force Commander, the recovered vehicles were then turned over to Hezbollah to avoid confrontation and because they were not United Nations property.

      Over the next few months, various meetings took place between the United Nations and Israel.  At these meetings, Israeli officials requested information that could have a bearing on the condition of their soldiers.  Senior UNIFIL officials shared information about what had been recovered and what had transpired on 8 October, but did not inform them about the existence of a videotape.  They did not consider the videotape to be of primary importance when viewed against concerns about the possible illegal use of United Nations items in the vehicles during the abduction.

The Israeli authorities asked repeatedly for any humanitarian information that could shed light on the condition of their soldiers.  On 29 June 2001, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guèhenno, informed Israel that the United Nations was in possession of a videotape.  Senior and current Personal Representatives in Lebanon -- Mr. Knuttson and Mr. Staffan di Mistura; the Special Coordinator to the Middle East Peace Process, Terje Roed-Larsen; and Under-Secretary-General Guèhenno -- were not aware of the existence of any videotape when they made their denials to the Israeli authorities before

29 June.

Summing up the investigation team’s findings, Mr. Connor reiterated that UNIFIL personnel did not witness the abduction of the three Israeli soldiers, and the United Nations did not find any videotape of the actual abduction.  He had also found no indication of collusion with Hezbollah by any component of UNIFIL.  The steps taken to retrieve the vehicles and to secure the items were adequate, and in conformity with a peacekeeping mission's standard operating procedures.  Senior UNIFIL officers conducted their operations with the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers foremost in their minds and consistent with their mandate.

However, United Nations officials, at Headquarters and in the field, had made mistakes.  The failure to inform Headquarters adequately and in a timely manner contributed to miscommunications between the field and Headquarters and between the United Nations and Member States.  There was also a tendency by some senior United Nations officials to overprotect information or, at a minimum, not to disclose it to their superiors in the belief that their judgement alone was correct.  There also appeared to have been a too-rigid interpretation of what information could be shared with the parties.  Those failings had left colleagues and senior officials unaware of key developments which could have had important political implications.

When General Obeng, the Force Commander of UNIFIL, visited Headquarters in May this year, he provided a senior and experienced Department of Peacekeeping Operations official with a copy of the 8 October videotape.  The assessment of the Peacekeeping Department official was that the videotape did not shed any new information on the condition of the Israeli soldiers, and its existence should not be disclosed to any party.  The official also did not consider that the United Nations was under an obligation to share every last item of information with parties in conflict.  Other senior officials, who viewed the videotape in early July, shared that view.

On 11 July, as a result of the launching of the fact-finding investigation, the Acting Force Commander of UNIFIL, General Athmanathan, learned of the existence of another videotape and additional photographs, Mr. Connor said.  The second videotape showed the shelling of Israeli posts at the time of the abduction, but it did not show the abduction itself.  The tape had been in the possession of UNIFIL for several months before its existence was reported to Headquarters. 

Although viewing the tapes by themselves did not give much indication of the extent of the injuries, an on-site military assessment of the abduction operation contained a passing reference to the possible condition of the occupants of the vehicles.  That assessment had not been passed to Headquarters, as it was not considered significant in operational terms.

On the basis of what the investigative team has seen and heard, he concluded, the mistakes made by United Nations officials should be seen as lapses in judgement and failures to communicate, not as conspiracies or bad faith.

Turning to the major issues involved in the investigation, Mr. Connor said that, emphatically, the facts did not show the existence of any cover-up by high United Nations officials of the existence and content of audiovisual tapes of the events of 7 and 8 October.  There were faulty judgements, made by those lower down on the organizational chart, which had choked off the flow of important information to those who had a reason to know.  As a result, a Member State was unintentionally misled.

As for the question whether relevant internal records had been destroyed to obfuscate the real picture of events, he said that, emphatically, they had not. The facts had convinced his team that under the established Standard Operating Procedure, for security purposes, information was progressively moved from temporary electronic storage, where it could be compromised, to more permanent and secure storage.  Instances reported to the team concerning the destruction of photographic negatives and possible attempts to delete electronic files conformed to that policy.

He asked, however, whether a proper balance had been kept between operational responsibilities and humanitarian responsibilities.  Regrettably, it had not.  In the field, operational considerations were paramount.  Humanitarian issues had been put aside or not considered.  There was a failure.  Specifically, UNIFIL’s assessment of the physical condition of those at the abduction site had not been communicated to a Member State.

Then, Mr. Eckhard read the following statement, attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General:

“The Secretary-General has read the report of Mr. Connor's investigation team with great care.  He accepts its findings and has authorized the release of the report to the press.

“It is clear that serious errors of judgement were made, in particular, by those who failed to convey information to the Israelis which would have been helpful in an assessment of the conditions of the three abducted soldiers.  The Secretary-General regrets this error.  He repeats his offer to show to the Governments of Israel and Lebanon an edited version of the videotape made on

8 October.  He now extends this offer to cover the videotape of 7 October, which the investigation has uncovered, and is also willing to show these two Governments items recovered from the vehicles which may have a bearing on the condition of the soldiers.

“The report also reveals serious shortcomings in internal communications within the United Nations, and the way procedures for handling sensitive information are applied.  The Secretary-General will now take administrative measures, including measures to tighten up these procedures, with a view to ensuring that such lapses in assessment and communication –- within the United Nations chain of command and between the United Nations and Member Governments –- do not recur.

“Finally, the Secretary-General wishes once more to express his indignation at the use of United Nations equipment and insignia in the abduction.  He regards this as a very serious matter, which he continues to pursue with the Government of Lebanon.”

If it was standard procedure to make videotapes, a correspondent asked why hadn’t anyone “higher up” asked if such a tape had been made.

Mr. Connor replied that the Force Commander was aware of that.  It was, indeed, standard procedure to tape-record such incidents as the one that had occurred in October.  The Deputy Force Commander had specifically ordered the taping of events on 8 October.

Asked if the Force Commander and his Deputy had been “the break in the chain”, Mr. Connor repeated that the Deputy Force Commander had ordered the taping, specifically.  General Obeng knew about it, and, of course, he had turned in the tape at the end of his tour. 

A correspondent asked -– in view of the fact that information about the fate of the abductees changed with each succeeding United Nations report -– why Israel should believe in the good faith of the United Nations.  Mr. Connor said that the discovery of blood on several objects found on the site of the incident was “a major finding”.  The Deputy Force Commander had provided that information to the Force Commander on the second day after the event.  However, the focus was on operational information.  The information was not considered from the humanitarian point of view, and that, of course, was one of the statements of fact reflected in the investigators’ report.  That was a finding of fact developed by half-a-dozen people with deep knowledge of operating procedures in the field.  He hoped that the Secretary-General would act appropriately on those facts. 

A correspondent said that in the last press briefing by Mr. Guèhenno, he had indicated that the amount of blood was insignificant.  As a result of the investigation, were there grounds to believe now that the three soldiers might have perished in the attack?

Mr. Connor replied that a viewing of the tape revealed traces of blood.  In his report, the Deputy Field Commander, however, had mentioned more than just traces -- he had seen major blood deposits.  As a result, there was a difference in the way Mr. Guèhenno and the investigative team had reacted to the situation. 

Asked about the items retrieved from the vehicles, he said that they were very clearly a mixture of simulated and real United Nations material.  The traces of blood appeared on a number of those items.

Responding to a question about a civilian and a Lebanese military official who had approached the UNIFIL officials, Mr. Connor said that the correspondent was referring to a side event that appeared in a four-line entry in a fairly lengthy report.  That was not a major event.  Told that they would not be given control of the vehicles, the people in question had gone home.  The investigators had never even thought of any collusion between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Government, which was party to the Blue Line agreement.

As the points of view of various United Nations officials had differed so far, might another investigative committee “find that your approach was not correct”? a correspondent asked.  Also, because of the humanitarian considerations involved, why not give the Israeli authorities access to what the United Nations possessed so that they could assess it on their own?

Mr. Connor answered that, as fact-finders, the members of his team had developed a sequence of events for the Secretary-General to consider.  The team consisted of knowledgeable people who were prepared to identify the facts as they saw them.  A lot of the results were based on talking to one group of people and comparing what they said with what another group of people said.  He believed that such a methodology was “pretty good”.  He had been doing investigations for a long time, and he was satisfied at this point.  The team had done what it had been asked to do -- present a compilation of the facts and make “the most forthright statement we can”.

Asked why United Nations officials had told Israel for months that there was no videotape -– even though taking pictures and making videotapes were part of standard procedure -- he reiterated that they had been unaware there was a tape.

In response to a question about the timing of “conveying information up and down the chain of command”, Mr. Connor said that the Secretary-General was not informed about the tape until 26 June.  In his press briefing on the matter on

6 July, Mr. Guèhenno was only evaluating the information that he had.  He could not explain why the information had not been put included in Mr. Guèhenno’s briefing notes.

Asked whether officials from Israel and Lebanon had been interviewed by the investigators, he explained that the investigation was conceived as an internal one.  During its start-up phase, the Israeli delegation had asked if it could submit a paper, and received a positive response.  The same course was proposed to the Lebanese Government, which chose not to submit a paper.  The Israelis presented their paper around 27June.

A correspondent asked whether the investigation was now finished as far as the United Nations was concerned.  Mr. Connor replied that his fact-finding mission was over.  It had made its findings available to the Secretary-General.

Mr. Eckhard then added that his statement indicated in a general way the action that had already been taken by the Secretary-General and the Peacekeeping Department.

Recalling a statement in the report to the effect that the United Nations items found in the vehicles had apparently not been used in the kidnapping, a correspondent said that she had trouble understanding why it was assumed that they were not used, rather than that they could have been used.

Mr. Connor replied that the backings were still on the stickers, so they could not have been used.  As for the other items, they bore no traces of body odour.  The team had seen no instances in which the items  had been used.  As for the vehicles, they were wrecked.  The United Nations staff had removed a lot of the items, which were then brought back to New York.  As what was left had later been taken away from the United Nations, it was fortunate that many objects had been retrieved in time.

Asked if the items taken out of the vehicles would be handed to the Israelis for testing or examination, Mr. Eckhard said that those that had any relevance to humanitarian concerns (in other words, those that had blood traces on them) could be viewed by either the Israelis or the Lebanese.  He assumed that it was the Israelis who would want to see them.  If they wanted to conduct blood tests, the United Nations would arrange for a way to do that through the World Health Organization (WHO).

Mr. Connor added that seven of those items were in New York, and the rest were held under security arrangements.  Those were the ones with the blood on them.

In response to several other questions regarding the items retrieved,

Mr. Connor said that the remaining items were under safekeeping at UNIFIL headquarters.  Among the items with traces of blood on them were car mats and belts.  No testing of the items had been made at United Nations Headquarters.  No assumptions were being made as to whether those items had been used in the abduction.  There had also been traces of blood on the vehicles themselves, but, as he had already mentioned, the vehicles had been taken from UNIFIL by armed Hezbollah personnel.  The Secretary-General had decided that he would offer an opportunity to the Israeli and Lebanese Governments to view those items.

Asked if it was true that the United Nations had no idea whose blood was on the items, Mr. Connor said that was correct.  The items had been identified as having blood on them.  Beyond that, nothing had been done.  There might be follow-up action between the United Nations and the Israeli Government, but that was to be decided.

Regarding blood testing under WHO auspices, Mr. Eckhard said that he had mentioned it as a possibility in the event that one or the other Government said it wanted to test the blood and match it against its national records.  That would be done through a third party.

From the security point of view, said a correspondent, what steps were being taken to get to the bottom of a situation where United Nations items had been found in somebody else’s possession?

Mr. Connor replied that, upon discovery of those items, an immediate and forceful representation had been made to the Lebanese Government.  Corrective actions would come out of what the Secretary-General had said.  He was glad the question had been asked, however, for regardless of the investigators’ conclusions regarding the lack of balance between humanitarian and operational concerns, there was genuine concern about the possible use of United Nations designations, which was a violation of international law.

Mr. Walton added that possible or intended use of simulated materials represented a specific violation of the first Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.

Asked to respond to the question about “corrective actions”, Mr. Eckhard said he believed Mr. Connor had already answered it:  a strong representation had been made to the Lebanese Government.  What more could the United Nations do?

A correspondent commented that in talking about the tapes, it was important to remember that the main issue of concern was the three abducted Israeli soldiers.  However, nobody was talking about hundreds of Lebanese citizens who, according to Lebanese sources, had been kidnapped and detained by Israel.  The question could be resolved by Israel and Lebanon through an exchange of prisoners.

Mr. Eckhard said that he was not sure he had understood the question.  He would just say that the Secretary-General had raised the matter of 17 Lebanese prisoners when he visited Israel. 

Mr. Connor added that Hezbollah had announced that the exchange of those prisoners was among its objectives.

Asked if the Israeli Government had been informed that the soldiers might have been killed, Mr. Walton said that the report of the investigation group had, for the first time, produced a military assessment on the spot of the extent of possible injuries to occupants of the vehicle.  The initial determination of the Deputy Force Commander had been made to the Force Commander, who did not report that specific characterization in his security report sent to New York.

Mr. Connor said that the Israelis had been advised about the existence of the 8 October tape almost as soon as the United Nations at the highest level knew about it.

Asked if any disciplinary action would be taken against any United Nations officials, Mr. Eckhard said that he did not think the Secretary-General had made any final decisions in that respect, but he expected that some action would be taken at the personnel level.  Right now, he was not prepared to say what that action would be.

A correspondent then asked why General Obeng, during his meetings with the Israeli officials, had not told them about the tapes.

Mr. Connor replied that, following the October events, there had been frequent meetings with designated Israeli representatives, but their focus had not

been on the videotape at all.  It was on the exchange of some operational materials.  The Israeli officials had not asked about the tape at that point.  The tapes had become an issue only when Israel’s Permanent Representative had written to the Secretary-General in March.

A correspondent mentioned references to an unknown civilian cameraman and asked whether the possibility of such a presence worried the United Nations. 

Mr. Connor said that on 8 October there had been reports about “a wandering cameraman”.  But it was not unusual to see somebody recording events.  No concerns had been raised by the military at that time. 

Another member of the press said that, so far, reference had been made to three out of seven items with traces of blood on them.  Was there any reason for withholding information about the other four?

Mr. Connor replied that the seven items were a package.  What happened with one would happen with all seven.  The issue was not the number of items.  If there was an agreement, all of them would be subjected to further examination. 

“But what are the items?” the correspondent wanted to know.

Mr. Connor said he did not think he had any more details on the question, but all the items were of the same general type.

Asked if the United Nations was resisting handing the items over to Israel or sharing them, he said he was unaware that the Israelis had raised any questions about the items.  As they would be reading the report, they might raise such issues in the future.

To a further question, Mr. Connor said that Mr. Guèhenno’s assessment of the situation predated the discovery by the investigative team of the statement by the Deputy Force Commander.  Mr. Guèhenno had no knowledge of it.

Asked if the statement was not in the original report, Mr. Connor said that that was exactly the point he was trying to make.  No -– it was not in the original report.  Nobody in New York was aware of the Deputy Commander’s report. 

Asked whether the investigating team had come across any information indicating what had happened to the three soldiers, he said that it had not. 

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