REVIEW CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO NPT TO OPEN 24 APRIL
Press Release
DC/2691
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO NPT TO OPEN 24 APRIL
20000420 Background ReleaseThe 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), set to begin on Monday 24 April, is regarded as a pivotal moment for the Treaty, hinging on the parties' perception about whether it meets their national and global security needs in the new security environment.
The 1968 Treaty, to which 188 States belong, underscores the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war, and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a course and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples. Aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and furthering the goal of nuclear disarmament, the NPT consists of a series of mutually reinforcing and legally binding obligations committing non-nuclear- weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons, and committing the five recognized nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith.
These obligations are accompanied by a system of international safeguards, as well as assurances guarding the right of all States parties to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The Treaty's authors created periodic reviews to assess its implementation, and stipulated that a conference on its future would be held 25 years after its entry into force, given the reluctance in 1968 of some non-nuclear-weapon States to accept a non-proliferation instrument of indefinite duration. At the last review, in 1995, the parties agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely as part of a package of decisions that included a strengthened review process and a set of principles and objectives for non- proliferation and disarmament. Also agreed was a resolution on the Middle East, calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone there.
Earlier this month, the Secretary-General warned the General Assembly upon presentation of his Millennium report that the disarmament agenda had lost momentum in an "alarming" way since 1995. The forthcoming Review Conference would likely be a "depressing affair" unless all parties, including the nuclear- weapon States, were ready for a real effort, he said. To his Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, he said it was hard to approach the Conference with much optimism, given the discouraging list of nuclear disarmament measures in suspense, negotiations not initiated and opportunities not taken. Among those he cited the increasing likelihood of the deployment of ballistic missile defence systems, the growing number of countries with nuclear-weapon capability, and the high alert status of nuclear weapons in several States.
Then, on 14 April, the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), the second of two treaties by which the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to significantly reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The
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1993 Treaty provides for the elimination of heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) and all other multiple-warhead ICBMs, as well as a two-thirds reduction of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides. START II was approved by the United States Senate in 1996. Its entry into force will allow negotiations to begin on further reductions under START III.
In a swift response, the Spokesman for the Secretary-General welcomed the ratification on the Secretary-General's behalf, and commended Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin for having taken that important step. The long-awaited development would likely provide a fresh impetus to nuclear disarmament efforts, and will have a positive effect on the forthcoming 2000 NPT Review Conference, he said. Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala told correspondents at a Headquarters press conference that, notwithstanding the conditions imposed on it, the ratification by the Duma helped relieve some of the gloom surrounding the Conference and would help to answer some of the criticism regarding nuclear disarmament. That long-awaited move -- which calls for cutting the American and Russian nuclear arsenals in half -- helped to open the doors for START III negotiations to begin.
The views expressed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, as well as recent developments, will set the stage for the forthcoming deliberations. At the last Review Conference, some States parties noted with grave concern the nuclear collaboration among certain nuclear-weapon States parties with certain non-States parties, under regional arrangements. Others held that no collaboration had occurred that was incompatible with the Treaty. At the same time, concern was expressed that the nuclear programmes of certain non-States parties -- particularly in the Middle East and South Asia -- might have led them to obtain, or seek to obtain, a nuclear weapons capability. Similar concern had been expressed at prior Review Conferences. The Treaty parties reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in any form, would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war, adding that scrupulous and unreserved compliance was vital.
Nevertheless, in May 1998, India and then Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, marking the first time in the history of the NPT that any State -- even such non-parties -- had departed from the established norm and gone nuclear. Despite negotiations aimed at encouraging those countries to join the Treaty, they continue to reject what they perceive to be its inherently discriminatory features -- in particular, its distinction between the rights and obligations of nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Under-Secretary-General Dhanapala called the South Asian tests a blow to the reasonable expectations of the 182 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Yet, despite the tests, he said there remains broad and deep international support for the global non-proliferation norms found in articles I and II of the Treaty, reassuring amid the waves of pessimism and fatalism that immediately followed these tests", he added.
According to a report of the Secretariat, the States parties agreed in 1995 that the Treaty's implementation depended on the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them, and pursuit by all States, of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Progress in this area has been limited, as long-standing differences over substantive as well as overall procedural questions continued to prevent multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. The voting in the General Assembly on annual resolutions on various aspects of nuclear disarmament has revealed deeply rooted divergences, reflecting strategic doctrines and national security perceptions. Differences also remained over the pace, form and ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament negotiations. The critical issue in the debates was whether to proceed on a multilateral or on a bilateral basis in negotiating nuclear disarmament.
The success of the Review Conference will likely depend on narrowing those differences and revitalizing global efforts towards full realization of the NPT. More than 50 years have passed since the world entered the nuclear age. Another report before the Conference highlights the tremendous challenge posed by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby reducing nuclear dangers, while guaranteeing the universal application of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has become the cornerstone of efforts by the international community to meet that challenge, it notes.
Main Developments since 1995
Nine additional States have acceded to the NPT: Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. Four States remain outside the Treaty: Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan.
In June 1998, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1172 (1998), which urged India, Pakistan, and all other States that have not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT without delay and without conditions.
The first measure agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference had been the completion of a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996. On 24 September 1996, the CTBT was opened for signature. It has been signed by 155 States, including all five nuclear-weapon States, and ratified by 51 States. However, not all the States whose ratification is required for its entry into force have done so, including the United States which rejected ratification last fall.
At a Conference to facilitate the Treatys operation, held in Vienna in October 1999, a Final Declaration called on all signatory States to ratify the CTBT as soon as possible, and urged those States whose ratification was required for its operation to do so. Meanwhile, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) has been at work in Vienna since March 1997 to carry out the necessary preparations for the Treatys effective implementation. It has concentrated on establishing an effective global verification regime.
The second and third measures agreed upon in 1995 in the nuclear disarmament programme have not been realized. Negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons have not yet begun in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. Progress towards further reductions in nuclear weapons remains limited, although ratification by the Russian Federation of the START II Treaty will further that goal. Still, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs asserts that the absence of global negotiations on nuclear disarmament remains a source of disappointment and concern.
Concern since 1995 over non-compliance with the safeguards provisions of the NPT has continued, especially in view of the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains unable to verify that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea has been declared to the Agency. The IAEA is also still unable to carry out its Security Council-mandated responsibilities with regard to Iraq.
Two further treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and Africa (Pelindaba Treaty) have been signed, and the former has entered into force. Negotiations are under way on a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. There has been little progress with respect to the implementation of the proposals on establishing such a zone in the Middle East.
Treaty Obligations
Article I concerns the commitment of each nuclear-weapon State party not to transfer to other countries nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, or control over such weapons.
Article II concerns the commitment of each non-nuclear-weapon State party not to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in their manufacture.
Article III concerns the acceptance by each non-nuclear-weapon State party of IAEA safeguards, including for fissionable material, in all peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party undertakes not to provide equipment or material designed for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the material is subject to the safeguards required by this article. The safeguards are designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.
Article IV concerns the inalienable right of all the parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.
Article V concerns the commitments of each party to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties on a non-discriminatory basis, and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible.
Article VI concerns the obligation of each party to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII concerns the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII concerns the right of any party to propose amendments to the Treaty. Any amendment must be approved by a majority of all parties, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States parties and all other parties which, on the date of the amendment's circulation, are members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. Also, five years after the Treaty's entry into force, a review conference of parties will be held in Geneva.
Article IX concerns the signing and ratification processes.
Article X concerns the right of each party in exercising its national sovereignty to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Also, 25 years after the Treaty's entry into force, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period, the decision to be taken by a majority of the Treaty parties.
Article XI concerns the deposit of the Treaty in English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese in the archives of the Depositary of governments.
The Treaty was done in triplicate, in London, Moscow and Washington, D.C., 1 July 1968.
Preparations for Conference
Five review conferences have taken place since the Treaty became operational. Each has sought to assess its implementation and recommend measures to strengthen it. Agreement on a final declaration was reached during the 1975 and 1985 Conferences, but was eluded at the review sessions in 1980 and 1990. In 1980, concern was expressed about the increasing capability of some non-parties to the Treaty to develop nuclear weapons; in 1990, deep concern was expressed that the national nuclear programmes of some States not party to the Treaty might lead them to develop a nuclear-weapon capability. The Final Declaration, adopted by consensus at the 1985 Review Conference, stated that one of the primary objectives of the Treaty, namely fulfilment by nuclear-weapon States parties of their obligations under articles I and II, had been achieved in the period under review. However, deep concern was also expressed about the acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability by some States not party to the Treaty.
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted the following decisions: extension of the NPT; strengthening the review process; principles and objectives for nuclear-non-proliferation and disarmament; and a resolution on the Middle East. No final declaration on the review of the Treaty's operation was adopted. The Conference welcomed the accession of 38 States since 1990, and noted that the vast majority of Member States, including all five nuclear-weapon States, had become parties. Also, States reaffirmed their conviction that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in any form, would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. They acknowledged that both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States had fulfilled their obligations under articles I and II, and underlined the vital need for scrupulous and unreserved compliance with their respective obligations. At the same time, serious concern was expressed that the nuclear programmes of some States non-parties might, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, have led them to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.
In preparation for the 2000 Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee held three sessions: in New York from 7 to 18 April 1997; in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May 1998; and in New York from 10 to 21 May 1999. It devoted most of its meetings to a substantive preparation of the Conference and considered principles, ways and means for implementation of the Treaty and the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995. The Committee was unable to reach agreement, however, on any substantive recommendation to the 2000 Conference.
It was agreed that three Main Committees of the Conference will review specific aspects of the Treaty. Main Committee I will consider the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security, including security assurances. Main Committee II will consider the implementation of the Treaty provisions relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Main Committee III will consider the implementation of provisions relating to the inalienable rights of all parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Among the issues expected to be considered at length, in view of recent developments, are: universality, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, and safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Summary of Reports
The following reports of the Secretariat will be before the Conference: the final report of the Preparatory Committee (document NPT/CONF.2000/1*); implementation of the tenth preambular paragraph on the CTBT (document NPT/Conf.2000/2); implementation of articles I and II and developments since 1995 (document NPT/CONF.2000/3); article VI (document NPT/CONF.2000/4); article VII (document NPT/CONF.2000/5); developments regarding security assurances (document NPT/CONF.2000/6); implementation of the resolution on the Middle East (document NPT/CONF.2000/7); realization of the Treaty goals (NPT/CONF.2000/*); activities of the IAEA relevant to article III (document NPTA/CONF.2000/9); activities of the IAEA relevant to article IV (document NPT/Conf.2000/10); and activities of the IAEA relevant to article V (document NPT/CONF.2000/11).
The Conference will also have before it a memorandum from the General Secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (document NPT/CONF.2000/12), a memorandum from the Secretariat of the South Pacific nuclear-free-zone treaty (document NPT/CONF.2000/13); a memorandum from the Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity on activities related to the Pelindaba Treaty (document NPT/CONF.2000/14); and a memorandum from the depositary of the Bangkok Treaty (document NPT/CONF.2000/15).
The final report of the Preparatory Committee (document NPT/CONF.2000/1*) reviews such items as the substantive work of the Committee, proposals submitted by delegations concerning the Chairmans working paper of 14 May 1999, and draft rules of procedure, including voting procedures.
On voting, the report recalls that the task of the Conference is to review the Treatys operation with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the Treatys provisions are being realized. To strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted. If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for 48 hours. During this period he shall make every effort, with the assistance of the General Committee, to facilitate general agreement, and report to the Conference prior to the end of the period.
The report states that, if by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement, voting will take place and decisions will be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, provided that such a majority includes at least a majority of the States participating in the Conference. If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the Conference President will make the ruling. An appeal against this ruling will immediately be put to the vote, and the Presidents ruling will stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representatives present and voting. In cases where a vote is taken, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting in the General Assembly will apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.
[The General Committee is composed of the Conference President, thirty- four Vice-Presidents, the Chairmen of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee, and the Credentials Committee.]
The report on implementation of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (document NPT/Conf.2000/2) states that the question of nuclear-weapon-test explosions represents one of the longest-standing issues on the global disarmament agenda. At the time of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, three treaties on nuclear testing, none comprehensive, were in force: the multilateral Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), and two bilateral treaties on limitation of yields of nuclear tests for military and peaceful purposes between the former Soviet Union and the United States (respectively 1974 and 1976). The subject of a comprehensive test-ban treaty received prominent attention. Indeed, it was decided that such a treaty should be completed no later than 1996.
The report recalls that following intensive negotiations in the Geneva- based Conference on Disarmament, a draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test- ban emerged. The Indian delegation would not join consensus, however, insisting that the text was only a nuclear-weapon-test explosion ban treaty, and was not comprehensive. That left open the possibility of non-explosive testing and thus the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, risking another nuclear weapons technology race, it said. On 22 August 1996, the Australian Ambassador requested the President of the fiftieth General Assembly session to convene a plenary meeting to consider and take action on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. It also submitted as an official document of the Assembly a draft text identical to the one negotiated in Geneva.
On 10 September, the report recalls the Assemblys adoption of a draft resolution endorsing the treaty by a vote of 158 in favour to 3 against, with 5 abstentions. Following the vote, the Indian delegation declared that it would never sign this unequal treaty; Libya expressed the view that it fell short of the complete and comprehensive elimination of all nuclear weapons and tests. On 24 September, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature. It would enter into force 180 days after ratification by 44 States listed in its annex. To date, the Treaty has been signed by 155 countries and ratified by 54. Of the 44 States whose signature and ratification are required, 28 have ratified it, including France and the United Kingdom. The Treaty creates an international norm against testing and obliges signatory States to refrain from acts that would defeat its object and purpose in the meantime.
The report states that, in November, a text on establishing a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was approved. Its purpose was to carry out preparations for implementation of the Treaty and prepare for the first session of the Conference of States Parties. The Preparatory Commission took up its work in Vienna on 17 March 1997. Since then, it has concentrated on establishing the global verification regime mandated by the Treaty to verify compliance with the global prohibition on nuclear explosive testing. The regime will consist of an International Monitoring System, a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. Upon the Treatys entry into force, the global verification regime has to meet the Treatys verification requirements.
Also according to the report, on 11 and 13 May 1998, India announced that it had conducted five underground nuclear-test explosions. Pakistan then announced, on 28 and 30 May, that it had conducted six nuclear tests. The tests were the first since the opening for signature of the CTBT and the de facto moratorium on nuclear testing that had been in existence since then. There was considerable concern about the effects of these developments on the long-term viability of the non-proliferation regime and international peace and stability, at both regional and global levels. As part of the broad international response, the Security Council, on 6 June 1998, adopted resolution 1172 (1998), by which it recognized that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constituted a serious threat to global efforts towards non-proliferation and disarmament, and urged those countries and all others that had not yet done so to become parties to both the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions.
The report notes that both India and Pakistan rejected the resolution: India argued that it was coercive and unhelpful, and that a global and comprehensive approach towards the adoption of a nuclear weapons convention in the shortest possible time was essential; Pakistan stressed that it would expect the Council to address the issues related to promoting nuclear restraint and stabilization measures between itself and India. Since the testing, both countries have announced unilateral moratoriums. India also conveyed its willingness to explore ways and means of converting that undertaking into a de jure obligation. Both have agreed to participate in negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. They have also engaged in bilateral discussions on the issues with key interlocutors. Moreover, India offered to enter into discussions on an agreement on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has indicated readiness to engage with India and other members of the international community to formalize its moratorium, and to reach agreement with India on a bilateral nuclear-test ban or a wider ban involving other countries in the region.
The CTBT stipulates that if it has not become operational three years after its opening for signature, the Secretary-General will convene a conference at the request of a majority of ratifying States. Thus, in October 1999, a Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty was held in Vienna. A Final Declaration, adopted by consensus, reflects the unanimous agreement of the participants on the steps required to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty, and ultimately achieve its universality. Nevertheless, on 13 October 1999, the United States Senate rejected ratification of the CTBT. Following the vote, United States President William Clinton stressed that with the Senate vote, the United States had taken a detour, but that eventually it would ratify the Treaty. At the deliberations during the fifty-fourth General Assembly session, Member States expressed concern about the Senates rejection of the CTBT, and viewed it as a serious setback to multilateral efforts to further strengthen the nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament regimes.
The report on articles I and II (document NPT/CONF.2000/3), concerning the obligations of nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States parties, recalls the Final Declaration adopted at the first and second Review Conferences (1975,1980), which asserts that the obligations under articles I and II have been faithfully observed by all parties. At the Third Review Conference (1985), the Final Declaration reiterated that strict observance of those articles remained central to preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the NPTs vital contribution to peace and security. The Conference acknowledged in 1985 that the declarations under articles I and II had been met. At the same time, it expressed deep concern that the national nuclear programmes of some States not party to the Treaty might lead them to obtain a nuclear-weapon capability. In that connection, it stated that any further detonation of a nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclear-weapon State would constitute a most serious breach of the non-proliferation objective.
No Final Declaration was adopted at the Fourth Review Conference, the report continues. Participants once again recognized that full and effective implementation of the Treaty would play a major role in promoting international peace and security. They reaffirmed their determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would lessen the security of all States and increase the risk of nuclear war. Despite declarations by the nuclear- weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States that they had fulfilled their obligations under articles I and II, deep concern was expressed once again that the national nuclear programmes of some States not party to the Treaty might lead them to develop a nuclear-weapon capability.
Also according to the report, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted the following decisions on 11 May indefinitely extending the NPT; strengthening its review process; principles and objectives for nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament; and a resolution on the Middle East. No final declaration was adopted. The Conference welcomed the accession of 38 States to the NPT since 1990, and noted with satisfaction that the vast majority of United Nations Member States, including all five nuclear-weapon States, had become parties. It also noted with satisfaction the significant contribution of those States to nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of regional and global security. The Conference called on non-parties to accede to the NPT without delay, and remained convinced that full compliance and universal adherence were the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non- nuclear-weapon States parties.
At the same time, the report recalls, serious concern was expressed that the nuclear programmes of certain States non-parties, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, might have led them to obtain, or seek to obtain, a nuclear-weapons capability. Participants thus called on all States parties to undertake a total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all sensitive nuclear technology to States non-parties, and to refrain from giving them assistance in the nuclear field. They further called on all non-parties to renounce the nuclear-weapons option, to accede to the Treaty and to accept full- scope IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.
The report notes that various interpretations of the implementation of certain aspects of articles I and II had evolved, especially regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States parties among themselves and in cooperation with groups including non-nuclear-weapon States parties under regional arrangements, which might have resulted in the transfer of nuclear weapons in violation of article I. Some participants noted with grave concern the nuclear collaboration among certain nuclear-weapon States parties with certain States non-parties, as well as the transfer of nuclear weapons and their control, under regional security arrangements. Other States parties held that existing security arrangements had been implemented in full compliance with articles I and II, and that there had been no collaboration with non-parties that was incompatible with the Treaty. Nonetheless, all States parties were called upon to renew their commitment and maintain their vigilance.
Since 1995, the international community has remained concerned at the continuing non-compliance with the Treaty, including its safeguards obligations. States parties are aware that Iraq had engaged in activities inconsistent with its Treaty obligations, including its Safeguard Agreement. They are also aware that the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea remains in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. Implementation of the IAEA mandate in Iraq, as defined by the Security Council, continued until 16 December 1998, when Agency personnel were withdrawn from Iraq. Notwithstanding the adoption of Security Council 1284 (1999) last December, the Agency has not yet been able to resume its resolution-related activities in Iraq, where as a result of earlier IAEA inspection activities, a technically coherent picture of Iraqs clandestine nuclear programme has evolved.
Continuing, the report states that the Agency did not find evidence that any nuclear-weapon State had contributed directly to the development of Iraqs clandestine nuclear programme. From the Agencys detailed analysis of it, however, it is clear that publications available in the open literature, together with activities and training related to the development of a civil nuclear machine, can have an important bearing on the development of a clandestine nuclear-weapons programme. Iraqs violation of its obligations as a non-nuclear-weapon State party was recounted in detail in an IAEA background paper, relating to article II of the Treaty and prepared for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (document NPT/Conf.1995/7).
Also since 1995, the report recalls that the General Assembly in 1999 had stressed the need for Iraq to fully implement all Security Council resolutions and permit the immediate resumption of monitoring and verification activities. It also expressed deep concern about the continued non-compliance of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, despite repeated calls by the international community for such action. It urged that country to cooperate fully with the Agency, and take all steps that the Agency might deem necessary to preserve all information relevant to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the countrys initial report on the inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards, until the country came into full compliance with the Agreement. Referring to Iraq, the Assembly stressed the need for both full implementation of all Security Council resolutions and the resumption, without delay, of monitoring and verification activities.
Regarding developments outside the Treaty, the report finds that the nuclear-test explosions undertaken by India and Pakistan in May 1998 have led to increased international concern about their effects on global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Security Council soon after adopted a resolution which recognized the serious threat posed by those tests. It urged India and Pakistan, and all other States that had not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions. A statement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five permanent members of the Council, on 23 September 1999, reaffirmed their commitments to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under article VI of the NPT. They expressed their willingness to contribute to the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference and their intention to promote a further constructive review of the Treaty in 2000. At the same tine, they urged all parties to bring into force the comprehensive IAEA Safeguards Agreements, as well as the additional protocols to them.
The report on article VI (document NPT/CONF.2000/4), concerning the obligation of each State party to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, reviews arms limitation and disarmament efforts since 1995. Those included multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts within the United Nations framework, other unilateral and bilateral measures on nuclear disarmament, and initiatives relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The issue of multilateral nuclear disarmament is permanently on the agenda of the General Assembly, specifically its First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), the Disarmament Commission, and the Conference on Disarmament. The issue of non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war continued to be debated within various forums. The difference in positions between various political groups and individual States remained in evidence.
The report states that, in the Assembly, those differing positions were reflected in the voting patterns on a resolution entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", which has been submitted annually for many years. The resolution calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and to report to the Assembly on the results of such negotiations. Divergent views were also in evidence on another resolution, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger", which was introduced for the first time at the fifty-third Assembly session. It called for a review of nuclear doctrines and for urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. It requested the five nuclear-weapon States to undertake measures towards implementation of those steps. The resolution called upon States Members of the United Nations to prevent proliferation and to promote nuclear disarmament and eliminate nuclear weapons. Controversial discussions took place on various modifications undertaken in the nuclear doctrines of States and military alliances.
At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the States parties agreed that in order to fully realize and effectively implement article VI, it was important to achieve the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons; and pursuit by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The report states that progress in this area has, however, been limited. Long- standing differences over substantive as well as overall procedural questions continued to prevent the start of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. During the period under review, the Assembly has annually adopted resolutions on various aspects of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. The voting has revealed deeply rooted divergences, reflecting strategic doctrines and national security perceptions. Differences also remained over the pace, form and ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament negotiations. The critical issue in the debates was whether to proceed on a multilateral or on a bilateral basis in negotiating nuclear disarmament.
The report also details measures and initiatives relating to general and complete disarmament: the inability of the General Assembly to reach consensus on the objectives and agenda for a fourth special session on disarmament; efforts by the international community to further strengthen the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention); and the establishment in 1997 of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is entrusted with ensuring implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention).
The issue of new weapons of mass destruction has long been under consideration within the United Nations framework, the report states, but it has not been possible so far to find generally acceptable criteria for the identification of such weapons. As a result, both the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament have tended to focus on prohibitions of specific categories of weapons, in particular radiological weapons. In the regional context, an initiative was launched by Egypt on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The Conference maintained the item on its agenda but did not establish an ad hoc committee for its consideration during the review period. In the area of conventional weapons, a growing number of armed conflicts involving such weapons has led to increasing recognition of the need to address conventional disarmament. The report reviews developments in the areas of small arms and light weapons, the Register of Conventional Arms, and the landmines convention.
According to the report, the prevention of an outer space arms race has received further attention since 1995. In the Conference on Disarmament, from 1995 to 1999, delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions. However, owing to continuing divergent views, the Conference was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on the item. In 1998, however, a Special Coordinator was appointed to seek the views of Conference members on the most appropriate way to deal with questions related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. His report indicated that there was a general recognition of the importance and urgency of the issue, and that it was also generally understood that further consultations were needed. He proposed a draft mandate to re-establish an ad hoc committee to continue to examine and identify relevant issues, with a view to agreeing on a mandate for an ad hoc committee to negotiate specific measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. He recommended that the draft mandate be used as a basis for further consultations.
Concerns over the past several years about the dangers to international security posed by revived interest in missiles and missiles defence have further increased, the report states. There are reportedly more than a dozen States possessing various levels of capabilities for the development and production of ballistic missiles, and it has become increasingly easy to obtain access to technology, expertise and information for the development of such systems. There is, however, currently no multilateral treaty or agreement regulating the production, possession or trade of missiles. There are also no multilaterally negotiated norms against the spread of ballistic-missile technology for military purposes. In 1999, the Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject of missiles, by which it expressed its conviction of the need for a comprehensive, balanced and non-discriminatory approach towards missiles, and asked the Secretary-General to seek the views of all Member States on the issue of missiles.
The report on article VII (document NPT/CONF.2000/5), concerning the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, covers developments since 1995 on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The concept of such zones was first developed in the late 1950s as a possible complementary measure to the efforts of the international community towards establishing a global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It gained momentum in the context of regional approaches to arms control and disarmament, and was an expression of the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to protect themselves from the potential danger of nuclear confrontation, and also to preclude the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories and in the adjacent areas. The military strategic global situation throughout the cold war era played a decisive role in the consideration of various proposals for the zones establishment.
The report notes the establishment in 1967 of the first such zone, namely the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The second such agreement, concluded in 1985, was the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). During the period under review, discussions on the establishment of such zones were continuing within the framework of the United Nations as well as outside. As a result, two additional treaties were concluded: the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), signed in 1995 and operational in 1997; and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), which was signed in 1996 but has not yet entered into force.
Owing to widely varying security conditions and concerns of the States of the Asian region, the proposals put forward thus far refer to various subregions rather than to the continent as a whole, says the report. Among developments was the unanimous adoption by the Assembly in 1998 of Mongolias declaration of its nuclear-weapon-free status. The removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Kazakhstan, and its signing of the NPT together with the other Central Asian States, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, created a new culture of nuclear security in the region. In February 1997, the heads of State of the Central Asian States adopted the Almaty Declaration in which they expressed the need to proclaim Central Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Final agreement on the text is still outstanding, but an expert group was to meet in March with a view to finalizing its work. During the review period, no further developments had occurred with regard to the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, for whose for early and full implementation the Republic of Korea has repeatedly called.
The proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been the subject of General Assembly resolutions since 1974. Following the nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan did not submit its traditional draft resolution on such a zone in South Asia, reflecting its belief that the goal was no longer realistic. Concerning Europe, the Assembly adopted a resolution in 1998 entitled Regional disarmament, by which it urged all concerned States to have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the non-nuclear States in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The proposal did not receive broad support among the majority of the States of the region, which stressed that there was no consensus on the objective of such a zone. At the same time, China and the Russian Federation expressed their support for the initiative.
The report recalls that the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East originated in the 1970s with Iran and Egypt. The proposal has met with wide acceptance in the United Nations, and the General Assembly has adopted resolutions annually on the subject (by consensus since 1980). In recent years, a large number of States, drawn principally from members of the four existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, stressed that the success so far achieved by those treaties lay in the fact that they were gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas from nuclear weapons. In 1996, a resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere was introduced by Brazil. France, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed reservations on the proposal. They said that since all land territory in the southern hemisphere, with the exception of a few small islands, was already covered by nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, the only new areas such a zone could cover were the high seas. In their view, the true aim of the sponsors was to create a new zone that covered international waters, a step that would be inconsistent with international law, they said.
The report also reviews the concept of zones of peace, which originated with the Non-Aligned Movement of countries and gained increasing attention in the 1960s and 1970s. Although no precise definition of a zone of peace has been formulated, several elements characterize the concept: non-interference and acceptance by extra-zonal Powers; maintenance of regional peace by political cooperation and military restraint; and regional economic and political cooperation. Zones of peace could be seen as a process characterized by a certain conception of regional peace which it aims to promote. The report covers activities related to the promotion of zones of peace in the Americas, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic, South-East Asia, and South-Eastern Europe.
The report on positive and negative security assurances (document NPT/CONF.2000/6) states that non-nuclear-weapon States have long harboured feelings of insecurity in a world where nuclear weapons continue to be possessed by some Powers. Thus, since the beginning of the nuclear age, they have looked for means to protect themselves against the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. A number of non-nuclear-weapon States have sought such security within alliances, involving one or several nuclear-weapon States. Others have sought different international arrangements to ensure their security. They called first for disarmament, notably nuclear disarmament, to be pursued with a sense of urgency and, in the meantime, for international security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was a major issue in the negotiations on the NPT in the 1960s.
The report states that while the five nuclear-weapon States in 1995 believed that their updated unilateral declarations and Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which took note of them, would greatly facilitate consideration of the matter, the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States parties held that the declarations did not address their main concerns, and that the resolution itself also had some shortcomings. No agreement was reached on language acceptable to all States parties, but a number of approaches to resolve those difficulties were advocated. Among them: the conclusion of a protocol on security assurances to be attached to the Treaty, proposed by a number of States, including Mexico and Nigeria; conclusion of an international legal instrument on security assurances, proposed by China, or a multilateral treaty proposed by Sweden; a collective commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to remedy the fundamental shortcomings of the Council resolution, proposed by Egypt; and more elaborate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones, also proposed by Egypt.
Following the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, various delegations, in addressing the Conference on Disarmament, agreed that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the harmonized declarations by the nuclear Powers constituted a new and genuine contribution to the strengthening of international security, but acknowledged that the measures taken had not fully met the hopes of many States parties to the Treaty, which sought legally binding commitments. Non-parties to the Treaty criticized the conditional nature of the unilateral commitments, and stressed that any linkage of security assurances to accession to the Treaty or any other treaty constituted an erosion of the United Nations Charter, specifically the principle of sovereign equality of all Member States and the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence enshrined in the Charter.
The report states that in 1998 the Conference on Disarmament re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. The Committee concluded by reaffirming that, pending the complete and effective elimination of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and noted the relationship between positive and negative security assurances. At its 1999 session, the Conference was unable to establish an ad hoc committee and the issue was discussed only in plenary meetings, where delegations reaffirmed or further elaborated their respective positions on the subject. The General Assembly continued to address the issue annually through the adoption of various resolutions.
There were also developments outside the context of the United Nations framework relevant to the question of security assurances. In 1996, for the first time in history, a legal "Advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" was rendered by the International Court of Justice in response to a request by the General Assembly. The Court agreed unanimously that the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that was contrary to Article 2 of the Charter (refraining from the threat or use of force) and did not meet the requirements concerning the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence was unlawful, and that such threat or use of nuclear weapons should be compatible with international law applicable in armed conflict. While the Court found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, it could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self- defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake. Since the Court gave its advisory opinion, the Assembly has adopted specific resolutions on the subject.
The report cites further developments: in 1998 in its white paper on national defence, China reiterated its commitment to providing non-nuclear- weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones with negative security assurances and promised to provide them with positive security assurances; in 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), reaffirmed its policy of nuclear deterrence; during the preparatory process for the 2000 Review Conference, specific proposals on the issue of security assurances were made by Myanmar, Nigeria and Sudan, in the form of a draft protocol aimed at providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty; and South Africa proposed a draft protocol to the Treaty on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties.
The report on implementation of the resolution on the Middle East (document NPT/CONF.2000/7) recalls that the resolution, adopted during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process, which contribute to a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. (The full text of the resolution is attached as an Annex to the report.) Since the 1995 Conference, nine more States have become parties to the NPT. With the exception of Israel, all States of the Middle East are now parties.
According to the report, the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was first raised by Iran and Egypt in the 1970s. In 1990, broadening the concept, Egypt called upon the major arms-producing States to endorse the declaration of the Middle East as a region free of weapons of mass destruction.
The report states that the proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East has met with wide acceptance in the United Nations and has been adopted by consensus in the General Assembly since 1980. By its resolution 54/51 (1999), the General Assembly urged all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps to implement the proposal, and invited them not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit their stationing on their territories.
The Arab States, stressing the importance of confidence-building measures, underlined that the establishment of such a zone would contribute substantially to a comprehensive peace settlement in the region. They called upon Israel to accede to the NPT without further delay. Israel has stated that it firmly believes in the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon- free zone, but that the zone must be established by direct negotiations between States after they have recognized each other and comprehensive peaceful relations between them have been established.
The report adds that other forums both inside and outside the United Nations framework also support the proposal. The General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency recently called upon all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal. In addition, the Director- General of the Agency has undertaken consultations with the countries in the Middle East on the verification of compliance with the future Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty.
The report on realization of the goals of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in various regions of the world (document NPT/CONF.2000/8) highlights major developments since the 1995 conference in Africa and the Middle East, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe. During the period under review, States in all regions have acceded to the NPT and have signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. A more detailed description of developments, including unilateral, bilateral and multilateral initiatives and measures taken, is contained in other reports before the Conference.
According to the report, States of Africa and the Middle East region have continued to express their support for measures to achieve the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. Some States of the region have signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines. Several regional organizations in Africa have taken measures to combat illicit arms flows, in particular of small arms, to and in Africa. On 11 April 1996, 45 African States signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were adopted annually by the General Assembly without a vote.
In the Americas, the report continues, States continued to express strong support for measures to achieve the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons, and some have signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines. The United States and the Russian Federation continued their bilateral negotiations mainly in the framework of START.
The report states that, in January 1999, the United States Government announced its intention to increase funding for ongoing National Missile Defense and Theatre Missile Defense programmes, and that in order to accommodate those programmes, the bilateral 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty might have to be amended. Both parties to that Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, and stressed the importance of the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons. In January 2000, the United States, in a report on its National Security Strategy, stated that "nuclear weapons serve as a guarantee" of America's security commitments to its allies, and that it would maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any potential adversaries who may have or seek access to nuclear forces.
Describing developments in the Asia and Pacific region, the report states that on 11 and 13 May 1998, India announced that it had conducted five underground nuclear test explosions. Pakistan then announced on 28 and 30 May that it had conducted six nuclear tests. With regard to implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), some progress has been made, but the Agency remains unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration by the DPRK of its nuclear material subject to safeguards.
In further developments in the region, China has continued to stress that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. In September 1996, Kazakhstan completed its nuclear weapon dismantlement programme. Also in 1996, France, the United Kingdom and the United States signed Protocols 1, 2 and 3 to the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was signed in December 1995 by all 10 countries of South-East Asia. States of the region have signed
or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines.
States of the European region, according to the report, continued to express their support for measures to achieve the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. The United States and the Russian Federation continued their bilateral discussions mainly in the framework of START. In June 1999, both countries signed a protocol to continue the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme in the Russian Federation.
On further developments in the region, the report mentions that the United Kingdom's Strategic Defence Review, undertaken in 1997, included significant reductions in its nuclear deterrent. France has significantly reduced the format and alert-status of its nuclear forces since 1991. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaffirmed its policy of nuclear deterrence in 1999. The Russian Federation, in January 2000, published its new National Security Strategy in which it stressed the right to use all available means, including nuclear weapons, to repel aggressors. An Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was concluded in November 1999. In 1998, the European Union adopted a code of conduct on arms sales.
Parties to Treaty
The parties to the NPT are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Switzerland, Sweden, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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