BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

Press Briefing

BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Sergio Vieira de Mello this afternoon briefed correspondents at Headquarters on the situation in East Africa, from which he had just returned, and on his recent appointment as the Special Representative of the Secretary- General for East Timor.

Mr. Vieira de Mello said he had just visited Burundi, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Burundi stop had not been scheduled; he could not have predicted that two international staff would be summarily executed in the Rutana province [on 12 October]. The entire team there was traumatized and there had been a need to raise matters with the Burundi Government. "There we go again: more humanitarian personnel killed in absolutely revolting circumstances", he said.

His visit to Somalia had been short but intense, he continued. In briefing the Security Council earlier today, he had stressed -- as had Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahima Fall -- that, contrary to what was often implied, Somalia was not a hopeless country. Rather, in the areas he had visited -- Bakool, Bay and lower Shabeellaha in the south -- he had witnessed the strong and encouraging reaction of local civil society against warlords. Locally, civil groups were saying "enough is enough", organizing themselves and creating embryonic administrative structures. Those efforts deserved full support. Women were playing an important role in rebuilding civil society at the grassroots level. The level of support from humanitarian agencies was minimal, however, because donors were tired of contributing to protracted or hopeless emergencies.

He appealed to donors to help that embryonic network of reorganized civil society. That plea would be repeated on 23 November, when the consolidated appeals for the year 2000 were launched in Geneva. Such assistance would parallel the peace process and the United Nations recommitment. He recalled that the Secretary-General had told the Council in August that it was a priority to bring Somalia out of the nightmare in which it had been since the early 1990s.

Turning to his visit to Ethiopia and Eritrea, he said the war last year should and could have been avoided. It had caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people on both sides. In Ethiopia especially, the situation was aggravated by drought. The latest estimates of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were that 7 million people would be in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of war and drought; that was many more than originally expected. The situation was equally pathetic on the Eritrean side, where he had visited camps of internally displaced persons. Stressing the need to prevent a relapse into conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Under-Secretary-General said he was afraid, judging by what he had heard in Addis Ababa and Asmara, that

Vieira de Mello Press Briefing - 2 - 27 October 1999

renewed conflict would be a very real possibility unless agreement were reached soon on the peace package put forward by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Sudan remained high on his agenda, Mr. Vieira de Mello said. Later in the afternoon, a brainstorming session would be held at the highest level with the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Carol Bellamy; the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, Catherine Ann Bertini; the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, and others. They would review Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and determine how, through the provision of humanitarian assistance and, where possible, rehabilitation assistance, the peace process could be strengthened in southern Sudan.

Humanitarian agencies were tired of being taken for granted while war continued to produce victims whom they must then look after, he said. The war in Sudan was the longest in the century, beginning in 1956 when Sudan had become independent.

A correspondent asked what the international community and the United Nations could do to support civil society in Somalia. Mr. Vieira de Mello stressed the need for resources. For example, the hospital he had visited in Baydhabo, which was supposedly caring for 1.3 million persons in the three provinces it covered, had only one doctor who worked there without remuneration. The conditions were appalling. In Marka, which was the harbour of the lower Shabeellaha, south of Mogadishu, local groups were organizing and had begun demobilizing militiamen and retraining them to re-enter productive economic life. But only a few international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were helping them. The United Nations should be involved too, but for that, money was needed.

When Djibouti's President, Ismail Omar Guelleh, had addressed the General Assembly [on 22 September 1999], he had proposed a plan for Somalia that had since received strong support. It aimed at strengthening local structures -- including those in the northern area, "Somaliland", where they were better organized than in the south -- and forcing the warlords to take account of new realities and bring new local authorities in to the peace process. A combined effort was needed, at the humanitarian/rehabilitation level and at the international and regional political/diplomatic level, he stressed.

Asked for further details on obstacles to peace in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Mr. Vieira de Mello said that while he was not in charge of political matters, every effort was being made by mediators, with the Secretary-General's strong support, for agreement to be reached as soon as possible on the OAU peace plan and its early implementation.

A correspondent said that he had heard that some in north Somalia wanted to create "Somaliland" that was separate from the south. Mr. Vieira de Mello said that while the United Nations would want Somalia to remain a united country, it was for the Somalis to decide what constitutional arrangements they wished to live under. His impression, based on talking to

Vieira de Mello Press Briefing - 3 - 27 October 1999

people in the southern part of the country, was that they hoped that Somalia would survive as a unified country. Therefore, he expected that the tendency for secession by one or another party would not receive widespread support from the people of Somalia.

A correspondent asked whether he had received assurances from the Government of Burundi and the various political factions that incidents of summary execution would not recur. Mr. Vieira de Mello said the Government had expressed deep regret about what had happened. President Pierre Buyoya had assured him of redoubled efforts to improve the security of United Nations staff. However, he represented only one side to the conflict. Therefore, Mr. Vieira de Mello had informed the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs that he would be talking to the rebels, including the armed wings, to try to explain to them the nature of the humanitarian work being carried out in Burundi.

Humanitarian workers had come under attack by the CNDD [National Council for the Defense of Democracy], he continued. On 1 October, his Office had been threatened because it was assisting Burundians who had been regrouped by the Burundian army in certain areas of the country. The CNDD had said that such assistance indicated support for the Government's regroupment policy, but that was nonsense. The United Nations did not support the regroupment policy and had said so since 1996. He had repeated it to President Buyoya. The Secretary-General had been "crystal clear" with Burundi's Foreign Minister three weeks ago. But this did not mean that the victims should not receive assistance.

Next, the Under-Secretary-General briefed correspondents on East Timor. The Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for East Timor had been launched today in Geneva, asking for $199 million to meet urgent humanitarian needs through June 2000. Of that, $183 million would be earmarked for projects in East Timor, and $16 million for West Timor. United Nations agencies and NGOs were on the ground in East and West Timor. The United Nations had never left East Timor, he stressed.

He said he hoped East Timor would move as quickly as possible from the emergency humanitarian relief phase to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. However, several hundred thousand persons remained displaced inside East Timor, afraid to return or with nothing to return to.

Meanwhile, there were estimated 200,000-240,000 refugees in West Timor, he continued. There, humanitarian agencies were working with the Government of Indonesia to enable these people to make a free and informed decision on whether to return to East Timor, stay where they were, or be relocated to other parts of Indonesia. The Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal had stated that Indonesia would facilitate such free choice for refugees and President Habibie had assured United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata that the Indonesian Government would cooperate fully in the management of the problem in West Timor.

An inter-agency team had finally managed to reach Oekussi, also known as Ambeno, which was the enclave in West Timor that belonged to East Timor,

Vieira de Mello Press Briefing - 4 - 27 October 1999

in the wake of the deployment there of INTERFET [the Interim Force in East Timor], he continued. What they had seen was grim, but fortunately, houses had been looted rather than burned. In the two days since the arrival of the Force, some 4,000 people had returned to the city and another thousand were expected to return today. The original population of that particular town was 7,000, so those preliminary reports were positive.

Until the new transitional structure was in place, humanitarian agencies would function on the basis of the present arrangement, he said. The Secretary-General had appointed the Director of the Georgia-based Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ross Mountain, as Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim. He would remain in charge of humanitarian coordination until the new structure was established.

A correspondent asked how active the militia were in the West Timor camps, and what impact that had on humanitarian assistance. Mr. Vieira de Mello said he did not yet have information on all refugee locations. It seemed, however, that in recent times, Indonesian authorities and military had been cooperating with humanitarian agencies, especially the UNHCR, in bringing the militias under control and, as Ms. Ogata had requested, in removing them from the camps.

A correspondent asked for Mr. Vieira de Mello's thoughts on his new task and how it compared to his earlier work in Kosovo. Mr. Vieira de Mello said that in East Timor, after the 5 May Agreement, and the 30 August popular consultation, the end game was now clear. Nearly 80 per cent of the population had opted for independence. The Transitional Administration would assist them in achieving their long-frustrated dream. That was a fundamental difference with Kosovo. The challenge ahead was daunting, but extremely rewarding for a career civil servant. The Administration would be working closely with the local leaders, in particular those of the CNRT [National Council for Timorese Resistance], in determining the best way to involve them in the transition and the establishment of democratic and self-governance institutions.

Asked how long he would be in East Timor, Mr. Vieira de Mello said "ask my boss". His new deputy had arrived this morning and would be Officer-in- Charge of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Secretary-General had indicated that he would keep his job and return to it eventually.

Asked about a lack of evidence to support allegations that militia had engaged in mass murder, he said he would not comment yet. He was receiving reports by cable on INTERFET's findings that needed to be looked into. Human rights issues would be high on the agenda.

A correspondent said Asian States had pressed for his job to be filled by an Asian. How would he deal with concerns over Westerners running a place that had been part of Indonesia, and how he would deal with the prospect of a guerrilla war from West Timor? He said he was not aware of people pushing

Vieira de Mello Press Briefing - 5 - 27 October 1999

for an Asian. Also, he was not a "Westerner" -- he was a career international civil servant.

He would be visiting Jakarta as soon as possible after taking up his functions in Dili, he continued. There was a need to establish relations of confidence with the new regime in Jakarta and the Government. He was counting on receiving from them the same assurances he had been receiving from President Habibie that they would cooperate fully in enabling the United Nations to carry out its role. That would include keeping the militia under control, hopefully disarming and demobilizing them, and preventing them from operating out of West Timor territory and infiltrating into the East.

Asked when he would leave for East Timor, how long the transition to independence would last and what would be his priorities be upon arrival in East Timor, Mr. Vieira de Mello said he would leave on 7 or 8 November and arrive in Dili at the end of that week. As for the transition period, it was premature to answer that question. His priority was to create the national capacity to run affairs in a competent and efficient manner. While there were human resources available, unfortunately not many were in East Timor. The large diaspora would have to be encouraged to return and help build the country.

Credible institutions were needed for East Timor to become viable, Mr. Vieira de Mello said in response to a question. These must be created from scratch in all sectors before the United Nations could hand over its transitional functions to a new government. It was impossible to predict how long the process would take. The shorter the better, but there was a need to be responsible.

How would he handle the questions of reconciliation and justice? a correspondent asked. Mr. Vieira de Mello said the question was vital for the success of the mission. He was encouraged by Xanana Gusmao's consistent message of "no revenge, no summary justice". Reconciliation was Mr. Gusmao's message. Leaders were essentially responsible for ensuring restraint. There was a need to establish a credible system of justice, and an effective international and local police structure to deal with these issues responsibly.

Asked about reconciliation with Indonesia, the Under-Secretary-General said Mr. Gusmao intended to visit Indonesia soon, and that the response of the new leadership had been extremely encouraging: they had said they would meet him at the airport. They had every interest in establishing good neighbourly relations with all countries in the region.

How would FALINTIL [the military arm of the National Council of Timorese Resistance] be dealt with in the process of building a new country and government? a correspondent asked. Mr. Vieira de Mello said "Let me get there. Let me see the situation on the ground." From New York, he could say that FALINTIL had behaved in an extremely responsible manner. That created a favourable climate for those who did not wish to be demobilized to possibly

Vieira de Mello Press Briefing - 6 - 27 October 1999

be considered for recruitment and training -- on an individual basis -- for whatever security force was created in East Timor.

What stopovers would the Under-Secretary-General make, and when would he consult the Timorese? a correspondent asked. He said he would stop first in Lisbon; then Geneva. The Timorese had been consulted consistently and he would be meeting with their representatives again tomorrow. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) would not be a superstructure imposed on the East Timorese. Rather, it would strengthen them to take affairs into their own hands.

A correspondent asked whether there were parallels between United Nations operations in Cambodia and in East Timor. Namibia was a more appropriate analogy than Cambodia, the Under-Secretary-General said. In Cambodia, the United Nations had co-managed the transition, sharing responsibility with the national council established under the Paris Peace Agreement. The United Nations' Authority in East Timor was different. Perhaps it was more of an exclusive authority, despite what he had said about including the Timorese leadership, than had been the case in Cambodia.

A correspondent asked about States' contributions, Brazil's in particular. Mr. Vieiro de Mello said the response had been encouraging in the military area, though there were more questions on the civilian front. As for Brazil, the question should be posed to its authorities. He hoped it would consider increasing its military and police presence in East Timor. The Government had indicated that it was more than willing to provide civilian support in terms of human resources and training.

* *** *