CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTS AGENDA FOR 1999 SESSION

Press Release
DCF/353

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTS AGENDA FOR 1999 SESSION

(Reissued as received.)

GENEVA, 21 January (UN Information Service) -- The Conference on Disarmament this morning adopted the agenda for its 1999 session, which was the same as its agenda for the 1998 session. The agenda is made up of the following items: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament; transparency in armaments; and consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The President of the Conference, Ambassador Robert Grey of the United States, said there was consensus among Conference members that any item on the agenda may be a matter of discussion during the session.

Also this morning, the Conference heard statements by Italy's Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and representatives of Romania and Peru.

Italy's Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Patrizia Toia, said that her country believed that the control and production of armaments had regional dimensions, and that certain problems relating to disarmament and to non-proliferation could be regulated in the geo-political context wherever they were manifested. Europe, for instance, which, after the Second World War, had lived for several decades in a state of tension and confrontation, not only had been able to put in place a mechanism of security and reciprocity of confidence, but also had been able to conclude agreements on control of armaments and on disarmament which had substantially reduced the level of military arsenals in the region.

John Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and acting Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, said that the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) would create a legal, verifiable ban on the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. By imposing a finite ceiling on the amount of material for nuclear weapons, one also helped cement in place a ceiling on the world's nuclear arsenals. Sceptics might argue that cut-off was too modest, that nuclear-weapon States had more than enough fissile material, and had halted its production in any event. But that argument was based on the faulty assumption that the current informal state of affairs was locked into place. Who could say that the international political and strategic situation would not reverse itself, creating new incentives for the nuclear-weapon States to re-embark on the production of nuclear material? he asked.

The Conference also decided to admit Albania, Angola, Armenia and Libya to participate in the work of the Conference as observers.

When it next meets in plenary session at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 26 January, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan will address the Conference.

Statements

PATRIZIA TOIA, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, stated that her country attached great importance to the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation which were basic elements of Italy's security policy. The Government of Italy believed that the Conference should, as a priority, maintain and even strengthen its role as a multilateral negotiations forum by consolidating its vocation to conclude treaties of a universal nature. For this reason, Italy was in favour of the participation of countries interested in the problems of disarmament as a guarantee for better international representation in this institution. In that spirit, Italy supported the admission of the countries of the European Union that presented their candidature as members to the Conference.

Ms. Toia said that Italy estimated that the control and production of armaments also had a regional dimension, and that certain problems relating to disarmament and to non-proliferation could be regulated in the geo-political context wherever they were manifested. Europe, for instance, which, after the Second World War, had lived for several decades in a state of tension and confrontation, not only had been able to put in place a mechanism of security and reciprocity of confidence, but also had been able to conclude agreements on control of armaments and on disarmament which had substantially reduced the level of military arsenals in the region.

The Government of Italy had favourably welcomed the decision last August to start negotiations with a view to formulate a treaty to ban the production

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of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, Ms. Toia said. Moreover, Italy requested the immediate establishment of the ad hoc committee on that issue and the start of negotiations in a climate of accrued global and regional confidence, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and of the mandate formed for that purpose. Italy was confident that the Conference could advance rapidly to the realization of a treaty of vital interest, in order that the process of nuclear disarmament became intensified and irreversible and led to the elimination of nuclear arsenals. In addition, Italy had achieved a constitutional procedure enabling it to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and it would do so soon.

With regard to conventional weapons, the international community had succeeded in having an important instrument which prohibited a particularly insidious category: anti-personnel landmines, Ms. Toia said. The Ottawa Convention, which was the result of joint efforts of parliaments, governments and humanitarian organizations, would enter into force the first day of next March. Italy was determined to fully participate in the Maputo Conference in May and would complete its ratification of the Convention. Moreover, Italy, together with the international community, would firmly work and contribute to a continued perfection of the global and coordinated strategy defined by the "process of Ottawa" to completely eliminate the pandemic of anti-personnel landmines.

JOHN HOLUM, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Acting Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, conveyed a message from the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, to the Conference, in which the President underlined the strong commitment of the United States to prompt the resumption of negotiations on the next key multilateral step in the nuclear disarmament process: a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. "Only your focused and energetic efforts can cap, for all time, the material basis of nuclear weapons, thereby complementing your success in concluding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and moving another step closer to the eventual goal of nuclear disarmament", the President's message stated.

Mr. Holum said that the negotiation of an FMCT would create a legal, verifiable ban on the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. By imposing a finite ceiling on the amount of material for nuclear weapons, one also helped cement in place a ceiling on the world's nuclear arsenals. Sceptics might argue that cut-off was too modest; the nuclear-weapon States had more-than-enough fissile material, and had halted its production in any event. But that argument was based on the faulty assumption that the current informal state of affairs was locked into place. Who could say that the international political and strategic situation would not reverse itself, creating new incentives for the nuclear-weapon States to re-embark on the production of nuclear material?

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Mr. Holum underlined that the FMCT would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives by States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It would also open to strict monitoring and verification the production facilities of all States not subject to such monitoring at the present time, and it would be a stabilizing influence in otherwise unstable regions. In addition, the FMCT would help produce a climate conducive to continued, long-term progress on reducing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon material. Looking beyond START III negotiations, it seemed clear that the prospects for negotiating deeper reductions would be enhanced if one had in place a dependable cap on fissile material for weapons, as well as confidence that the international community would detect illegal production. An FMCT also would help make nuclear arms reductions irreversible. The United States and the Russian Federation currently were pursuing verifiable means to dispose of fissile material from nuclear weapons material stockpiles and dismantled warheads, and to put such material under safeguards. Those efforts would have even greater impact if unmonitored production of fissile material was banned.

IOAN MAXIM (Romania) observed that the shrinking of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, the transformation of the NPT into a permanent instrument in 1995, the agreement on the CTBT in 1996, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, among others, indicated that the overall security threat was on a downward course. Nevertheless, non-traditional threats, such as terrorism, ethnic conflict, organized crime, drug trafficking, as well as the merger of explosive population growth and poverty that generated economic stagnation and political instability, were on the rise.

Mr. Maxim said focus should centre on halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, if the international community truly wanted the Conference on Disarmament to live up to its responsibilities as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and international security. For that purpose, 1999 should be the year of action. The negotiations on an FMCT should be started today. Romania fully supported the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on FMCT and stood ready to participate in the negotiations.

Mr. Maxim emphasized that the FMCT should prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices after a "cut-off" date to be agreed upon. That clearly referred to future production, not the past one, although the question of past production and resulting stocks of fissile material could be raised. However, the treaty should not aim at prohibiting the production of fissile material for civil or non- explosive military uses, such as naval propulsion. The treaty was intended to cap the amount of fissile materials available for explosive military purposes, not only in nuclear-weapon States, but also in those States which currently had unsafeguarded enrichment or processing plants. It would, thus, contribute

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to consolidate the conditions under which the process of nuclear disarmament could broaden, would constrain the opportunities for vertical proliferation, and would help prevent any future resumption of the nuclear arms race.

Furthermore, Romania believed that the "Ottawa process" should stimulate discussions on the anti-personnel landmines issue within the Conference on Disarmament, which would provide a wider involvement, enabling a broader implementation of its final product. The Conference was a forum with large representation and valuable expertise within which participated countries with significant mine-producing capabilities, States in regions of tension, as well as States where anti-personnel landmines, were still being retained as a military option. Romania maintained that an appropriate step could be the re-appointment of a special coordinator on landmines, entrusted with building upon the accomplishments so far and preparing the ground for a rapid establishment of an ad hoc committee to launch substantive negotiations in that field.

JORGE VOTO BERNALES (Peru) underlined that the appearance of nuclear weapons following the Second World War and their later development within the context of the cold war had made the twentieth century one of nuclear threat. Today, as the century ended, the nuclear threat persisted. Also, the options in which the issue of nuclear weapons should be dealt with in the current international context consisted of choosing, on the one hand, the maintaining of the doctrine and strategy of nuclear dissuasion or, on the other hand, the total prohibition of nuclear arsenals, as well as the halting of their production and deployment. Peru requested the Conference to avoid recourse to selectivity and to work in the spirit of transparency in order to reconcile the different interests and divergent issues.

Mr. Voto Bernales said that in the course of 1998 the agreement reached to start negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material was a result of the positive and constructive political will of States. He believed that it was imperative to contemporary international relations to see that States with nuclear weapons and those with the capacity to produce them started an irreversible process leading to the total elimination of those arms. In fact, the measures to limit the nuclear weapons arsenals, as well as the selective or limited measures of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation agreement, had remained positive actions of great value. However, they could not replace the sole effective guarantee which humanity could possess in the face of nuclear threat: the elimination and prohibition of all existing nuclear weapons.

Mr. Voto Bernales said that nuclear powers should move non-strategic nuclear weapons from their present sites and avoid any kind of scientific cooperation which could, directly or indirectly, contribute to their horizontal proliferation. Those States with nuclear capacity should also contribute to that process by ending any kind of activity aimed at developing

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or putting in place nuclear weapons, by adhering to the NPT, and by renouncing their nuclear option. In was indispensable that all States that did not yet done so, particularly those with nuclear capacity, accede to the Treaty.

Mr. Voto Bernales further said that Peru and Ecuador had mutually agreed to remove and eliminate all anti-personnel landmines which were planted along their common borders. He said that the international community would contribute and an example of true cooperation would be added to this programme of demining. He also supported the admission as members of the Conference of Ecuador, Ireland, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Tunisia during the current session.

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