COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY 'MAJOR MILESTONE', BUT SOUTH ASIA TESTS WARN OF COMPLACENCY, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD

15 October 1998

Press Release
GA/DIS/3111

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY 'MAJOR MILESTONE', BUT SOUTH ASIA TESTS WARN OF COMPLACENCY, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD

19981015 Confidence Expressed in Evolving Nuclear Test Verification Regime; Proposed Treaty on Fissile Material Also Discussed in Continued General Debate

The opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 24 September 1996 had been a major milestone in the uphill struggle to ban all nuclear explosions, but the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan had been a sharp reminder that there could be no complacency in that effort, the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) was told this morning as it continued its general debate.

The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Wolfgang Hoffmann, described the organization's worldwide monitoring network designed to detect nuclear explosions, and emphasized that the facilities had to be operational by the time the Treaty entered into force. Thus far, he pointed out, 21 States had ratified the Treaty, including 10 of the 44 States required for its entry. He added that, although the monitoring network was not fully operational at the time of the nuclear tests in South Asia, its analysis of those events had been "remarkably successful" and should instill confidence in the evolving verification regime.

The representative of Canada said that the fundamental global disarmament treaties must be defended, given the profound tests experienced this year by the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. All attempts at proliferation must be rolled back, he said, adding that "we have worked too hard for too long to see the tide of history reversed".

He welcomed the start of negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but said that existing stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile material should not be ignored. With an estimated 2,000 metric tons of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in stockpiles, there was enough material for 100,000 nuclear warheads. His

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country called for a moratorium on fissile material production pending the conclusion of a treaty, and asked States which possessed weapons-grade fissile material to remove it.

On the same issue, the representative of Norway said that while negotiations should be limited to the production of fissile material, the issue of past production and existing stockpiles should be addressed, perhaps through a parallel and voluntary process. Similarly, the representative of New Zealand said that dealing with the contentious issue of existing stocks of fissile material might not be possible in a single instrument. Sooner or later, however, stocks would have to be integrated into an agreement, if a comprehensive fissile ban was to become a permanent measure.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Turkey, Iran, Belarus, (on behalf of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission), Brunei Darussalam, Argentina, Uzbekistan and Cameroon. The representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Pakistan spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. Friday, 16 October, to continue its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

Among the nuclear disarmament issues under review is the adoption in 1996 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), so far signed by 150 States and ratified by 21 countries. Following the CTBT's opening for signature in September 1996, a Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) was set up to establish the Treaty's global verification regime and to prepare for its entry into force. The CTBT requires ratification by the 44 States listed in its annex, which include India, Israel and Pakistan.

The Committee will also assess the implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be discussed in the context of the international non-proliferation regime.

In the context of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, the Committee is expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such zones have already been created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. Another draft is expected on a nuclear-weapon-free State in Mongolia.

Other treaties governing weapons of mass destruction will also be reviewed. Those include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), which entered into force on 29 April 1997, triggering a complex verification mechanism that will be implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The Committee will also consider the verification measures of another treaty governing weapons of mass destruction -- the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). Efforts have intensified to forge a consensus behind a protocol that would establish effective verification and compliance.

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Discussion will continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the two instruments to ban or limit their use. The first was Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), a partial ban negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention), a total ban, was agreed to in Oslo as part of the so-called "Ottawa process" and will enter into force on 1 March 1999.

Other matters to be discussed include the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as well as regional transparency and confidence-building measures, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

(For detailed background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3106 issued 9 October.)

Statements

MARC VIDRICAIRE (Canada) said that in 1998, the world had experienced a profound test of the strength of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. In that regard, the three fundamental global treaties must be defended, namely the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Those instruments were complemented by the CTBT and by nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Biological Weapons Convention needed more muscle through the adoption of an effective compliance protocol, he said. The NPT, which proudly claimed 187 States parties, was the best tool in place for pursuing a very tough job. Its vitality depended, in part, on the success of the new preparatory process for future NPT review conferences. The need for dynamism and reassurance in that process was all the more pressing now. All States had a stake in, and could benefit from a more ambitious approach.

The negotiating process for the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) must be vigorous, he said. Currently, however, that process was at a standstill. His country had a fundamental and a clear security interest to see START II ratified and implemented, as well as to see the START process continue. The smooth and speedy onset of START III negotiations was also essential. Reducing the number of nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads possessed and deployed by both the United States and the Russian Federation did more than increase the confidence of those two States -- it reassured States in all regions about their security, and about the vitality of the international security regime. The other three nuclear-weapon States should join the START process in the near future.

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A treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes was now being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, he said. That had been an objective of his country for more than 40 years. While there was no agreement that stocks should be part of an eventual treaty, that vital issue should not be ignored. There were an estimated 2,000 metric tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in stockpiles -- enough material for 100,000 nuclear warheads. His country called for a moratorium on fissile material production for the duration of the treaty negotiations. Further, those States with weapons-useable fissile material should take progressive steps to irreversibly remove it.

He said that it was time for the Conference to heed the call for the establishment of a subsidiary body aimed at substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament. Its creation would reflect faith in the international security regime and promote its vitality. In some areas, the pace of nuclear disarmament had slowed in recent years. Despite success at maintaining and enhancing the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime, that had been seriously challenged in 1998 by Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. While neither country had adhered to the NPT, their justification for the tests "attack the integrity" of the non-proliferation regime. His country condemned nuclear-weapon testing and rejected those arguments.

All attempts at proliferation must be rolled back, he went on. Allowing that regime to be undermined in any way as the result of events in one region, or as the result of the response to those events, could jeopardize the security of all States. "We have worked too hard for too long to see the tide of history reversed," he said. He welcomed efforts to engage in dialogue with India and Pakistan and draw them into the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. The threat to regional security and the economic and social consequences for South Asia outstripped any justification for the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons programme.

The growing global commitment to human security was nowhere clearer than in the common effort to eliminate anti-personnel landmines, he said. The vast majority of the international community had agreed that a total ban of those indiscriminate weapons was the best solution. His country was committed to working with friends and partners to universalize the Ottawa Convention and to ensure that demining and victim assistance efforts were fully funded and sustained. The Ottawa Convention provided the comprehensive framework for mine action.

He said that the insecurity and human suffering caused by the proliferation and vast accumulations of small arms and light weapons was troubling. Those were legitimate weapons used by States for legitimate purposes. Yet, huge quantities seemed to have moved unchecked between regions and have fallen into the wrong hands. Ensuring regional stability involved three steps: transparency; dialogue; and restraint. It was more urgent than ever that full advantage be taken of the available tools, namely the United

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Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In that connection, the European Union should be congratulated for its adoption of a code of conduct on the export of conventional arms.

The fundamental strategic issue of the "non-weaponization of outer space" should also be urgently addressed, he said. More States than ever had demonstrated a capability to engage in the uses of outer space. That opportunity should remain peaceful, as weapons based in outer space by one or more States would undermine international security. Currently, there was no international regime ensuring against the possible abuse of outer space. His country had formally proposed negotiations on a treaty banning the weaponization of outer space, but, regrettably, the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to take action on that proposal. He hoped it would do so in 1999.

TULUY TANC (Turkey) said his country was committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. That goal should be pursued in a manner involving both nuclear and conventional weapons. Success would depend on the creation of a political atmosphere that ensured the security of all States and inspired confidence. The NPT was one of the most important disarmament treaties of all time and every country should be encouraged to accede to it, to give it more vigour.

He said the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan could have serious repercussions for the security of the region and of the world at large. It was encouraging that both countries had announced their readiness to accede to the CTBT. His own country had joined the CTBT and had also actively contributed to the establishment of the CTBTO.

He supported the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions, he said. It was a measure with a direct bearing on the security of all States in concerned regions. The desire for the establishment of such zones, however, should come from all the countries in the zone. The Middle East was one of the regions where the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a tangible threat. Turkey's geographical proximity to the region demanded that it participate in regional efforts to check that threat.

He said his country was fully conscious of the human suffering caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. Unfortunately, the security situation of Turkey was distinctly different from what the proponents of the Ottawa Convention had in mind and, thus, his country had been precluded from signing the Convention. Still, in consideration of the humanitarian element of the Convention, Turkey enacted a national moratorium in 1996 banning the sale and transfer of land mines. It had also developed bilateral arrangements with some of its neighbours, including Bulgaria and Georgia, on how to keep their common borders free of those weapons.

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His Government regarded the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as the cornerstone of European security, he continued. The Treaty, however, needed to be adapted to the new security conditions on the continent. As far as his country was concerned, the CFE "flank regime" was the heart of the Treaty. His Government also recognized the serious threat posed by the illicit trade in small arms and supported the idea of convening an international conference to address the problem.

LEIF ARNE ULLAND (Norway) said the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was for States to realize that the acquisition of such weapons did not serve their political or security interest. For that reason, international cooperation to resolve local and regional conflicts should be seen as major contributions to non-proliferation efforts. Events in South Asia earlier this year accentuated the relationship between an unstable regional security environment and the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The tests by India and Pakistan were in clear defiance of international norms and constituted a serious threat to the global non-proliferation regime and to international peace and security, he said. Both countries would be acting in their own best interests by abandoning their nuclear programmes and complying with the norms established by the non-proliferation regime. Both should accede to the CTBT and the NPT.

He said the nuclear-weapon States had an obligation under the NPT to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. They should intensify their efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. In that regard, his country urged the Russian Federation to ratify START II, which would enable negotiations on START III to commence. The ultimate role of the international community was to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. One important and urgent step in that direction would be to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and related devices. His Government welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty. Such a treaty must include a credible verification regime, he added.

The negotiating mandate of the ad hoc committee should be limited to the production of fissile materials, he continued. Still, it was important to address the issue of past production and existing stockpiles in an appropriate manner. That could best be handled outside the negotiating framework, in a separate, parallel and voluntary process designed to enhance transparency. The management and disposal of weapons-grade fissile material should be seen as a central part of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

He said the CTBT could be regarded as the qualitative counterpart of a fissile material treaty, preventing the future development of qualitatively new explosives. His country welcomed the fact that 150 countries had signed the CTBT, with 17 ratifications so far. Norway planned to ratify the Treaty

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this year. The illicit traffic in nuclear material was also a matter of international concern and the IAEA should intensify its efforts on that issue.

The NPT was the most important international instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of promoting nuclear disarmament, he noted. Unfortunately, the Preparatory Committees's second session for the year 2000 Review Conference had proved to be a failure. Now, the basis for a more constructive dialogue on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be laid. In addition, the Conference on Disarmament was in urgent need of reform, in terms of its membership, working methods and agenda. The Conference had not been able to keep pace with the changing security and disarmament agenda. Furthermore, his country attached great importance to the successful conclusion to negotiations on a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention.

He said the fortieth ratification of the Ottawa Convention was a significant step towards a world free of anti-personnel landmines. The remarkable speed of the ratification process was a clear indication of the strong international will to address the humanitarian problems posed by those weapons. His country was contributing $120 million to international mine action over five years. It was heartening that the Government of Mozambique had offered to host the first meeting of States parties to the Convention in Maputo in 1999, and it was appropriate that the first meeting should be held in Africa as no other continent had been more severely afflicted by that scourge.

MOHAMMADREZA ALBORZI (Iran) said that although the recent unprecedented success in arms control and disarmament agreements fostered optimism about the future of the disarmament process, two negative events had seriously affected the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Those were the nuclear tests in South Asia, and the failure of the 1998 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting.

He said that past calls to eliminate the nuclear-weapon threat had received little attention, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons had gone unheeded. That indifference had grave consequences for international peace and security. Ignoring the desire of the international community and failing to achieve concrete nuclear disarmament agreement had played a role in the recent developments in South Asia.

The reactions by governments, non-governmental organizations and public opinion had demonstrated the global wish for a nuclear-weapon-free world, he said. Those reactions, in turn, deserved a favourable reaction by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The optimism of the early 1990s had yielded to skepticism at the approach of the new century. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had demonstrated their will through agreements on the indefinite extension of the NPT and the conclusion of the CTBT. They had expected their flexibility to be reciprocated through the establishment of an

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ad hoc committee within the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate nuclear disarmament. The various proposals made in that regard had not yet received a proper response.

Pending conclusion of a nuclear disarmament convention, efforts should be made to achieve universality of the NPT, he said. The forthcoming Review Conference had a crucial role to play in that regard. His Government had proposed the creation of an open-ended standing committee to follow up recommendations concerning implementation of the NPT, which would be agreed upon at the Treaty's year 2000 Review Conference. That proposal, which had the endorsement of the Non-Aligned Movement, should be supported by all NPT members in the First Committee.

He said his country had always favoured negotiations for a cut-off treaty on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons as one step in a phased programme of nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of such a treaty through negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It should also prevent the use and possible use of nuclear weapons, as well as their qualitative development.

He said his country welcomed the statements that India and Pakistan were moving towards adherence to the CTBT. For its part, Iran intended to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. It had been widely recognized that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted an important confidence-building and disarmament measure, as reflected in the final document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. The recent development had underscored the importance of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as a step towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament, particularly in sensitive regions like the Middle East.

The clandestine nuclear arms programme of Israel continued to pose an imminent security threat, he said. A selective approach towards nuclear non-proliferation would have disastrous effects. The international community, therefore, should exert pressure on Israel to abandon its nuclear programmes, accede without any preconditions to the NPT and put its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguard. In July, Iran and the Russian Federation had issued a joint statement on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which urged all parties directly concerned to seriously consider practical and urgent measures for the establishment of such a zone.

Continuing, he said that other nuclear-weapon States should also exert pressure on Israel to stop endangering the region and international peace and security. Further, the Disarmament Commission should submit concrete recommendations and guidelines to the Assembly in with regard to such a zone in the Middle East. The recent Non-Aligned Movement summit in Durban, South Africa had called for the establishment of a subsidiary body to the main

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committee of the year 2000 Review Conference of the NPT to recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. That proposal could provide a suitable framework for establishing the zone in the Middle East.

While his country welcomed the growing number of parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, serious initiatives were required to realize its universality, he said. A related source of concern was the lack of any resolution of many important issues during the year since its entry into force. Intricate and extensive means of verification coupled with the free trade of chemicals among Member States had been the basis of the Convention. Meanwhile, parallel export control regimes continued to work against the Convention and, according to reports of the OPCW, certain chemicals were still exported to non-members of the Convention.

Concerning the Biological Weapons Convention, his country was committed to strengthening the verification regime and accelerating adoption of the relevant protocol. The verification regime was bound to succeed if it was coupled with a firm commitment to the free flow of material, equipment and technology for peaceful use among Member States, an undertaking which would directly affect the development of developing countries in the area of health-related science. Such assurances were essential for States that adhered to the verification protocol. A clear distinction should be drawn between those who stood for a universal instrument and those who preferred to stand aside with their sometimes questionable programmes.

He drew attention to the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and said it was a complex problem that should be addressed by individual countries, as well as by the international community. It was encouraging that the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other international actors had begun to tackle the issue. In his region, heinous massacres and systematic ethnic and religious persecution had occurred in Afghanistan as a consequence of small arms in the hands of criminals, terrorists and drug smugglers. His Government supported any initiative by the United Nations and individual countries to confront the issue.

ALYAKSANDR SYCHOU (Belarus), speaking on behalf of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, informed the Committee about the state of the Commission's work and annual report (document A/53/42). He said that a committee was created to rationalize and streamline the work of the Commission, as directed by the General Assembly. In addition, three working groups were set up to address each of the main subjects on the Commission's agenda. Those included: the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones; the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; and guidelines on conventional arms control and disarmament.

Although members of the Commission were not able to achieve consensus on the global question of nuclear disarmament, they did agree on the issue of

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nuclear-weapon-free zones, he said. Such zones were acknowledged as significant disarmament mechanisms that enhance transparency and confidence- building. The working group considering the question of the General Assembly Special Session on disarmament was not able to achieve consensus on the agenda and priorities of the session. Further consultations were needed.

He said the working group on conventional weapons was able to agree on the measures needed to make progress with conventional arms control and disarmament. In particular, action should be taken to assist countries in conflict situations. Furthermore, the efforts of the Chairman of the Commission to get the members of the working group to study guidelines related to peace agreements failed, because the members did not consider that issue to be part of their job. Regarding the issue of rationalizing the work of the Commission, the member States agreed that further consultations were needed.

CLIVE PEARSON (New Zealand) said that agreement in the Conference on Disarmament to begin substantive negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was overdue, but no less welcome. Designing a fissile treaty would enable the international community to address both the non-proliferation and disarmament imperatives related to that material. One of the tasks ahead would be to ensure that the controls would promote international confidence. Moreover, the treaty must be non-discriminatory and multilateral in its reach and be able to deliver a cost-effective verification machinery.

He said that the goal, therefore, was to put in place a credible international norm that would have the potential to boost confidence in regions of tension and to enhance the process of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. The contentious issue of existing stocks of fissile material also must be addressed. Dealing with production and stocks might not be possible in a single instrument -- one might have to follow the other. But, sooner or later, stocks would have to be integrated into the Government, if a comprehensive fissile ban was to become a permanent disarmament measure.

Concerning the START process, he said that the Conference on Disarmament had a legitimate role to play in considering what steps might usefully be taken to support those negotiations. A mechanism to underpin the negotiations must be established, and a decision in that regard should be taken soon or lingering frustration might creep back into the work of the Conference. Following last year's inactivity, the Conference moved forward in 1998 with an ambitious programme of substantive and reform issues. While it might be better to focus on a small range of priority issues, a decision on its work was significant. It demonstrated that body's importance in pushing forward the global disarmament agenda.

He said that while negotiations to design a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention were "inching forward", the progress had been far too slow. His Government's initiative to hold a ministerial meeting

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last month in New York was a constructive and creative way to build political impetus beneath those crucial negotiations. A verification machine had been lacking for a quarter of a century and it was time to "lift the game" in those negotiations. His country was committed to the conclusion of a protocol before the end of next year.

Another year had "slipped by" without ratification of START II by the Russian Federation, he continued. The START process was hugely important and, in that context, undertakings to proceed with START III were welcome. Ratification of the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties also remained incomplete. The proliferation of small arms was another priority issue, and on that issue a consensus was emerging. It was essential to seek new initiatives on the issue, and to pursue the "holistic" approach outlined by South Africa. Action was required on the national, regional and international levels.

He said that the exceptionally bad news was the threat posed to the non-proliferation regime. A "significant body blow" to the regime was delivered by the decision of India and Pakistan to undertake nuclear tests in May. Those tests were totally irreconcilable with the claims by both countries that they were committed to nuclear disarmament. The argument that the tests were prompted by the lack of nuclear disarmament progress was unacceptable and self-serving. The tests were undertaken in the pursuit of national interests and in the belief that security would be enhanced. The approach that India and Pakistan seemed determined to pursue in May belonged to a bygone age.

The NPT review process might also be in trouble, he said. Apart from the differences over the Middle East issue, divisions over how the review process should proceed could be similarly problematic. The question now was whether the decisions taken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference were being downgraded or, worse, were no longer regarded as binding. Minimalist interpretations of the 1995 review process would only take the disarmament community backwards. His country would continue to work with others to ensure a successful outcome as the NPT was as indispensable as ever.

PENGIRAN MAIDIN PENGIRAN HASHIM (Brunei Darussalam) said the collapse of bipolarity brought about an uncertain environment -- with strategic gaps and new polarization -- all of which had led to a new arms race. His Government welcomed all initiatives undertaken by the international community to maintain world peace and security. He also welcomed the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee to negotiate effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

He said the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world was a positive measure towards the achievement of the ultimate objective of a nuclear-free world. His country welcomed proposals for the

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creation of additional zones in such areas as Central Asia and Europe. The creation of those zones would further strengthen regional and international stability.

For a long time, some countries had refused to acknowledge landmines and small arms as weapons of mass destruction, he said. The Ottawa Convention was a disarmament landmark that would ban those weapons. Over the years, the international community had made tremendous efforts to tackle the problem posed by the illicit transfer of arms. His country believed that the problem could be best addressed by the building of a global consensus, on such issues as monitoring and controlling the transfer of small arms, and the inherent link with the traffic in other contraband products. A peaceful world could only be achieved through the adherence of Member States to international disarmament conventions and treaties.

FERNANDO ENRIQUE PETRELLA (Argentina) said that at the start of the new millennium, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction must be a priority. Fortunately, the international community was not starting from scratch. It had made some progress through a number of disarmament instruments, including the CTBT, the NPT and the Ottawa Convention. Despite that progress, however, it was necessary for all States to renounce the nuclear option and for nuclear-weapon States to provide unequivocal guarantees that nuclear technology would be used for peaceful purposes only.

He said his country was the first to master the circle of nuclear fuel early in the decade, yet it had opted for self-restraint. The tests by India and Pakistan had raised concerns and it was, therefore, encouraging that both countries had pledged to soon accede to the CTBT. His Government was also following the situation in Iraq closely. It appealed to Iraq to cooperate with United Nations efforts to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

The most notable development in the sphere of conventional weapons was the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention, he said. His Government had already initiated the process of ratifying the Treaty. In his region, a security system that was based on conflict prevention, cooperation and confidence-building was being established. His country had invited other governments in the region to join a dialogue on confidence-building, strengthening transparency in military budgets and expenditures, and greater cooperation in defence and security. Recent regional conferences on confidence-building and security in Santiago, Chile, in 1995, and in San Salvador in 1998, had promoted inter-American cooperation.

He said his country was in the process of approving the Inter-American Convention Against the Manufacturing and Illicit Trafficking in Weapons, Munitions and Explosives and Other Related Materials. That Convention had been elaborated by the Organization of American States (OAS). In April 1998, the States of the region had pledged to ratify that instrument and to progress

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towards a single mechanism for registering the buyers and sellers of those weapons and related materials. In addition, his country supported the proposal to make its region a zone of peace and a zone free of landmines. That very important initiative reflected the desire to seek a common regional security. Such a zone would eventually encompass all of the countries in the western hemisphere.

ALISHER VOHIDOV (Uzbekistan), said the international community should intensify efforts on the nuclear disarmament process, towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. A number of achievements worth mentioning included the CTBT, the NPT, the chemical and biological weapons Conventions, and the Ottawa Convention, among others. Regrettably, it could not be said that the world was now a completely safe place. The cold war had been over for one decade, yet the world situation remained fluid and volatile and conflicts, fuelled by ethnic, religious and cultural rifts were emerging in many parts of the world.

With the extension of the NPT and the CTBT, the international community had focused much attention on multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament, he said. Universality remained one of the essential aims of those efforts. His country was among the first to sign and ratify the CTBT and welcomed the fact that 150 countries had also signed the agreement. His country urged all those who had yet to sign and ratify the treaty to do so, especially the 44 countries whose ratifications were needed to bring the Treaty into force.

He said his country expressed deep regret regarding the situation in South Asia. The underground nuclear tests by India and Pakistan essentially damaged stability in the region and seriously threatened the nuclear disarmament process. His Government condemned those actions and urged both countries to accede to the CTBT swiftly and unconditionally. He supported the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. That represented an important disarmament and non-proliferation step.

Regional factors of insecurity could pose significant obstacles to the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, he continued. Therefore, the international community should encourage regional arms control initiatives. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important contribution in that context. He supported the development of new concepts for States whose geographical situation made it difficult for them to join existing or prospective nuclear-weapon-free zones. Mongolia was an example of such a situation.

He said he was delighted that proposals for the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia was accorded adequate recognition on the agenda of the United Nations and had received heartening international support. His country, along with many States in its region, had acceded to the NPT. To realize the objective of creating a nuclear-weapon-free regime in the region

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would require the political will of all the regional States. His Government was also concerned about the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, as well as anti-personnel landmines, and supported the relevant international instruments -- the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and the Ottawa Convention.

MARTIN BELINGA-EBOUTOU (Cameroon), said the United Nations was created to fulfil a dream and profound aspiration, which was to banish war and establish international peace and security. The end of the cold war had raised hopes about the fulfilment of that dream -- hope that finally the threat of war had given way to peace and development.

To be sure, he continued, some progress had been made in terms of international instruments designed to prevent war and instability. Those included the NPT, The Chemical Weapons Convention, the CTBT, the Ottawa Convention and the Treaty of Pelindaba. Despite those considerable achievements, however, much remained to be done because the application of those instruments did not match the spirit of their establishment.

He said a new cause for concern was the outbreak of numerous conflicts and an arms race. The tests by India and Pakistan had increased tension in the region and was a reminder that non-proliferation was not a given. The nuclear threat was still a reality and posed a dangerous threat to the survival of mankind. Efforts should be redoubled to get every country to accede to all disarmament conventions and to favour the establishment of new ones. Collective international action must be taken.

His country supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as was proposed by the recent summit meeting of Non-Aligned Movement, he said. In addition, attention must be drawn to the proliferation and illicit traffic in small arms. Those weapons posed a real threat to many regions in the world, including Africa. It was important in that regard to underline the situation in Central Africa. The various internal and external conflicts there had created instability. Further, the phenomenon of small arms proliferation in that subregion must be urgently combatted, as the ramifications of the problem went beyond Africa.

Concluding, he reiterated that for international efforts on general and complete disarmament to succeed, both the supply and demand for arms must be addressed. The hope that in the wake of the cold war, the course of disarmament could be accelerated and resources subsequently saved could be used for the crucial task of development was far from fulfilled. Conflicts continued to consume the resources of many countries. Disarmament should remain the priority concern of the international community. In the interest of future generations, the world should now take action on complete and general disarmament.

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WOLFGANG HOFFMANN, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), said that the opening for signature of the CTBT on 24 September 1996 was a major milestone in the uphill struggle to ban all nuclear explosions and in arms control, in general. Indeed, the early signatories had expressed their conviction that the Treaty would contribute to ending the nuclear arms race and to the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.

The occurrence of some unexpected developments, however, had served as a sharp reminder that there was no room for complacency in efforts to stop nuclear explosions, he said. Following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the CTBTO had echoed the deep concern expressed by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, who had appealed to all parties concerned in the region to show restraint and to join, without delay and unconditionally, the CTBT.

He noted that individual delegations also called upon those two countries to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without conditions. Among other reactions, the State signatories, in August, expressed deep concern and regret at the decision by India and Pakistan and warned that the tests would contribute to a nuclear arms race in South Asia. He was encouraged by the self-imposed moratoriums on further testing by India and Pakistan and the recent announcements of their intention to sign the CTBT.

Of the 21 ratifications received so far, 10 of the 44 States required for its entry into force had been received, including France and the United Kingdom, he said. Many other States had assured him that their domestic ratification processes were advancing smoothly. Nevertheless, the CTBTO needed to ensure that the Treaty had as many ratifications as possible by the third anniversary of its opening for signature. The Preparatory Commission was also working towards universality of the Treaty through the establishment of a global verification regime. Twelve countries -- including some non- signatories to the CTBT, such as Pakistan -- had placed existing facilities at the Commission's disposal or had offered to host stations.

He said that the worldwide network of 321 monitoring facilities -- supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories and spanning some 90 countries -- were capable of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions. Those had to be operational by the time the Treaty entered into force. Currently, some 60 stations were voluntarily transmitting data generated by four complementary technologies -- seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic -- to the International Data Centre at Vienna, and the Commission was authorized to initiate work at 82 stations in 30 countries. The installation, certification, operation and maintenance of monitoring stations, however, required the early conclusion of facility agreements with State signatories.

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The International Data Centre, which would be processing the continuous flow of data generated by the four technologies, was inaugurated in January, he said. By 15 May, the Centre was receiving real-time data. Although the Centre could not provide real-time processing and analysis during the nuclear tests announced by India, because it was still installing the first release of applications software, it shortly thereafter retrieved data from 28 primary seismic stations for 11 May.

He said that despite the fact that it was in the middle of software trials during the tests announced by Pakistan, the Centre received data from 29 and 23 primary seismic stations on the dates in question -- 28 and 30 May. The automatic processing of that data provided reasonable first estimates of the locations of the events, which were passed on to State signatories.

Given the limited development of the current network of monitoring stations, the monitoring and analysis of the events in May were "remarkably successful", he said. Indeed, they should provide a high degree of confidence in the ability of the evolving verification regime to detect the conduct of nuclear explosions in all environments and to monitor adherence to the CTBT. Nevertheless, much work remained to be done to ensure the reliable detection, identification and location of such events and to provide a deterrent to clandestine nuclear testing.

He said that the contract had been signed with an international partner to establish the CTBT's global communications infrastructure. Over the next 10 years, a complex global network of very small aperture terminals would be installed to ensure the swift and secure transport of data -- even in the severest weather conditions -- between the facilities of the International Monitoring System, the International Data Centre and the State signatories.

The Commission had also extended its outreach to State signatories and the host countries of stations, he said. It would equip some 90 countries with the most up-to-date technology and it would pay for the operation of their stations and the training of their staffs. A consultative group had examined the potential for synergies between the CTBTO and the IAEA, which had already facilitated the Commission's work in many ways. Further, the CTBTO had modelled its financial rules on those of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Right of Reply

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea spoke in exercise of the right of reply in response to the statement made yesterday by the representative of the Republic of Korea. He said that, with regard to the issue of implementing the IAEA safeguards agreement, the South Korean delegation asserted that the Democratic People's Republic should comply with that agreement regardless of the agreed framework signed between the Democratic People's Republic and the United States. That assertion was made

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out of ignorance of the inter-related nature of the agreed framework and the IAEA safeguards agreement.

He said that in 1993 his country had declared its withdrawal from the NPT, because the safeguards agreement had been abused by being used to apply political and military pressure. In 1994, the adoption of the agreed framework had resulted in a temporary suspension of his country's declared withdrawal from the NPT, on the condition that the agreed framework be implemented. That issue, therefore, could be resolved only when the agreed framework was implemented. Those two agreements were inseparable.

Continuing, he said that what was important about the agreed framework was that it reflected the interests of both sides in a very careful way. Accordingly, it was unreasonable to ask, unilaterally, for the implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement without regard to agreed framework. South Korea would be advised to correct its misunderstanding of the linkage of those two agreements.

On the issue of political and military confrontation, the South Korean delegation claimed to have an interest in removing such confrontation, which was akin to "reversing black and white". The South was clamouring about North-South coexistence, but it had failed to come up with a viable reunification proposal. If it truly wanted North-South coexistence, it should have responded positively to his Government's proposal to unify on the basis of North-South coexistence.

Moreover, the Republic of Korea was begging the United States and Japan to cooperate and collaborate in order to take advantage of a confrontation with the North, he said. South Korea was begging for a security alliance with the United States and for the permanent presence of United States troops. It had also strongly opposed a concluded peace between the Democratic People's Republic and the United States, which, as a prerequisite, would remove the military. If the military was to be removed, security assurances should be established among the three parties. At present, there was no security arrangement between the Democratic People's Republic and the United States. A peace agreement should be concluded to fill that vacuum.

Despite all the facts, South Korea still tried to maintain the ultimate goal of the cold war era, he said. Instead, he urged it to propose a sincere means by which the political and military confrontation on the Korean peninsula could be removed.

The representative of Pakistan, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said he had listened carefully over past few days to various statements regarding the nuclear tests in South Asia. His delegation appreciated the concern voiced by many delegations, although he did not fully share their assessments. His delegation would explain its position once again in some detail in its general statement.

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He said he had asked for the floor because there had been some remarks and statements made in the Committee that seemed to assert that Pakistan had justified its tests on the basis of the fact that no nuclear disarmament progress had been made. That was not true. As his country had stated, it was compelled to test because its neighbour had tested and that was a security compulsion. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would fully understand those compulsions. Nuclear weapons were intended to leave no doubt in the mind of a potential aggressor about the consequences of an aggression.

He said the representative of New Zealand had referred to the statement made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the General Assembly, and added that his country was not satisfied with words, but wanted deeds. Rather than refer to the arrogance of that posture, he would inform the Committee that the words of the Prime Minister were the consequence of very high-level consultations with important leaders. Moreover, they had spelled out clearly the conditions under which Pakistan would be able to adhere to the CTBT. Those conditions were the removal of coercion, progress in resolving the underlying disputes and the absence of financial or political blackmail. "We will not respond well to verbal blackmail either", he said.

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