PRESS BRIEFING BY UNSCOM EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY UNSCOM EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN

The Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), Richard Butler, told correspondents at a Headquarters press briefing this afternoon that, depending on the quality of Iraq's cooperation, the Council might receive in October the long-awaited report concerning the Commission's completion of its disarmament efforts there. The press briefing followed two days of consultations between UNSCOM's technical experts and Security Council members on the remaining disarmament issues requiring further accounting by the Government of Iraq. The Commission was established by Security Council resolution 687 (1991) to inspect Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities and to destroy, remove or render harmless Iraq's proscribed weapons and all related components, items and facilities; and to establish a system of ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that the banned weapons are not reacquired.

Mr. Butler described the two-day discussion in the Council as very detailed and extensive, prompting many questions around the table on all of the weapons areas for which UNSCOM is responsible. At the conclusion of this morning's consultations, he had distributed informally a paper to the Council which set forth the priority tasks remaining in Iraq's disarmament. As it indicated, if Iraq provided UNSCOM with the information and materials it needed on those remaining issues, UNSCOM would be able to report to the Council that Iraq had completed all of the disarmament actions contemplated in paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which established the Special Commission to oversee the elimination of and accounting for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Presumably upon the completion of such disarmament actions by Iraq and the submission of UNSCOM's report to that effect, the Council would be able to take a decision on the embargo, he said. The Commission's list set out the remaining tasks it envisaged which, if completed satisfactorily by Iraq and deemed verified by the Commission, would place the team in a position to make those paragraph 22 reports. As he told the Council members, under those circumstances he would expect UNSCOM's next report to the Council in October to be very different from past reports.

He and a team of his top technical experts would take that list, or "road map", to Baghdad next week, Mr. Butler said. Consultations on its contents were scheduled with Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on 13 and 14 June. The "driving instructions" for that road map would also require discussion, namely, how best to fulfil it -- whether by technical evaluation meetings, further inspections, or examination of documents to which to team required access by Iraq. He also hoped to discuss how long it would take to complete the list, as well as the stops along the way. Some Council members sought a follow-up briefing upon his return from Iraq, presumably with Iraq's reaction to the road map and, hopefully, agreed driving instructions.

Asked for an elaboration of UNSCOM's remaining tasks, he said the list comprised the main unresolved priority issues in the areas of missiles and chemical and biological weapons. The Commission's job was to verify that Iraq had taken all the required actions in each of those weapons areas -- namely, that it had accounted for all prohibited missiles, chemical and biological weapons, as well as its ability to produce them. The field of inquiry was very large, but UNSCOM had made it shorter, tighter and more concrete.

To a question about whether the road map was a bit vague, particularly in the area of biological weapons, as some delegations had suggested, he said the list was about as tight, and clear and specific as one could hope in the missile and chemical areas. Moreover, the amount of work involved to conclude each of those areas was relatively small. The biological weapons category, however, was less so because Iraq had been far less revealing over the years with respect to its biological programme. That meant that the starting point in the biological sphere was much further back than in the missile or chemical areas, and more information was, therefore, needed in the biological sphere than in the other two areas.

In a follow-up question, the correspondent asked about comments made by some Council members that UNSCOM did not have actual proof but only suspicions about Iraq's biological weapons. He said the view expressed in the Council was that the onus of proof was not on UNSCOM but on Iraq. The system of disarming Iraq, as established by the Council, consisted of declaration, verification and destruction. It was not the Commission's job to prove that Iraq no longer had a biological weapons capability; it was Iraq's job to declare truthfully what they had, followed by verification by UNSCOM.

Another correspondent asked if UNSCOM's requests for the remaining "material balance" of a lot of the weapons and materials could be quantified. Mr. Butler said that while he had a fair idea of the quantities involved, he would not reveal that information. It was up to Iraq to declare that information to UNSCOM. The verifying agency did not usually reveal its information in full. The system implied by the question was a far more complicated route than the one envisaged by the Council. A simpler, more correct route for verification was for the subject, in this case Iraq, to step forward and reveal the facts.

Where was UNSCOM's political stand on the continued divide in the Council over the Iraqi question? a correspondent asked. Mr. Butler said he would not make such a political statement, adding that the Council members were free to express their own interpretations. The UNSCOM had presented them with the facts, perhaps in a clearer, more supportable way than previously, including aerial imagery. There was no division in the Council on the will to get the job done as soon as possible, the need to have Iraq meet its obligations, the importance of the disarmament task, and the indispensability of UNSCOM's role as the verifying agency. Rather, there was very strong agreement on the basic objectives.

UNSCOM Briefing - 3 - 4 June 1998

A correspondent asked about a comment made by the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, pertaining to a serious new development concerning Iraq's domestic production of scud-type missiles and propellants for those missiles. Mr. Butler said that UNSCOM's list referred to both of those issues. A full accounting was needed of the scud-specific propellant, the unique fuel that powered scud-type engines, formerly imported by Iraq. Some Iraqi authorities had attempted to suggest to Council members that those fuels were not unique and could be used in Iraqi missile engines permissible under resolution 687 (1991). The Council now understood that such an assertion was not true; the propellant involved would only drive a scud engine, given its particular geometry, characteristics and nature, and those engines were prohibited because of the range they would give to the missile.

He had not meant to suggest to the Council that the propellant issue was one of very great significance in comparison with warheads or other missile issues, Mr. Butler said. Rather, he wished to apprise the Council that while UNSCOM had refuted the suggestion that the propellant was useful for other types of missiles, UNSCOM required a correct accounting of that element in order to take that item off the list of outstanding issues.

More important were the remaining questions over indigenous production of prohibited missile components, he said. Based on the document presented to the Council a few days ago by Iraq's Foreign Minister, Iraq's understanding of what UNSCOM needed to know was "crystal clear". It indicated a good understanding that the Commission had legitimate verification needs with respect to Iraq's indigenous capability to manufacture prohibited missile engines or parts. The UNSCOM had simply drawn the Council's attention to the matter.

Asked about the gap between Iraq's own declarations and the Commission's finding, he said that during the consultations just ended, attention was drawn to the fact that each of the weapons files was in a different state, requiring a different quality and quantity of work to bring them to closure. The same was true between Iraq's declarations and UNSCOM's understanding of the issues. In some cases, the gap was very small. For example, the inspectors were on the edge of accounting for all special warheads, which were carried on long- range missiles and filled with either chemical or biological weapons agents. However, the gap in some parts of the biological file was fairly wide, for which he sought progress at the upcoming meeting in Iraq.

In response to another question, Mr. Butler said that in briefing the Council, the technical experts had raised the possibility that 100 per cent verification might not be achievable in all cases. Indeed, that was a realistic assessment, and it was time to put it on the table. If after a number of years it was found that the ideal terms of resolution 687 text could not be met absolutely, then the Council might have to consider how much was acceptable.

UNSCOM Briefing - 4 - 4 June 1998

He said the Commission had, for the first time, opened up the possibility that it might not, in the end, be able to fully account for the absolute number of conventional missile warheads that Iraq claimed to have unilaterally destroyed. The Council's discussion on the question of absolute verification was inconclusive, because it involved some very important issues, including the question of how mich was enough. This moved consideration out of the technical area and into the political arena.

Asked whether it was realistic that all that verifying could be done by the October report, he said the answer relied in good measure on the quality of information provided by Iraq. Some items on the list could be completed in a day if UNSCOM was given the document or the piece of information it needed. Some would take longer, particularly in the biological field. If the Government of Iraq provided the team with the truth about the materials he knew it held, the Commission could foresee a report in October that was very different from any previous report.

To a question concerning the scepticism expressed by some delegates over the evidence presented by UNSCOM, he said that its evidence was factual and "absolutely sound", adding that the simple misunderstanding about the date of a certain photograph had been cleared up.

Was the spirit of cooperation with Iraq, to which Mr. Butler referred following the resolution of the crisis over inspection of the presidential sites, continuing? a correspondent asked. Mr. Butler said it was, and that he hoped to see more of it next week. The list marked a very significant step forward by UNSCOM. For years, the provision of such a list was considered to be neither acceptable nor possible. Although some Council members wanted some adjustments -- or sought good "driving instructions" with Iraq and a follow-up meeting -- no one had complained about it.

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