DIVERGENT APPROACHES TOWARDS NUCLEAR-WEAPON ELIMINATION HIGHLIGHTED IN FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE

15 October 1997

Press Release
GA/DIS/3082

DIVERGENT APPROACHES TOWARDS NUCLEAR-WEAPON ELIMINATION HIGHLIGHTED IN FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE

19971015 Some Speakers Cite Success of Bilateral Negotiations, Others Say Process of Achieving Elimination Must Be Multilateral

The two divergent approaches to the elimination of nuclear weapons -- bilateral or multilateral negotiations -- were highlighted this afternoon, as the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) continued its general debate.

The representative of Australia told the Committee that, while he did not deny a role for multilateralism in nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States were obligated under the nuclear non-proliferation regime to reverse the cold-war accumulation of nuclear weapons, as a necessary prelude to their elimination. The reduction in those stockpiles was at last taking place and attempts to prematurely "multilateralize" that process could only complicate and retard it.

The representative of Myanmar said, however, that the contention of nuclear-weapon States that a phased programme of nuclear disarmament was the exclusive domain of their bilateral negotiations was fatally flawed and morally indefensible. Negotiations on nuclear disarmament needed to multilateralize. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations were not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing.

The representative of Indonesia told the Committee that even though the prospect of nuclear holocaust had receded, thousands of nuclear weapons remained on trigger alert -- inter-continental ballistic missiles were ready to launch within minutes and nuclear-armed submarines were on round-the-clock patrol. Against that sombre background, he regretted the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations for the phased reduction of nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame.

The representative of South Africa, also addressing efforts in the Conference, said that its lack of progress on nuclear disarmament was the result of two opposing views. There were those who refused to accept the multilateral dimension of nuclear disarmament; and others who sought to impose

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"linkages" between the various elements of that process. The solution lay in neither of those approaches, but rather in practical steps towards the systematic and progressive elimination of those weapons.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Poland, Kazakhstan, Croatia, Uruguay, Bangladesh, and the Observer for the Holy See.

The First Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 16 October, to continue its general debate.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its general exchange of views on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements.

Those agreements include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), which entered into force in April, and the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention).

On the subject of landmines, the Committee will consider the treaty agreed to in Oslo following the so-called "Ottawa process" -- the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Also under discussion will be ways to further negotiations on that weapon in the Conference on Disarmament, namely, Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).

Regarding nuclear disarmament, the Committee will discuss the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by 147 States in the past year, and implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones. Such zones have already been created by: the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok); and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of similar zones in the Middle East, Central Europe, and South Asia.

Another matter to be debated is the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, subject to the emergence of a consensus and agenda. Other issues before the Committee include regional transparency measures, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the international non-proliferation regime.

(For more background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3079 of 9 October.)

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Statements

U MYA THAN (Myanmar) said that there had been an unprecedented groundswell of interest and support by the international community for nuclear disarmament. In a very encouraging trend, those clamouring for the elimination of nuclear weapons included not only Member States, but also non- State entities and individuals.

He said that while significant developments were taking place in terms of bilateral nuclear arms negotiations, it must be stressed that to carry out nuclear disarmament measures the nuclear-weapon States must do so in good faith and in the interests of the rest of the international community. They must not attempt to circumvent existing treaty provisions in order to gain technical and strategic advantage. In that regard, he was concerned about the nuclear-weapon test carried out by one nuclear-weapon State. All such tests must be stopped, he added.

Turning to the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, he said that he regretted the "standstill" in its work. The main contention of nuclear- weapon States, namely, that a phased programme of reduction of nuclear weapons leading to their elimination was the exclusive domain of their bilateral negotiations, was fatally flawed and morally indefensible, logically incoherent and politically unacceptable. All multilateral disarmament agreements involved not only weapons possessors, but non-weapon States, from the negotiation phase onward. Why should the Conference be denied the role for which it was established, and why should nuclear weapons be an exception to that well-established rule? he added.

There was a need to "multilateralize" nuclear disarmament negotiations, he continued. While bilateral negotiations had their role, the Conference should play an important role in working out a general framework agreement on nuclear disarmament. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations were not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing. He would, once again, table a follow-up draft resolution on nuclear disarmament at the current session.

A ban on fissile materials was a matter of great urgency, he said. The Conference, through its ad hoc committee on fissile materials, was unable to carry out any substantive work. No effort should be spared in re-establishing that committee within the Conference and commencing negotiations on the subject as soon as possible.

Security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States should be further pursued within the Conference, he continued. At a time when reform was under consideration in the General Assembly, it was fitting to find ways to revitalize and strengthen the Conference. Flexibility was the key in that regard. Of equal importance was the flexibility of the positions of Member States, particularly of the nuclear-weapon States. The final document of the

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first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stated that nuclear disarmament was of the highest priority. It remained so today. The introduction of conventional arms into the Conference's agenda was worth considering, as long as those issues were rightly chosen and accurately identified. The issue of landmines could be further discussed in the Conference, as well as the illicit trafficking of small arms, he said. In the event that consensus still eluded the Conference, a separate ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament could be established, with one working on nuclear disarmament and another on fissile materials. It was clear that the urgent tasks before the Conference were nuclear disarmament, a ban on fissile materials and negative security assurances.

MAKARIM WIBISONO (Indonesia) said that the dangers of nuclear arsenals persisted, notwithstanding recent developments, which included agreements reached between the United States and the Russian Federation and the consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Even though the prospect of a nuclear holocaust had receded, thousands of those weapons remained on trigger alert. On land, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were ready to launch within minutes. At sea, nuclear-armed submarines were on round-the- clock patrol. Further compounding the situation was the absence of an agreement calling for the dismantling of nuclear warheads, or proposals to move beyond the 1993 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). With the diminished role and utility of nuclear weapons, it was time to remove them from their alert status, renounce their use and initiate negotiations for START III in an effort to seek further, deep reductions.

There was also the need to look at negative assurances to non-nuclear- weapon States, he said. Rationalization for the continued possession of nuclear weapons needed to be discarded. So long as their role was not viewed as illegitimate and so long as nuclear doctrines were not abandoned, nuclear arms race could be resumed. Against that sombre background, it was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament failed to reach a consensus to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations for their phased reduction within a specific time-frame.

The convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was supported by an overwhelming majority of Member States, he continued. The issue was of paramount importance, since it would allow for the assessment of the successes and setbacks in the disarmament process and chart the course for future action. Unilateral policies no longer sufficed and a multilateral approach was required. The Secretary-General, in his reform report, called nuclear disarmament the central issue on the global agenda and said that nations had come to recognize their stake in multilateral negotiations. As a consequence, he said that the United Nations had taken centre stage in the worldwide effort to limit both weapons and conflict.

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While the Ottawa process represented a significant accomplishment, it did not provide a complete and final answer to the multitude of problems posed by anti-personnel landmines, he said. A cautious approach that took into account the diverse perspectives of all nations was required. The magnitude of such a task could only be undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament. The Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons contained comprehensive provisions. Until all States could accept a total ban, that amendment should be part of a broader strategy to substantially reduce the disastrous effects of that weapon.

EUGENIUSZ WYZNER (Poland) noted two recent events of importance to his country, namely, the invitation to Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and approval by the European Union for negotiations to begin on Polish entry into the Union. Both decisions responded to long-standing aspirations of his country and carried major political implications for its security.

Whereas previous periods of "new international order" had failed, he said, recent developments in Europe marked a totally new European order in the making. He noted plans for the expansion of NATO -- which was not a source of threat, and should not be taken as such -- accords between NATO and the Russian Federation, the Russo-Ukrainian agreement, and the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The new order obliterated the infamous "post-Yalta" system imposed at the close of the Second World War.

On disarmament, he said his country was encouraged by the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and with the work of the organization that was set up to ensure verification. For its part, the Polish Parliament was preparing domestic legislation, with a view to establishing a specific oversight mechanism to implement the Convention. He urged all States that were still outside the Convention to sign and ratify it without further delay. Referring to the Biological Weapons Convention, he commended the efforts under way to draft recommendations for a legally binding compliance verification protocol.

Turning to nuclear disarmament, he endorsed the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and welcomed the progress made in regard to further universalization and strengthening of the NPT, which was the mainstay of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He looked forward to the second Preparatory Committee meeting for the year 2000 Review Conference of parties to the NPT. He hoped there would be a constructive climate and spirit of positive cooperation, particularly since his country -- if States parties to the NPT so agreed -- would preside over its proceedings.

He believed there had been significant progress to reduce nuclear weapons, noting the summit last March between the United States and the Russian Federation and the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and START II documents by the two countries. He also noted progress made in gathering signatures for the CTBT. However, he was concerned by the lack of agreement in the Conference on Disarmament to ban the production of fissile material. Referring to the Conference report on its work during the year, he said it was "not only scant reading -- it also is indicative that, regrettably, political will was not

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there throughout 1997 to make productive use of time and resources available to the Conference".

JOHN CAMBELL (Australia) said that 1997 had been a mixed year of successes and setbacks for the international community in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and international security. Against that backdrop, he appealed to all delegations to ensure that the expectations of the international community in that regard were met.

Of highest priority was the need to conclude a cut-off treaty on fissile material, he said. A cut-off was an important corollary to the completed CTBT and was the next logical step on the path towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It was also the "ripest" issue for a multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament. He remained deeply disappointed that the reservations of a fraction of the Conference's membership were bogging it down. A cut-off treaty was surely an outcome for which it was worth putting aside those differences, and it would be "another brick in the wall" of nuclear disarmament.

Turning to landmines, he said that the Convention recently concluded in Oslo was a significant development in efforts to ban the scourge of those weapons. His Government would continue to pursue that goal in all appropriate forums, including in the Conference. His country would not be "sitting on its hands" towards progress in eliminating landmines and had already pledged more than $A 19 million for mine-related assistance programmes.

Efforts towards preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must focus on the strengthening of current arms control regimes, he said. That was most apparent in the negotiations under way to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention through the development of an effective verification mechanism. So far, that effort had weakened that Convention. Any violation of that Convention could have disastrous effects on Australia, in terms of the enormous human cost and agricultural devastation. A sound negotiation was needed to reassure key players that the practical application of a verification regime would assist, rather than intrude.

The entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible time must remain a major goal for the international community, he said. Steps to bring the vital aspects of the Treaty's verification regime into early operation were welcome. His country hoped to be able to ratify that Treaty before the next General Assembly. The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons

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Convention was also welcome and underlined the value of the Conference on Disarmament as an inclusive forum for the negotiation of sound multilateral disarmament treaties.

It was with considerable frustration that he had witnessed the "lumbering and convulsive attempts" of the Conference to find an appropriate "post-CTBT" role for itself, he continued. That body was in urgent need of regeneration and prolonged inaction would be corrosive. A disarmament negotiation could take place anywhere, but only the Conference could strike the right combination of checks and balances, which guaranteed the broadest possible participation and adherence to arms control regimes. Overloading that body with obligations it was not equipped to meet would lead nowhere.

He said that, while the question of the approach to nuclear disarmament was a major cause of the logjam in the Conference, he was committed to the pursuit of the ultimate objective -- global nuclear disarmament -- through concrete interlocking steps. He did not deny a role for multilateralism in nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the final phase of the elimination of nuclear weapons would inevitably be a multilateral endeavour. But nuclear-weapon States were specifically obligated under the nuclear non-proliferation regime to reverse the cold-war accumulation of nuclear weapons, as a necessary prelude to their elimination. The reduction in those stockpiles was at last taking place, but attempts to prematurely multilateralize that preliminary phase could only complicate and retard the process.

The world's international security architecture would be poorer, if the Conference were to stagnate and decline into irrelevance, he said. Its membership must urgently decide whether that body would make a central contribution.

RENATO R. MARTINO, Permanent Observer for the Holy See, said he drew a measure of hope that the next century, unlike the "death-filled twentieth century", would bring peace, noting the end of the cold war, the reduction of military forces in Europe, the Chemical Weapons Convention, reduction of nuclear weapons by the two foremost nuclear-weapon States, the extension of the NPT, the CTBT and the adoption of the Convention on anti-personnel landmines.

However, he continued, violence persisted, spurred by the international arms trade, particularly the trade in small weapons. Weapons of mass destruction were also still produced in great quantity, and the most powerful States refused to let go of their nuclear weapons. Even now, nearly a decade after the end of the cold war, the world's governments still spent more that $800 billion a year to support military forces of more than 27 million soldiers.

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Developing countries spent $221 billion on their armed forces, a significant drain on their already limited resources, he said. Huge investments were needed in such areas as scientific research, technological development, education, training and infrastructure, as well as in structural advances that would protect the environment. However, as the Secretary- General had said: "We cannot simultaneously pay the price of war and the price of peace."

He commended the work done in the Ottawa process towards a ban on landmines and urged universal support for the treaty agreed upon in Oslo. If biological weapons, chemical weapons and landmines could be done away with, so too could nuclear weapons. "Let not the immensity of this task dissuade us from the efforts needed to free humanity from such a scourge", he said. The international community could no longer shield itself from the assault on life itself that nuclear weapons represented. Mankind faced the gravest consequences if it was ruled by the militarism of nuclear weapons, rather than the humanitarian law espoused by the International Court of Justice.

AKMARAL ARYSTANBEKOVA (Kazakhstan) noted international efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and said her country supported work towards full compliance and effective implementation of the NPT. All countries must play an active part in implementation of the NPT, and she welcomed the work under way towards the new review process of that Treaty.

She said there was a need to revitalize efforts to provide non-nuclear States with safeguards against the use of nuclear weapons by those in possession of them. She firmly supported the CTBT, which was one of the most important events of this century. It was a qualitatively new step in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and she called on all States to sign it.

She said her country had felt the catastrophic consequences of nuclear testing. There had been 470 nuclear-test explosions in Kazakhstan, about 70 per cent of all the nuclear testing that had been undertaken by the former Soviet Union. That had resulted in major humanitarian and environmental problems. The test sites were now closed, but her country faced many problems concerning the converting of former test sites and nuclear infrastructure.

She supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. All nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from her country. Even when there had been nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, her country had never tried to use them. Since broad areas of her country had suffered the effects of nuclear explosions, she understood the importance of strengthening environmental safeguards and that was another reason to strive for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area. She was grateful to the Secretary-General for her support for such a zone, which had also been a topic in the international conference on disarmament that had taken place in Tashkent this year.

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In other areas of disarmament, she said she supported the IAEA system of guarantees, and that her country had taken several steps to control atomic energy. She continued to believe that the production of fissile materials should be banned. She supported the principles of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which her country was considering signing. Her country also adhered to the ABM Treaty, which had been endorsed by the documents signed recently in New York by Kazakhstan, United States and the Russian Federation, among others. Those documents fully reflected the security interests of her country.

Her country had also adopted a unilateral moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines, she said, noting that continuing armed conflicts around the world required the control of such weapons. In that context, her country was taking part in the Register of Conventional Arms. She supported the Conference on Disarmament and believed new members should be considered on a regionally balanced basis.

VICE SKRACIC (Croatia) said that multilateral treaties and their verifying mechanisms were the basis of achieving disarmament goals and objectives. While some progress had been made, the disarmament process was deadlocked in the Conference on Disarmament this year.

Of all disarmament issues on the Committee's agenda, nuclear non- proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons was the most important, he said. A combination of bilateral and multilateral efforts had paved the way for a new phase in the process, as the opening for signature of the CTBT had shown. He strongly believed that the NPT offered the only universal mechanism to curb nuclear proliferation aimed at the ultimate elimination of those weapons. Yet, he was concerned by the refusal of some threshold States to commit themselves to nuclear non-proliferation, particularly since the latest initiatives by some nuclear Powers had accelerated that process.

He said that he also supported early negotiations on a cut-off of fissile material for weapons purposes. Recent momentum towards nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament should not be held hostage by unrealistic demands. The best way to further the cause of nuclear non-proliferation was to proceed one step at a time.

As one of the original States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, he said that Croatia had never produced or possessed, and would never produce or possess, those weapons. He was eager to see the successful conclusion of a legally binding verification regime to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. In that regard, he would welcome the adoption in 1998 of the proposal to establish a specialized verification regime modelled on the CTBT and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

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The amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was a significant step, but one that did not fulfil all expectations, he said. The Convention produced in Oslo, however, had his full support. His Government had played an active role in the Ottawa process from the beginning. It had reinforced its commitment by placing its own unilateral moratoria on the production, transfer, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines. He regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to make any progress in that regard.

His concern with the global landmine problem had been deepened by his country's tragic war experience, he continued. The thousands of mines laid there, in formerly occupied territories, continued to be cause of tragedies among civilians. The demining process was difficult and would take many years. Unfortunately, a lack of trained personnel and specialized equipment would further delay the process. He was grateful for aid received in that regard, and appealed for further aid -- material, financial or professional -- which could expedite the demining process.

Turning to regional disarmament measures, he said that his country took those commitments very seriously. On the local level, his Government had been asked to consider the possibility of establishing a permanent demilitarized zone in Eastern Slavonia along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. His Government had openly stated that it would favour that approach, which would be successful only if similar action was taken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Such action on its part had not been forthcoming. As a result, negotiations on the possible zone had not proceeded.

JORGE PEREZ-OTERMIN (Uruguay) noted the celebration this year of the thirtieth anniversary of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. It was a historic Treaty and its anniversary served as a reminder of the need to eliminate nuclear weapons.

He also highlighted the Chemical Weapons Convention and appealed to States that had not yet signed the Treaty to do so. It was a pity that the objections of weapons producers and traders had prevented more palpable progress on reducing weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, he could not believe that it was impossible for nuclear weapons to be completely eliminated by the year 2025. While the twentieth century had seen the creation of such weapons, the twenty-first century should see their complete destruction. The world's resources should not be diverted for weapons, while other projects were desperately needed by humanity. A positive step would be the complete denuclearization of the southern hemisphere, by combining existing nuclear- weapon-free zones.

He was concerned about the decision of the United States to lift restrictions on exports of weapons to Latin America. The region was in the midst of a period of peace and stability. He hoped that would not be

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disrupted by an influx of weapons, as such weapons tended to have a force of their own. He was concerned, too, about the world trade in weapons and the international transport of dangerous materials. In that context, his country had recently adopted a law banning the passage within its territory of any kind of dangerous waste.

Many challenges lay ahead for the international community and for the United Nations, he said. For example, at the end of conflicts the weapons that had been used by the combatants should be collected, so that they did not spur further conflict or fall into the wrong hands. It was especially important to control the flow of small weapons, which played a major role in drug trafficking and international crime. The task was not easy, but neither was it impossible.

ANWARUL KARIM CHOWDHURY (Bangladesh) said that despite some recent progress, military threats to security could not be underestimated. The collapse of bipolarity had also resulted in uncertainties, strategic gaps and new polarization, which had created a new arms race. Yet, the momentum towards confidence-building measures bolstered the notion that regional disarmament could begin without waiting for global disarmament.

Many of the treaties so far negotiated were critically imperfect, he said. The cap on nuclear proliferation remained weak on a number of counts. Five countries remained outside the NPT and the entry into force of the CTBT had been seriously undermined. The controversy over vertical proliferation had been accentuated by sub-critical tests. While great optimism had been attached to nuclear-weapon-free zones, there was a limit to that exercise. The Bangkok Treaty, without the endorsement of the five nuclear-weapon States, bore witness to that fact. The negative security assurances, as perceived, were seriously flawed. And, a nuclear-free southern hemisphere was blocked, as the North maintained its nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear arms control had proved elusive, he continued. A cut-off treaty on fissile material for weapons seemed as intractable as the CTBT appeared for decades. The Conference on Disarmament had been unable to even set up an ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile material ban. It was evident that there was "no credible way out of the impasse except global nuclear disarmament".

The conclusions of the Canberra Commission concerning nuclear disarmament and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should serve to remind the signatories of the NPT of their obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament, he said. The Non-Aligned Movement submitted a programme of action for a phased elimination of nuclear weapons that was both realistic and expedient. It would be an historical aberration if "we did not act on such a grave matter in time", he added.

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He said he was encouraged by the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and by efforts aimed at strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention. In the conventional arms sphere, attention remained focused on transparency. The Register of Conventional Arms remained limited to the participation of approximately half the Organization's membership. Although questions remained on the scope of the Register, the work of the Panel of Governmental Experts in the area of small arms was to be commended. The open sale of those arms was of particular concern. There was intense competition to export them, including to conflict areas where the United Nations sought peace.

The Ottawa process had produced a positive development, he said. However, the decision by the major Powers not to sign the agreement rendered it virtually ineffective. A comprehensive global treaty was needed that encouraged States to discard that weapon as a means of national defence. The Conference would hopefully negotiate such a treaty, with due regard to victim rehabilitation and mine clearance.

Regarding the convening of the fourth special session on disarmament, nuclear disarmament should remain the priority item on its agenda, he said. Such a session should meet in a "spirit of multilateralism", which had previously found a bold and concrete path towards disarmament. He hoped that an agenda would be elaborated in the 1998 session of the Disarmament Commission.

PETER GOOSEN (South Africa) said he was not able to give such a glowing account of the work of the First Committee as he had given the year before. His attitude could best be described as ambivalent. While there had been several accomplishments in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament, there were as many disappointments.

The inability of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on its work for 1997, despite some last minute papering over the cracks, was symptomatic of the problems, he continued. Noting the achievements of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the CTBT, he said that his country, as a new member of the Conference, had hoped it would go on to do more of the same.

The deadlock in the Conference could be ascribed mainly to the inability of members to look beyond the issues that divided them, he said. Lack of progress on nuclear disarmament was a result of two opposing views: there were those who refused to accept the multilateral dimension of nuclear disarmament; and those who sought to impose ideological concepts on and "linkages" between the various elements of nuclear disarmament. The solution lay in neither of those approaches.

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Substantive work on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament would not -- and should not -- undermine such negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. Work in the Conference should focus on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

One of the essential foundation stones for the achievement of the elimination of nuclear weapons was a cut-off treaty, within the Conference, banning the production of fissile material, he said. It was also vital for the Conference and for the disarmament process that the deadlock be broken. "As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the Conference on Disarmament will not be able to justify another wasted year."

He said his country would continue to work with States that had begun efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, and would continue to support the initiative to promote the southern hemisphere as a zone free from nuclear weapons.

He looked forward to the entry into force of the Convention banning the production and use of anti-personnel landmines that had been agreed on at the Oslo conference. The Convention established a compelling new international norm against that scourge. His country appealed to all States to heed the call of the international community against such inhumane weapons.

The membership of the Conference on Disarmament should be democratized, he said. Some had argued that the Conference could only function with a limited membership, but the weakness of that argument had been demonstrated by the negotiations that had taken place under the umbrella of existing treaties and also by the Oslo conference. The national security and other concerns of States were protected by the conference's rules of procedure, not by limited membership.

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