DISARMAMENT PACE ACCELERATING THROUGH BOLD, PRACTICAL INCREMENTS, UNITED STATES TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE

14 October 1997

Press Release
GA/DIS/3081

DISARMAMENT PACE ACCELERATING THROUGH BOLD, PRACTICAL INCREMENTS, UNITED STATES TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE

19971014 Russian Federation Cites Own Efforts to Limit Enriched Uranium, Plutonium; Two Approaches to Landmine Issue Also Addressed, as General Debate Continues

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, John Holum, told the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) this afternoon that the pace of nuclear disarmament was "picking up" largely because the countries whose arms were directly involved had moved in "bold but practical increments".

Mr. Holum speaking during the Committee's continuing general debate, said that reductions of nuclear weapons under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) were ahead of schedule and the United States and the Russian Federation had cleared away all remaining obstacles for ratification by the Russian Federation of START II. Furthermore, the two countries had set a timetable of 2007 to start negotiating ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads -- 20 per cent of peak cold- war levels.

He added that the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, was "in the grip of a linkage virus", insisting that all other progress must cease until agreement was reached on a timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a linkage stalled the proven step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia.

The representative of the Russian Federation said that his country was willing to undertake consistent action aimed at the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals by all the members of the "nuclear club". It had already stopped production of weapons-grade uranium, and was in the process of ceasing production of weapons-grade plutonium. The decision to gradually remove from its nuclear military up to 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and up to 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium was an effective contribution towards rendering the process of nuclear disarmament irreversible.

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Several other speakers drew attention to the two approaches to the landmine issue: the so-called "Ottawa process", which had resulted in a Convention for the total ban of landmines that will be open for signature in December; and negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

The representative of Canada hailed the Convention negotiated through the Ottawa process and New Zealand's representative said the process had demonstrated that there were circumstances where coalitions of like-minded countries were able to establish new international norms. The representative of China, however, said that his country favoured restricting the use of landmines, with the view to their ultimate elimination, in a step-by-step manner. Similarly, the representative of the United States said that, while it welcomed the result of the Ottawa process, it could not join the Convention, since it ruled out military options his country could not now do without.

Statements were also made by the representatives of Japan, Brazil, Fiji Colombia, and the observer for Switzerland.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. Wednesday, 15 October, to continue its general debate on disarmament and security issues.

Committee Work Programme

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its general debate, including consideration of a number of international disarmament agreements. Those include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), which entered into force on 29 April, triggering its complex verification mechanism as implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The Committee will also consider the verification measures of another treaty governing weapons of mass destruction -- the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). Multilateral efforts to negotiate the treaty's verification mechanism intensified this year.

Discussion will continue on the subject of landmines, in the context of the instrument negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, namely Protocol II of the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons). Also under consideration by the Committee will be the treaty agreed to in Oslo following the so-called "Ottawa process" -- the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. That convention has given impetus to the call for a universal ban on those weapons.

The Committee will also discuss the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was opened for signature last year. Many countries had hoped the Treaty would motivate the implementation of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that were adopted at the Review and Extension Conference of the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The CTBT, requiring ratification by 44 States listed in the Treaty's annex before it enters into force, has so far been signed by 147 countries, and ratified by seven.

The Committee is also expected to focus on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Already in existence are nuclear-weapon-free zones covered by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Committee drafts are anticipated for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, Central Europe, and South Asia.

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Other matters to be discussed include regional transparency measures, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the international non- proliferation regime. The Committee is also likely to consider such bilateral agreements as the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START).

(For more background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3079 of 9 October.)

Statements

CLIVE PEARSON (New Zealand) said it had been an especially good year for disarmament, as evidenced by the overhaul in May of the IAEA safeguards, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. He welcomed the Convention as the first to outlaw an entire class of weapons while providing a verification system to ensure that parties comply with its provisions. He also noted continuing efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, and the United States' consent to START II.

His Government fully supported the Ottawa process and urged as many countries as possible to sign the treaty banning the use of anti-personnel landmines, he continued. New Zealand had already been active in assisting with demining operations. The Ottawa process had demonstrated that there were circumstances where coalitions of like-minded countries were able to gather sufficient support to establish new international norms -- provided there was sufficient political will to do so.

He said that seven countries had so far ratified the CTBT, which remained a priority for New Zealand, as it was a step towards nuclear disarmament. He hoped the number of ratifications would swell during the year. "There should be no doubt that this treaty, and its State signatories, mean business", he said.

Unfortunately, he continued, along with all the disarmament successes of the year, 1997 had not been a good year for the Conference on Disarmament, which had even been unable to agree on how to record its lack of progress. That was not encouraging. If the deadlock continued during the year, it would call into question the credibility of the Conference, and the body would thus have difficulty securing financial resources.

The Conference must be open, without preconditions, to any new members who wished to exercise their commitment to disarmament, he said. The Conference must also be more accountable. He remained committed to the Conference, but it must prove that it was still capable of delivering. There must be a greater willingness to entertain movement and engage in compromise. The Conference must fully engage in debate on nuclear disarmament and provide leadership on the issue. That debate must not be suffocated in Geneva.

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Packaging nuclear disarmament into time-bound outcomes was not productive, nor was linking progress on nuclear issues to progress in other areas of arms control, he said. He recommended the report of the Canberra Commission, which proposed practical steps to enhance stability in the move towards a nuclear-free world, and called on the five nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate a firm commitment to nuclear disarmament.

There had never been a better time to engage in nuclear disarmament, he said. There was now a growing and discernible trust between the major Powers. Of nuclear weapons, he said, "The fact that they have not been used for 50 years does not mean that the risks are in any way lessened as time goes by. The longer we retain them, the greater the temptation of others to acquire them."

JOHN D. HOLUM, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, said that security was an increasingly broad concept involving such areas as economics and the environment, science and information, drugs and terrorism, and education and human rights. Even so, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament remained vital components. The threats posed by weapons of mass destruction were far from being extinguished and the consequences of miscalculation or deliberate acts could be horrific. And, with grim regularity, thousands of lives continued to be lost in conventional conflicts. "These sobering realities should spur us", he added.

Even as the Committee aspired to the loftiest goals, its members should strive for the kind of focused, practical steps with which arms control was not just argued, but actually achieved, he continued. "Let us not stand immobile, longing for the stars, but resolve to keep moving surely towards them in deliberate strides. "The Committee had the particular responsibility to help the international community establish such realistic goals and provide the orientation needed to make real negotiations possible.

The achievements of the past year included the adoption of the CTBT and the progress towards universality of the NPT, he went on. Nuclear-weapon-free zones now spanned entire continents. Indeed, the pace of nuclear disarmament was "picking up", largely because the countries whose arms were directly involved had moved in "bold but practical increments". START I reductions were ahead of schedule and the Russian Federation and the United States had cleared away all remaining obstacles to the Duma's ratification of START II. With steps being set for early Russian ratification and entry into force of START II, it was possible to move on to even deeper reductions and more comprehensive controls on nuclear arms. In the Committee, Russian and American delegations would urge the adoption of a resolution supporting that process on which so much of the world's future security rested.

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He said that the practical approach called for the consolidation and realization of past achievements, through entry into force and compliance, enforcement and implementation. Respective governments, for example, needed to secure approval for ratifications and commitments to such organizations as the IAEA were crucial. Each country had the responsibility of applying the powerful new safeguards adopted in May to the real world, by upgrading bilateral agreements with the IAEA. The United Nations had a vital role in stimulating governments to take compliance seriously. A United States- sponsored resolution this year in the Committee would re-emphasize that point.

He said that both his Government and the Government of the Russian Federation had set a timetable of 2007 for the next dramatic disarmament step of proceeding to negotiate START III ceilings of 2,000 to 2,500 warheads -- 20 per cent of peak cold war levels. It was already agreed that START III would include the destruction of the means of delivery, and the nuclear warheads themselves. It would also embrace transparency measures to ensure that nuclear material from destroyed warheads would never again be used in weapons. The nuclear-weapon States were also coming to terms with an alarming potential side effect of nuclear disarmament -- the diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear ambitions elsewhere. Those States had a particular responsibility to set aside rigid rules of secrecy in the storage and disposition of nuclear warheads and fissile materials.

Another leading priority was the need to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, he said. Realism in that regard meant recognizing the core purpose of the effort to protect all humanity from the depraved proposition that the deadly diseases the world had struggled to eradicate -- plague, botulinum, anthrax and others -- could be deliberately inflicted as weapons of war. On another critical issue, the United States had not given up on the negotiation for a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Such a ban would establish a cap on the amount of nuclear weapons material in the world. How could reduced roles for nuclear weapons be achieved if it was not even possible to begin discussing a cap on their indispensable contents? he asked.

Much more practical work remained to be done to end the civilian carnage caused by anti-personnel landmines, he continued. While the United States had worked diligently to find an outcome to the Ottawa process, the result was one which it welcomed, but could not join. The Ottawa Convention would rule out military options his country could not now do without -- to use landmines of types or in ways that would not pose the humanitarian threat of long-lived, undetectable mines planted in unmarked fields. But, all countries in a position to do so should sign the Convention, and then turn to the critical landmine work that lay ahead.

On that issue, the Conference on Disarmament unfortunately revealed that it was prepared for neither long strides nor a quick start, he said. Yet,

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since the Conference included all the major historic landmine producers and exporters, the United States would strongly support Conference negotiations on landmines, beginning with a ban on exports. In that regard, he urged prompt ratification of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It dealt specifically with long-lived, undetectable mines, which had not been dealt with by the Ottawa process. President Clinton had directed a significant increase in United States demining efforts, beginning with a 25 per cent increase in funds next year. The United States currently spent nearly as much on demining as the rest of the world combined.

The Conference on Disarmament was "in the grip of a linkage virus", he said. It insisted not only on maximum results on one subject, but that all other progress must cease until agreement was reached on a timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The Conference was a negotiating body, not a debating society, and negotiations in Geneva should address matters of global reach that required broadly representative participation. The "linkage disease" proposed to stall the proven step-by-step approach by the United States and Russia -- that was in fact bringing nuclear disarmament closer -- and drag all possible progress on other issues into the same morass. That linkage virus had paralyzed the Conference. "We will see if it proves to be fatal", he added.

He said that the United States was reorganizing its arms control operations by integrating the 38-year old Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the Department of State. That step would enhance the role of arms control and non-proliferation in United States foreign policy. Independent policy advocacy and compliance reviews would be preserved, as the Department's senior arms control official would report directly to the President and the national security leadership.

AKIRA HAYASHI (Japan) noting the adoption of the CTBT and the Chemical Weapons Convention, said there had been remarkable recent progress in disarmament. Yet, there were also dangerous regional armed conflicts and a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Further, the Conference on Disarmament had been unable this year to reach agreement on a number of issues.

He said his country upheld its non-nuclear principles and maintained a military force only for self-defence purposes. It was an important time now to engage in serious disarmament work. While maintaining the lofty ideal of complete disarmament, his Government would continue to appeal to the international community to aim at steady progress in disarmament through concrete measures, taken one at a time. He would reintroduce in the Committee this year a draft resolution aimed at achieving the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, encouraged by support from Member States. His Government would also make efforts to pursue the disarmament process in conventional arms.

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It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to agree on a process to ban the production of fissile materials, particularly since the majority of States seemed to support such discussions, he continued. He hoped that next year the Conference would be able to make more progress. If progress was to be made towards the goal of nuclear disarmament, there must be steady and cumulative effort. Perhaps negotiations could begin immediately on the technical aspects of a cut-off treaty for fissile materials. Such an approach had been successful in the approach of the ad hoc group of scientific experts on seismic events, prior to the commencement of the CTBT negotiations.

In the area of conventional disarmament, he said it was important that the Conference grapple with the issue of landmines. His Government had identified four important tasks in that field: contribution to international efforts to achieve a total ban on anti-personnel landmines; assistance for demining efforts; the development of technology for mine clearance; and assistance for victims of landmines. His Government would soon decide whether or not to sign the treaty negotiated in the Ottawa process. Nevertheless, it was convinced that the international community must continue to strive to realize the universal and effective elimination of those weapons.

In the field of nuclear disarmament, he noted that Japan had ratified the CTBT in July. He hoped many more countries would sign and ratify it without delay and he urged those countries that had opposed the Treaty to reconsider their positions. Subsequent to the indefinite extension of the NPT, the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the year 2000 Review Conference had been held this year. At the first meeting, nuclear-weapon States had provided information on the measures they had taken for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. That was an important effort, bringing increased transparency to the nuclear disarmament process, and providing greater confidence between those States and the non-nuclear States. He commended Brazil's decision to join the NPT and called on countries still outside the Treaty to join the regime.

MARK MOHER (Canada) said that the courageous package of reform initiatives presented by the Secretary-General should motivate a new approach and a new standard for common practical action by the First Committee.

He said he did not believe that an inability to make substantive progress in some areas of arms control and disarmament during the past year signalled the collapse or uselessness of specific forums. Nor did it mean the international community had come to the end of the disarmament road. Instead, the inability to act on certain areas of the disarmament agenda in the past year underlined the urgent need to mobilize political will and creativity, in order to move the process forward.

Effective measures to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction must be pursued, as well as the universality of existing instruments, he

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continued. For example, agreement must be reached on a protocol that would enhance the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention. And, while the Chemical Weapons Convention had entered into force, further challenges remained.

Recent achievements in the nuclear arena represented only a fraction of what was needed towards the elimination of those weapons, he said. The START process must be revitalized and broadened to include other nuclear-weapon States and convert promises into actions. The nuclear-weapon States must comply with their obligation under the NPT to negotiate in good faith and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The NPT review process must continue to be qualitatively different. Further, the Conference on Disarmament must overcome its current stalemate and move forward decisively on nuclear disarmament and a cut-off of the use of fissile material for weapons purposes. In addition, much work remained to be done in terms of security assurances and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

While Canada acknowledged the special responsibilities of the nuclear- weapon States, it did not abdicate its engagement in that field, he said. His country expected the nuclear-weapon States "to meet their responsibilities and deliver on their commitment". He did not accept the view put forth by some States that vast and comprehensive progress across the board, such as towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, was a precondition for specific progress. He was committed to achieving progress wherever and whenever possible. For example, he specifically believed it was a propitious moment to finally get to work to prevent an arms race in outer space.

He said he continued to be deeply concerned about conventional disarmament questions. Efforts in that regard were governed by the need for greater transparency and the exercise of restraint by all States. There was still no global consensus on the need to act decisively on the conventional arms agenda. The Register of Conventional Arms would continue to fall short of its potential, so long as States erratically and sporadically submitted their data. The work of the Expert Governmental Panel on Small Arms was a balanced and reasonable step towards addressing the deleterious effects of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons. He especially supported the Panel's recommendations relating to peacekeeping mandates and the destruction of weapons as part of post-conflict peace- building.

The Ottawa process, resulting in a Convention to ban landmines, proved that new approaches, new convictions, new coalitions of like-minded governments and civil society working together would produce clear and rapid results, he said. The treaty would be opened for signature on 3 and 4 December, in Ottawa. Those countries that would be unable to sign should place unilateral restrictions on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. All countries should ratify the Convention on

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Certain Conventional Weapons and its amended Protocol II. The agreement reached in Oslo, Norway, was just the first step. An agenda for action, to be undertaken in December in Ottawa, would strive to ensure the treaty's early entry into force and universal adherence, along with its effective implementation.

In terms of the disarmament machinery, the First Committee should aim for well-focused substantive sessions, the Conference on Disarmament should be strengthened and negotiations begun on agreed issues, and the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be clarified. In closing, he drew attention to a draft resolution on landmines being circulated in Geneva and New York, which had the support so far of 40 countries. He would be seeking further co-sponsors before submitting the text next week.

SHA ZUKANG (China) noted several factors that had contributed towards world peace, including the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, he added, the world was not at peace and the cold war mentality still existed, with power politics and States interfering in the internal affairs of others. Continuing research and development of missile defence systems were not conducive to international peace and security. International non-proliferation efforts must be strengthened.

He was pleased to note the indefinite extension of the NPT, the conclusion of the CTBT, the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and negotiations to enhance the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention. However, some of the so-called non-proliferation mechanisms were discriminatory, exclusive in nature and non-transparent in practice. They impeded the social and economic development of developing countries, while allowing developed countries to engage in massive sales of advanced weapons and equipment to sensitive regions.

He said China would never yield to any outside pressure to enter into alliances with any big Power of group of countries, nor would it participate in the arms race or seek military expansion. It was a long-time advocate of genuine disarmament and had been the first country to sign the CTBT after the United Nations host country. Since his country first came into possession of nuclear weapons, it had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. China was the only nuclear State that had promised, unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. His country had also consistently supported efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones.

As for the issue of anti-personnel landmines, was it more important than the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and outer space weapons? he asked. His country had taken a constructive and realistic attitude towards the amendment to the landmine Protocol and might ratify that Protocol at an early date. It had also undertaken to implement a moratorium on the export of

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anti-personnel landmines that were not in conformity with the technical criteria contained in the amended Protocol before its entry into force. Furthermore, it had done a lot of work in assisting other developing countries in clearing mines.

Anti-personnel landmines were defensive in nature, he continued, and the humanitarian concerns about them were caused by the shortcomings of the older mines, their indiscriminate use and inadequate post-conflict demining efforts. The elimination of civilian casualties should be the sole objective. That could be achieved by clearing the older mines and banning their future use. His Government was in favour of imposing strict and reasonable restrictions on the use of anti-personnel landmines, with a view to achieving their ultimate ban in a step-by-step manner. It reserved the right, however, to use such weapons on its own territory until alternative means had been found. His country would only use anti-personnel landmines for the purpose of defending against foreign military intervention and aggression.

On the issue of international security, each country had the right to choose a road of development according to its own natural conditions, he said. No country or group of countries should seek security by compromising the security of others. International arms control and disarmament should reinforce the security of countries, not undermine it. "No country has the right to impose its own domestic laws on the international community, nor should it impose or threaten to impose sanctions at will", he said.

VLADIMIR P. LUKIN (Russian Federation) said that the building of a "non-bloc," multipolar world continued to be his country's principal priority. One of the most significant strides in that regard was the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), signed last May in Paris. That had been possible because the major countries of Europe and North America had the political will to keep the world from returning to confrontation. While his Government continued to oppose NATO expansion, it was strenuously working to transform the closed-bloc structures into an integral part of a European and universal security system. In order to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe, his Government was willing to "go our part of the road". For example, an initiative was under consideration to change the targeting of Russian nuclear systems, so they would no longer be directed at NATO countries.

The CTBT, he continued, liberated mankind from any nuclear explosions and would effectively contribute to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. He attached paramount importance to a comprehensive and objective review of the NPT, one of the cornerstones of the global security system. His Government was willing to undertake consistent action, together with other nuclear-weapon States, aimed at the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals by all the members of the "nuclear club". In cooperation

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with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the withdrawal of Russian nuclear weapons that had been left in the territory of those countries after the former Soviet Union ceased to exist had been completed, with a view to their elimination.

It was important that the Conference on Disarmament initiate negotiations on a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, he said. His country had already stopped the production of weapons-grade uranium and a national programme to stop the production of weapons-grade plutonium would be implemented by 1998. The decision to gradually remove from Russia's nuclear military up to 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and up to 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium was an effective contribution towards rendering the process of nuclear disarmament irreversible.

He said that the recent signing in New York of the agreements on the demarcation between the strategic and non-strategic anti-ballistic missile systems represented substantial progress towards strengthening the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. They offered Russia and the United States new opportunities to work together towards reducing their nuclear weapons to a level 80 per cent below that which existed during the cold war. The work of experts on START III would continue, with full-scale negotiations for that treaty beginning upon the entry into force of START II.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world significantly enhanced stability and security and promoted the narrowing of the sphere of nuclear preparations, he said. Particularly welcome was the idea for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe.

The Duma was actively engaged in ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and hoped to complete that process soon, he continued. His country would not stay outside the efforts of the international community to get rid of chemical weapons. Negotiations on the Biological Weapons Convention should produce a verification and compliance system that was reliable, not burdensome and based on objective criteria. In the process, it was important that the Convention be strengthened, not revised.

He said that he favoured the elimination of anti-personnel landmines through a gradual process that included agreed stages. While President Yeltsin had expressed support for the principle of the Convention negotiated in Oslo, Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons balanced the interests of States and took into account their actual capabilities and security interests. A hasty prohibition, unaccompanied by measures to strengthen stability, could have a negative impact, including upon anti-terrorist activities. The proper forum for the discussion of landmines

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was the Conference on Disarmament, where it was possible to carry out an in-depth study of the entire set of problems.

Turning to conventional armaments, he said the results of the work on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty were positive. The adopted document defined areas of accord and set the directions for further work, by drawing the basic contours of the future conventional armaments verification regime in Europe in a new geopolitical environment. His Government consistently pursued a policy of enhancing transparency, including by submitting on a regular basis data to the Register on Conventional Arms.

He said that a number of linkages had been insisted upon by various countries in the multilateral negotiating process this year in order to shake the role of the Conference on Disarmament into taking a "fast track" approach. Such an approach was incapable of assessing the security interests of all countries. He opposed the "cutting of corners" and was convinced that only the patient work within the Conference could lead to such achievements as the NPT, the biological and chemical weapons conventions, the CTBT and other significant international agreements. It was important that the General Assembly reaffirm the role of the Conference.

CELSO L.N. AMORIM (Brazil) said that the text adopted in Oslo on landmines was perhaps the most significant disarmament event of the past year. Close cooperation among Latin American countries was a sign of harmony in that region and regional defence procurement was aimed basically at replacing obsolete equipment. Indeed, there was an increase in military cooperation among neighbouring countries, with Latin American military expenditures the lowest in the world.

Despite recent disarmament progress, the unlimited development of new forms of armaments was cause for concern, he said. Caution should be exercised, as well as self-restraint, to avoid a new arms race of sophisticated weapons among the nuclear-weapon States. The verification mechanism of the Chemical Weapons Convention would continue making strides towards its full implementation. In that regard, the Russian Federation's commitment to that treaty's ratification was welcome.

On 20 June, the President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, submitted the NPT to the Brazilian Congress for approval, he said. The option of acquiring nuclear weapons was renounced by Brazil long ago. His country had actively participated in negotiating the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The same renunciation was reaffirmed in other bilateral agreements. Now, in joining the non-proliferation regime of the NPT, his country intended to further the cause of nuclear disarmament. But, the NPT by itself did not represent a definitive solution to the nuclear problem.

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He said that developments during the last decade had reflected an accelerated change in the nuclear disarmament process, as those weapons were increasingly seen as unnecessary and expensive, indeed an embarrassment. Everyone sought a world in which nuclear arsenals were sharply reduced and eventually eliminated. In that regard, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the findings of the Canberra Commission were illuminating. It was essential to undertake progressive steps towards the complete elimination of those weapons. Yet, despite solemn commitments to do so under the NPT, some still argued that the elimination of nuclear weapons was not feasible. To the contrary, what was unthinkable was that the current unstable situation could be left unattended.

He said that Brazil and other like-minded countries intended to table a draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free Southern hemisphere. It was a step in the direction of freeing mankind of the nightmare of nuclear destruction.

POSECI BUNE (Fiji) hailed the progress that had been made during the year in the field of disarmament, mentioning the creation of nuclear-weapon- free zones, the signing of the CTBT, and the indefinite extension of the NPT.

His country had been the first to ratify the CTBT, he said. He urged all countries who had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty. However, the Treaty would be meaningless without rapid and positive implementation of its provisions. Therefore, he deplored the recent announcement by one nuclear-weapon State to conduct a series of "sub-critical" underground nuclear tests, which represented a blatant disregard of the expressed concerns of the international community. He called on the international community to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

On biological weapons, he said the Biological Weapons Convention was still an academic document and he urged the international community to move with greater speed towards concluding a verification protocol for the Convention. He hailed the treaty banning anti-personnel landmines that had been agreed upon in Oslo and called on all nations to sign and ratify the Convention as quickly as possible. The international community should cooperate to speedily remove the millions of landmines that had been planted throughout the world.

The international community was not prepared to deal with intra-State conflict and more inclined to manage such conflicts than to deal with them, he said. He renewed his call for the establishment of a permanent mechanism or unit of preventative diplomacy that could respond promptly, positively and peacefully to potential conflicts and threats of genocide.

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ANDELFO J. GARCIA (Colombia) said among the most relevant matters for First Committee consideration were the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NPT, the 148 signatures that had so far been received for the CTBT, and the treaty on anti-personnel landmines.

However, he continued, it was also necessary to flag certain problems, including the virtual paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament. He supported the establishment within the Conference of an ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame. He also supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in Central Asia and in the Middle East.

His Government was concerned about the increase in international sales of arms, he said. All States should follow the guidelines on the transfer of small arms and light weapons established by the General Assembly in 1991 and the Disarmament Commission in 1996. Furthermore, they should intensify efforts to stop the illicit trafficking of small weapons. The Register of Conventional Arms would be a better confidence-building measure if it were extended to include light weapons. The Register should also be expanded to include domestic production, as well as imports and exports of weapons. He reiterated support for the holding of a fourth special session on disarmament, which would become an important tool in the process of multilateral disarmament.

ERWIN HOFFER, observer for Switzerland, said that he fully supported the priorities and proposals contained in the Secretary-General's reform proposals. He particularly supported the flexibility in allocating resources to satisfy the needs of disarmament negotiations underway, including those occurring outside the Conference on Disarmament.

As a new member of the Conference, for which he had tremendous respect, he said he regretted its inability to begin substantial negotiations at its last session. Rather than be encumbered by its historic package of achievements, the Conference should find ways to regain the path of true negotiation based on the common political will. If it did not, it ran the risk of being sidestepped by the international community, which would try to find other ways to address global security concerns. The paralysis within the Conference was largely caused by the widely divergent views on the subject of nuclear disarmament. That process was not an end in itself, but a way to consolidate international security. It could be achieved by the parallel and gradual establishment of a stable balance in, and constant reduction of, those weapons, along with their dismantling.

First Committee - 15 - Press Release GA/DIS/3081 4th Meeting (PM) 14 October 1997

A multilateral framework might not be the most adequate one for setting the pace and substance of reducing nuclear arsenals, he said. Rather, START II needed to be ratified and implemented as soon as possible, to pave the way for further reductions. The Conference, simultaneously, should provide a mechanism to negotiate a ban on the use of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Also concerning nuclear disarmament, he looked forward to the next meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, and supported efforts aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Asia.

While little progress had been achieved in the nuclear sphere, he said substantial developments had taken place to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention through a verification mechanism. Another encouraging development was the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. He appealed for its ratification by all States.

In spite of the threatening potential of weapons of mass destruction, the majority of human tragedies today were connected to the use of conventional weapons, he said. Concerning landmines, the text agreed to in Oslo should enjoy adherence by the largest number of States, since only a universal ban would enable the world to free itself from the scourge of such weapons. The revised Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons could also mitigate the suffering caused by landmines. The long-term success of such efforts, however, depended on the removal and destruction of existing mines and the universality of a total ban.

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