PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ SPECIAL COMMISSION

1 May 1997

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING ON IRAQ SPECIAL COMMISSION

19970501 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

The outgoing Executive Chairman of the United Nation Special Commission charged with the destruction of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Rolf Ekeus, said at today's noon briefing that he was delighted with the Secretary- General's selection of Australia's Permanent Representative, Richard Butler, as the Special Commission's new Executive Chairman.

"The Secretary-General couldn't have made a better choice for this immensely difficult task", he said. "I know he is exactly the right person to carry it out."

As for his own feelings, Mr. Ekeus said he was disappointed that the agenda he had set out for the Commission -- to reach a situation enabling the Security Council to decide to lift sanctions against Iraq -- had not been reached. The Iraqi people were the victims of a situation that had prevented the Commission from disposing of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, long- range missiles and related means of production.

On the other hand, he said, he drew some satisfaction from what had been achieved since 1991 and the coalition liberation of Kuwait. Rather than dictating the cease-fire conditions, the victors in that war decided to hand over the complex issues of disarming Iraq over to the United Nations "as an expression of confidence in the Organization and its capabilities". As a result, the Security Council outlined the cease-fire arrangements that followed the war, got Iraq to accept them and created the Special Commission.

Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he continued, the Commission acted for about six years to identify the nuclear weapons programme, most of which was now accounted for. In the area of chemical weapons, the Commission had discovered an advanced chemical weapons capability that had been identified and destroyed. The Commission had also succeeded in destroying Iraq's production facilities for biological weapons.

"There remains, unfortunately, some quantitatively small, but qualitatively still highly significant, items unaccounted for in Iraq", he said. "Iraq appears to have decided to try to keep these capabilities, and it is now time, once and for all, for the Iraqi leadership to take a decision to give up these weapons."

He said the Commission's "crowning achievement" was the monitoring and verification system that had been put into place. It was without precedent in arms control history. The IAEA would continue to work with the Special Commission and it would be impossible for Iraq to re-establish its prohibited weapons programmes.

Mr. Butler, currently Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations and who will succeed Mr. Ekeus beginning 1 July, said the Commission's work remained a very important job for the United Nations and an important task for the whole international community, including the people of Iraq. The work had the full authority of the Security Council behind it and it must continue to be done until it was completed.

The two-month transition period before he was to take over was not only necessary, but would prove to be very important to ensure his smooth take- over, he continued. The job must continue until it was finished. He hoped the transition would be smooth and produce continuity in the work of the Commission in the service of the international community.

A correspondent wondered whether the choice of a blunt-spoken person to succeed a soft-spoken one was deliberate? "We all change", Mr. Butler said.

Asked whether he thought he or the Security Council had made any mistakes in the past six years, Ambassador Ekeus said the totality of the Council had expected at the outset that the job would be a purely technical one. Everyone had taken it for granted that the Iraqi leadership was anxious to get its very considerable oil resources back on the international market, and therefore would give up quickly what remained of its chemical, biological, missile and nuclear-weapons programmes in order to get quick economic relief and to establish as quickly as possible a normal situation in the country. The opposite had happened. "Iraq decided systematically to mislead, conceal and cheat" in an effort to preserve those capabilities, he said. Some of the early expectations of the Commission had perhaps been a little optimistic.

He said the Commission had taken the declarations given by high Iraqi officials as correct and truthful, and that might have delayed the work of the experts. "We were sceptical, but not quite so sceptical" at the beginning. They might have made a fundamental misjudgment of the situation, but the Commission quickly adjusted its policies.

The Security Council had, even in its different configurations from year to year, shown a remarkable stability and consistency in its position, he said. The international community, including the Council, knew the disastrous consequences for the security of the region if the Commission's work failed. "There may have been shortcomings here and there, and we are definitely not fault-free. But if you add everything together, it is shown to be quite a good performance".

Ekeus Briefing - 3 - 1 May 1997

A correspondent asked whether the Commission felt the lack of any resources or sources that might have made it more effective? Mr. Ekeus added that they had tried to have a small but highly effective operation, avoid large bureaucratic structures and focus upon substance. "I think our administrative activities are very small compared with the operational part of it", he said. The Council decided very early on -- "against my advice and that of then-Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar" -- that the Commission should not be financed by the United Nations budget. "Of course, the Council was much wiser on this issue than the former Secretary-General and myself", in view of the United Nations subsequent financial problems, he commented.

"So we had to finance ourselves", he continued. "It has been one of the most difficult headaches, and a total surprise for me, as I have had to spend a very substantial part of my time as a fund raiser." The Commission, he said, "does not take a single cent from the United Nations. We had to find the money up to the moment that resolution 986 came into place".

A correspondent asked Ambassador Butler how he was going to get the Iraqis to cough up the stuff they were still hiding. Mr. Butler reminded the correspondent that his appointment had been announced all of 30 minutes before, and that he had two months to work on the subject "under Rolf's guidance". The issue could be raised later.

What were the most critical challenges and what efforts would Ambassador Ekeus make to reduce those challenges, so as to pass on an easier task to Ambassador Butler? a correspondent asked. There was an ongoing diplomatic process, including bimonthly meetings and dialogue between the Executive Chairman and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Ekeus said. In that dialogue, the Iraqi side expressed the need to move very, very fast. "Whether that is translated into practical action, of course, we don't know. However, we feel that we have been successful on both sides, and there is now a good structure for the remaining work." In the end, he added, "I have given my promise to the Iraqi side that I will keep full speed on the work as long as I am here".

Was the departure of Saddam Hussein the final indicator in that process? a correspondent asked. The Commission did not express opinions on political issues, Mr. Ekeus said. However, in the Commission's report one of the points highlighted was that it was up to the Iraqi leadership, "once and for all, to give up all that remains."

A correspondent, commenting that he was not aware that the Commission had had to raise its own funds for the operation, asked, who were the main supporters? Mr. Ekeus said that several members of the Security Council had contributed not funds, but highly qualified personnel; namely, the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. He added that the Commission had wanted to aim for a broad geographical

Ekeus Briefing - 4 - 1 May 1997

distribution among its staff, but that it dealt with highly advanced weapons, the knowledge of which was limited to very few countries.

Also, he said, the German Government had for many years, "had the patience to keep all our flying operations going, without payment, and we hope one day to be able to reimburse them" for the costs of the helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. The United States Government provided a U2 flight operation, a very costly one, based in Saudi Arabia, "and we haven't paid for that". On the cash side, the Commission had had "generous support" from the Gulf Cooperation Council States, led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Others, such as the United Kingdom, had been very generous as well.

Despite the implementation of resolution 986, it seemed that the sanctions were still hurting the Iraqi people, a correspondent said. Would Ambassador Butler have a public relations problem in that regard? Did Mr. Ekeus feel that the humanitarian issue had been taken more into account in recent years? Mr.Ekeus reiterated that resolutions 706 and 712 of 1991 had offered Iraq the possibility of selling limited quantities of oil for food and medicine, to be distributed by the United Nations, "and that is why Iraq objected, I guess". Resolution 986 had changed that, and Iraq was now responsible for the distribution" and the United Nations was limited to the task of observing the process.

Continuing, he said that what remained was not much in quantity, but important in qualitative terms. "We have not accounted for a large programme for the production of VX, a chemical weapons nerve agent several times more lethal than the best-known nerve agent, Sarin", Mr. Ekeus said. "We have, in the biological field, another concern. Iraq has admitted to the production of considerable amounts of anthrax. Our analysis is that it has produced even more than it has admitted." Even a small amount contained millions of lethal doses, he noted. "One biological bomb successfully delivered on a city would have the casualties, the deaths, of a nuclear attack", he said.

From a humanitarian point of view, he continued, "our hearts must go out to the victims of such a biological attack. It is not humanitarian to say, let these weapons stay there and be used. It is intolerable, and that is the Security Council's policy also. I think it is a very important humanitarian concern."

A correspondent asked about Saddam Hussein and his hold on power within Iraq, indicating that Mr. Ekeus probably knew him better than anyone else. Mr. Ekeus said that it was not up to the Commission to make political statements. He added that Iraq was a well-established country, with its leadership, its structures, "and the system is working. We have to accept the facts as they are and we cope with it as best we can".

Ekeus Briefing - 5 - 1 May 1997

With the pilgrim flights, the helicopters, and so forth, there was always a testing of the United Nations resolve, a correspondent said. Did Mr. Ekeus get a sense that the Iraqis could go on for years, that they had time on their side? Were they capable of using those weapons? What was his sense of their capabilities?

Mr. Ekeus said, "It is a sort of endurance test between the Security Council and the Iraqis, in a sense. That why it is so important that the Council send signals that it is firm and united. We are not happy, sometimes, with certain statements that indicate hesitation, that will only encourage them [Iraq]".

"The best message that we can send to Iraq is that this is a firm and steady operation, and that it will outlast the resistance", he continued. Iraq, he added, might misread any sign of hesitation and stay on the course of denial. "That would never lead to a solution for Iraq. There is only one way: to give up these prohibited items and to give a full accounting for them, so they are destroyed and eliminated."

Did Iraq still pose a threat to the international community? a correspondent asked. The capabilities Iraq had, or could have "are definite threats" as they were not accounted for, Mr. Ekeus said. He added, however, that the Commission did not believe it was "an acute and immediate threat, because the capabilities are not deployed, they are hidden". Iraq had a military structure organized for missiles and an organized force for delivering Scud-type missiles. "But, of course, we keep a very close eye on that", he said. "So today, we don't believe that Iraq could activate those capabilities without being detected, depending on the continued presence of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq."

* *** *