PRESS BRIEFING BY HIGH REPRESENTATIVE

1 May 1997

Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING BY HIGH REPRESENTATIVE

19970501 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

At a Headquarters press conference Wednesday afternoon, the High Representative on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, briefed correspondents on his report to the Security Council on the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Although the peace process was not without problems, it was proceeding fairly well, he said. Major challenges ahead included the local elections scheduled for September, the final stage of the Arbitration Tribunal for Brcko in March 1997 and long-term issues concerning the international presence during 1998.

There was no alternative to the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the international community would stand by it, he continued. The Agreement would not be amended, altered or tampered with, nor would it be subject to partial interpretation. It would be fully implemented. In years to come, the international community would have to act to block the three anti-Dayton options -- the military, secessionist, and domination options. Economic reforms, democratization, rebuilding institutions within the regional framework, regional economic relations and respect for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were all very important, he added.

If the Dayton Peace Agreement was a failure, would Mr. Bildt consider himself as one of those responsible for the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina? a correspondent asked. Mr. Bildt said the peace process was going ahead. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been heavily partitioned by the war. There had been gradual progress and positive signs, such as refugee returns, which were 30 to 40 per cent higher than expected. Every week, more than 10,000 people used the cross-inter-entity bus lines operated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There had been a lot of problems making the bus lines operational a year ago but "now we are considering privatizing them into normal commercial companies", he added.

A year ago, during the Muslim holiday of Bairam, there had been substantial problems on the inter-entity boundary line, he continued. This year, there had been more than 100 large-scale visits across the line. There had been only 17 months of peace and it was naive to expect that all the wounds created in some 42 months of war would have been healed in that time. If the country's political leaders and the international community were determined to follow the Dayton path he was "fairly confident" the peace agreement could be made to work. It would take a generation, but the process was on track.

In answer to a follow-up question, Mr. Bildt said people from the different parts of the country had been brought to the first meetings in armoured cars after weeks of negotiation on every single detail. Efforts were being made to connect the telephone system and it would be done. He remembered when it was virtually impossible for people to cross the inter- entity boundary lines. Now it was happening.

Every day of peace meant one day of lessening partition, he continued. Political leaders with their own agendas were playing their games, but ordinary people, whatever their religious affiliations, wanted peace and they were increasingly interacting with each other. Progress away from partition was slower than he would have liked, but it was progressing. A year ago there were no common institutions at all. Now they were there, although he would have liked them to be more effective.

Tuesday, the European Union had relaxed its economic sanctions against Belgrade, a correspondent said. What guarantees did Mr. Bildt get in regard to Kosova and did he believe that Kosova should have republic status? he asked. Mr. Bildt said the Union's lifting of its autonomous trade measures was an effort to stimulate economic development in the region, which was absolutely essential to political development. It would take 10, 15 or even 25 years for the countries of the region to recover economically from the effects of war. In the meantime, the rest of the world had been reforming and that could breed instability in and between the countries of the region.

Referring to Kosova, Mr. Bildt said, personally, he believed that the solution to the problems of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Kosova would have to be along the lines of possible republic status. He did not know how that would be implemented. He hoped the dialogue that had begun between Serbian and Albanian representatives would continue, so that, at some point, there would be a mutual understanding that a far-reaching autonomy had to be a solution and it would have to find its own constitutional forms. "But we aren't there yet," he added.

A correspondent said some in the United States believed the Europeans were "rushing too fast to Serbia's aid and to restore it to international institutions". Mr. Bildt said the European Union had been paying attention to democratic developments in the last few months in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its decision to lift its autonomous trade measures had been influenced by appeals "from the democratic opposition in Serbia" and as support for the changes in local government.

In response to a question about the situation in Kosova and mediation efforts there, Mr. Bildt said his deputy and others had travelled extensively to Kosova to deal with what eventually turned out to be the education agreement. However, other ideas on how to proceed had not materialized and progress since last year had been limited. The follow-up to the education agreement had fallen victim to the general crisis in the Federal Republic of

Carl Bildt Briefing - 3 - 1 May 1997

Yugoslavia following local elections there. "The Serbian crisis is yet to come, because if you look at the problems of Serbia they're massive", he continued. Given the country's social, economic and political conditions, it was "not in our interest for the problem to explode".

A correspondent asked for Mr. Bildt's response to comments by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic that if the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement were not implemented, its military results would be null and there could again be war. Mr. Bildt said that as the "final authority" he sometimes had to make interpretations of the Dayton Peace Agreement that were not directly in line with what either side wanted. Implementation did not always happen, because all the sides resisted it and some elements of the Dayton Peace Agreement were contrary to various political aims of both sides. No side was "snow white" and he had substantial problems with everyone concerning different aspects of implementation. The international community had to stand by the Agreement letter by letter, interpretation by interpretation, and insist on each side implementing it.

Continuing, Mr. Bildt said he was concerned with the human rights situation and primarily with the issue of property rights. Legislation in the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina made it very difficult for people to come back and reclaim their properties. It was complicating the issue of minority return and, accordingly, driving the ethnic purification of different parts of the country. He had been urging everyone to put pressure on the authorities to change those laws and allow people to return to their homes, so as to restore more ethnic balance. But that measure was not currently popular anywhere in Bosnia, he added.

What was the interpretation of both the Federation and the Republic of Srpska on the issues of refugees and war criminals? a correspondent asked. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal had improved across the board, except for the delivery of people who had been indicted, Mr. Bildt replied. In that regard, neither the Republic of Srpska nor the Federation were delivering. He was concerned that in some places in Bosnia and Herzegovina, people who had been indicted by the Tribunal were living "fairly freely" and also occupying positions. However, there was a substantial difference in the degree of non-acceptance by both sides. In the Republic of Srpska one person who had been indicted was still exercising substantial political influence.

Another major challenge was the issue of minority returns, he said. Everyone was in favour of majority returns. However, all attempts at organized, large-scale minority returns had failed, particularly in the Republic of Srpska and in parts of the Federation, mostly but not exclusively in Bosnian-Croat areas. Small scale returns had happened, although it was difficult to know if the numbers were 10,000 or 20,000. The property laws that discriminated against minorities had to be changed. International help

Carl Bildt Briefing - 4 - 1 May 1997

with housing reconstruction, which was badly needed, would be conditional on minority returns.

What made him sure that the Serbian leadership in Pale would implement any part of the Dayton Agreement that they did not like? a correspondent asked. Mr. Bildt replied that no one was keen to implement parts of the Agreement they did not like. Accordingly, the international community had to create "sticks and carrots to make certain things happen". There was a dialogue on minority return with local authorities in parts of the Republic of Srpska, where the World Bank, UNHCR and the European Commission had created a link between minority return and housing aid.

He was particularly concerned that Radovan Karadzic continued to exercise political power in the Republic of Srpska, he said. He had informed the Security Council of the problem and had served notice to the authorities that the situation "would not be tolerated and there would be consequences", although he would not spell them out at present. There would be no aid, except for elections and purely humanitarian concerns, for the municipalities of Bosanska, Samac and Foca because indicted people were running around there. A number of indicted people were also living and working in the municipality of Vitez in the Federation.

In reply to a question concerning the levels of aid to the Republic of Srpska, and the situation in Brcko region, he said only about 2 per cent of international aid went to the Republic of Srpska. At the Donor's Conference in Brussels in April 1996, the leadership, led by Mr. Karadzic, had been afraid of opening up Srpska to the outside world. He preferred to sit in isolation and had effectively blocked a lot of the international aid. That policy of self-isolation had been decided in Pale and implemented there, and was a detriment to the ordinary people in Srpska who were now aware of that fact.

It was crucial that the common institutions, such as the Presidency and Council, work together and that required a commitment by the representatives and constituents of all three constituent people, Mr. Bildt stressed. He said there was a special arbitration in Brcko region. It did not mean there was no concern for other areas. There were many empty houses in some areas, yet local authorities in the Federation still resisted the return of Serbs. Over the weekend, his office had tried to organize the return of the Orthodox Bishop of Tuzla as a symbol of reconciliation, but it had not materialized because of the "rather hard-line position" of the local leaders.

In response to other questions, Mr. Bildt said he had discussed the extradition of Mr. Karadzic with the Security Council earlier in the day, but his resignation, which was always the subject of rumours, had not been discussed and there was nothing new to add on the matter.

Carl Bildt Briefing - 5 - 1 May 1997

What were the main challenges ahead and what were the priorities? a correspondent asked. Mr. Bildt said he had no control over a lot of issues. He did not have the legal authority nor the forces to arrest anyone indicted by the Tribunal. He could, however, exert political pressure on the authorities to move ahead with minority return and coordinate their efforts. Minority return would happen over a prolonged period, once initial resistance to the initial returnees had been broken down.

But, resistance was everywhere, he continued. Local elections would go ahead on specific dates. Economic reform was absolutely crucial, because endless aid would not flow to Bosnia. "The willingness and ability of the Bosnian authorities to undertake radical economic reform measures today will determine the economic future of the country in two or three years time", he added.

Constitutional implementation was also extremely important, he said. For all the difficulties, harmonizing policies and getting joint decisions must be done, because there was no other way towards peace. The Council had spent some time discussing the threats to the Dayton Agreement, because the international community was committed to preserving it and implementing it.

He said the international community must block three anti-Dayton options -- the military option; the possibility of overt or creeping secession; and the trend to domination and preserving old structures, which was not true power sharing. It should also back that up with economic reform, democratization, institution building, civilian police, human rights monitoring. Respect for the International Tribunal was important not just for Bosnia, but for the region. It was important as a deterrent, to prevent similar acts in other parts of the region.

* *** *