PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TAJIKISTAN
Press Briefing
PRESS BRIEFING BY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TAJIKISTAN
19970319
FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY
At a press briefing this afternoon, Gerd Merrem, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Tajikistan, recalled that Tajikistan had suffered a rather atrocious civil war in 1992, which had been followed by several years of civil strife which came close to a resurgence of the civil war. Eventually, in the second half of last year, both the head of State and the leader of the opposition agreed to meet and focus on political questions and to reach agreement. A major breakthrough was reached in a rather informal meeting in northern Afghanistan, in Khusdeh, a mountain resort of General Ahmad Shah Masoud. The meeting had led to a number of draft agreements which they subsequently signed in Moscow.
After Moscow, he continued, there was another round of political talks in Teheran, between President Emomali S. Rakhmonov and opposition leader S. Abdullo Nuri, and recently, another round of talks in Moscow. The following measures had been agreed: amnesty and mutual forgiveness; the creation of a transitional authority called the Commission on National Reconciliation; and a time-bound schedule for the remaining political talks and talks centring on other substantive issues. The negotiation process would come to an end in June, so that by the end of that month, a comprehensive national peace accord could be signed.
He said that the parties had also signed a protocol on the return of refugees and internally-displaced persons, reinstating them to previous social rights and conditions. In Moscow recently, another protocol had been signed which dealt with military issues, including how to disarm, when to disarm, where to assemble, how to demobilize and how to reintegrate, which, the Special Representative said, was perhaps the most complex protocol.
Ahead, Mr. Merrem continued, was another protocol or agreement on political guarantees: how would primarily the various observer countries that had accompanied the process provide political guarantees that what had been agreed was eventually implemented. Outstanding was one of four issues which together would form the protocol on political questions. That outstanding issue dealt with the timing and modality under which political parties would again be allowed to be active, since a number of parties were currently banned. Once the next round was completed -- hopefully with the achievement of the last two protocols -- there would then be the challenge not only to help both sides to agree, but perhaps to support both sides in doing and carrying out what they had agreed. That, he added, might lend itself to another press session altogether.
A correspondent asked which parties were banned, and what had been the issues concerning unbanning them. Mr. Merrem said that the reservations of the Government so far in permitting certain political parties to work as part of a process of peaceful political competition, rather than of militant antagonism, concerned the fact that some parties still commanded armed forces, and the argument had been made that it was not appropriate for a movement or a party to come into being as long as they commanded armed forces of their own, outside the State-controlled units. Since the protocol on military questions now provided a number of benchmarks, one of them being the formal announcement of the disbandment of armed forces of the opposition, he was "cautiously optimistic" that both parties would be able to agree on a proper timing related to some of the benchmarks.
Among the parties that he was referring to, he continued, were the Islamic Revival Movement, which had to constitute itself as a political party, and a regional party from Gorno Badakhshan, known as Lali Badakhshan.
Asked how important the Sodirov brothers were in the process, Mr. Merrem described the question as one that "would easily entertain a seminar". As both leaders tried to resolve their differences in a peaceful way, he answered, and as one tried to define what might be the common programmatic vision for the future, there were some people that could relate to the process and others that were more hesitant and wished to go slower; or that might, in fact, find out that they had different concepts. There was, therefore, on both sides, the problem of potential renegade groups showing up, or simply disagreement.
He said that the Sodirov brothers at some stage were engaged in the armed forces of the opposition, but the opposition expelled them for a variety of reasons, accusing them of crimes. They had returned to the country and were engaged in hostage-taking, among others, and both the Government and the opposition agreed to take joint action against them.
At the moment, Mr. Merrem said, some of that joint action had already been taken. Bakhrom Sodirov, the elder brother, was reported to have been detained, along with some other members of their group. Both President Rakhmonov and opposition leader Abdullo Nuri, when they met in Mashhad under the aegis of Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati signed a joint statement condemning the terrorist activities of the group and other such activities, agreeing at the same time to cooperate against such perpetrators.
He was then asked what role the United Nations would have in the military protocol and what kind of forces were envisaged.
Tajikistan Briefing - 3 - 19 March 1997
Mr. Merrem said that the United Nations would essentially support the process, and help to monitor and verify the various actions agreed to be carried out. Both parties had also desired that a contingent of the already existing Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping forces, a regional unit, took up certain roles during moments of vulnerability or when there was a need for logistic support, such as escorting opposition forces to agreed assembly points.
He added: "We know that this process will span about one year, but the first six months were the most crucial; identification of who is who, then movement to assembly points, and separation of fighters from arms, and a selective process by a joint commission as regards the suitability -- age- wise, training-wise, background-wise -- of these fighters to be reintegrated or to be demobilized, and then eventually to be redeployed and merged with Government units."
Having mentioned the CIS, he was asked, what would the United Nations do? He replied that the United Nations would, among other things, advise the subcommission of the National Commission on Reconciliation -- the subcommission that dealt with military issues -- on how to go about it, how to prepare for it; how to get organized for it; and what were the critical aspects to watch.
In addition, he said, the United Nations would be present at agreed assembly areas to verify that the various steps that were agreed to be taken were being carried out. He noted that the United Nations was not armed, and there was therefore a security angle, for instance, the moment of vulnerability when former armed opposition fighters left the mountains and arrived at assembly areas. During that time, physical security had to be ensured, and that aspect would gravitate very much to a contingent from the CIS. The details were still to be discussed, he stated, the agreement being so far one that both parties had reached. Operational parameters and details remained.
Asked if there had been a request for the enlargement of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), Mr. Merrem confirmed that there had been such a request for UNMOT support, and "we can anticipate that we would have to adjust our operational and professional profile somewhat but the details would still have to be discussed by the Security Council. I am somewhat reluctant to use this platform, sympathetic as it is, to launch some ideas of our own. I think this is part of the sovereign decision-making process of the Security Council, but it is fair to say that a few more people will be required."
What effect had the hostage-taking had on the United Nations operations in Tajikistan? a correspondent asked. Were United Nations personnel targets?
Tajikistan Briefing - 4 - 19 March 1997
"I am afraid I have to answer in the affirmative", Mr. Merrem replied. The first time they were taken hostage, he recalled, they had felt it was coincidence because they just happened to be passing by, but the roles that the United Nations played in the national process of reconciliation and of political negotiations had as a side-effect that in the public eye the Organization stood out. There were, therefore, some forces that felt that by threatening to, or by taking United Nations personnel hostage, they could somehow squeeze the Government to lean one way or the other, to influence the situation when a new reality fell into place.
He said their work had been affected in the sense that for security reasons they had had to reduce the entire United Nations system, not just UNMOT as a special mission, reduce staff and temporarily relocate many international staff -- and national staff that were seen to be possibly threatened -- to neighbouring Uzbekistan, where they awaited developments. "It affects, of course, the intensity of operations; in some cases operations had been virtually suspended", he noted.
On the other hand, Mr. Merrem continued, he was encouraged by the fact that both Government and opposition had agreed that the matter was not tolerable; it was not part of the common denominator of political culture, and that they had begun to take action. The message had got out very clearly that the hostage-taking was definitely beyond the line of tolerability. In fact, the Special Representative concluded, there had also been very encouraging statements by individual governments regarding the condemnation of that kind of terrorist action and hostage-taking.
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