STATES PARTIES CITE URGENT NEED TO STRENGTHEN BIOLOGICAL-WEAPONS CONVENTION
Press Release
DC/2568
STATES PARTIES CITE URGENT NEED TO STRENGTHEN BIOLOGICAL-WEAPONS CONVENTION
19961129 GENEVA, 26 November (UN Information Service) -- The discovery that biological-weapons programmes had been carried out by Iraq and the former Soviet Union was a sobering warning that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) must be strengthened, representatives of several countries said this morning before the Convention's Fourth Review Conference.The threat of use of such weapons by terrorists was an added concern, they said. A representative of the United States reported, for example, that last year a "hate-group member" in the United States had acquired a sample of the bubonic plague bacterium, but was caught before he could use it.
Work to establish a verification protocol for the international treaty should be intensified, representatives said, but they cautioned that preventing weapons development should not interfere with the promotion of peaceful uses of biotechnology and the spread of helpful technical and medical knowledge to developing countries.
The two-week Conference has as its basic task consideration of proposals to strengthen the treaty, the first multilateral disarmament instrument to ban a whole category of weapons. There are close to 140 States parties to the Convention.
Addressing the morning meeting were representatives of India, United Kingdom, United States, South Africa, China, Canada, Japan, Pakistan, Malta, and Cuba.
The Conference will reconvene at 3 p.m. to continue its general debate.
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Statements
ARUNDHATI GHOSE (India) said that setting up a verification mechanism would not be a simple task, as equipment and materials involved could be of a dual-use nature, there was no prohibition on research since such research was essential for medical therapeutics, and it was difficult to demonstrate intent to violate the Convention. None the less, a verification regime that could balance those concerns was feasible. The ad hoc group of States parties should intensify its work, but should not be bound by artificial deadlines. It was more important to develop a practical, effective regime that could command consensus. Participation in sending in information on confidence-building measures had been scant, but that was because, in part, many developing countries, including India, had departments and offices that frequently were too overburdened to respond. In his view, any convention secretariat should be designed to be small and cost-effective.
DAVID DAVIS (United Kingdom) said that there seemed to be a general perception that the biological weapons problem was solved, but over the last decade that comfortable assumption had been overturned by the revelations that Iraq had had an extensive biological-weapons programme and that the former Soviet Union had carried out a massive biological-weapons programme. The rapid development of biotechnology and genetic engineering in recent years had a bearing on future risk, and a paper the United Kingdom had submitted to the Conference on those new developments highlighted some of those advances. The United Kingdom continued firmly to believe that the Convention fully covered all microbial and other biological agents and toxins, whether occurring naturally or not, including any resulting from genetic modifications or other technologies. It looked to the Conference to reaffirm that view. The Convention needed teeth -- systematic and reliable mechanisms to detect and, hence, deter proliferators.
JOHN D. HOLUM (United States) said that after more than 20 years the threat of biological warfare remained all too real, as evidenced by revelations about biological-weapons programmes in Iraq and the former Soviet Union. He believed that twice as many countries now had or were actively pursuing offensive biological weapons as had been when the Convention went into force in 1975. Meanwhile, the potential for future weapons was spreading because of the boom in biotechnology and the possibility of terrorist use of such weapons was a growing concern. Last year a hate-group member in Ohio in the United States had acquired a sample of the bubonic plague bacterium, but was caught before he could use it. The Convention's existing language should be interpreted to include new developments and threats, the number of States parties should be increased, and the ad hoc group should intensify negotiations to develop a verification protocol, with a deadline of 1998, following which a special conference should be called to consider the draft instrument.
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J.S. SELEBI (South Africa) said the country recently had withdrawn its reservation to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, because it appeared inconsistent for a State party to the Convention and could pose problems for its future compliance protocol. He felt the final declaration of the Conference should state: that Article 1 of the Convention prohibited the use of biological and toxin weapons; that the work of the ad hoc group should be encouraged to move towards a "rolling text" format as soon as possible; and that increased cooperation with confidence-building measures should be encouraged. South Africa was legally and morally bound to prevent spread of technologies to States having aspirations to develop biological technologies. Nevertheless, it was also concerned to encourage transfer of bacteriological technologies for peaceful purposes and strongly supported the efforts of such organizations as the World Health Organization to establish a system of global monitoring of emerging and other communicable diseases.
SHA ZUKANG (China) said China approved of the work of the ad hoc group and felt it should continue its efforts, but in a balanced way. If the verification scope was too wide, it would not only generate an excessive burden for States parties, but would interfere with peaceful uses of biotechnology. If it was too narrow, it would not be effective. The first step for the group was to formulate a set of definitions and objective criteria for the purpose of verification and then proceed to set up, in a scientific manner, verification measures that were fair, reasonable, and feasible. More countries must accede to the Convention. China did not develop, produce or stockpile biological weapons, and had always been against their proliferation. It was, none the less, in favour of the opinion voiced by many developing countries that cooperation and international exchange in the field of biology should be enhanced.
MARK MOHER (Canada) said the harsh reality was that the world was uncovering to this very day the truth concerning the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons in spite of the Convention. With recent advances in biotechnology and the advancing threat posed by terrorist groups, it was ever more clear that the Convention needed strengthening. Canada looked forward to the ad hoc group completing its work well before the next review conference. Elements specific to a protocol should include: provision for mandatory declarations and notifications concerning certain facilities, materials, equipment, and activities; provision for visits in relation to declarations, within established guidelines and time-frames; provision for short-notice, fact-finding inspections, within established guidelines and time-frames, on any matter of concern regarding compliance with the Convention; and provision for multilateral information sharing, on a voluntary basis, to contribute to the efficacy of the Convention.
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HISAMI KUROKOCHI (Japan) said Japan had strictly observed the Convention and was determined to continue to faithfully comply with it. Regarding article X, Japan had been providing a wide range of assistance to developing countries from medical treatment to research sectors. Japan thought it necessary for the Convention and ad hoc group to make realistic efforts toward strengthening the Convention, but also to take precautions not to hinder the future development of industries based on biotechnology, taking into account the burden that compliance measures might place on such industries. Japan had introduced two working papers to the ad hoc group in December 1995 to promote better understanding of the issue. In future work, careful consideration should be given to the specific characteristics of biological agents.
MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said article 1 of the Convention posed a problem in the context of verification. An extreme interpretation could conceivably require verification of even the intent to use dual-nature substances for allegedly military purposes. The difficulty in doing so was self-evident and, clearly, such interpretation would leave potential for abuse unless clear definitions and criteria were established. His Government had noted with considerable interest the proposal submitted by Iran to amend the Convention by explicitly forbidding the "use" of biological weapons. He hoped the Conference would examine that proposal with the seriousness it deserved and arrive at an appropriate and forward-looking conclusions. Under a verification regime, on-site inspections, other than those agreed to as part of confidence-building visits, should be invoked only as last resort to establish violations. The information on which such inspections were based should only be collected through legitimate means, and not by espionage or human intelligence or other unacceptable practices. Furthermore, it must be recognized that on-site inspections could be abused for the purposes of intrusion into buildings and facilities unrelated to the Convention, but sensitive for national security reasons. The inspected State party must have the right to deny access to such facilities.
MICHAEL BARTOLO (Malta) said Malta was firmly committed to the total and comprehensive banning of biological weapons and to the control of the spread and use of such weapons. His country did not produce biological weapons and had no intention of acquiring them. He believed that a stronger Convention would benefit all countries because of increased security and the confidence that any serious or unusual outbreak of disease or toxins in a State party would be investigated as a matter of urgency. Indeed, his country was very conscious of the dangers that existed in the Mediterranean region. In view of its geographical and strategic position, the use of biological and toxin weapons would not only affect Malta, but would have wider implications because of such unforseen elements as wind, rain, and other atmospheric conditions. He favoured development of a legally binding and effective verification system.
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MARIA DE LOS ANGELES FLORES (Cuba) said further steps were needed toward the elimination of this particularly reprehensible type of weapon. It also was understood that transfers of biological technology were of great help to developing countries in such fields as agriculture. Therefore, it was important that any verification regime should not hinder such transfers. Article X of the Convention must be strengthened, and nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as imposing restrictions on the legitimate needs of developing countries. Victims of breaches of the Convention should benefit from a voluntary fund created to provide recompense and repair damage caused by violations of the Treaty. Work of the ad hoc group should be stepped up, but artificial deadlines imposed for the end of its work could be counterproductive. Any conclusions reached should have true universality. It was vital to encourage strictly peaceful uses of technology and science and strict prohibition of the "use" of biological weapons should be included in the Convention.
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