DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS NEAR RUSSIAN FEDERATION WOULD FORCE IT TO REVIEW APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD
Press Release
GA/DIS/3056
DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS NEAR RUSSIAN FEDERATION WOULD FORCE IT TO REVIEW APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL, FIRST COMMITTEE TOLD
19961017 Representative Expresses Concern Over Possible Eastward Expansion by North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationCiting the possibility of eastward expansion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the representative of the Russian Federation said this afternoon that any deployment of tactical nuclear weapons or sophisticated conventional arms systems near his country's borders would force it to review its approach to arms limitation and disarmament. Addressing the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) as it continued its general debate, he also stressed the importance of blocking illicit trafficking in fissile materials. The Russian Federation had already stopped its production of weapons-grade uranium, and a programme to stop production of weapons- grade plutonium would be implemented by 1998, he said. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had yet to fulfil its multilateral obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the representative of the Republic of Korea told the Committee. He said North Korea's non- compliance with the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) posed a dangerous challenge to the global non-proliferation regime. Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said that, as a colony, south Korea was not qualified to talk about the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Both the Security Council and the IAEA had welcomed the Agreed Framework between his country and the United States. That agreement clearly stipulated what had to be done with regard to the IAEA. The Marshall Islands said the South Pacific Forum, which his country currently chaired, had expressed satisfaction at the permanent cessation of French nuclear- testing in the South Pacific, marking the end of all testing in a region which had been subjected to atmospheric and underground tests for five decades. He expressed concern, however, over shipments of plutonium and radioactive wastes through the region. Statements were also made by the representatives of Kazakstan, Norway, Myanmar, Uganda, Mali, Tunisia, Malta, Samoa, Hungary (as Chairman of the Third Review Conference of States Parties to the biological weapons Convention) and South Africa. The First Committee will meet again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, 18 October, to continue its general debate.
Committee Work Programme
The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its general debate on a wide range of disarmament initiatives and a number of international disarmament agreements. Those include the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (chemical weapons Convention), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (biological weapons Convention).
Other agreements under discussion include the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons). Protocol II of that Convention (on Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Such Devices), has been revised by the Review Conference of the States Parties to that convention to include internal conflicts, provisions on the transfer of land-mines and further restrictions on the use of mines. The States Parties also adopted a new additional Protocol IV to the Convention, in which they agreed to ban the use and transfer of anti-personnel laser-blinding weapons.
Regional disarmament agreements include the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty).
Other matters being considered by the Committee include the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the international non-proliferation regime. The Committee was expected to consider such bilateral agreements as the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). It was also likely to discuss an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which ruled that States were obliged to pursue good-faith negotiations aimed at complete nuclear disarmament. (For additional background, see Press Release GA/DIS/3051 of 10 October.)
GRIGORY V. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said the CTBT made an effective contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and would be an obstacle to qualitative improvement of such weapons. However, it should not be assessed from an all-or-nothing perspective, since it had nothing to do with prohibiting the development and improvement of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it would promote the gradual attainment of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear arsenals should be deployed only in the territory of the respective nuclear Powers.
The Russian Federation vigorously supported the IAEA's activities in the areas of non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said. It was also necessary to block illicit trafficking in fissile materials. His country had already stopped its production of weapons-grade uranium, and a programme to stop production of weapons-grade plutonium would be implemented by 1998. Reduction of nuclear weapons was a complex and multidimensional process. Citing a possible eastward expansion of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), he said that any deployment of tactical nuclear weapons or sophisticated conventional arms systems near his country's borders would force it to review its approach to arms limitation and disarmament.
Mere appeals for ratification of the chemical weapons Convention, were not enough, he said. A real effort was needed to remove the well-known objections of States to various aspects of it. The Russian Federation was doing everything in its power to resolve those problems, so that its Federal Assembly might move to ratify it. The Russian Federation also favoured negotiations to consolidate the regime under the biological weapons Convention. In addition, it was important to adapt the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe to current political and military realities.
AKMARAL KH. ARYSTANBEKOVA (Kazakstan) said that five years ago, her country had ended its testing of the world's most dangerous weapons and destroyed its nuclear infrastructure. Priority attention must be given to verification for the CTBT, prohibiting the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and preventing illegal trading in nuclear materials. The IAEA had done work, but the damage done to people and the environment by nuclear tests still needed to be assessed. Kazakstan had conducted 459 nuclear explosions, including 113 in the atmosphere, thus subjecting more than a half million people to radioactivity. International assistance -- particularly from the nuclear Powers -- was needed.
She welcomed the decision to expand the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the decision last year to extend the NPT, thus strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Kazakstan had adopted a law aimed at averting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Steps to complete work on the chemical weapons Convention and biological weapons Convention were important. Priority must also be given to banning anti-personnel land-mines. Particular attention should be given to regional and subregional security issues, especially in Europe and Asia. The Register of Conventional Arms played an important part in that process.
FINN K. FOSTERVOLL (Norway) said that for non-proliferation to succeed, the emphases placed on the political and strategic significance of nuclear weapons in must be lessened, while the linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation should be stressed. A decreasing relevance for nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy would reduce the incentive to acquire them. Now that the CTBT had been concluded, nuclear-weapon States should destroy their testing facilities. An effective international verification system was needed to ensure a credible Treaty; Norway was prepared to provide technical expertise and financial support towards that end.
A halt in the qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons arsenals and their further reduction would strengthen the non-proliferation regime, he said. Early negotiations on strategic reductions beyond those prescribed by START II should be undertaken, and controls placed on all plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for weapons purposes. A cut-off agreement would help prevent proliferation.
He urged ratification of the chemical weapons Convention by the United States and the Russian Federation. Such verification measures as on-site investigations would enhance the biological weapons Convention, whose protocol on verification should be produced by no later than 1998. The Register of Conventional Arms played an important role in confidence-building; the regional centres for disarmament also deserved further support.
All anti-personnel land-mines had been removed from Norwegian military stockpiles and destroyed, he said. Norway was ready to join Canada in negotiating a treaty by December 1997 for the worldwide prohibition of such weapons. All Member States should provide information regarding their stockpiles of land-mines.
WIN MRA (Myanmar) said that in today's world, nuclear weapons could no longer be used. They must be eliminated and their use outlawed. Myanmar welcomed the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to international law regarding armed conflict, as well as to the principles of humanitarian law. That historic opinion had delegitimized the use of nuclear weapons. Although not legally binding, it would be helpful in crystallizing customary legal norms on the non-use of such weapons.
Like most non-aligned States, Myanmar believed that a number of elements were essential for a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and the achievement of nuclear disarmament, he said. They included a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a treaty banning fissile materials, and international legal instruments on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. They also must include an international treaty or treaties on a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, with a view to their total elimination within a time-bound framework. Myanmar therefore welcomed the recent adoption of the CTBT, even if it was not a perfect document.
Conventional arms control must also be addressed, he said. It required a very different approach from that used in nuclear arms control efforts. The objective must be identified precisely before being placed on the Committee's agenda. The illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their illicit use were pressing problems that must be given due consideration.
HAROLD ACEMAH (Uganda) said peace and development still eluded many countries. The majority of humankind was still afflicted by regional conflicts, oppression and injustice. For them, the end of the cold war was meaningless, and their plight cried out for action. The United Nations must give hope to those hopeless people. Peace was not simply the absence of war, whether hot or cold. It was something which had to be actively sought.
Well into the Third Disarmament Decade, action regarding nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction had been disappointing, he said. The nuclear-weapon States retained their arsenals. The number of warheads might have been reduced, but their destructive capacity had been enhanced. Declarations of intent to eliminate nuclear weapons had been made, but in the absence of specific time-frames, prevarication had become the norm. Uganda therefore associated itself fully with the proposal on a programme of action to eliminate nuclear weapons in three phases, with a view to attaining a nuclear-weapon-free world by the year 2020.
Although Uganda welcomed the CTBT as a first step towards nuclear disarmament, it regretted that the Treaty only prohibited explosive tests while ignoring other means for the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, he said. To be effective, the Treaty should end all types of nuclear testing. It was a matter of concern that some nuclear Powers were not committed to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It was also disappointing that the Treaty did not address the use or threatened use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. A no-first-use provision would have been useful and reassuring.
He welcomed the signing in Cairo last April of the Pelindaba Treaty. Africa was unique among nuclear-weapon-free zones, being the home of South Africa, a former nuclear-weapon State. In pioneering complete openness on nuclear questions, that Government had acted with courage and sincerity. It was hoped that would serve as an example in the establishment of future nuclear-weapon-free zones.
MOCTAR OUANE (Mali) said that his delegation would sign the CTBT in the next few days. He welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia and expressed the hope that such a zone would be established in the Middle East. Despite significant advances in the nuclear arena, biological and chemical weapons treaties were still outstanding.
He said Mali favoured the total elimination of land-mines. Priority attention must also be given to the illicit transfer of weapons. The use of small weapons had disastrous results, especially in developing countries, where they fed conflicts.
He stressed the need for effective control of borders in the Sahara region, as well as for review of legal measures governing the possession of small weapons. A regional registry of weapons and data bank could be established with the participation of all countries of the region. The United Nations had supported efforts to destroy millions of such weapons from former fighters in the north of Mali.
SLAHEDDINE ABDELLAH (Tunisia) welcomed the fact that 126 nations had now signed the CTBT. Nevertheless, its full meaning would not be realized without the determined commitment of all States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States to an end of the arms race, nuclear disarmament, and the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
He drew attention to the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States in 1995, when the NPT was indefinitely extended. Among those commitments had been a willingness to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, as well as the pursuit of a systematic reduction in nuclear arsenals. The implementation of START II must be accelerated and new agreements on further strategic arms reductions concluded by the two major nuclear Powers.
He said Tunisia proudly welcomed the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon- free zone. Nevertheless, it was concerned that a similar zone had not yet been created in the tense region of the Middle East, despite repeated appeals from regional States and the entire international community. Israel was the only country in the region that had not joined the NPT, as well as the only one to possess unsafeguarded nuclear capacities. Those capacities were a direct and constant threat to the security of the region and to establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone there.
No less urgent were problems in the field of conventional arms control, he said. There had been significant progress during the past year concerning anti-personnel land-mines, with the agreement on a revised Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. However, those revisions did not represent the most appropriate solution to the problem. Only a total ban on their production would suffice. Tunisia would associate itself wholeheartedly with all efforts by the Committee to that end.
JOANNA DARMANIN (Malta) said the pursuit of international security and disarmament remained at the core of the Organization. There should be universal adherence and compliance with disarmament and security treaties. The risk of world
conflict as a result of local wars made it necessary to reduce regional conflicts and bipolar tensions.
While the threat of a nuclear holocaust led to control, there was no such restraint where conventional arms were concerned, she said. Priority attention should be given to entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention, completion of a verification protocol for the biological weapons Convention, and negotiation of a cut- off treaty on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. A ban on the production, export and use of anti-personnel land-mines and their de-mining deserved worldwide assistance and support.
Consolidation of confidence-building regimes could promote the peaceful settlements of disputes, she said. Comprehensive regional security was distinct from other concepts of defence. It encompassed a wide-ranging policy of cooperation which sought to melt the bastions of suspicion. The Mediterranean region was vulnerable to conflict. Mutual cooperation which respected and enhanced the diversity of the region would contribute to its overall stability.
LAURENCE N. EDWARDS (Marshall Islands) said the members of the South Pacific Forum, which his country currently chaired, had expressed satisfaction at the permanent cessation of French nuclear-testing in the South Pacific. It marked the end of all nuclear testing in a region which had been subjected to both atmospheric and underground testing for five decades. China's recent announcement of a nuclear moratorium meant that all five nuclear-weapon States were now observing the moratoriums long urged by the Forum.
He said leaders of the region also welcomed the signature and ratification by Vanuatu of the Treaty of Rarotonga, the signature by Tonga, and the signing of its Protocols by France, United Kingdom and the United States. All States within the Treaty area had now given their support to it, and all five nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to respect its provisions.
He said the Forum had reaffirmed the special responsibility towards those peoples of the Marshall Islands -- a former United Nations Trust Territories administered by the United States -- who had been adversely affected by nuclear-weapons testing during the trusteeship period. That responsibility included safe resettlement of displaced populations and restoration to economic productivity of affected areas. It was urgent that progress be made on that matter. While some steps had been taken by the former administering Power, all the relevant issues must be addressed.
The South Pacific Forum was also concerned about shipments of plutonium and radioactive wastes through the region, he said. Such shipments must be carried out in accordance with the strictest international safety and security standards. He supported the statement by Barbados expressing apprehension at the shipments of such matter through the Caribbean region.
PARK SOO GIL (Republic of Korea) said that while his country staunchly supported the CTBT, it was not an end in itself; it required worldwide adherence. Also important would be a cut-off treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Nuclear-weapon States should take systematic and progressive steps to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by further reducing their arsenals.
Despite significant progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the Korean Peninsula was still living under the shadow of nuclear proliferation, he said. While the agreed framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented progress, North Korea had yet to fulfil its multilateral obligation under the NPT. He remained gravely concerned that North Korea's non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards system posed a dangerous challenge to the integrity and credibility of the global non-proliferation regime.
As a new member of the Conference on Disarmament, the Republic of Korea would work to strengthen multilateral disarmament efforts. The chemical weapons Convention should have all possessor countries on board -- declared and undeclared alike. Non- participation casts doubts on the Convention's effectiveness. The lack of meaningful progress with respect to the biological weapons Convention called for intensified efforts.
Given the build-up of conventional weapons, there must be universal participation in the Register of Conventional Arms, he said. The Republic of Korea's one-year moratorium on anti-personnel land-mines had been extended for another year. His country was also considering accession to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II. While there was a need to ban all anti-personnel land- mines, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula presented exceptional circumstances.
The regional forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was enhancing transparency and mutual confidence in the Asia-Pacific region, he said. That was essential to regional and global arms control and disarmament efforts. The United Nations Regional Centre in Asia and the Pacific at Katmandu was also an important venue for strengthening regional disarmament efforts.
TUILOMA NERONI SLADE (Samoa) said it was a source of great satisfaction that the CTBT had been brought to the Assembly's attention by one South Pacific State, Australia, and that another, Fiji, had been the first to ratify it. For the nations of the Pacific, which had so long experienced the nightmare of nuclear testing, the Treaty bore the promise of a future of hope. The comprehensive verification procedures it laid down would greatly increase the level of international cooperation in the nuclear field. There was now very wide support, from Governments and citizens alike, for the belief that nuclear testing would never be conducted again anywhere in the world.
Nevertheless, the CTBT was only one line of pursuit. There was a need for continued joint effort in the quest for a nuclear-free world. His country placed considerable faith in the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the vital role they played in the disarmament process. As other speakers had noted, the signing of the South-East Asia and Pelindaba Treaties, together with the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, and the Treaty on Antarctica, meant that the entire southern hemisphere was now free of the development, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer or use of nuclear weapons. Samoa therefore supported the proposal by Brazil for enhanced cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere.
Samoa had been greatly encouraged by the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, he said. The Court had ruled that there could be no doubt of the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. Those principles, reflected in The Hague and Geneva Conventions, constituted what the Court termed "intransgressible principles of international customary law". Of particular importance was the Court's
acceptance of the obligation to negotiate in good faith for the goal of nuclear disarmament.
TIBOR TOTH (Hungary), Chairman of the Third Review conference of States Parties to the biological weapons Convention, said the Conference had established an ad hoc group to consider measures involving verification and proposals to strengthen the Convention. It considered such matters as definitions of terms, lists of bacteriological agents and toxins, incorporation of confidence-building measures into the regime, and measures to promote compliance with the Convention. The need to protect proprietary commercial information and legitimate national security interests was stressed, as well as the need to avoid any negative impact on scientific research and industrial development.
He said the group had made significant progress, identifying a preliminary framework and elaborating potential basic elements for a legally binding instrument to strengthen the Convention. Its work on compliance measures addressed such matters as declarations, challenge inspections, and other visits. With respect to terms and objective, possible lists for human, animal and plant pathogens had been discussed.
In the area of confidence-building and transparency, the Group had discussed surveillance of publications and of legislation, multilateral information-sharing, exchange visits and confidence-building visits as possible non-mandatory measures. Those might be included in a legally binding instrument.
Nevertheless, the group had been unable to complete its work and submit its report to the States Parties for consideration at the Fourth Review Conference. In order to fulfil its mandate, it decided to intensify its efforts with a view to completing its work as soon as possible before the beginning of the Fifth Review Conference.
PETER GOOSEN (South Africa) read out a statement of joint positions reached in Cape Town today between South Africa and Sweden. It included the following elements: a welcoming of the CTBT and a shared belief in the need for further steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. It also sought the early commencement of negotiations for a convention to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.
He said the statement attached great importance to the NPT and to a strengthened review process. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Pelindaba Treaty were welcomed, as well as the imminent entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention and work on the biological weapons Convention. The area of conventional weapons should receive priority attention as should efforts towards a comprehensive prohibition of land-mines and international cooperation in their clearance.
Right of Reply
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply, KIM CHANG GUK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said south Korea was not qualified to talk about the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The ignorance, or perhaps the feigned ignorance, in the statement on the nuclear issue by the south Korean representative had surprised him.
It was clearly stipulated at what stage most obligations under IAEA would be fulfilled, he said. His country was still cooperating actively in that process. South Korea might be illiterate on the Framework Agreement between his country and United
States, and was not qualified to comment on the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula. Settlement of that issue between the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea and the United States was a prerequisite to further progress. As a colony, south Korea had no say on the matter.
YOUNG SUN PAEK (Republic of Korea) said he wished to set the record straight on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's non-compliance with the NPT. Its excuse for that non-compliance was absurd and unacceptable to all States Parties to the NPT. The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula must be seen in a multilateral context. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Agreed Framework accord with the United States did not negate its obligation to honour other agreements. It would be appropriate for the United Nations to draw attention to the only case in the world of non-compliance with IAEA safeguard obligations. Bilateral arrangements could not substitute for that country's obligations at the multilateral level.
Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said the interlocutor had once again exposed his ignorance. Both the Security Council and the IAEA had welcomed the Agreed Framework between his country and the United States. The Agreed Framework clearly stipulated what had to be done with regard to the IAEA. Once again, he advised the south Korean authorities to refrain from poking their noses into the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula -- an issue which his country was trying to resolve with the United States.
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