PRESS BRIEFING BY UNTAES ADMINISTRATOR

1 October 1996

Press Briefing

19961001 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

At a Headquarters press briefing today, Jacques Klein of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), told reporters the stabilization of the region was a United Nations success story. On both the military and civilian side, he said, the mission was credible and successful.

The UNTAES Administrator said he had come to Headquarters for consultations with the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Kofi A. Annan, regarding the next phase of the mission.

Recapping the history of the mission, Mr. Klein said the Secretary- General had first commissioned him to conduct a study during late 1995 on whether the mission could be carried out. He reported his findings to the Security Council on 9 January, 1996, and the Security Council had voted the mandate on 15 January.

The mission had assembled troops from as far away as Karachi and Amman, and had deployed by mid-April. The demilitarization phase of the mission was begun by 21 May, and by 20 June, some 16,000 Serb regular troops with 120 tanks were moved out.

Mr. Klein compared the mission to a law firm that had been hired by a corporation that had broken up. While it was not possible to put the corporation back together again, there were many human and material assets that needed to be identified and saved. "We have tried to identify as many of those human and material assets as possible", he said.

Following demilitarization, efforts were directed towards "building linkages" that would reintegrate the region. The railroad link between Croatia and Serbia had been rebuilt, he said. Telephone links had also been re-established and were handling 20,000 phone calls within 48 hours. The Belgrade-Zagreb highway had been reopened, and was handling 1,000 cars per day and 3,000 on a weekend.

When the region was demilitarized, he said, a zone of separation had been established, which had now been turned into an open market-place. Last weekend his staff reported that 11,000 people from both sides had met in the market-place to meet and exchange goods.

Mr. Klein said the next phase of the mission involved the question of elections and the extension of the mission, issues he hoped would be taken up by the Security Council in November. The United Nations had appointed an

electoral officer who had joined the mission. He would work with the committee considering when preconditions for elections were met.

Asked why the Croatians wanted to remove him sooner than was planned, Mr. Klein said this involved differences of opinion. The Security Council had voted a mandate of one year, with an option of a second-year extension of the mission if it were requested by each side. Local authorities had indeed asked for the extension, and he had forwarded those requests to the Council and they would make a decision.

"The issue is not up to us, it is up to the Croatian Government", he said. Preconditions had to be met before the mission would leave. Elections had to be held. That, in turn, would mean registration of citizens, electoral lists, registration of political parties, and deciding the geographic boundaries of election districts. The UNTAES was there to stabilize the region and to create an atmosphere where such things could occur. It now depended on the Croatian Government as to when those preconditions would be met.

It had been understood at Dayton that the mission could be extended for a second year, he added, and now to say now that it could not, touched "sensitive ground", since the other side might argue that the agreement had been abrogated, or that it had not been fulfilled in the context in which it had been negotiated. This was something for the two parties to decide and for the Security Council to take up.

In his view, a one-year extension was not unreasonable. It had taken six months to stabilize and demilitarize. That had involved moving 16,000 Serb regular troops with their equipment, including 120 tanks, 100 artillery pieces, and 140 mortars. But removing hardware also required complementary "psychological demilitarization" of people, which, in turn, meant establishing a system of amnesty. The current amnesty bill, which met the needs of the region, had been negotiated with the Croatian Government and with members of the Croatian Parliament.

Asked if Croatia could be described as constituting in effect a separate autonomous region, Mr. Klein replied that it could not. "That is a canard that should be quickly put aside", he said. When the Security Council voted on 15 January, it was indicated de jure that the region was part of Croatia. There was no doubt that Croatian law applied. The issue was how this part of Croatia was to be reintegrated and returned to a multi-ethnic configuration. That involved such things as allowing Croatian refugees to return, as well as allowing Serbian return to Western Slavonia, and permitting the area to reassume its function as part of the Croatian State.

He referred to a training programme for police, who, he said, were key to any kind of democratic framework. He said 220 Croatian and 220 Serb policemen were sent together to the International Police Academy in Budapest.

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"Everyone said that could not be done. But within two or three days they were talking. By the end of the week they were playing soccer together, and were soon going to dinner together." This had occurred because the policemen were told that their role was basically one of jurisprudence -- dealing with criminality -- not politics.

Ideally, he said, whatever the ethnic balance of the population in areas of Eastern Slavonia, people should function as part of the administration. "That means the police chief may be a Croat, one of the local Serbs may be a lieutenant", he added. The same principle should be applied in the educational, medical, postal, and communications infrastructure. Subsequent to the military departure of the mission, other military institutions were already present within the military compound.

Had the strength of the Government's legal protection to minorities changed? the correspondent asked. Not in Eastern Slavonia he said; the Government had suspended certain portions of the Constitution regarding other areas, but not in Eastern Slavonia.

How did the excavation of mass burial sites of Serbs in Eastern Slavonia affect confidence-building? a correspondent asked. Mr. Klein said his responsibility was for Eastern Slavonia. He referred to an area secured by the Russian battalion, which had established the integrity of the site. The Jordanian battalion took over in May. The site was secured. A BBC team was filming for historical reasons.

He said he was trying to minimize publicity that might engender further hate. Remains were being removed to Zagreb where there were refrigeration units and forensic pathologists available. All three sides were being represented there at all times. He said he could not speak for the other sites, but this one was being handled completely professionally.

Mr. Klein added that he had met with a leader of the Mothers of Vukovar, which was the organization at Osijek that was very concerned with the remains of their sons and husbands at the site. Their chief concern for the site was to maintain dignity, and that was what he was doing. No effort was being made to keep things secret.

A correspondent said Mr. Klein was being quoted in a Yugoslav newspaper as saying there were too many Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. Mr. Klein said he had not said that. There had been no refugee outflow from the region, and the population trusted the mission, and would continue to do so, provided the mission continued to keep its word, as it had up to now.

Asked what was the significance of the exchange of oilfields, he said that that was "a rather sad story" because there had been an agreement between the two Governments to close certain oilfields. With its closure, the money that had been coming in to finance the regional administration dried up. He

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had negotiated an agreement with the Croatian Government to provide for regional financing, and he expected the Government to live up to its agreement. He said unemployment was above 60 per cent. It was a psychologically depressed area. Opening borders was very important for the economy. This week the border with Hungary was to be opened.

To a question on whether the mission would be affected by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decisions regarding NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, he replied that it would not. Had the Secretary-General's concerns, expressed before the creation of UNTAES, now been allayed? a reporter asked. Mr. Klein said yes; he had, in fact, been sent by the Secretary-General to determine if the mission could be done. He added that both the Serbian and Croatian Presidents had to support the mission. As long as the two Presidents did that, there was no reason a Croatian-Serbian- Hungarian border open to trade, traffic and commerce was not possible in five years. There was no reason why an open Danubian basin with trade, traffic and commerce flowing both ways was not possible. "If we work together we can help construct a future that is liveable, at least for the sake of the children who live here", he said.

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