PRESS BRIEFING ON DEMINING BY DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

14 August 1996



Press Briefing

PRESS BRIEFING ON DEMINING BY DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

19960814 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

In anticipation of a Security Council meeting to be held tomorrow on demining in the context of United Nations peace-keeping, a briefing was held this afternoon by Lieutenant-General Manfred Eisele, Assistant Secretary- General in the Planning and Support Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, and Tore Skedsmo, Chief of that Department's Demining Unit.

General Eisele said that the Department of Peace-keeping Operations was not trying to duplicate the conferences that the United Nations had held last year in Geneva and again this year in Vienna on land-mines. Those had both been political gatherings in which Member States, under the leadership of the United Nations, were dealing with the problem of future mines. "We, the peace-keepers, are dealing with present mines."

The work of the conferences on mines was important to reducing the future threat of mines in war-torn or conflict-torn countries, he stressed. "We, the peace-keepers, are dealing with those roughly 100 million mines -- that is a wild guess -- that have been polluting conflict-torn areas in roughly 65 countries around the globe."

Several inactive mines were laid out on the podium in front of the two speakers. "You need not be afraid", said Lieutenant-General Eisele, holding up a small land-mine, "they have been properly defused." He said that the mine's small size was indicative of the extent of the problem, explaining that the smaller the mine the more difficult it generally was to discover it. Such a small mine was sufficient to kill a child, since it needed only a pressure of three kilos to be set off.

Another problem with such small mines was that they contained very little amounts of metal, making them difficult to find, he continued. Apart from the less than two grams of metal built into the striking pin, there was nothing that a mine detector could discover. Therefore, it would be necessary to use prodding, or, "if you were to use the language of the most successful mine-detectors, then you would have to talk to them in dog language; sniffing dogs are the most successful deminers that we find". Rather than using high- technology to discover mines, peace-keepers were using the capabilities of dogs.

Given the magnitude of the problem, which could hardly be overstated, he said the advance parties of peace-keeping missions required demining equipment and capabilities. "That is why we are about to develop the idea of a stand-by rapid mine-clearance capability that perhaps the Member States would make

available to the United Nations under the auspices of the stand-by forces concept, which is one of the consequences of the Secretary-General's An Agenda for Peace." Some 50 Member States had responded positively to the stand-by forces concept, and the idea for a company-sized mine-clearing unit was being developed.

He said that operational demining -- the demining which was required for peace-keepers to properly deploy into a conflict area -- was the responsibility of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. "We are mainly focused on clearing the roads to have access to the deployment areas of Blue Helmet units." Once that had been achieved, the Department would contribute to the establishment of indigenous capabilities for long-term mine-clearance. The task of long-term humanitarian demining would be handled by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

"Our activities come to a quick end at the end of a peace-keeping operation, but humanitarian demining requires efforts over an extended period", he went on. For example, in Cambodia, if efforts continued at the present speed, another 10 to 15 or 20 years would be required. "For humanitarian demining, we are thinking in terms of generations." For example, although demining activities were performed in Afghanistan by non-governmental organizations during the last six years, it might take a century to remove all of the mines.

Mr. Skedsmo then described each of the mines on the podium, beginning with the largest -- the anti-tank mine. He said that it was the historical antecedent of present-day mines. The rest of the mines were anti-personnel mines, such as the "blast mine", which exploded up into the leg of the victim. The other mines were "fragmentation mines" which threw out shrapnel at their victims. They ranged from the simple mines which had been in use since before the Second World War to the "bouncing Betty", which jumped up approximately one metre before exploding, sending shrapnel in a 30-metre radius area, and potentially taking out a whole patrol.

He also showed correspondents a home-made mine, which had been the sole kind used in El Salvador. Such mines demonstrated that when people wanted to fight they would find a way to do so. "To put it bluntly, every high-school student of medium intelligence can make his own mine if he wants to -- a water pipe, some explosives, the battery from a torch, an electric fuse, a rubber band, and that's it. You can do it." "Even without high school", added General Eisele.

Mr. Skedsmo went on to say that the main problem was that the locations of mines were not known. "The Geneva Conventions were made with the Western way of thinking -- they presume that people can read, that they can write, that they know how to use maps, and that they have a disciplined army which follows all the rules." That was not the situation prevailing today. Peace- keepers were left to find the mines by using the most primitive means, such as

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the metal detector, which was practically useless in locating small mines with little metal in them.

"Bio-sensors" were used, but that was just a more advanced word for dog's noses, he added. The United Nations demining programme, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, had some 100 to 120 dogs operating, but it would like to double that figure.

Next, Mr. Skedsmo held up what was known as a butterfly mine, which was a Russian-made copy of the United States-made mine known as the dragon-tooth. The butterfly mine had been found in Afghanistan and the dragon-tooth, among other places, in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Journalists often thought that the mines had been designed to attract children, but that was not the case; rather, their shape, which resembled a falling leaf, was made to fly down in circles. "That is why these are shaped the way they are -- not to attract kids, but because when you drop them from the sky they fly down nicely."

The butterfly mine had enough explosives to take off a hand or part of a foot, or to destroy a face. The problem with those mines was that, unlike other mines which either went off with enough pressure or did not explode at all if sufficient pressure was not applied, the butterfly or dragon-tooth mines accumulated pressure. "So instead of pressing one time hard, you can press 10 times softly, or a hundred, or a hundred and fifty." As a result, a person could toy with the mine for a long time and nothing would happen until suddenly enough pressure had been accumulated to explode it. Thus, the mine could be among a child's toys for weeks before exploding. But the mines had not been designed to attract children, he said. They came in different colours, such as green or sand-coloured, depending on the type of terrain that they were supposed to land in.

A correspondent then asked what component in the mines the dogs were able to sniff. Mr. Skedsmo said that it was presumed that the dogs were able to react to the vapors from the explosives, but it could also be the combination of the vapors and the surrounding plastic. When dogs were moved into a new area, it was necessary to retrain them as to the new smells in that area. For example, if the peace-keepers were moving into parts of the former Yugoslavia, they had to train the dogs to sniff the kinds of mines that had been laid there.

"We assume it is the explosive that they smell", added General Eisele, noting that "we can't communicate with them properly so we don't know".

Asked what action the Security Council was expected to take on the issue of demining, General Eisele replied that the whole problem required continuous awareness-raising. A number of non-governmental organizations were devoted to tackling the problem, but they required donors to support their efforts, including governments and individuals. "So whenever the world at large, or

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the centre of gravity here in the United Nations -- the Security Council -- is dealing with the topic, it will get world-wide attention, and that might trigger donors to give to the required support to continue humanitarian activities."

A correspondent then asked for further clarification about the butterfly and dragon-tooth mines and their impact on children. General Eisele replied that governments made decisions about the explosives they wanted to buy based on political or military assessments of their needs. The market for mines was under discussion at the conferences held on land-mines. It was hoped that governments would refrain from the use of anti-personnel land-mines. Some governments, such as Germany, had decided that they would no longer use those mines. "We can only hope that the information will spread around the globe and people will realize that this is unacceptable to mankind any longer, and will, therefore, give up the idea of using them." He cautioned that it was not possible to be overly optimistic, considering that home-made mines could continue to be produced.

Mr. Skedsmo then reiterated that the butterfly or dragon-tooth mines had not been made to target children, but rather to target soldiers. They were spread out by air in front of advancing armies. Such mines had been used in Afghanistan, but were no longer being laid in that country.

Children fell victims to those mines most easily, noted General Eisele, but they had not been the target.

A correspondent then asked who was doing the demining in the context of peace-keeping operations -- was it the troops, or foreign contractors, or was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) involved? General Eisele replied that all were involved. The Department was responsible for the mine- awareness training of peace-keeping units. Host-country governments had the main responsibility for organizing indigenous demining capabilities, often assisted by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. In Angola, for example, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations had established a school which aimed to train 900 indigenous deminers who could continue to clear the country's fields over an extended period of time. Non-governmental organizations were dedicated to the same task, including some from Scandinavian countries. The warring factions were also requested to participate in demining. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs also worked to coordinate the activities of non-governmental organizations, often utilizing the UNDP for management of funds and support in the country concerned.

Regarding the Secretariat, he said that the Department of Peace-keeping Operations cooperated with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which would take over when the former left the area in question.

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For information media. Not an official record.