PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
Press Briefing
PRESS BRIEFING BY UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
19960725
FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY
At a Headquarters press briefing yesterday afternoon, Under-Secretary- General for Pace-keeping Operations Kofi Annan said a lot had happened in Burundi since everyone started talking about it two years ago. In the last few days there had been further developments. He assumed correspondents knew about the Burundi President and the forced removal of refugees, which had been halted. The United Nations had been working on contingency planning for some time. The Secretary-General was encouraging a two-track approach: a Chapter VI option and a Chapter VII option. The Chapter VI option was in the expectation that the situation might calm down and the Burundi Government might invite the United Nations to step in and the Organization would do so with its consent. The Chapter VII option was in the event that "things blow suddenly" and the international community had to react rather than sit back and watch another Rwanda unfold in Burundi.
The Secretary-General had further requested that the Chapter VII planning should be done by Member States who would form the coalition that would go into Burundi. "In effect he was pleading for a coalition of those willing to put together the force and pay for it." A series of discussions with Member States had taken place. As far as the planning was concerned, the Security Council, following a series of letters from the Secretary-General -- "and as you know he has been quite constant on this" -- had requested that the Secretariat, working with the Member States, facilitate the planning for a Chapter VII operation. "And so it has been a collaborative effort. We've done the Chapter VI planning; most of the elements of the Chapter VII planning are also in place. But we're waiting for additional planners which Member States had promised, for us to complete the Chapter VII planning", he said.
Mr. Annan said the Secretariat had also approached Member States seeking participation in Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations. Some responses had been received. Some Member States had indicated they would participate. Additional support and additional commitment of resources would be needed for the United Nations to be able to deploy a force in Burundi. He recalled that he had met on the previous day with representatives of a group of governments which had shown particular interest in the Burundi crisis, "to assess where we are and where we go from here to review our own efforts". Also discussed were the efforts taking place in the region, the proposed African force from Ethiopia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, and how the international community could respond. He said it was a very positive and constructive meeting. "For the first time, the thought was put forward that if we really want to break the back of the problem and move forward, we have
to consider a United Nations-funded operation." Moreover, mounting this type of operation on a voluntary basis simply was not going to happen that quickly.
Mr. Annan said that two of the governments participating in the meeting -- the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States -- had also sent military experts to the east African region to talk to the governments concerned. He would continue his consultations with the African States, with the traditional peace-keeping donor countries, and with the western countries which had considerable capabilities to move the process forward. "But, of course, we have to move very quickly before everything blows up in our faces. We have had lots of forewarnings. We cannot claim lack of information, and I don't think the international community can be seen as not acting." He added, "As it is, history will judge us rather severely for Rwanda and I don't think we can repeat that experience in Burundi". Everybody was concerned or aware of the urgency and would want to see something done. "What we need, and we're seeking now, is the political will to act."
Asked what his top priorities were in putting together the multinational force, Mr. Annan said initially, the Secretariat had started by looking for a nation which would lead the operational force. In the absence of a lead nation, the Secretariat had been trying to put together a coordinating organization, a group of countries that would come together to lead the operation. That had not worked either. If a decision was taken to run it as a United Nations-funded operation, governments would have to be approached again. He said he would be talking to them on the basis of what their reaction would be if the United Nations were to pay for the operation. Resources and financing, and above all, the political will to commit troops on the ground were needed.
What were his targets for the number of troops and how many had actually been committed, at least tentatively? a correspondent asked. Mr. Annan said several battalions had been offered. He would also presume, he said, that if the United Nations were to pool its resources the three African governments -- Ethiopia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania -- which had offered to deploy troops would join the multinational force. They had all indicated that they would contribute about 3,000 troops each. Mr. Annan said he hesitated to announce planning figures now because it would all depend on a lot of other factors. Generally, the figures for the Chapter VI operation would be lower than for the Chapter VII operation.
Responding to another question, he said the force would be expected to attempt to arrest the deterioration of the situation, try to the extent possible to save lives and prevent the parties from killing the population, and where necessary, provide humanitarian assistance to those who were on the ground. "Obviously, this would have to be refined by a Council decision, but we, as planners, have to work under certain assumptions."
Annan Briefing - 3 - 25 July 1996
Responding to another question, he said there were no clear front lines in the Burundi situation. Very few of the operations that the United Nations had been involved in recently had very clear front lines. The test was to be creative and adaptable to be able to operate in those circumstances, he said. "You [the press] call it a disaster, some say the United Nations made a contribution. Total success is not a disaster. Between total success and disaster is a whole range of things and contribution. Nobody in this room would argue that the United Nations made a contribution in Bosnia. The United Nations made a contribution in Somalia and even in Rwanda, if one looks at it objectively", he added. Although the French went in late into Rwanda, with only half a brigade, they were able in the south-west of the country to stop the fighting. The 750,000 to 1 million people who remained in the south-west did not have to go into the refugee camps in Goma and most of them eventually went home. "It was not a question of defined front line", he said.
A correspondent said he understood that none of the major western countries had offered troops. Did the Under-Secretary-General think the operation would be feasible without the involvement of France or the United States, for example? Mr. Annan said they had not offered troops but had offered logistical support, materiel and airlift. It would be easier if one of them were to lead the operation, he said, adding that they had the capacity. In the absence of that, countries with troops wold have to be matched with those with equipment. Some of the troops would have to be trained to use the equipment. Responding to a further question from the correspondent, he said it would be preferable if one of the major Powers led it. The operation could go on without a major Power leading it, but it could not be as effective.
Asked about the time-frame for the operation to start, Mr. Annan said some would agree that the United Nations troops should have been there by now. "The fact is we're not there. We do not have the elements together that would make us deploy there tomorrow." As he had stated, consultations were going on. There were planners in the field and on their return or when they send in their report, it would be seen how, as an international community, resources would be pooled together to carry out the operation. When African countries were first approached to indicate the contributions they could make, most of them said they were prepared to play their part, but they did not want genocide to be seen as an African problem; it was a universal problem and a problem for the United Nations. They had said, "Tell us, who is the lead nation, who's going to pay for it and what the logistic support is, and then we'll come in." Now that the pressure was on, Member States might agree to consider a United Nations-funded operation.
Who would propose a United Nations-funded operation to the Security Council? a correspondent asked. Mr. Annan said the issue had been raised at the meeting the previous day. If some support for the operation could be generated, the Secretariat would go forward with it. However that would
Annan Briefing - 4 - 25 July 1996
depend on the will of the Member States. He said the international community often reacted on a rather tardy basis. Everybody was ready to do things only when an explosion happened. That had been the problem with the Burundi situation. The whole idea of preventive action, he said, was an attempt to do something about a situation before the need for an intervention.
A correspondent suggested that the United Nations should forget about the introduction of a force and concentrate on a political solution. Mr. Annan said the idea of introducing a force was running parallel with the efforts led by the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. There was a parallel political process going on. The difficulty was that it had not led anywhere. It was not known whether that process would succeed. The international community was faced with a dilemma. "Do we sit back and allow the genocide or massacre to go on" as the discussions on a political settlement continued? "Can we in all conscience sit back and do nothing? It is a difficult problem. It is almost an insoluble problem."
A correspondent said that a criticism of the Security Council was not the apparent failure to send in troops but to sufficiently respond to the humanitarian needs, which might have prevented the escalation of the crisis. She asked what plans were in place on the humanitarian side of the operation. Mr. Annan said the Department of Humanitarian Affairs could provide more details. He said quite a lot of work had been done by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Union and the World Food Programme. But even on the humanitarian front, the cooperation of the leaders of the country would have to be obtained, for people on the ground to make things happen. The UNHCR had been very vocal and very active in trying to prevent forced repatriation of refugees to Rwanda.
Responding to questions about what a force would do in the situation, he said that to show a credible deterrence, or calm the situation, it might be necessary to show force in order not to use force. In Bosnia, the Implementation Force (IFOR) was performing peace-keeping but because it had a credible force on the military front it had had more peace of mind than the United Nations did.
Did the Secretariat intend to present the Council with a draft of the deployment of troops? a correspondent asked. Mr. Annan said the said the initiatives the Secretariat had undertaken had the support of the Council, which had been encouraging it to consult Member States about the contingency planning. All the contacts made with regard to Chapter VI and Chapter VII had been outside a Council mandate. There had been an attempt to pre-plan the operation pending a decision by the Council. The Council had been kept abreast with the Secretariat efforts, but the Secretariat was not in a position now to ask the Council for a mandate.
Annan Briefing - 5 - 25 July 1996
Had the Secretariat thought about the creation of safe areas? a correspondent asked. Mr. Annan said it was not intended for United Nations troops to enter and beat up everybody. Peace could not be imposed by force. It was hoped to use the presence of the troops to calm the situation, to protect as many lives as possible and give the peace process a chance. "Peace-keeping is not an end in itself" and if it was able calm the situation, space and time could be provided for the negotiators to proceed with their work.
Responding to further questions, Mr. Annan said the situation in Burundi was not quite clear yet. There was the news that the President had resigned and was in a western embassy. The public did not seem to know about that so the situation was relatively calm. He did not know how the situation was going to evolve. Coming from a third world country, he knew "a little bit about coup d'etats", he said . "It depended on how the organizers managed it, and it could be fairly smooth. However, if it got out of hand, it could also be very bloody. It was too early to judge the situation.
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