PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION
Press Briefing
PRESS BRIEFING BY EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION
19960625
FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY
The Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission monitoring the disarmament of Iraq, Rolf Ekeus, told correspondents at a press briefing yesterday that the Government of Iraq had agreed to a joint statement to grant immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wished to inspect. The statement was very significant and represented a concession by the Iraqi Government to the Council's demands. It was a major political decision which could represent a crossroads in the relationship among Iraq, the Special Commission and the Security Council.
The Special Commission was established under Security resolution 687 (1991) to oversee the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and related capabilities and facilities and its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres.
Mr. Ekeus reminded correspondents that on 14 June the Security Council had issued a statement condemning Iraq's refusal to admit the Special Commission's inspectors into sites they had wanted to inspect. The Council had also demanded that Iraq should admit the inspectors. The Council had requested further that the Special Commission's Executive Chairman visit Baghdad as soon as possible with a view to securing "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites which the Special Commission wishes to inspect, and to engage in a forward-looking dialogue on other issues under the Commission's mandate". Mr. Ekeus was also requested to report immediately after his visit on the results and on the impact of Iraqi policies on the mandate and work of the Special Commission.
Reporting on the mission, Mr. Ekeus said he had arrived in Baghdad on Monday, 19 June, and the discussions with Iraqi officials had started with a plenary session, led by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. That was followed by five meetings, tête-à-têtes and plenary sessions with the Deputy Prime Minister and other Iraqi officials. He had pointed out that, in his private assessment, if his mission was rejected, there would be serious repercussions for Iraq and that the Council would not take no for an answer.
The talks were sombre but professional and disciplined, he said. By Thursday evening, 20 June, he had proposed that a joint statement be issued in which Iraq would accept the Council's resolutions. The Iraqi officials had hesitated to endorse statements that condemned their Government. The proposals were then redesigned to more closely reflect the Security Council's mandate for the mission. It outlined a three-point statement that was handed over personally to the Deputy Prime Minister on Friday evening, 21 June.
There were three components in the statement, Mr. Ekeus said. First, that Iraq undertook to grant immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wished to inspect. The Special Commission would be guided by what Member States have undertaken with regard to Iraq's territorial sovereignty and independence. In carrying out its operations, the Commission would respect Iraq's legitimate security concerns. The question of what was legitimate was emphasized as opposed to the action of hiding prohibited items which were not seen as a legitimate concern.
Mr. Ekeus said that the statement's third paragraph referred to the fact that the Special Commission would engage in an intensification of its work, with the objective of reporting to the Council that Iraq had fulfilled its obligations under Security Council resolution 687, if the Council wished to implement paragraph 22 of that resolution -- which refers to the complete lifting of the oil embargo against Iraq.
Following intensive discussions on the possibility of Iraq accepting the statement and how access would be given to all sites, the "package" was given to the Iraqi leadership on Saturday morning, 22 June. Late Saturday morning, Mr. Tariq Aziz informed Mr. Ekeus that his Government had accepted the statement. It was signed on Saturday. There were some accompanying arrangements including a joint programme of action which included an agreement to convene a political dialogue every two months between Mr. Aziz and Mr. Ekeus to review developments.
The statement was a very important agreement on the limited problem of operational access to sites which has been the basis of confrontation between Iraq and the Special Commission and the Security Council, Mr. Ekeus continued. "It appears to be solved. I have full confidence that this will hold." It would soon be tested to see if the Iraqi Government would grant immediate unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites. However, substantively nothing had happened on the mission with respect to the outstanding questions on Iraq's prohibited weapons.
Based on the Commission's analysis, Iraq was still concealing some important components and weapons and was also concealing important documents explaining its weapons programmes, Mr. Ekeus said. The substantive issues still remained. Iraq had also agreed to hand over to the Commission before the end of June full, final and complete disclosures on programmes on chemical and biological weapons, long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. Two such documents were made available during the mission and the two others were expected. The inspectors would start the process of verifying the correctness of those declarations.
UN Special Commission Briefing - 3 - 25 June 1996
The Commission had fully responded to the Council's mandate and the joint statement signed between him and Mr. Tariq Aziz corresponded to the Council's requests, Mr Ekeus said. He had reported to the President of the Council and would report to the Council this afternoon.
Asked if he was convinced that during the "stand-offs" with Iraq no crucial evidence had been destroyed or concealed, Mr. Ekeus said he was convinced that Iraq was concealing weapons by both static and other means, such as the storage and concealment of weapons on moving vehicles -- trucks and other means of transportation. During investigations before August 1995, the Iraqi Government had admitted that it had material stored on trucks but when inspectors approached those areas the trucks were made mobile throughout the country. When the teams left, the trucks were returned to the original sites. Those highly dynamic methods of concealment made it difficult to track the weapons.
Had the Iraqi leadership decided to "come clean"? a correspondent asked. Mr. Ekeus said that Iraq denied concealment but the Commission had insisted that that issue remained an important point in its relationship with the Iraqi Government. He had requested that the Iraqi Government give high-level attention to the matter of unilateral destruction. Iraq had explained that no prohibited items remained in the country because they had been unilaterally destroyed. The inspectors were aware that Iraq had acquired highly sensitive chemical weapons but they had claimed that they had been secretly destroyed in 1991 and 1992. However, Iraq had never revealed the areas in which they were destroyed.
Asked when the Special Commission's inspectors would return to Iraq, Mr. Ekeus said that planning for the next mission had already started.
When asked about language used in the Iraqi press to describe him, such as "killer cowboy", and the atmosphere it might have engendered, Mr. Ekeus said that the press reports were part of the psychological softening directed at him. The closed meetings and the tête-à-têtes were highly professional and that kind of language was not repeated. A good civilized society did not treat an envoy in that manner.
In response to a correspondent's request for information on the contents of the joint plan of action, Mr. Ekeus said it contained certain components that had been agreed upon. Others were still to be agreed on. First, Iraq would make complete declarations on all their weapons programmes. The Commission would wait to see if that was the case. Secondly, the experts would undertake to verify the declarations. The third step was the high-level attention to the matter of secret destruction and methods of concealment. Iraq still disagreed to those issues and especially the role of certain individuals in such acts of concealment. They had asked for high-level political dialogue on all the matters every two months, ideally, before the Council's review of the sanctions against Iraq.
UN Special Commission Briefing - 4 - 25 June 1996
Asked if the Special Commission's work would affect the oil-for-food agreement, Mr. Ekeus said there was no link. The Special Commission's operations were very complex and were very carefully planned and dependent on the work of specialists. The inspectors' work was not tied to Security Council resolution 986 (1995).
In response to another question, Mr. Ekeus said the question of concealment was a dilemma because the concealment was managed by institutions which were related to security in Iraq. Those security institutions were also responsible for security for the head of State, his family members and other leading personalities in the country. The participation of those institutions in hiding weapons presented a problem. For that reason, the Special Commission had ran into problems. Hence, Iraqi Government's concession could not be underestimated. It really had made a sacrifice in accepting the joint statement which should be saluted and respected. However, it remained in a limited area -- access to operations.
Was the reference to Iraq's security just an empty phrase to help the Iraqis to give in to the Council's requests? asked a correspondent. Mr. Ekeus said the reference to Iraq's security was not an empty phrase. The inspectors were strictly instructed to focus only and exclusively on the mandated items. That was a factor on which Iraq had to be convinced. Anything outside chemical, biological long-range missiles and nuclear weapons was not the Commission's business. Since 1991, the Special Commission had stated and respected Iraq's legitimate security concerns. It was a mandate and not an empty phrase.
* *** *
UN Special Commission Briefing - 5 - 25 June 1996