AT DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, INDONESIA'S FOREIGN MINISTER CALLS FOR GREATER EMPHASIS ON NON-PROLIFERATION IN NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TALKS
Press Release
DCF/268
AT DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, INDONESIA'S FOREIGN MINISTER CALLS FOR GREATER EMPHASIS ON NON-PROLIFERATION IN NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TALKS
19960625 Indonesia and Pakistan Urge Nuclear Powers To Show Flexibility as Negotiations Near 28 June DeadlineGENEVA, 25 July (UN Information Service) -- The Foreign Minister of Indonesia this morning called for the nuclear-test ban treaty now under negotiation to aim at curbing any form of nuclear weapons proliferation and to serve as a basis for pursuing the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Addressing the Conference on Disarmament as negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty approached a deadline of 28 June, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas expressed dismay over the positions being taken by some nuclear-weapons States. Despite their claim to being the guardians of global non-proliferation, he said, those countries failed to reflect a genuine non-proliferation policy in the draft basic obligations of parties. They gave the impression that maintenance of their individual and strategic postures as well as their status as nuclear-weapon States had taken precedence over their commitment to total abstention from nuclear-weapons tests, he stated.
The representative of Pakistan expressed disappointment at the manner in which negotiations had proceeded over the past month, saying that texts had descended one after another while most members of the Conference had become spectators to a drama played out among the five nuclear powers. The frustration of non-nuclear-weapon States was heightened by the fact that the nuclear-weapon States were not prepared under the treaty to provide any commitment to halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, with or without a time-bound framework, he said.
Ambassador José Urrutia of Peru, beginning a four-week period as Chairman of the Conference, said in opening remarks that he believed differences of opinion could be overcome in negotiations on the test-ban treaty if the political will existed and if flexibility was shown.
The representatives of Cameroon and Syria also spoke.
Statements
JOSE URRUTIA (Peru), the incoming Chairman, said he believed differences of opinion could be overcome in negotiations on the test-ban treaty if the political will existed and if flexibility was shown. No efforts should be spared to conclude the treaty in the time allotted. The international community was watching and expected results. There should be a universal treaty totally banning nuclear tests that would be effectively verifiable.
ALI ALATAS, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, said the preambular part of the draft treaty should have at least two fundamental objectives: to curb any form of nuclear weapons proliferation, and to serve as a basis for the pursuit of the objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Indonesia was dismayed by the positions being taken by some nuclear-weapon States which, despite their claim to being the guardians of global non-proliferation, failed to reflect a genuine non-proliferation policy in the draft basic obligations under the treaty. It seemed that the maintenance of their individual and strategic postures as well as their status as nuclear-weapon States had taken precedence over their commitment to total abstention from nuclear-weapon tests.
It was imperative that an agreement be reached for the treaty to ban all nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other kind of nuclear explosions in order to totally cap the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he said. While taking note of the flexibility being shown by a particular country on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, he wished to reiterate the opposition of Indonesia to allowing peaceful nuclear explosions under the treaty.
As for composition of the executive council of the treaty, he said that Indonesia was convinced that election of its membership should be guided by the principles of equitable geographical distribution and of the equal right of every State party to serve as a member. The idea of establishing a larger membership on the council also warranted favourable consideration.
Indonesia agreed that on-site inspection requests under the treaty should be based on data gathered solely by the International Monitoring System, he continued. It was therefore essential that the monitoring network should be fully operational by the time the treaty entered into force. Any request for an on-site inspection should be given the benefit of a judicious evaluation by the executive council in order to prevent any States parties from launching unfounded and politically motivated on-site inspections -- to which developing countries would be particularly vulnerable. It was essential that action on a request for an on-site inspection should be taken collectively. Whenever the Council found a request to be justified, it should carry it out expeditiously, before time-critical evidence could be removed from the suspected testing site.
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Indonesia felt that entry-into-force of the treaty should be based on a simple numerical approach, with an agreed number of ratifications, as in the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, he went on. However, there should be a mechanism to secure the ratification of nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-capable States; Indonesia was open to the suggestion that a mechanism be devised outside the framework of the treaty but linked to it in order to prevent the possibility of its entry-into-force from being taken hostage by a small number of States.
MUNIR AKRAM (Pakistan) said that what was now before the Conference was a draft text that would ban some nuclear tests, but not all, because a number of tests were sub-critical and not verifiable. It was unfortunate that the nuclear-weapons States were not prepared to agree that such tests should not be used to enable them to improve their weapons in the guise of so-called "safety" and "reliability" tests. Moreover, since both "zero-yield" and "low-yield" tests were as yet unverifiable, the advanced nuclear-weapon States could conceivably continue to violate the prohibition contained in the proposed treaty. The frustration of non-nuclear-weapon States was heightened by the fact that the nuclear-weapon States were not prepared under the treaty to provide any commitment to halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, with or without a time-bound framework.
Inordinate emphasis in the draft text was based on on-site inspections, which should be used only in rare and exceptional circumstances, he continued. Concerns that such inspections could be used as a kind of harassment and interference were heightened by demands for an easy "trigger" for such inspections. The use of so-called national technical means for triggering such inspections was bound to render the verification of the treaty even more unequal against the technologically less-advanced countries and open it to discrimination and abuse by the few States which possessed such means.
Pakistan was also unhappy at the manner in which negotiations had proceeded over the past month, he said, adding that texts had descended one after another, and most members of the Conference had become spectators to a drama played out among the five nuclear powers.
Pakistan had not simply given up on the negotiations, however, as it might have done, because it felt that a ban on nuclear explosions was better than no ban at all, and that such a ban would contribute significantly to nuclear non-proliferation, he went on. A test-ban treaty signed by both Pakistan and India would fulfil the objective of the bilateral test-ban treaty which Pakistan had formally proposed to India in June 1987. Pakistan was extremely disturbed by the declaration made on 20 June by its neighbour announcing a decision not to sign the comprehensive test-ban treaty unless its conditions were met. If that decision was not reversed, it could spell the treaty's death.
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If one of the five nuclear powers or three so-called "threshold" States was out of the treaty, all of them would be out, he continued. Hence, in Pakistan's view, premature declaration by one of those eight States that it would not sign the treaty was an escape from political responsibility. While the declaration of 20 June had cast a long shadow over the proposed treaty, it also had raised the nuclear spectre in South Asia, and Pakistan was concerned that this could precipitate denunciation of the test-ban treaty and could imply the possibility of further nuclear tests in South Asia.
Pakistan had proposed that a separate section be added to the preamble spelling out the treaty's purposes and objectives, including prevention of the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and new kinds of nuclear weapons, and the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. Unfortunately, there was no serious response from either side to that compromise approach, he said.
Pakistan did not believe the Security Council should have any role in enforcing compliance with the treaty, especially since the five States which were among those most likely to conduct tests possessed the unequal right to veto any decision in the Council, he added.
FRANCOIS-XAVIER NGOUBEYOU (Cameroon) said the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was essential, as the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a critical issue for international peace and security.
SAWSAN CHEHABI (Syria) expressed support for the views of Pakistan and Iran as they related to the proposed annex to the draft treaty.
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