PRESS BRIEFING ON BOSNIA

8 May 1996

Press Briefing

19960508 FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY

The Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Special Envoy for the Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Muhamed Sacirbey, told a press conference at United Nations Headquarters today that elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be held only in Sarajevo and the areas controlled by the Sarajevo authorities, because it was the only region where conditions were "ripe" for democratic elections.

Mr. Sacirbey read a personal declaration before taking questions. In it, he said that the victims of war, the enthusiastic supporters of peace and the Bosnian Government were being subjected to "disingenuous criticism -- and, indeed, bashing -- in order to hide the failures of those charged with implementing the Dayton Agreement", and what he termed was their "betrayal" of the Agreement's objectives.

He said some of the criticisms directed at Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Sarajevo government, the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and the SDA (Party of Democratic Action) were not without foundation, but the Bosnian leadership had been especially adaptive to the new demands and roles under democracy, including full political rights and respect for human rights and freedoms in areas under the control of the Sarajevo government and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal, including the recent arrests of two indicted war criminals.

He cited as failures those responsible for the implementation of the Dayton/Paris Agreement, the non-arrest of those indicted, lack of provision of freedom of movement and support for the refugees, and the failure to establish conditions for democratic elections throughout all of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

An official decision had to be made over the next month whether or not the conditions existed for free and fair elections to be held, Mr. Sacirbey said; there could be several "negative, potential consequences" if elections were held in certain areas.

"The Bosnian people are deprived of real democracy, and [were elections to be held] cynicism becomes the dominant factor", he said. Also, "extremists like Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic [both indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] would be legitimized through the election process". It was also possible that Mr. Karadzic would turn the elections into a referendum on the total separation of the republic of Srpska. The holding of elections, said Mr. Sacirbey, could produce unrest, political conflict and even the resumption of the war.

Asked about his recent trip to The Hague, Mr. Sacirbey said he had represented Bosnia and Herzegovina as its agent before the International Court of Justice in a case of Bosnia and Herzegovina versus the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for violation of the Genocide Convention. He spoke of potential "areas of culpability". Individual culpability was what the International Criminal Tribunal was doing, he said, identifying individual responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law, the Genocide Convention. Under those standards, he continued, anyone could be responsible: Muslims, Croats and others. "Those are the types of crimes a solider would be held accountable for, while engaged in either legitimate or illegitimate action." The second possibility would be to hold the Serb people responsible as a whole, but that, he said, "is not our intention". However, ethnic cleansing and genocide had been systematically planned, instigated and carried out, and it was the responsibility of the Belgrade regime.

Mr. Sacirbey said he was not sure that identifying a few individuals served the purpose of reconciliation or peace. "We must identify those institutions and the leaders of those institutions who are responsible", including the government of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

A correspondent asked whether, after the recent admission of the Clinton Administration of having looked the other way when arms from Iran came through Croatia, there were signs that the United States wanted to drop its support of the SDA (Party of Democratic Action). He said there was a broad tendency to "identify easy scapegoats", but, in that sense, the SDA was not an easy scapegoat, either for the war or for what had happened concerning the arms or the mujahaddin.

There was no democracy in the republic of Srpska, Mr. Sacirbey continued, and thus no real opportunity for change through elections. There was democracy only in Sarajevo and the areas controlled by the Sarajevo government.

Regarding the arms, Mr. Sacirbey said the Bosnian Government was familiar with the issues, as were many Western nations. The Bosnian Government did not, nor did the SDA, "do anything that was not sanctioned and even encouraged by Western countries". At the United Nations at the time, Mr. Sacirbey said, he had consistently been told, "Don't press ahead with the arms embargo, because the arms are coming in anyway. Don't create a problem with the Russian Federation, or within the European alliance, or within NATO, by pressing for the lifting of the arms embargo. Just recognize that everyone has turned the other cheek, and that things are basically going, as well as they can". So it was very convenient for many to allow "a semblance of a fair fight", but it was not the policy of the Bosnian Government, nor the SDA. It was the policy of the powers within the Security Council, who wished to be able to say, "Bosnia is holding its own, we don't have to do much, and at the same time avoid the divisive battle on the arms embargo".

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Answering another question on the possibility of elections, Mr. Sacirbey said that he would encourage elections taking place in those areas where the conditions were "ripe"; there was a need for the voters to give leaders a new mandate, as between the existing leaders or others. In the other areas, where change was most needed, elections would only confirm the existing ideology and leadership. One of the most effective tools that Karadzic and Mladic had was the knowledge that certain Western nations, for political reasons, wanted to have elections held, with a certain time-frame in mind. "All they have to do is hold out, within that time frame, and they would be legitimized."

Would he favour IFOR force staying a bit longer? The presence of IFOR did play a positive role, he said "but they are failing in some basic tasks, which are essential for elections".

A reporter commented that while the Dayton Peace Agreement banned Karadzic and Mladic from running for office, others from the Serbian Democratic Party would probably run. Was Sarajevo democratic enough to accept those candidates? Mr. Sacirbey replied that Karadzic had reasserted his role as the head of the committee managing the international politics of the Palais authorities. "I suspect he would continue to play that role", which was in complete disagreement with the Dayton Agreement. The Agreement also required the extradition of Karadzic and Mladic to The Hague Tribunal. He wondered if Pale would arrest Karadzic for crimes committed against non-Serbs.

Should the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) arrest Karadzic and Mladic through a manhunt? the correspondent asked. Mr. Sacirbey said NATO had the obligation, according to Dayton, but the unarmed police force would not be able to confront "a well-armed gang of hoodlums". At the same time, it was quite counterproductive to NATO's presence on the ground to have a known war criminal driving freely through their checkpoints. He said that built a disrespect for justice, "which will come back to haunt them at some point in time". Karadzic did not reassert his position until well after the Dayton Agreement was signed, and he came to the conclusion that, once again, IFOR and the implementation authorities were starting to lose backbone and did not intend to fully implement the accord.

Would Bosnia and Herzegovina pay their dues so as to be able to vote at the United Nations? a correspondent asked. "Yes, despite our tight budget; Ambassador [Ivan Zrdavko] Misic was absolutely right in claiming our right to vote", because it was thought that all had been paid.

Asked about the registration to vote in the elections, Mr. Sacirbey said it was essential that people were offered a real choice, whether to register where they were currently or where they came from. But the lack of freedom of movement meant there was no real choice.

Would the Serbs doing the stoning be prosecuted eventually? a correspondent asked. Mr. Sacirbey responded that there were people looking to

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violate not only local law, but also the Dayton Agreement, and it would have to be looked into before the elections took place.

A correspondent asked if Richard Holbrooke, the United States envoy, who was no longer on the scene, was missed. Would his presence be useful now? Mr. Sacirbey replied that, "Dick Holbrooke was a friend who sincerely believed he was working on behalf of justice and on behalf of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina". He was also a man "who ruffled feathers" and who, with his enormous energy and sometimes heavy-handed style, tended to get things done. "He was also, by his own admission, not prone to detail, and I think what we need now is detail." What had not been included in Dayton had now "come back to haunt us". It would certainly be helpful to have him back, to give things a certain push at the right time.

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