Consensus Scuttled in First Committee over Two Competing Draft Resolutions on Space Security, Creating Parallel Processes, Polarization, Say Speakers

Five Draft Resolutions Requiring 22 Separate Votes Forwarded to General Assembly

The General Assembly would establish two open-ended working groups related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, according to overlapping draft resolutions approved today by the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), which had delegations warning that parallel processes would lead to further polarization and fragmentation of efforts to preserve space security.

The United Kingdom-sponsored draft resolution titled “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” (document A/C.1/78/L.15/Rev.1), which required 12 separate recorded votes for its approval, was among five drafts on the disarmament aspects of outer space forwarded to the General Assembly for adoption.

By the terms of “L.15/Rev.1”, the Assembly would welcome the deliberations held in 2022 and 2023 by the Open-Ended Working Group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, and decide to convene, in Geneva, a new open-ended working group to continue deliberations and make recommendations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The draft as a whole was approved by a recorded vote of 166 in favour to 9  against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 5  abstentions (India, Niger, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan).

The second text, tabled by the Russian Federation, titled “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.55), required five separate recorded votes prior to its approval as a whole by 122 in favour to 49 against, with 7 abstentions (Chile, Fiji, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland).

It would have the Assembly express grave alarm over an arms race in outer space and urge the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a balanced work programme that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of such an arms race.   For this, the Assembly would establish an open-ended working group for the period 2024-2028 to make recommendations on elements of an international legally binding instrument.

The representative of the United Kingdom, introducing the draft on reducing space threats through responsible behaviours, said that the text stresses the urgency to break the impasse on the matter.  It is also a response to growing calls to develop international norms, rules and principles to address threats to space systems and launch negotiations on a treaty to ensure peace and security and the prevention of an outer space arms race.  His delegation sought to consolidate the two initiatives into a single track, he said, but this flexibility was not reciprocated.

The representative of the Russian Federation, introducing the draft on further practical measures, maintained that steps to prevent the weaponization of outer space and the creation of barriers to the participation of States in space activities can be achieved through a multilateral legally binding agreement that contains robust guarantees against the placement of weapons in outer space and includes all space-faring States.  This is the focus of the text, he said, adding that for 15 years, Western countries have avoided or blocked discussions on such an agreement. Their statements lamenting the inability to create any legal document on the matter is bewildering, he said.

Also requiring separate votes for approval was a draft resolution titled “No first placement of weapons in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.53).  Approved without a vote were traditional texts, respectively, on “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.3) and “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” (document A/C.1/78/L.54).

The Committee began its consideration of drafts on conventional weapons, hearing the introduction of some drafts in the context of general statements.

The First Committee will reconvene at 10 a.m., on Wednesday, 1 November, to continue action on the 61 drafts before it.

General Statements — Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)

AIDAN LIDDLE (United Kingdom) introduced the draft resolution, titled “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” (document A/C.1/78/L.15/Rev.1).  Since its first introduction in 2020, this text has received overwhelming support in the General Assembly.  The text stresses the urgency to break the impasse in the prevention of an arms race in outer space.  The responsible behaviour initiative covers a whole range of issues, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space measures can be advanced by both legally binding agreements and political commitments.  His delegation adopted an inclusive approach to negotiate this text, including space-faring nations and those who depend on space services.

The text, he said, is also a response to calls echoed in the Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda policy brief to develop international norms, rules and principles to address threats to space systems and launch negotiations on a treaty to ensure peace and security and prevention of an outer space arms race.  Having two proposals on the open-ended working group would be an unacceptable burden on Member States and the Secretariat.  His delegation sought to consolidate the two initiatives into a single track, but this flexibility was not reciprocated.

SHEN JIAN (China) called on all members to vote in favour of four draft resolutions co-sponsored by his country:  “L.3”, titled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.3), “L.53”, titled “No first placement of weapons in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.53), “L.54”, titled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” (document A/C.1/78/L.54) and “L.55”, titled “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.55).  A fundamental solution to outer space security is to negotiate an international legally binding instrument through the UN, especially at the Conference on Disarmament.  He hoped that all parties can uphold true multilateralism, balance different proposals and work on synergy to converge rather than diverge.  He regretted that “a scant few countries” requested votes on certain paragraphs in “L.53” and “L.55”.  The language of a UN document needs to crystalize the wisdom of the broader membership.  It is not the property or prerogative of any single country, and it must not be tempted by ideology.

ANDREY BELOUSOV (Russian Federation) said that as States are increasingly dependent on technology, preventing outer space from transforming into an arena of armed confrontation and keeping it as an environment for peaceful exploration remains a key priority for the international community.  Steps developed on a genuinely collective basis to prevent the weaponization of outer space and the creation of unilateral barriers to participation of States in space activities and sharing of benefits can be achieved through a multilateral legally binding agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space.  It must contain robust guarantees against the placement of weapons in outer space and should include all space-faring States.  This approach allows international governance of space activity. The work to draft such an agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space should be cooperative and constructive. This is the focus of the draft resolution “L.55”, which would establish an open-ended working group operating on consensus.

The working group would provide for a broad discussion of mechanisms and instruments, supplementing a future legally binding agreement, he said, noting that “L.53” and “L.54” would aid in these endeavours. However, he expressed “bewilderment” at statements by the collective West lamenting the “inability” to create any legal document on the issue.  For 15 years, Western countries have avoided or blocked discussions on such an agreement with untenable arguments.  The plans of the United Stated and its allies to use outer space for military purposes are at odds with the drafting of any such agreement, and their discussion for plans for correct conduct is a “smoke screen” concealing the genuine intentions of Western States in outer space.  The concept of “responsible conduct” is used as propaganda wherein any activity by Western States is legitimate and responsible while that of any other space-faring State is censured and labelled irresponsible. These actions contradict the statements of Western States about their willingness to develop safety in outer space, he said.

ROSANIS ROMERO LÓPEZ (Cuba) said that her country co-sponsors “L.3”, “L.54” and “L.55”.  She supported the legitimate rights of all States to have access to outer space for peaceful purposes and highlighted the need for multilateral legally binding instruments to regulate that domain.  Cuba hopes that the open-ended working group will be expanded, as proposed in “L.55”.  She urged Member States to vote in favour of “L.3”, “L.53”, “L.54” and “L.55”, including the provisions subjected to votes.

Action, Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)

The representative of Iran, explaining the delegation’s vote against “L.15/Rev.1”, said that developing a legally binding instrument related to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Outer Space Treaty, is not enough to make outer space safer because it does not mention or address other types of weapons and military activities.  Moreover, the monopoly of a few countries and the imposition of any restrictions on the transfer of space-related expertise, technology and services to developing countries should be rejected.  The proposal to establish another open-ended working group with previous defects and an ill-defined modality, when the political stance of Member States remains unchanged, raises concerns regarding its constructive nature.  It may also undermine the Group of Governmental Experts’ efficacy by suggesting that its success is not imperative, given the possibility of another future working group.

Adopting the draft, he said, could lead to a divisive, completely unacceptable situation where Member States would be forced to split into “so-called responsible versus irresponsible States”.  The draft also overlaps with the Fourth Committee’s agenda, which should be avoided.  He called on delegations from developing countries to likewise vote against the draft.

In explanation of vote before the vote, the representative of the United States, speaking also on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, said the group would vote no on “L.55” and encouraged all delegations to follow suit.  Citing its cooperation with other delegations on the draft, he underscored that the safety of the outer space environment will impact all countries.  Regulation of behaviours that may lead to conflict is a shared responsibility.  Preventing an arms race in space can most quickly be achieved by reducing threats or perceived threats, which is why his country has led efforts at the UN to discuss current security threats in outer space, including “L.15/Rev.1”, to build upon the progress from the last Working Group.

He said, however, that the Russian Federation, the principal author of “L.15/Rev.1”, stymied discussion on issues to the interest of a majority of States.  The country’s “obstructionism” prevented the Open-Ended Working Group from reaching consensus, as well as discussion of responsible behaviour.  It continues to “invent spurious explanations for its own irresponsible behaviour”.  The speaker cited, in particular, its anti-satellite missile test, which created more than 1,000 pieces of debris.  The Russian Federation aims to “lock us into the same stale debate that has not made progress since 1978”.  Discussions on the prevention of an outer space arms race cannot be focused solely on the creation of a legally binding instrument on “no solid ground”, which is what “L.55” seeks to do.  It is limited in scope and will only drag Member States into a never-ending process instead of progress.  Instead, a broad approach must be adopted, which is what “L.15/Rev.1” seeks to do.

The representative of the European Union, in its capacity as observer, said that the group’s member States will vote against “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.53”, and the speaker urged all to follow suit.  The draft, “L.15/Rev.1”, proposing a separate open-ended working group, ignores previous processes and fruitful discussions in the 2022–2023 open-ended working group.  Nor does it identify the realistic areas where progress can be made. It seeks to dismantle multilateral efforts and sow divisions.  “L.53” does not sufficiently address outer space-related threats, including missile tests.

The representative of Australia, explaining the delegation’s votes against “L.53” and “L.55”, said that the approach of “L.53” fails to adequately define what constitutes a weapon in outer space.  It also fails to recognize the dual-use nature of many space objects.  It also does nothing to tackle threats to space systems that currently emanate from Earth-based systems.  On “L.55”, Australia does not support creating a new forum that would run in parallel to the Open-Ended Working Group on responsible behaviours.  The proposed working group has a narrow scope that limits potential measures to support the prevention of an arms race and it pre-empts the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts, which has not yet begun its work.  It would also impose an unreasonable resource burden on States and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.  Australia cannot support creating a new forum when the Open-Ended Working Group on responsible behaviours has been widely supported, has a broad mandate and offers real prospects for progress.

The representative of Malaysia said that “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55” each seek to establish the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group. Voicing support for the informal consultations convened by both parties, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, on the respective drafts, he said Malaysia will vote in favour of both, including separate paragraphs.  However, it reiterates the need to avoid parallel multilateral processes on key First Committee agenda items that may duplicate Member States’ work or create divergent and possibly irreconcilable pathways.  Further, practical considerations of smaller delegations, particularly from developing countries, must be taken into account in the creation of mechanisms for institutional dialogue.  He called on the main sponsors of the two drafts to communicate with the aim of maximizing the use of scarce resources.  It is vital to advance multilateral discourse and initiatives on the prevention of an outer space arms race through a transparent and inclusive process.

The representative of the Russian Federation said that his country led many landmark initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and welcomes any ideas that can contribute to keeping outer space free of weapons of any kind and preventing it from becoming another sphere for tension and armed confrontation.  The United Kingdom-sponsored text, “L.15/Rev.1”, does not clearly address the link between the “responsible behaviour” initiative and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.  The initiative puts an emphasis on the issues that have been dealt with for a long time, and successfully, by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

He added that the United Kingdom’s initiative is an attempt to refocus the efforts of the Member States from the goals of the prevention of an arms race in outer space to secondary and non-core topics and to consolidate the rules for regulating space activities that are beneficial for Western States to the detriment of other countries.  His delegation, therefore, will vote against this draft resolution.

The representative of New Zealand, explaining its votes against “L.53” and “L.55”, continues to have concerns that “L.53” seeks to regulate only the first placement of weapons in outer space, which risks providing tacit approval for their second and subsequent placement. The approach also does not address the risk of “Earth-to-space” threats to space objects.  As a space-launching State, New Zealand is concerned that important definitional and verification questions have not been addressed, given space’s physical realities and the dual-use nature of many space capabilities. On “L.55”, its proposal to establish an open-ended working group risks crowding and confusing the space security conversation and will create capacity challenges for smaller States and those with emerging space capabilities.  While New Zealand supports the open-ended working group format for broad participation, it is concerned about an approach that cannot provide outcomes until the end of 2028.  Other initiatives with more ambitious timelines are better able to achieve timely progress.

In explanation of vote, the representative of Canada, associating with the European Union, said he would vote against “L.53” and “L.55”.

Next, the Committee turned to the draft resolution titled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (document  A/C.1/78/L.3), tabled by Egypt and Sri Lanka.

By the text, the General Assembly — convinced that further measures should be examined in search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the realm’s weaponization — would call on all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective, and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and the relevant existing treaties.

Further, the Assembly would reiterate that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.  It would urge States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference informed of progress on negotiations on the matter.

The Committee approved “L.3” without a vote.

The Committee then turned to the draft resolution titled “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” (document A/C.1/78/L.15/Rev.1), submitted by the United Kingdom.

By its terms, the Assembly would welcome the deliberations held in 2022 and 2023 by the Open-Ended Working Group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, and decide to convene, in Geneva, a new open-ended working group, to make recommendations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Assembly would also decide to consider how the implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours could be monitored and verified, including through the possible establishment of a mechanism for inter-State coordination and consultation.   It would further decide that the open-ended working group should submit its report to the Assembly at its eighty-first session.

Recorded votes were requested on preambular paragraphs 8, 13 and 15, operative paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, and the draft as a whole. 

Preambular paragraph 8 would have the General Assembly stress that the deliberate destruction of space systems increases the amount of long-lived orbital debris, the risk of in-orbit collisions and the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculations that could lead to conflict and welcome the commitment of several States not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 150 in favour to 8 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 5 abstentions (Guinea, India, Kazakhstan, Niger, Sri Lanka).

In preambular paragraph 13, the Assembly would be convinced that possible solutions to outer space security, including norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, can involve a combination of legally binding obligations and political commitments, and that work in both of these areas can be further pursued in a progressive, sustained and complementary manner, without undermining existing legal obligations.

The Committee retained that provision by a recorded vote of 146 in favour to 10 against (Afghanistan, Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 7 abstentions (India, Kazakhstan, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan).

Preambular paragraph 15 would have the Assembly reiterate the common objective of preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, and the consequent need for all States to work together to reduce threats to space systems through the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, including an appropriate combination of both political commitments and legally binding instruments.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 146 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 7 abstentions (Chad, India, Kazakhstan, Niger, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan).

Operative paragraph 2 would have the Assembly welcome the deliberations held in 2022 and 2023 by the Open-Ended Working Group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours established by the General Assembly in its resolution 76/231, which, together with the working papers and presentations submitted to the Assembly, constitute an important contribution to outer space security and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 151 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 3 abstentions (India, Niger, Sri Lanka).

Operative paragraph 4 would have the Assembly decide to convene, in Geneva, a new open-ended working group, building on the work of the 2022–2023 Open-Ended Working Group and other relevant bodies, including the Group of Government Experts established by its resolution 77/250.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 140 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 12 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 5 would have the Assembly decide that the open-ended working group shall submit its report to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session, and that it shall adopt its final conclusions and recommendations by consensus.

The Committee retained that provision by a recorded vote of 144 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 9 abstentions (Brunei Darussalam, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mexico, Niger, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Togo).

Operative paragraph 6 would have the Assembly decide that the open-ended working group shall hold a two-day organizational session and two substantive sessions of five days each in 2025, and two substantive sessions of five days each in 2026.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 144 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 8 abstentions (Brunei Darussalam, Chad, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Niger, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Togo).

Operative paragraph 7 would have the Assembly reaffirm that intergovernmental organizations and other entities having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the work of the General Assembly and representatives of non-governmental organizations that are in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council may participate in the formal and informal meetings of the open-ended working group as observers.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 123 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 30 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 8 would have the Assembly request the Chair of the open-ended working group to draw up a list of representatives of other relevant non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions and the private sector who may participate in the open-ended working group, taking into account the principles of transparency and equitable geographical representation, with due regard for gender parity, to submit the proposed list to Member States for their consideration on a non-objection basis and to bring the list to the attention of the open-ended working group for a final decision by the open-ended working group on participation. 

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 119 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 32 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 9 would have the Assembly request the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the open-ended working group and its Chair and to transmit its report to the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 147 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 6 abstentions (Brunei Darussalam, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Niger, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Togo).

Operative paragraph 10 would have the Assembly decide to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-ninth session, under the item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, the sub-item entitled “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 149 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 3 abstentions (India, Niger, Sri Lanka).

“L.15/Rev.1”, as a whole, was approved by a recorded vote of 166 in favour to 9 against (Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria), with 5 abstentions (India, Niger, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan).

The Committee then turned to the draft resolution titled “No first placement of weapons in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.53). 

By the text, the General Assembly would encourage all States, especially space-faring nations, to consider the possibility of upholding a political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space.   The Assembly would reiterate that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum on this subject, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement, or agreements, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.   It would urge an early commencement of substantive work based on the updated draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects, introduced by China and the Russian Federation in 2008. 

Recorded votes were requested on preambular paragraphs 5, 9, 11 and the draft as a whole.

Preambular paragraph 5 would have the Assembly reaffirm that practical measures should be examined and taken in the search for agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in a common effort towards a community of shared future for humankind.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 118 in favour to 49 against, with 5 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland, Türkiye).

Preambular paragraph 9 would have the Assembly welcome the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, introduced by China and the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament in 2008, and its updated version in 2014.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 116 in favour to 49 against, with 5 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland, Türkiye).

Preambular paragraph 11 would have the Assembly stress the importance of the political statements made by a number of States that they would not be the first to place weapons in outer space.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 118 in favour to 47 against, with 5 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Türkiye).

“L.53” was approved as a whole by a recorded vote of 127 in favour to 50 against, with 4 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland, Türkiye).

Moving along, the Committee turned to the draft resolution titled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space  activities” (document A/C.1/78/L.54), approving it without a vote.

By the text, the General Assembly would encourage Member States to continue to review and implement, to the greatest extent practicable, the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, considered by the General Assembly on 5 December 2013.   The Assembly would also call upon Member States and relevant entities of the United Nations system to support the implementation of the report’s full range of conclusions and recommendations. 

It then turned to the draft resolution titled “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space” (document A/C.1/78/L.55).

By the text, the General Assembly would proclaim it a historic responsibility of all States to ensure that the exploration of outer space is carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind and call upon all States, above all those with major space capabilities, to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force in outer space, from space against Earth and from Earth against objects in outer space.   The Assembly would also urge the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an outer space arms race.   In this regard, the Assembly would also decide to establish an open-ended working group for the period 2024-2028 to make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Recorded votes were requested on preambular paragraph 5, operative paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11, and the draft as a whole. 

Preambular paragraph 5 would have the Assembly bear in mind that all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the prevention of an arms race in outer space with a view to promoting and strengthening international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, with the objective of shaping a community of shared future for humankind.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 113 in favour to 49 against, with 6 abstentions (Chile, Fiji, Georgia, Papua New Guinea, South Sudan, Switzerland).

Operative paragraph 8 would have the Assembly decide, to ensure continuity and consistency in considering issues pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, upon the termination of activities of the Group of Governmental Experts, to establish for the period 2024–2028 an open-ended working group to continue building on the Group’s work to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 98 in favour to 49 against, with 18 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 9 would have the Assembly decide that the newly established open-ended working group will operate by consensus, without prejudice to national positions in future negotiations, and will hold in Geneva its organizational two-day session in 2024, as well as eight sessions, comprising two sessions annually of 10 and five days each, in 2025, 2026, 2027 and 2028.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 97 in favour to 49 against, with 19 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 10 would have the Assembly request the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the open-ended working group and its Chair and to transmit its report to the General Assembly at its eighty-third session, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 99 in favour to 49 against, with 17 abstentions.

Operative paragraph 11 would have the Assembly decide that, if the Conference on Disarmament agrees upon and implements a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that includes the negotiation of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the newly established open-ended working group will conclude its work and submit the results thereof to the Secretary-General for onward transmission to the Conference on Disarmament.

The Committee retained the provision by a recorded vote of 100 in favour to 49 against, with 16 abstentions.

The Committee approved the resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 122 in favour to 49 against, with 7 abstentions (Chile, Fiji, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland).

Explanations of Vote after the Vote, Outer Space

The representative of Switzerland said that his delegation abstained from “L.53”, as its previous explanations of vote on the issue remain valid.  Reservations to the text were reinforced by the testing of counter-space capabilities by its promoter, inconsistent with the State’s objective of the resolution. Regarding “L.55”, the country also abstained, and voted “no” on operative paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11. Switzerland remains concerned over the deployment of weapons systems in outer space.  A legally binding instrument to address that remains the objective.  Questions around the wording in several paragraphs remain.  His country votes “no” on the operative paragraphs because of its grave concern about establishing a second open-ended working group, which would call into question coherence of work.  A working group has met over the past two years, and its mandate is flexible enough to address all concerns.  It is important to address both behavioural and capacity issues, but these discussions should take place under a single process.  Also, the open-ended working group envisaged in “L.55” does not provide for a sufficiently inclusive process.

The representative of Pakistan said that his country abstained on “L.15/Rev.1” as a whole and on its operative paragraph 4.  His delegation would have preferred a more inclusive list of topics in that paragraph rather than the narrow framing of safe operations of space systems — a notion that is being discussed in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.  Pakistan stands ready to participate in any future open-ended working group on reducing threats in space.  Such a group should focus on both capabilities and behaviours, examine threats in a comprehensive manner and contribute towards the development of a legally binding instrument.  Pakistan voted in favour of “L.55”.  However, he expressed concern that competing proposals are on the table, to be launched after 2024, at the same time.

The representative of Indonesia, explaining its votes in favour of this cluster’s resolutions, said that establishing a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space should be a top priority.  She deeply regretted the increased polarization among Member States this year. The proposal to establish two open-ended working groups running in parallel profoundly reflects the lack of trust, dialogue and political will to strive towards consensus.  Two groups might also prevent the inclusive participation of all Member States, especially smaller delegations.  These factors must not continue affecting the credibility and legitimacy of the First Committee’s work.  At the same time, the two working groups can operate in complementarity and not serve as exclusive efforts disconnected from each other.  Indonesia will respect all ongoing processes to promote peaceful uses of outer space, on the understanding that all configurations aim to establish a legally binding instrument that addresses threats to outer space in a comprehensive manner.

The representative of Singapore expressed support for practical approaches towards a common framework for outer space security, such as the development of norms of responsible behaviours and measures to prevent the threat or use of force in outer space.  Singapore is also open to the possibility of a legally binding instrument in the future, to strengthen the application of international law in outer space.  Given these positions, the delegation supported both “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55” and their respective operative paragraphs establishing open-ended working groups.  However, the creation of parallel tracks leads to duplication, inefficiencies and fragmentation of discussions and places a particular strain on small States with limited resources.  Singapore calls for an eventual single-track mechanism.

The representative of Sri Lanka said that his country and Egypt, for some time, have tabled the resolution on preventing an outer space arms race, “L.3”, which was previously adopted by consensus.  He thanked all delegations, particularly the co-sponsors, for their continued support.  The resolution has been calling for negotiations to begin on an international, legally binding instrument at the Conference on Disarmament.  Sri Lanka voted in favour of draft resolutions “L.53”, “L.54” and “L.55”.  However, it was compelled to abstain from “L.15/Rev.1” as the content of the resolution has changed from its previous version to include the establishment of another open-ended working group, which would essentially duplicate other processes and create an undue burden on Member States with capacity constraints, especially smaller delegations.

The representative of the United States, explaining the negative votes of his country, France and the United Kingdom on “L.53”, said that the text contains significant problems.  Firstly, it does not adequately define a weapon in outer space. The dual-use nature of many space systems makes it challenging to create a workable definition and could be the basis for spurious claims that civilian satellites are weapons, allowing them to be targeted on purely political grounds.  It also contains no elements to effectively confirm whether a State is meeting a commitment to not be the first to place weapons in outer space, because observing the nature of space systems is challenging, and judging the intentions of their operators, impossible.  Without a common understanding of what is threatening and not, the resolution does not fulfil criteria for effective transparency and confidence-building measures. In the current security context, measures like no first placement only introduce ambiguity and uncertainty, exacerbating the risks of misunderstanding and misperception.  Moreover, the resolution has language with no meaning or relation to discussions on preventing an arms race.  “We have reason to believe” that the resolution’s authors and other countries’ military actions do not match the rhetoric of no first placement of weapons.

Also in explanation of vote after the vote, the representative of Argentina said that his country voted in favour of both “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55”.  However, he underscored the importance of avoiding duplication of work, which might strain delegations’ capacity and affect the process’s outcome.  The differences in regard to the approaches in preventing an outer space arms race should be resolved within the mechanism that is created in order to avoid duplication, he said.

The representative of the Philippines lends his country’s support to both “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55”.  These texts are of paramount importance in the fields of disarmament and international security.  Manila’s commitment to these resolutions is evident in its active participation in the Group of Governmental Experts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space for 2023-2024.  The Philippines is also aware of the challenges that these open-ended working groups present to smaller delegations in Geneva.  Stressing the need to allocate resources to participate in both processes creates a significant burden.  He called for cooperation among all delegations to prevent the politicization of issues impacting the shared outer space domain.

The representative of Mexico, explaining the delegation’s votes in favour of “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55”, strongly supported developing a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. Mexico supports developing norms and principles of responsible behaviour as part of confidence-building measures among States, but they cannot be a substitute.  Outer space should be preserved exclusively for peaceful uses, as a priority for countries, including his own, which do not have advanced space capabilities and will never support the placement of weapons in that realm.

While Mexico voted in favour of both resolutions as a whole, it abstained on operative paragraph 5 of “L.15/Rev.1” and operative paragraph 9 of “L.55”.  Mexico’s position on the improper use of consensus is well-known.  Noting complaints during the thematic debate about outcomes blocked in the Open-Ended Working Group, he asked, “Why repeat this method of work?”  On operative paragraph 9 of “L.55”, Mexico is concerned that its formulation does not bind Member States in future negotiations.  “Why do we want to achieve consensus if it will not be complied with in subsequent negotiations?” he asked.  On operative paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 of “L.55”, he disagreed with forcing the General Assembly to establish a new open-ended working group when the Group of Governmental Experts has not begun its work.  He appealed to all Member States to not present initiatives without the proper mandate, leading to conflict and improper use of human and financial resources.  Both of these approaches can come back to a complementary approach.  While Mexico supports “L.53”, he reiterated that this support should not be understood as a tacit endorsement or acceptance of a supposed right to place arms in space or to launch these weapons from Earth if another State does first.

The representative of Iran said the delegation voted in favour of both “L.53” and “L.54”, as its previously stated position on them remains valid.  Iran, joining consensus on “L.54”, however, should not indicate its support for the Group of Governmental Experts.  The Group was limited and selective, and Iran was not among its members.

The representative of India said that his country abstained on “L.15/Rev.1”.  New Delhi has been a consistent advocate for preserving space as an ever-expanding frontier for cooperative endeavours.  India supports substantial consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and remains committed to a legally binding instrument, which is universally acceptable, verifiable and multilaterally negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.  Subjectivity in interpretation of space behaviours and perception of threats are a matter of concern.  Also concerning was the politicization of verification measures.  India voted in favour of “L.53”, but against its preambular paragraph 5, which includes language on political ideology.

The representative of Japan, explaining its vote against “L.55”, agreed with the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space and the need for further practical measures, but noted the resolution’s problematic issues.  Given multiplying activities and actors in outer space, he called for a practical and holistic approach that accounts for the dual-use nature of space objects and technologies, as well as current and potential space threats. Procedurally, operative paragraph 8 would establish an open-ended working group to continue building on the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, but the Group has not yet begun its formal sessions and it is premature to prejudge the result.  There is no urgency to establish an open-ended working group at this stage, considering significant resource implications. This proposal should be considered when the Group’s prospects become clear, such as after the General Assembly’s seventy-ninth session.  The working group’s duration should also be considered carefully, as the UN budget is limited.  Another issue is the working group’s period from 2024 to 2028, which would overlap with another proposed working group on responsible behaviours.

The representative of China said that his country voted against “L.15/Rev.1”, noting several concerns including subjectivity in the definition of “responsible” and “irresponsible” space behaviours in the draft, which could instigate geopolitical conflict.  The discussions by the Open-Ended Working Group are one-sided and selective and its agenda is unbalanced.  “L.15/Rev.1” would create parallel processes.  Beijing is not in favour of creating a dedicated open-ended working group on responsible behaviours, as it would sidetrack efforts to negotiate a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is the best solution to maintain security in outer space.

The representative of Brazil said that his country joined consensus on “L.3” and “L.54” and voted in favour of “L.15/Rev.1”, “L.53” and “L.55”.  Its approach to the cluster on outer space to give the green light to all resolutions tabled under this topic is based on the understanding that there is an urgent need to regulate outer space activities, owing to their critical impact on Earth structures and to the impending risks of the realm’s weaponization.  Yet, the international community could not coalesce around common terms of reference to address simultaneously the vexing question of behaviours versus capabilities.  Brazil is disappointed that the sponsors of the establishment of three competing negotiating bodies failed to arrive at a compromise that would have enabled a process of convergence similar to that achieved in cybersecurity.

The representative of Egypt, explaining its votes in favour of “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55” as a whole, supported all credible efforts to elaborate rules that pave the way to conclude a legally binding instrument. However, Egypt abstained on operative paragraph 4 of “L.15/Rev.1” and operative paragraph 8 of “L.55” due to the negative consequences of establishing competing, duplicative processes that will only lead to further polarization and fragmentation of efforts. His country has consistently warned against the negative implications of establishing parallel processes under the same agenda item.  Having different approaches does not mean establishing different processes.  The relevant mandate of one process can easily be designed in a comprehensive and balanced manner that allows consideration of different approaches.

Moreover, he said, most developing countries, including Egypt, do not have the necessary resources to effectively participate in parallel processes under the same agenda item.  His country hoped that Member States would give a chance for the already-established process of the Group of Governmental Experts as a stepping stone towards a single, comprehensive process.  Egypt also abstained on operative paragraphs 7 and 8 of “L.15/Rev.1”, as their language was too descriptive and goes beyond recently agreed practices.

The representative of Türkiye said his country voted against “L.55”.  He underscored the importance in preventing an outer space arms race and the right to unrestricted access to outer space use for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all countries.  There is an increasing need to define civil or military objectives of space objects — a good example of norms in the field.  It is also important to maintain trust by increasing international cooperation. Highlighting the current state of play of international affairs, consensus on a legal instrument does not look likely in the near future.  Developing legally binding norms is important, but a behaviour-based approach is a more practical way forward to make progress.  Developing a shared understanding of responsible behaviours is a way to increase transparency and pave the way for a future legally binding instrument.  Based on these principles, his country supported the Open-Ended Working Group, whose mandate ended a few months ago, and supports efforts to establish a new one to continue its predecessor’s work.  Türkiye supports the promotion of standards for responsible State behaviour as well as confidence-building measures in this area.

The representative of Costa Rica, explaining its votes on this cluster’s drafts, valued all initiatives that allow dialogue to make progress in preventing an arms race in outer space.  Having voted in favour of “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55”, Costa Rica considers creating an open-ended working group a positive step.  While her country prefers to create only one rather than two working groups, it is better to have two forums of negotiation than none. Regretting that the authors of both resolutions could not find common ground, she said that all could be done in an inclusive way by one open-ended working group.  She appealed to all to approach discussions in both working groups in a constructive spirit, since this situation is not ideal in terms of resources or the most efficient way to carry out deliberations.  On “L.53”, she reaffirmed Costa Rica’s position that placing weapons in outer space is unacceptable under any circumstances.

The representative of Cuba, explaining the delegation’s vote against “L.15/Rev.1”, said the draft reinforces deficiencies and duplicates many tasks that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should fulfil in the Fourth Committee, particularly security of space operations and sustainability guidelines.  The draft also seeks to legitimize the fact that technology and space systems could be used for purposes incompatible with international peace and security.  There is ambiguous language that opens the possibility of the use or threat of use of force in space, which counters Cuba’s commitment to use and explore space for strictly peaceful purposes.

The draft, said the speaker, further seeks to establish a sequence between new voluntary measures and the adoption of a legally binding instrument.  While Cuba is involved in efforts to create transparency and confidence-building measures, they cannot be a substitute or precondition for a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space.  They should not divert attention from the urgent need for binding provisions to ban the placement of weapons.  The draft relegates the path towards a legally binding international instrument to the back burner, even though it is a long-standing goal supported by a majority of States.

The representative of El Salvador said it voted in favour of “L.15/Rev.1” and “L.55”, entirely aware that two parallel processes with common goals of preventing an arms race in outer space will be created. She expressed concern over the obstacles that the two paths will create, especially for small delegations.  El Salvador is committed to contribute to the work of the UN, yet when a lack of determination and flexibility to overcome differences prevails among Member States, other States are deprived of sharing their perspectives.  This is due to inequitable conditions of their participation.  A sovereign right to vote is a way to avoid dialogue, which should be discouraged as it complicates work and creates an improper use of resources.  It also aggravates geopolitical divides.  El Salvador will continue its constructive work in the First Committee towards the common goal of general and complete disarmament.

The representative of Israel said that his country joined consensus on “L.3” and “L.54”, although it has some reservations concerning the latter.

General Statements, Conventional Weapons

MATTHIAS EDTMAYER (Austria) introduced “L.56”, titled “Lethal autonomous weapons systems” (document A/C.1/78/L.56).  The resolution, he said, is the first on the impacts of artificial intelligence in the military field.  It was developed by a cross-regional group of States reflecting wide interest from different parts of the world to address the humanitarian, legal, security, technological and ethical concerns raised by these new types of weapons.  He maintained the resolution’s neutral and balanced character and stressed its many benefits, including renewed impetus for ongoing international discussions.

Ms. NAGAI (Japan), introducing the draft resolution “L.40” titled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” (document A/C.1/78/L.40), said that since 2001, her delegation, together with Colombia and South Africa, has submitted the draft, which has been adopted by consensus.  It already has received 82 co-sponsors.  Described as de facto weapons of mass destruction, small arms continue to proliferate, hindering security of the public sector and of post-conflict development.  Their diversion to unauthorized users remains a challenge that the international community must address.  The draft resolution reaffirms the determination to prevent and combat the small arms and light weapons illicit trade and strengthen the International Tracing Instrument.  The text sets a date for the fourth review conference on the subject, to be held in New York.  Japan believes that the resolution will build momentum for the conference next year and hopes it will be adopted by consensus again, she said.

Point of Order

The representative of the Russian Federation, on a point of order, said that moving on to the explanations of vote before the vote on the conventional weapons cluster in the remaining time is not a good idea, as statements before action are very important.  Therefore, he proposed that the Committee reconvene tomorrow.

The representative of the United States said that she was prepared to deliver her explanation of position but will leave the decision to proceed or not to the Chair.

The Chair, in light of the point made, decided to reconvene the session on Wednesday, 1 November, at 10 a.m.