Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2253 (2015), Security Council Expands Sanctions Framework to Include Islamic State in Iraq and Levant

Finance Ministers Further Outline Efforts to Supress Terrorist Financing

In a sweeping move to suppress the financing of terrorism, the Security Council today expanded and strengthened its Al-Qaida sanctions framework to include a focus on Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) in an unprecedented meeting that heard finance ministers from around the world outline efforts to dismantle funding channels to a terrorist group now in control of large swaths of Iraq and Syria.

Through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2253 (2015) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council decided that the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee would be known as the “1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee”, while the Al-Qaida Sanctions List would be known as the “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List”.

The 28-page resolution, sponsored by the United States and the Russian Federation, and co-sponsored by a broad array of Governments, covers asset freeze, travel ban, arms embargo and listing criteria for ISIL, Al-Qaida and “associated individuals, groups, undertaking and entities” — measures that the Council decided it would review in 18 months or sooner, with a view to their possible strengthening.

The Council, through the text, reaffirmed that those responsible for committing, organizing or supporting terrorist acts must be held accountable, and urged States to provide full coordination in investigations or proceedings involving ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

In that context, it reiterated States’ obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territory not make available economic resources to those actors — which applied to both direct and indirect trade in oil, modular refineries and related chemicals and lubricants, among other natural resources.

Expressing concern about the lack of implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2199 (2015), including “insufficient” reporting by States to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), the Council called on States to “move vigorously and decisively” to cut the flows of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to individuals and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.

Further, the Council decided that States would take appropriate measures to promote enhanced vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated on their territory, to prevent ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals and groups from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives or raw materials that could be used in their manufacture.

As for the United Nations, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson established by resolution 1904 (2009) for 24 months from the expiration of its mandate in December 2017.  It requested the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources and make “necessary arrangements” to ensure the Office’s continued ability to carry out impartial work, updating the Committee in six months on actions taken.

It also decided to extend the mandate of the Monitoring Team established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004) — concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities — for another 24 months from its current expiration in December 2017.  It requested the Secretary-General to add up to two new experts to the Team, along with additional administrative and analytical support resources, to strengthen its ability to analyse ISIL’s financing, radicalization and recruitment.  It also requested him to provide an initial strategic report in 45 days that reflected the gravity of the ISIL threat and to provide updates every four months thereafter.

Opening the meeting, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Da’esh ran a multimillion-dollar economy in territories under its control, and raised money through oil trade, extortion, cash couriers, kidnapping, trafficking of humans and arms and racketeering.  They looted and sold cultural property.  Other groups, from Boko Haram to Al-Shabaab and the Taliban, were following suit, employing elusive tricks to raise and transfer funds and leaving little evidence for Governments and the private sector to identify tainted resources.

Je-Yoon Shin, President of the Financial Action Task Force, said ISIL operated as a State and therefore needed more money than other terrorist groups.  “Money is its biggest vulnerability,” he said.  The Task Force had put in place a global framework of standards to combat terrorist financing.  Almost all jurisdictions had committed to implementing them.  It had publicly named those that failed to take action.  “Our aim is to protect the integrity of the financial system and the broader economy,” he said.

When the floor opened for debate, the United States Secretary of the Treasury and Council President, speaking in his national capacity and noting that it was the first time finance ministers had addressed the 15-member body, said the meeting’s purpose was to destroy ISIL through financial means.

A critical part of the strategy to counter ISIL was the use of financial tools to isolate its finances, he said, noting that the group derived only a small share for funding from abroad and the greatest part from the territory under its control.  Yet, it had reaped millions from racketeering and black market oil.

He said today’s resolution expanded the focus of resolution 1267 (1999) to specify ISIL as a subject for targeted sanctions.  It called on Member States to increase interaction with the private sector and encouraged Governments to share information.  There was a need for meaningful implementation and coordination internationally, as well as robust national implementation.

The representative of the Russian Federation said eradicating ISIL could only be achieved by acting together without double standards.  While resolution 2199 (2015) had reaffirmed existing and created new State commitments to prevent terrorism financing, obligations were not being implemented by everyone, everywhere.

Further, he said, the sale of fuel to ISIL continued with complicity.  Smugglers moved mainly through Turkey.  Shipments were carried by Turkish companies and transported to ports on the Mediterranean Sea.  On the Russian-United States initiative, the Council had adopted today’s resolution.  It was important that the text had named ISIL as the most dangerous independent threat.

The Minister for Finance and Public Accounts of France said each country had a duty to act, setting aside national specificities to advance a common endeavour that must find its expression in the Council.  He urged finance ministers to improve financial intelligence and ensure capabilities to track suspect flows.  He noted in that regard that the Paris attacks had been financed through prepaid cards, enabling anonymous transfers between Belgium and France.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom said States must ensure that counter-terrorism financing regimes were used to fuller effect, as the gap between sanction announcement and implementation was crucial in a world where “you can move money in a matter of seconds”.  Finance ministers should make clear that United Nations sanctions would target terrorists, as well as traders, middlemen and all those who facilitated the oil trade that financed ISIL.  The same should be done for the trade in cultural artefacts.

Chad’s representative underscored the importance of the independence of the Ombudsperson, whose Office must have the necessary resources to carry out its work.  The independence of the Monitoring Team must also be guaranteed and equal geographical distribution should be applied.  He recalled that deliberative provocative propaganda by terrorist organizations could not be used to undermine any ethnicity or religion as terrorism sought to hide behind religion.

Also speaking today were the ministers of finance, foreign affairs and other senior officials of Jordan, Chile, Spain, Angola, Malaysia and Lithuania.

The representatives of New Zealand, Nigeria, Venezuela and China also took the floor.

The meeting began at 3:05 p.m. and ended at 5:24 p.m.

Opening Remarks

BAN KI-MOON, Secretary-General of the United Nations, said that as Da’esh (also known as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL) and other terrorist groups disseminated their hateful propaganda and ratcheted up murderous attacks, “we must join forces to prevent them from acquiring resources to do further harm”.  Terrorists took advantage of weaknesses in financial and regulatory regimes to raise funds and circumvented formal channels to avoid detection.  They had forged destructive links with drug and criminal syndicates, among others, and abused charitable causes.  “They are agile and have been far too successful in attaining resources for their heinous acts.”

He said that numerous Council resolutions had clearly expressed the international community’s determination to tackle terrorist financing.  More and more Member States had signed and ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.  The guidance of the Financial Action Task Force had expanded to include the spectrum of methods to fund terrorism, but more needed to be done.  Today, Da’esh ran a multimillion-dollar economy in territories under its control, and raised money through oil trade, extortion, cash couriers, kidnapping, trafficking of humans and arms and racketeering.  They looted and sold cultural property.  Other organizations, from Boko Haram to Al-Shabaab and the Taliban, were following suit.  They increasingly employed elusive tricks to raise and transfer funds, leaving little evidence for Governments and the private sector to identify tainted resources.

He said:  “Just as terrorist groups are innovating and diversifying, the international community must stay ahead of the curve to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism.”  Many States had yet to establish the necessary legal regimes, institutions and expertise to identify and freeze terrorist financing and assets.  Implementation of key Council resolutions remained weak.  The private sector and civil society were often left outside the circle of consensus-building.  Today’s Council resolution would help intensify efforts, identify new vulnerabilities, and advance more efficient regulatory regimes, with due regard for human rights.

International cooperation should be increased, as well as sharing information and expertise, he said.  United Nations programming on countering the financing of terrorism, which currently included the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force’s work group, should be expanded.  That body coordinated the activities of such entities as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the 1267 Monitoring Team.  The Counter-Terrorism Centre would also focus on the issue.  Greater cooperation was necessary with the private and charitable sectors.  In fighting terrorists, special measures should be taken to ensure that migrants or refugees, and their communities of origin were not harmed.

Welcoming today’s resolution, he urged the Council to take concrete action to ensure that the funding channels of terrorist groups were shut down in order to prevent attacks and build a safer and more secure world for all.

Briefing

JE-YOON SHIN, President of the Financial Action Task Force, said ISIL operated as a State, providing all the services a State was expected to provide — and meaning it needed more money than other terrorist groups.  “Money is its biggest vulnerability,” he said.  Preventing and disrupting financial flows must be at the centre of any strategy to defeat it.  Doing so would damage its ability to recruit fighters.  It needed access to the financial system to move money and pay for supplies.  It misused charities and money remitters, and needed to move large quantities of cash.

For its part, the Task Force had put in place a global framework of standards to combat terrorist financing, he said, noting that almost all jurisdictions had committed to implementing them and were being assessed by their peers.  It had publicly named those that failed to take action, which warned other jurisdictions and banks of the risks and deterred foreign investment.  Thus far, it had placed more than 80 jurisdictions through that process, publicly identifying 58 of them, of which, 43 had since made necessary reforms.  “Our aim is to protect the integrity of the financial system and the broader economy,” he said.

In the last six months, the Task Force had reviewed the implementation of counter-terrorist financing measures in 196 jurisdictions, he said, and almost all had criminalized such financing and could apply targeted financial sanctions.  In the last two months alone, half of those where serious problems had been found had tabled urgent laws to address them.  Yet, only 33 jurisdictions had secured convictions for terrorist financing, and most jurisdictions implemented United Nations asset freezes too slowly, with delays of between two days and one month.  All must now focus urgently on implementation of the standards.

“The value of these measures is clear,” he said, noting that on 12 December, the Task Force held a meeting of operational experts from financial intelligence units, law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, who explained how financial intelligence from the private sector had helped track down terrorists behind recent attacks, and thus, prevent other ones.  A day later, members from the Task Force, the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank discussed lessons learned.  Their most important conclusion was the need for better, more timely information-sharing between agencies within jurisdictions; between jurisdictions; and with the private sector.

In the next six weeks, he said Task Force members would discuss terrorist financing risks, the challenges of sharing financial intelligence and responses to those challenges.  They would also identify and share “red flags” — indicators of terrorist financing — to help the private sector detect and report suspicious activity.  In October, the Task Force had updated its standards to reflect resolution 2178 (2014) on foreign terrorist fighters.

“With a strong mandate from the Security Council today, we will take further action to strengthen these measures,” he said, and promote faster, more effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions.  The Task Force’s limited mandate allowed it to be responsive and flexible.  It depended on the support of its members.  As finance ministers, “we need your strong support to carry on our work,” he said.

The Council then unanimously adopted resolution 2253 (2015).

Statements

JACOB J. LEW, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and Council President for December, spoke in his national capacity, noting that it was the first time finance ministers had addressed the 15-member body.  The meeting’s purpose was to destroy ISIL through financial means.  The adoption of the resolution would help to protect the financial system from abuse by terrorists.  He reaffirmed his country’s commitment to cut off ISIL’s financial resources.  After 11 September, his country had recognized the financial resources terrorists used to travel and murder.  The transparency and resilience of the financial international system had been strengthened.  The impact was real, he said, as it had become harder for terrorist groups to acquire funds.  But the terrorist threat had evolved and ISIL was the most dangerous manifestation of the new threat.

He said that in order to counter ISIL, more had to be done together to eliminate the group.  A critical part of the strategy was the use of financial tools to isolate finances for ISIL, which derived only a small share for funding from abroad and the greatest part from the territory under its control.  ISIL had reaped millions from black market oil and racketeering.  To cut off revenues, the United States had been working to cut off the oil-supply chain.  The international community must also work with neighbouring countries.

While progress was being made, he said all must intensify efforts together, as well as on the national level.  Today’s resolution expanded the focus of resolution 1267 (1999) to specify ISIL as a subject for targeted sanctions.  It called on Member States to increase interaction with the private section and encouraged Governments to share information.  There was a need for meaningful implementation and coordination internationally, as well as robust national implementation.  One should also be committed to protecting the stability of the international financial system.

OMAR MALHAS, Minister for Finance of Jordan, said the resolution was a watershed as a result of its specificity.  It updated the sanctions regime and expanded the criteria of inscription on the sanctions list to include Da’esh.  His country had always underlined the importance of addressing the financing of terrorism.  However, that fight could not rest only on the shoulders of a single country.  Cooperation with financial institutions must be strengthened at the regional and international level, and he stressed the importance of bolstering the Convention on the Financing of Terrorists and of countries living up to their commitments.  Donor countries and relevant agencies must provide assistance to States to strengthen their capacities, including their banking sectors.  Individuals must be brought to justice.

Describing domestic measures, he said his country’s Parliament had criminalized any acts of financing of terrorism.  Measures had been undertaken at border points to prevent entry of Da’esh and antiquities, as those two forms of trafficking were its main source of income.  It had also raised the level of awareness in the financial sector and had undertaken steps to combat trafficking of antiquities, the second most important source of financing of Da’esh.  The war against terrorism was truly a global fight and required comprehensive global efforts.

MICHEL SAPIN, Minister for Finance and Public Accounts of France, recalled that his country had been attacked one month ago, noting that no State was immune to such violence and citing Lebanon, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt and the United States in that context.  It was each country’s duty to act, setting aside national specificities to advance a common endeavour that must find its expression in the Council.  Noting that foreign ministers would gather in the chamber tomorrow to seek a solution to the Syrian crisis, he said a recognition that common security was a common responsibility must guide their work.  For finance ministers, it was their role to cut off terrorism financing.  Today’s resolution must be quickly implemented and lead to new listings by the Council.  He urged finance ministers to improve financial intelligence and ensure capabilities to track suspect flows.  Anonymity was a challenge, as terrorists could rely on cash, gold and other precious metals that must be better controlled.  They could also use electronic trade and currencies, he said, stressing that the Paris attacks had been financed through prepaid cards, enabling anonymous transfers between Belgium and France.  Finally, private financial players must be vigilant.  France had created a manual for financial associations and had written to bankers about the risks of financing Da’esh.  He hoped that “new, effective and powerful” measures would be taken at the next Group of 20 meeting of finance ministers in February.

RODRIGO VALDÉS PULIDO, Minister for Finance of Chile, underscoring the destabilizing factor of ISIL in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts, stressed that Member States must work together to implement a multilateral strategy to stop the group.  It was also crucial to ensure the implementation of the standards included in the Financial Action Task Force recommendations.  Putting an end to ISIL’s funding would be difficult as a significant portion of its income came from activities within the territory it controlled and, thus, could not be detected by the formal financial system.  Therefore, efforts must focus on ISIL’s interactions with the rest of the world, such as oil selling, ransom paying or smuggling of objects of cultural and historical value.

To achieve such goals, he continued, it was critical that the adoption of the resolution, which extended the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, further enabled a detailed study of the evolution and trends of terrorist financing.  Also important was the effective implementation of sanctions imposed against Al-Qaida and other associated groups.  More so, it was key to strengthen the link between inclusive development and international peace and security; as destabilization proved, the lack of inclusive development exacerbated such conflicts.  Nonetheless, the lack of opportunities must be addressed without losing sight of the immediate steps needed to stop the financing of terrorist groups worldwide.

GEORGE OSBORNE, Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, said that in 2014 alone, his country had prevented seven plots to attack citizens on its territory.  Strengthening global efforts required ensuring that existing tools to combat terrorist financing were being used to full effect.  The United Kingdom had put forward a list of British nationals who had travelled to Syria and recommended them to the United Nations for listing.  He encouraged other countries to do likewise.  Domestically, States must ensure that counter-terrorism financing regimes were used to fuller effect, as the gap between sanction announcement and implementation was crucial in a world where “you can move money in a matter of seconds”.  The United Kingdom would legislate domestically so it could implement United Nations sanctions without delay.  States must also use new measures to counter terrorism.  Finance ministers should make clear that United Nations sanctions would target terrorists, as well as traders, middlemen and all those who facilitated the oil trade that financed ISIL.  The same should be done for the trade in cultural artefacts.  He encouraged finance ministers to work together to consider how to implement recommendations, suggesting that finance ministers reconvene in the Council in the coming months to consider other proposals.

LUIS DE GUINDOS JURADO, Minister for Economic Affairs and Competitiveness of Spain, said the resolution provided tools to the international community to fight terrorism through financial means, and welcomed the justified inclusion of the 1267 Sanctions Committee sanctions regime.  He said that, often, terrorism was viewed as an issue that only interested countries that had suffered from it first-hand.  But, the financial system of one country could be used to finance terrorist acts in other States.  The first task was to raise awareness around the world.  All countries must create an effective mechanism in oversight of financial flows.  Channels of communication and information at the international and national levels must be improved.

He said that, as a first step, national structures should be established that could disrupt financial flows to terrorists.  To that end, access to information was a cornerstone.  Better information about holders of assets was needed.  Other financial aspects of violent extremism must also be addressed.  Terrorist groups were involved in criminal activities, including the illegal trade in oil, and it must be ensured that they could not use financial tools towards that end.  The resolution had underlined the importance of the role of the Ombudsperson, he said, and called on the Secretary-General to guarantee the independence of that office.

ARMANDO MANUEL, Minister for Finance of Angola, said the resolution would strengthen the means to achieve the common goal of fighting terrorism and money-laundering.  Many countries had been battling terrorists who violated fundamental human rights.  Terrorism was not a concern of single countries, but it affected the whole world.  Advancements in information technology had facilitated financial flows and communication of those who violated human rights.  His country’s action against terrorism had started in 1999 and included joining the African Union convention on the issue, as well as other instruments, such as the United Nations Convention on Terrorist Financing.  A national law allowed his country to immediately implement resolutions on terrorism.  Angola had also established a Financial Intelligence Unit.

He said the proliferation of terrorist organizations was of major concern.  While recognizing that they originated from erroneous religious ideologies, he said the best weapon against terrorism was still the eradication of its sources of financing.  To that end, a massive international effort was required.  Citizens, as well, must feel socially responsible and be involved in fighting terrorism.  It was worth it to strengthen and improve the structures of the international financial system according to the Volcker plan.  It was also necessary to provide mechanisms whereby all countries had the necessary information and develop international cooperation mechanisms.

AHMAD HUSNI HANADZLAH, Second Finance Minister of Malaysia, called for additional measures to constrain and ultimately cut-off from the international financial system the source of funding for terrorist groups such as Da’esh/ISIL.  The United Nations and other multilateral frameworks were the best platforms for a coordinated and sustained action, he said, adding his support for the present initiative by the Russian Federation and the United States and welcoming the unanimous adoption of resolution 2253 (2015).

On a domestic platform, his Government had adopted a comprehensive framework that criminalized terrorism financing and money-laundering, he said, providing an overview of national initiatives and judicial measures taken.  As well, Malaysia had undergone the Mutual Evaluation Exercise, illustrating his country’s compliance with the Financial Action Task Force standards.  In addition, the National Anti-Money-Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism Act Strategic Plan engaged the private sector on terrorism financing issues.  He called upon all Member States to undertake further multilateral actions and to be vigilant of terrorist financing activities.  Concerted efforts were urgently needed not only to adopt and implement the new resolution, but to renew a global commitment to counter the challenge at hand.

ANDRIUS KRIVAS, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, said States should protect the integrity and stability of the international financial system, cut off resources available to terrorists and ultimately hold them to account.  Sources of terrorism financing were two-fold:  external support and internal revenue-generating activities, the latter of which included the illicit production and trafficking of drugs, human smuggling and kidnapping for ransom.  Da’esh had given rise to other sources, such as extortion of money from ethnic and religious groups, oil refining and trade, and cultural heritage trafficking.  For its part, Lithuania had brought its legislation to combat terrorism financing into line with its international obligations and the recommendations of Moneyval, and was now focused on implementation.  The Director of the national Financial Intelligence Unit had issued an order establishing a list of 50 criteria related to clients’ behaviour, outlining guidance for reporting entities on recognition of suspicious transactions.  Essential to all such efforts was the long-term commitment of States.  In that context, he called on donors and the United Nations to help build capacity.

GERARD VAN BOHEMEN (New Zealand) said that the Council’s message in today’s resolution was simple:  Member States must work more actively to terrorist groups.  “The threat must unite us, not divide us,” he emphasized.  The need for a more holistic and strategic approach to counter ISIL was reflected in the text, which also reoriented the focus of the sanctions regime equally to ISIL and Al-Qaida.  Targeting terrorist financing had never been more important.  The non-traditional sources of terrorist financing, whether fundraising through social media, organized trade in oil and antiquities, or self-funded foreign terrorist fighters, could be difficult to disrupt without coordinated efforts at all levels.  It was worrying that many States had major legal deficiencies and systematic challenges.  The Sanctions List had unrealized potential, if updated by the wider United Nations membership, he pointed out, noting “the spider’s web of funding streams and support reaches well beyond the territory that ISIL controls”.  It had been difficult at times to chair the 1267 Sanctions Committee as its rules and practices could compromise the effectiveness of the very regime.  Consensus could be a strength, but requiring unanimity for taking action on important matters, such as the investigation of alleged non-compliance, remained a major weakness.

U. JOY OGWU (Nigeria) said terrorist groups had an insatiable appetite for territory, setting up administrative structures and gaining access to funding, which they used to support destabilizing activities.  Nowhere was that more profound than in the case of Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS), which was funding itself through resources illicitly generated in territories it occupied.  Cooperation must be enhanced to stifle funding for ISIS, Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram.  A comprehensive approach within the scope of the rule of law and due process, respecting the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law was essential.  Describing efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Intergovernmental Action Group against Money-Laundering, she said Nigeria had enacted legislation that empowered the central bank to ensure all financial institutions complied with international standards, consistent with the Task Force’s recommendations.  Mechanisms to identify, monitor and take action against unregulated financial transfer services were also needed.  National financial intelligence units must be empowered to discharge such mandates, which could require capacity-building.

RAFAEL DARÍO RAMÍREZ CARREÑO (Venezuela) condemned terrorist acts in all forms and manifestations, expressing deep concern at the “break-neck” rise of the terrorist phenomenon, which was the “fruit” of the financial and military support given to armed non-State actors, who were being exploited by Governments and eventually joining ISIS ranks.  The 15-member body must stamp out terrorism financing, and States had to ensure full compliance with international instruments, including Council and Assembly resolutions.  Stressing that there were no “good” and “bad” terrorists, he said the international response required an assessment of conditions that fostered the spread of terrorism.  ISIS thrived on money illicitly generated in its occupied territories and financial intelligence would help dismantle the group.  It was important to understand how terrorists managed their resources, he said, stressing that an international convention against terrorism would facilitate a single definition of terrorism which would allow for building consensus.

MAHAMAT ZENE CHERIF (Chad) said an effective fight against the financing of terrorism, in particular against the illicit transfer of funds, required States to continually adapt.  The Al-Qaida sanctions regime had allowed for asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes.  Today’s resolution would strengthen the existing regime against Al-Qaida and also include ISIS.  While welcoming those new steps, including targeting the illicit trade of oil, he said the inclusion of individuals on sanctions lists must be governed by transparency and respect human rights.  He underscored in that regard the independence of the Ombudsperson, who must have the necessary resources to carry out its work.  The independence of the Monitoring Mechanism must also be guaranteed and equal geographical distribution should be applied.

He said global efforts against terrorism entailed actions at the national, regional and international level.  Chad had implemented the ECOWAS agreement against money-laundering.  The country also supported the Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering recommendations, as they were the bedrock of the fight against financing of terrorism.  Efforts were under way in his country to criminalize the financing of terrorism.  He recalled that deliberative provocative propaganda by terrorist organizations could not be used to undermine any ethnicity or religion.  Terrorism sought to hide behind religion, but it was an international scourge and should not be limited to any religion or ethnicity.

ZHAO YONG (China) said international terrorist activities were rampant and had become the most urgent security challenge in the world.  Terrorist groups used a wide array of channels to raise funds and threatened international financial systems.  The sources of terrorist funds were many, including the illicit exploitation of mineral resources and trafficking of cultural goods.  Financing was also strengthened by the rapid growth of electronic payment platforms.  International cooperation must be strengthened to address double standards and a lack of coordination.  The efficiency to combat financing should be improved.

He said terrorist acts committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever reason constituted serious crimes.  Double standards should not be applied in countering terrorism.  He underlined the leading role of the United Nations in the fight against financing of terrorism.  Council resolutions should be effectively implemented by all States, as well the requirements by the Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering.  Targeted measures should be taken at the international and national level, including the establishment of databases and a means to exchange information.  The industrialized community should consider establishing a code of conduct.  As developing countries had limited means, the international community should provide them with effective assistance such as financial resources and training.

VITALY I. CHURKIN (Russian Federation) said eradicating ISIL could only be achieved by acting together without double standards in suppressing financing channels.  While resolution 2199 (2015) had reaffirmed existing and created new State commitment to prevent terrorism financing, obligations were not being implemented by everyone, everywhere.  The sale of fuel to ISIL continued with complicity.  Smugglers bought oil with cash, crossed borders and made deals with ISIL, whose illicit exports had reached $1.5 million a day, moving mainly through Turkey by a road that passed through thousands of border crossing points.  Shipments were carried by Turkish companies and transported to ports on the Mediterranean Sea.  The basket of resources that financed ISIL had hit $700 million a year, with $250 million earned from the sale of phosphates and $100 million from the sale of cement.

He said ISIL’s supreme military council allocated $30 million a month for such purposes, mainly through shell companies in Eastern Europe.  Under the pretext of strengthening the Syrian opposition, many rocket launch systems, hand held portable rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons had entered ISIL-controlled Syrian territory.  To eradicate ISIL’s illicit economy, a comprehensive approach was needed.  On the Russian-United States initiative, the Council had adopted today’s resolution.  He looked forward to the Secretary-General’s report on the sources of illicit ISIL financing.  It was important that the resolution had named ISIL as the most dangerous independent threat.  For that reason, the Sanctions List and Committee had both been renamed.  The Russian Federation was systematically working to suppress terrorist financing.  An inter-agency committee and plan had been created.  Law enforcement agencies had conducted 5,000 investigations and 270 criminal cases had been initiated.

In closing remarks, Mr. LEW (United States) lauded today’s unprecedented session as a productive one.  The Council had adopted a resolution that would protect the international financial system from abuse and reaffirmed the commitment to use measures and tools honed over 14 years to make the world safer.  It must remain united to execute with same determination.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2253 (2015) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1624 (2005), 1699 (2006), 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), 2133 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2214 (2015), and 2249 (2015),

“Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever committed, and reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the deaths of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property, and greatly undermining stability,

“Recognizing that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations,

“Reaffirming that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, or civilization,

“Expressing its gravest concern about the presence, violent extremist ideology and actions of ISIL, Al-Qaida and their affiliates in the Middle East and North Africa and beyond,

“Reaffirming its commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

“Recalling the Presidential Statements of the Security Council on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts of 15 January 2013 (S/PRST/2013/1), of 28 July 2014 (S/PRST/2014/14), of 19 November 2014 (S/PRST/2014/23), of 29 May 2015 (S/PRST/2015/11), and of 28 July 2015 (S/PRST/2015/14),

“Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

“Recognizing that development, security, and human rights are mutually reinforcing and are vital to an effective and comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, and underlining that a particular goal of counter-terrorism strategies should be to ensure sustainable peace and security,

“Reaffirming its resolution 1373 (2001) and in particular its decisions that all States shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists,

“Stressing that terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States and international and regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate the terrorist threat,

“Emphasizing that sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, including in support of countering terrorism, and stressing in this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 of this resolution,

“Recalling that ISIL is a splinter group of Al-Qaida, and recalling further that any individual, group, undertaking, or entity supporting ISIL or Al-Qaida is eligible for listing,

“Condemning the frequent, recent terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIL around the world resulting in numerous casualties, recognizing the need for sanctions to reflect current threats and, in this regard, recalling paragraph 7 of resolution 2249 (2015),

“Reminding all States that they have an obligation to take the measures described in paragraph 2 with respect to all individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities included on the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), and 2161 (2014) (now and hereunder referred to as the “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List”), regardless of the nationality or residence of such individuals, groups, undertakings, or entities,

“Urging all Member States to participate actively in maintaining and updating the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List by contributing additional information pertinent to current listings, submitting delisting requests when appropriate, and by identifying and nominating for listing additional individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities which should be subject to the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution,

“Reminding the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) (“the Committee”) to remove expeditiously and on a case-by-case basis individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing outlined in this resolution, welcoming improvements to the Committee’s procedures and the format of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, expressing its intent to continue efforts to ensure that procedures are fair and clear, and recognizing the challenges, both legal and otherwise, to the measures implemented by Member States under paragraph 2 of this resolution,

“Recognizing the importance of building capacities of Member States to counter terrorism and terrorist financing,

“Welcoming again the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009) and the enhancement of the Ombudsperson’s mandate in resolutions 1989 (2011), 2083 (2012), and 2161 (2015), noting the Office of the Ombudsperson’s significant contribution in providing additional fairness and transparency, and recalling the Security Council’s firm commitment to ensuring that the Office of the Ombudsperson is able to continue to carry out its role effectively and independently, in accordance with its mandate,

“Welcoming the Ombudsperson’s biannual reports to the Security Council, including the reports submitted on 21 January 2011, 22 July 2011, 20 January 2012, 30 July 2012, 31 January 2013, 31 July 2013, 31 January 2014, 31 July 2014, and 2 February 2015,

“Welcoming the continuing cooperation between the Committee and INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in particular on technical assistance and capacity-building, and all other United Nations bodies, and strongly encouraging further engagement with the UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system,

“Recalling its resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2133 (2014) strongly condemning kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups for any purpose, including with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, expressing its determination to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions in accordance with applicable international law, reiterating its call upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages, and welcoming the endorsement by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in September 2015 of the “Addendum to the Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists”,

“Gravely concerned that in some cases ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities continue to profit from involvement in transnational organized crime, and expressing concern that terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of arms, persons, drugs, and artefacts, and from the illicit trade in natural resources including gold and other precious metals and stones, minerals, wildlife, charcoal and oil, as well as from kidnapping for ransom and other crimes including extortion and bank robbery,

“Recognizing the need to take measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, terrorist organizations, and individual terrorists even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act, including from the proceeds of organized crime, inter alia, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs and their chemical precursors, and recalling paragraph 5 of resolution 1452,

“Recognizing the need for Member States to prevent the abuse of non‑governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations by and for terrorists, and calling upon non-governmental, non-profit, and charitable organizations to prevent and oppose, as appropriate, attempts by terrorists to abuse their status, while recalling the importance of fully respecting the rights to freedom of expression and association of individuals in civil society and freedom of religion or belief, and welcoming the relevant updated Best Practices Paper issued by the Financial Action Task Force for the appropriate, risk-based implementation of the international standard related to preventing terrorist abuse of the non-profit sector,

“Recalling its decision that Member States shall eliminate the supply of weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists, as well as its calls on States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, and to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional, and international levels,

“Expressing concern at the increased use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters, of new information and communications technologies, in particular the Internet, to facilitate terrorist acts, and condemning their use to incite, recruit, fund, or plan terrorist acts,

“Expressing concern at the flow of international recruits to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated groups and the scale of this phenomenon, and recalling its resolution 2178 (2014) deciding that Member States shall, consistent with international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting, or equipping of foreign terrorist fighters and the financing of their travel and of their activities,

“Reiterating the obligation of Member States to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for the purpose of participating in the foreign terrorist fighter-related activities described in paragraph 6 of resolution 2178 (2014), and reiterating further the obligation of Member States to prevent the movement of terrorist groups, in accordance with applicable international law, by, inter alia, effective border controls, and, in this context, to exchange information expeditiously, improve cooperation among competent authorities to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups to and from their territories, the supply of weapons for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists,

“Condemning any engagement in direct or indirect trade, in particular of oil and oil products, modular refineries, and related materiel including chemicals and lubricants, with ISIL, ANF, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities designated by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), and reiterating that such engagement would constitute support for such individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities and may lead to further listings by the Committee,

“Condemning the destruction of cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria particularly by ISIL and ANF, including targeted destruction of religious sites and objects; and recalling its decision that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally removed from Iraq since 6 August 1990 and from Syria since 15 March 2011, including by prohibiting cross-border trade in such items, thereby allowing for their eventual safe return to the Iraqi and Syrian people,

“Recalling its resolution 2178 (2014) expressing concern with the continued threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and reaffirming its resolve to address all aspects of that threat, including terrorist acts perpetrated by foreign terrorist fighters,

“Condemning in the strongest terms ‎abductions of women and children by ISIL, ANF, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities and recalling resolution 2242 (2015), expressing outrage at their exploitation and abuse, including rape, sexual violence, forced marriage, and enslavement by these entities, encouraging all State and non-state actors with evidence to bring it to the attention of the Council, along with any information that such human trafficking may support the perpetrators financially, emphasizing that this resolution requires States to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make available any funds, financial assets or economic resources for ISIL’s benefit, and noting that any person or entity who transfers funds to ISIL directly or indirectly in connection with such exploitation and abuse would be eligible for listing by the Committee,

“Welcoming the efforts of the Secretariat to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists to facilitate implementation by national authorities, further welcoming the Secretariat’s efforts to translate all list entries and narrative summaries of reasons for listing available in all official languages of the United Nations, and encouraging the Secretariat, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, as appropriate, to continue its work to implement the data model approved by the Committee,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Measures

“1.   Decides that, from the date of adoption of this resolution, the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee shall henceforth be known as the “1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee” and the Al-Qaida Sanctions List shall henceforth be known as the “ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List”;

“2.   Decides that all States shall take the following measures as previously imposed by paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000), paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), and paragraphs 1 and 4 of resolution 1989 (2011), with respect to ISIL (also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities:

Asset Freeze

(a)   Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly for such persons’ benefit, by their nationals or by persons within their territory;

Travel Ban

(b)   Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis only that entry or transit is justified;

Arms Embargo

(c)   Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities;

Listing Criteria

“3.   Decides that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking or entity is associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida and therefore eligible for inclusion in the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List include:

(a)   Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;

(b)   Supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;

(c)   Recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;

“4.   Notes that such means of financing or support include but are not limited to the use of proceeds derived from crime, including the illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors;

“5.   Confirms that any individual, group, undertaking or entity either owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, any individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, including on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, shall be eligible for listing;

“6.   Confirms that the requirements in paragraph 2 (a) above apply to financial and economic resources of every kind, including but not limited to those used for the provision of Internet hosting and related services, used for the support of Al-Qaida, ISIL, and other individuals, groups, undertakings or entities included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“7.   Confirms that the requirements in paragraph 2 (a) above apply to funds, financial assets or economic resources that may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of listed individuals in connection with their travel, including costs incurred with respect to transportation and lodging, and that such travel-related funds, other financial assets or economic resources may only be provided in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), and in paragraphs 10, 74 and 75 below;

“8.   Confirms further that the requirements in paragraph 2 (a) above shall also apply to the payment of ransoms to individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid;

“9.   Reaffirms that Member States may permit the addition to accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 above of any payment in favour of listed individuals, groups, undertakings or entities, provided that any such payments continue to be subject to the provisions in paragraph 2 above and are frozen;

“10.  Encourages Member States to make use of the provisions regarding available exemptions to the measures in paragraph 2 (a) above, set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002), as amended by resolution 1735 (2006), confirms that exemptions to the travel ban must be submitted by Member States, individuals or the Ombudsperson, as appropriate, including when listed individuals travel for the purpose of fulfilling religious obligations, and notes that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may receive exemption requests submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity, for Committee consideration, as described in paragraph 76 below;

Measures Implementation

“11.  Reiterates the importance of all States identifying, and if necessary introducing, adequate procedures to implement fully all aspects of the measures described in paragraph 2 above;

“12.  Reaffirms that those responsible for committing, organizing, or supporting terrorist acts must be held accountable, recalls its decision in resolution 1373 (2001) that Member States shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings, underlines the importance of fulfilling this obligation with respect to such investigations or proceedings involving ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and urges Member States to provide full coordination in such investigations or proceedings, especially with those States where, or against whose citizens, terrorist acts are committed, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find and bring to justice, extradite, or prosecute any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the direct or indirect financing of activities conducted by ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;

“13.  Reiterates Member States’ obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territory not make available economic resources to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, recalls also that this obligation applies to the direct and indirect trade in oil and refined oil products, modular refineries, and related material including chemicals and lubricants, and other natural resources, and recalls further the importance of all Member States complying with their obligation to ensure that their nationals and persons within their territory do not make donations to individuals and entities designated by the Committee or those acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated individuals or entities;

“14.  Encourages all Member States to more actively submit to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) listing requests of individuals and entities supporting ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and directs the Committee to immediately consider, in accordance with its resolution 2199 (2015), designations of individuals and entities engaged in financing, supporting, facilitating acts or activities, including in oil and antiquities trade-related activities with ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;

“15.  Expresses increasing concern about the lack of implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2199 (2015), including the insufficient level of reporting by Member States to the Committee on the measures they have taken to comply with its provisions and calls upon Member States to take the necessary measures to fulfil their obligation under paragraph 12 of resolution 2199 to report to the Committee interdictions in their territory of any oil, oil products, modular refineries, and related material being transferred to or from ISIL or ANF, and calls upon Member States to report also such interdictions of antiquities, as well as the outcome of proceedings brought against individuals and entities as a result of any such activity;

“16.  Strongly urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) revised Forty Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation, particularly Recommendation 6 on targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing; to apply the elements in FATF’s Interpretive Note to Recommendation 6, with the final objective of effectively preventing terrorists from raising, moving and using funds, in line with the objectives of Immediate Outcome 10 of the FATF methodology; to take note of, inter alia, related best practices for effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing and the need to have appropriate legal authorities and procedures to apply and enforce targeted financial sanctions that are not conditional upon the existence of criminal proceedings; and to apply an evidentiary standard of proof of “reasonable grounds” or “reasonable basis”, as well as the ability to collect or solicit as much information as possible from all relevant sources;

“17.  Welcomes the recent FATF reports on the Financing of the Terrorist Organization ISIL (published February 2015) and Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks (published October 2015) that includes discussion of the ISIL threat, welcomes further the FATF clarifications to Interpretive Note to Recommendation 5 on the criminalization of terrorist financing to incorporate the relevant element of UNSCR 2178, specifically clarifying that terrorist financing includes the financing of the travel of individuals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and highlights that FATF Recommendation 5 applies to the financing of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act;

“18.  Encourages FATF to continue its efforts to prioritize countering terrorist financing, in particular identifying and working with Member States with strategic anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CFT) deficiencies that have hindered Member States from effectively countering the financing of terrorism, including by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, group, entities and undertakings, and in this regard, reiterates that the provision of economic resources to such groups is a clear violation of this and other relevant resolutions and is not acceptable;

“19.  Clarifies that the obligation in paragraph 1(d) of resolution 1373 (2001) applies to making funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act;

“20.  Calls upon States to ensure that they have established as a serious criminal offence in their domestic laws and regulations the wilful violation of the prohibition described in paragraph 1(d) of resolution 1373 (2001);

“21.  Calls upon Member States to move vigorously and decisively to cut the flows of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to individuals and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as required by paragraph 2 (a), and taking into account relevant FATF Recommendations and international standards designed to prevent the abuse of non-profit organizations, formal as well as informal/alternative remittance systems and the physical trans-border movement of currency, while working to mitigate the impact on legitimate activities through these mediums;

“22.  Urges Member States to act cooperatively to prevent terrorists from recruiting, to counter their violent extremist propaganda and incitement to violence on the Internet and social media, including by developing effective counter narratives, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in compliance with obligations under international law, and stresses the importance of cooperation with civil society and the private sector in this endeavor;

“23.  Urges Member States to promote awareness of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List as widely as possible, including to relevant domestic agencies, the private sector and the general public to ensure effective implementation of the measures in paragraph 2 above and encourages Member States to urge that their respective company, property and other relevant public and private registries regularly screen their available databases, including but not limited to those with legal and/or beneficial ownership information, against the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“24.  Highlights the importance of strong relationships with the private sector in countering the financing of terrorism and calls upon Member States to engage with financial institutions and share information on terrorist financing (TF) risks to provide greater context for their work in identifying potential TF activity related to ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and to promote stronger relationships between governments and the private sector in countering terrorist financing;

“25.  Recognizes the importance of information sharing within and between governments to effectively counter the financing of terrorism, calls upon Member States to continue exercising vigilance over relevant financial transactions and improve information-sharing capabilities and practices within and between governments through multiple authorities and channels, including law enforcement, intelligence, security services, and financial intelligence units, and also calls upon Member States to improve integration and utilization of financial intelligence with other types of information available to national governments to more effectively counter the terrorist financing threats posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities;

“26.  Decides that Member States, in order to prevent ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives, whether military, civilian or improvised explosives, as well as to raw materials and components that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices or unconventional weapons, including (but not limited to) chemical components, detonators, detonating cord, or poisons, shall undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of enhanced vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of such materials, including through the issuance of good practices, and further encourages Member States to share information, establish partnerships, and develop national strategies and capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices;

“27.  Encourages Member States, including through their permanent missions, and relevant international organizations to meet the Committee for in-depth discussion on any relevant issues;

“28.  Urges all Member States, in their implementation of the measures set out in paragraph 2 above, to ensure that fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated and removed from circulation, in accordance with domestic laws and practices, as soon as possible, and to share information on those documents with other Member States through the INTERPOL database;

“29.  Encourages Member States to share, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, with the private sector information in their national databases related to fraudulent, counterfeit, stolen and lost identity or travel documents pertaining to their own jurisdictions, and, if a listed party is found to be using a false identity including to secure credit or fraudulent travel documents, to provide the Committee with information in this regard;

“30.  Encourages Member States that issue travel documents to listed individuals to note, as appropriate, that the bearer is subject to the travel ban and corresponding exemption procedures;

“31.  Encourages Member States to consult the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List when considering whether to grant travel visa applications, for the purpose of effectively implementing the travel ban;

“32.  Encourages Member States to exchange information expeditiously with other Member States, in particular States of origin, destination and transit, when they detect the travel of individuals on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“33.  Encourages designating States to inform the Monitoring Team whether a national court or other legal authority has reviewed a listed party’s case and whether any judicial proceedings have begun, and to include any other relevant information when submitting the standard form for listing;

“34.  Encourages all Member States to designate national focal points in charge of liaising with the Committee and the Monitoring Team on issues related to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 2 above and the assessment of the threat from ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;

“35.  Encourages all Member States to report to the Committee on obstacles to the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 2 above, with a view to facilitating technical assistance;

“36.  Calls upon all States to submit an updated report to the Committee no later than 120 days from the date of adoption of this resolution on their implementation, including relevant enforcement actions as appropriate, of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution;

The Committee

“37.  Directs the Committee to continue to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and for removing them as well as for granting exemptions per resolution 1452 (2002), and directs the Committee to keep its guidelines under active review in support of these objectives;

“38.  Directs the Committee, as a matter of priority, to review its guidelines with respect to the provisions of this resolution, in particular paragraphs 23, 26, 30, 31, 34, 47, 52, 57, 59, 64, 77, 78, 80 and 81;

“39.  Requests the Committee to report to the Council on its findings regarding Member States’ implementation efforts, and identify and recommend steps necessary to improve implementation;

“40.  Directs the Committee to identify possible cases of non-compliance with the measures pursuant to paragraph 2 above and to determine the appropriate course of action on each case, and directs the Chair, in regular reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 87 below, to provide progress reports on the Committee’s work on this issue;

“41.  Confirms that no matter should be left pending before the Committee for a period longer than six months, unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that extraordinary circumstances require additional time for consideration, in accordance with the Committee’s guidelines;

“42.  Requests the Committee to facilitate, through the Monitoring Team or specialized United Nations agencies, assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;

Listing

“43.  Encourages all Member States to submit to the Committee for inclusion on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List names of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities participating, by any means, in the financing or support of acts or activities of ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities;

“44.  Reiterates that the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law;

“45.  Reaffirms that, when proposing names to the Committee for inclusion on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, Member States shall use the standard form for listing and provide a statement of case that should include as detailed and specific reasons as possible describing the proposed basis for the listing, and as much relevant information as possible on the proposed name, in particular sufficient identifying information to allow for the accurate and positive identification of individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and to the extent possible, the information required by INTERPOL to issue a Special Notice, and reaffirms that the statement of case shall be releasable, upon request, except for the parts a Member State identifies as being confidential to the Committee, and may be used to develop the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 49 below;

“46.  Reaffirms that Member States proposing a new listing, as well as Member States that have proposed names for inclusion on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List before the adoption of this resolution, shall specify if the Committee or the Ombudsperson may not make known the Member State’s status as a designating State;

“47.  Encourages Member States to submit, where available and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals for inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices;

“48.  Directs the Committee to continue to update, as necessary, the standard form for listing in accordance with the provisions of this resolution; further directs the Monitoring Team to report to the Committee on further steps that could be taken to improve the quality of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List and Consolidated Sanctions List, including by improving identifying information, as well as steps to ensure that INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities; and further directs the Secretariat, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, to build and maintain the data model approved by the Committee, with a view to its completion by June 2017 and requests the Secretary-General to provide additional resources in this regard;

“49.  Directs the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, to make accessible on the Committee’s website, at the same time a name is added to the ISIL (Da’esh) and
Al-Qaida Sanctions List, a narrative summary of reasons for listing that are as detailed and specific as possible, as well as additional relevant information;

“50.  Encourages Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies to inform the Committee of any relevant court decisions and proceedings so that the Committee can consider them when it reviews a corresponding listing or updates a narrative summary of reasons for listing;

“51.  Calls upon all members of the Committee and the Monitoring Team to share with the Committee any information they may have available regarding a listing request from a Member State so that this information may help inform the Committee’s decision on listing and provide additional material for the narrative summary of reasons for listing described in paragraph 49;

“52.  Reaffirms that the Secretariat shall, after publication but within three working days after a name is added to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the State or States where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the case of individuals, the state of which the person is a national (to the extent this information is known), requests the Secretariat to publish on the Committee’s website all relevant publicly releasable information, including the narrative summary of reasons for listing, immediately after a name is added to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“53.  Reaffirms the requirement that Member States take all possible measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform in a timely manner the listed individual or entity of the listing and to include with this notification the narrative summary of reasons for listing, a description of the effects of listing, as provided in the relevant resolutions, the Committee’s procedures for considering delisting requests, including the possibility of submitting such a request to the Ombudsperson in accordance with paragraph 43 of resolution 2083 (2012) and annex II of this resolution, and the provisions of resolution 1452 (2002) regarding available exemptions, including the possibility of submitting such requests through the Focal Point mechanism in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 76 of this resolution;

Review of Delisting Requests — Ombudsperson/Member States

“54.  Decides to extend the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson, established by resolution 1904 (2009), as reflected in the procedures outlined in annex II of this resolution, for a period of twenty four months from the date of expiration of the Office of the Ombudsperson’s current mandate in December 2017, affirms that the Ombudsperson shall continue to receive requests from individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking to be removed from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List in an independent and impartial manner and shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government, and affirms that the Ombudsperson shall continue to present to the Committee observations and a recommendation on the delisting of those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities that have requested removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List through the Office of the Ombudsperson, either a recommendation to retain the listing or a recommendation that the Committee consider delisting;

“55.  Recalls its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing in the Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson on a delisting request pursuant to annex II;

“56.  Recalls its decision that the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with annex II of this resolution, including paragraph 7 (h) thereof, where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;

“57.  Recalls its decision that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 56 on a case-by-case basis;

“58.  Reiterates that the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law;

“59.  Underscores the importance of the Office of the Ombudsperson, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the capacity of the Office of the Ombudsperson by providing necessary resources, including for translation services, as appropriate, and to make the necessary arrangements to ensure its continued ability to carry out its mandate in an independent, effective and timely manner, and to provide the Committee an update on actions taken in six months;

“60.  Strongly urges Member States to provide all relevant information to the Ombudsperson, including any relevant confidential information, where appropriate, encourages Member States to provide relevant information, including any detailed and specific information, when available and in a timely manner, welcomes those national arrangements entered into by Member States with the Office of the Ombudsperson to facilitate the sharing of confidential information, strongly encourages Member States’ further progress in this regard, including by concluding arrangements with the Office of the Ombudsperson for the sharing of such information, and confirms that the Ombudsperson must comply with any confidentiality restrictions that are placed on such information by Member States providing it;

“61.  Strongly urges Member States and relevant international organizations and bodies to encourage individuals and entities that are considering challenging or are already in the process of challenging their listing through national and regional courts to first seek removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List by submitting delisting petitions to the Office of the Ombudsperson;

“62.  Notes the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) international standards and, inter alia, best practices relating to targeted financial sanctions, as referenced in paragraph 21 of this resolution;

“63.  Recalls its decision that when the designating State submits a delisting request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity after 60 days unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the measures shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council;

“64.  Also recalls its decision that the Committee may, by consensus, shorten the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 63 on a case-by-case basis;

“65.  Further recalls its decision that, for purposes of submitting a delisting request in paragraph 63, consensus must exist between or among all designating States in cases where there are multiple designating States; and further recalls its decision that co-sponsors of listing requests shall not be considered designating States for purposes of paragraph 63;

“66.  Strongly urges designating States to allow the Ombudsperson to reveal their identities as designating States to those listed individuals and entities that have submitted delisting petitions to the Ombudsperson;

“67.  Directs the Committee to continue to work, in accordance with its guidelines, to consider delisting requests of Member States for the removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that are alleged to no longer meet the criteria established in the relevant resolutions, and set out in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and strongly urges Member States to provide reasons for submitting their delisting requests;

“68.  Encourages States to submit delisting requests for individuals that are officially confirmed to be dead, and for entities reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, while at the same time taking all reasonable measures to ensure that assets that had belonged to these individuals or entities will not be transferred or distributed to other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List or any other Security Council sanctions list;

“69.  Encourages Member States, when unfreezing the assets of a deceased individual or an entity that is reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist as a result of a delisting, to recall the obligations set forth in resolution 1373 (2001) and, particularly, to prevent unfrozen assets from being used for terrorist purposes;

“70.  Reaffirms that, prior to the unfreezing of any assets that have been frozen as a result of the listing of Usama bin Laden, Member States shall submit to the Committee a request to unfreeze such assets and shall provide assurances to the Committee that the assets will not be transferred, directly or indirectly, to a listed individual, group, undertaking or entity, or otherwise used for terrorist purposes in line with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), and decides further that such assets may only be unfrozen in the absence of an objection by a Committee member within thirty days of receiving the request, and stresses the exceptional nature of this provision, which shall not be considered as establishing a precedent;

“71.  Calls upon the Committee when considering delisting requests to give due consideration to the opinions of designating State(s), State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, and other relevant States as determined by the Committee, directs Committee members to provide their reasons for objecting to delisting requests at the time the request is objected to, and requests the Committee to provide reasons to relevant Member States and national and regional courts and bodies, upon request and where appropriate;

“72.  Encourages all Member States, including designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation to provide all information to the Committee relevant to the Committee’s review of delisting petitions, and to meet with the Committee, if requested, to convey their views on delisting requests, and further encourages the Committee, where appropriate, to meet with representatives of national or regional organizations and bodies that have relevant information on delisting petitions;

“73.  Confirms that the Secretariat shall, within three days after a name is removed from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, notify the Permanent Mission of the State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation (to the extent this information is known), and recalls its decision that States receiving such notification shall take measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or inform the concerned individual, group, undertaking or entity of the delisting in a timely manner;

“74.  Reaffirms that, in cases in which the Ombudsperson is unable to interview a petitioner in his or her state of residence, the Ombudsperson may request, with the agreement of the petitioner, that the Committee consider granting exemptions to the restrictions on assets and travel in paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of this resolution for the sole purpose of allowing the petitioner to meet travel expenses and travel to another State to be interviewed by the Ombudsperson for a period no longer than necessary to participate in this interview, provided that all States of transit and destination do not object to such travel, and further directs the Committee to notify the Ombudsperson of the Committee’s decision;

Exemptions/Focal Point

“75.  Recalls that the assets freeze measures outlined in paragraph 2 above shall not apply to funds and other financial assets or economic resources that the Committee determines to be:

(a)   necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or other financial assets or economic resources, following notification of intention to authorize access to such funds and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within 3 working days of the notification;

(b)   necessary for extraordinary expenses, being expenses other than basic expenses, following notification of the intention to authorize release of such funds and approval of the Committee of the request within 5 working days of the notification;

“76.  Reaffirms that the Focal Point mechanism established in resolution 1730 (2006) may:

(a)   Receive requests from listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 2 (a) of this resolution, as defined in resolution 1452 (2002) provided that the request has first been submitted for the consideration of the State of residence, and reaffirms further that the Focal Point shall transmit such requests to the Committee for a decision, directs the Committee to consider such requests, including in consultation with the State of residence and any other relevant States, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals, groups, undertaking or entities of the Committee’s decision;

(b)   Receive requests from listed individuals for exemptions to the measures outlined in paragraph 2 (b) of this resolution and transmit these to the Committee to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether entry or transit is justified, directs the Committee to consider such requests in consultation with States of transit and destination and any other relevant States, and reaffirms further that the Committee shall only agree to exemptions to the measures in paragraph 2 (b) of this resolution with the agreement of the States of transit and destination, and further directs the Committee, through the Focal Point, to notify such individuals of the Committee’s decision;

“77.  Reaffirms that the Focal Point may receive, and transmit to the Committee for its consideration, communications from:

(a)   individuals who have been removed from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(b)   individuals claiming to have been subjected to the measures outlined in paragraph 2 above as a result of false or mistaken identification or confusion with individuals included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

“78.  Directs the Committee, with the assistance of the Monitoring Team and in consultation with relevant States, to carefully consider such communications and to respond, through the Focal Point, to such communications referred to in paragraph 77 (b), as may be appropriate, within 60 days, and further directs the Committee, in consultation with INTERPOL as may be appropriate, to communicate with Member States as may be appropriate to address possible or confirmed cases of false or mistaken identity or confusion with individuals included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

Review and Maintenance of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List

“79.  Encourages all Member States, in particular designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, to submit to the Committee additional identifying and other information, including where possible and in accordance with their national legislation, photographs and other biometric data of individuals along with supporting documentation, on listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including updates on the operating status of listed entities, groups and undertakings, the movement, incarceration or death of listed individuals and other significant events, as such information becomes available;

“80.  Requests the Monitoring Team to circulate to the Committee every twelve months a list compiled in consultation with the respective designating States and States of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, where known, of:

(a)   individuals and entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List whose entries lack identifiers necessary to ensure effective implementation of the measures imposed upon them;

(b)   individuals on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List who are reportedly deceased, along with an assessment of relevant information such as the certification of death, and to the extent possible, the status and location of frozen assets and the names of any individuals or entities who would be in a position to receive any unfrozen assets;

(c)   entities on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List that are reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist, along with an assessment of any relevant information;

(d)   any other names on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List that have not been reviewed in three or more years (“the triennial review”);

“81.  Directs the Committee to review whether these listings remain appropriate, and further directs the Committee to remove listings if it decides they are no longer appropriate;

“82.  Directs the Monitoring Team to refer to the Chair for review listings for which, after three years, no relevant State has responded in writing to the Committee’s requests for information, and in this regard, reminds the Committee that its Chair, acting in his or her capacity as Chair, may submit names for removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as appropriate and subject to the Committee’s normal decision-making procedures;

Coordination and Outreach

“83.  Directs the Committee to continue to cooperate with other relevant Security Council Sanctions Committees, in particular those established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), 1988 (2011), 1970 (2011) and 2140 (2014);

“84.  Reiterates the need to enhance ongoing cooperation among the Committee and United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as their respective groups of experts, including through, as appropriate, enhanced information-sharing, coordination on visits to countries within their respective mandates, on facilitating and monitoring technical assistance, on relations with international and regional organizations and agencies and on other issues of relevance to these bodies;

“85.  Encourages the Monitoring Team and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to continue their joint activities, in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) and 1540 Committee experts to assist Member States in their efforts to comply with their obligations under the relevant resolutions, including through organizing regional and subregional workshops;

“86.  Requests the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution and resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009) 1989 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2083 (2012), and 2133 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014), 2199 (2015), and 2214 (2015);

“87.  Requests the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year, to the Council on the state of the overall work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with other Committee Chairs, expresses its intention to hold informal consultations at least once per year on the work of the Committee, on the basis of reports from the Chair to the Council, and further requests the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;

“88.  Directs the Committee to consider requests for information from States and international organizations with ongoing judicial proceedings concerning implementation of the measures imposed in paragraph 2 above, and to respond as appropriate with additional information available to the Committee and the Monitoring Team;

Monitoring Team

“89.  Decides, in order to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate, as well as to support the Ombudsperson, to extend the mandate of the current New York-based Monitoring Team and its members, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), for a further period of twenty four months from the expiration of its current mandate in December 2017, under the direction of the Committee with the responsibilities outlined in annex I, and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to this effect, and highlights the importance of ensuring that the Monitoring Team receives the necessary administrative, security, and substantive support, to effectively, safely, and in a timely manner fulfil its mandate, including with regard to duty of care in high-risk environments, under the direction of the Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Security Council;

“90.  Requests the Secretary-General to add up to two new experts on the Monitoring Team along with the additional administrative and analytical support resources needed to increase its capacity and strengthen its ability to analyse ISIL’s financing, radicalization and recruitment, and attack planning activities, as well as support the resulting increased activities of the Committee by the Secretariat, and notes that the selection process of these experts should prioritize appointing individuals with the strongest qualifications to fulfil the duties described above while paying due regard to the importance of regional and gender representation in the recruitment process;

“91.  Directs the Monitoring Team, in its comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee referred to in paragraph (a) of Annex 1, to report on relevant thematic and regional topics and developing trends as may be requested by the Security Council or the Committee following the adoption of this resolution;

“92.  Encourages relevant United Nations Missions, within their existing mandates, resources, and capabilities, to assist the Committee and the Monitoring Team, such as through logistical support, security assistance, and exchange of information in their work relevant to the threat by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated groups and individuals in their respective areas of deployment;

“93.  Directs the Monitoring Team to identify, gather information on, and keep the Committee informed of instances and common patterns of non-compliance with the measures imposed in this resolution, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building, requests the Monitoring Team to work closely with State(s) of residence, nationality, location or incorporation, designating States, other relevant States, and relevant United Nations Missions, and further directs the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to respond to non-compliance;

“94.  Directs the Committee, with the assistance of its Monitoring Team, to hold special meetings on important thematic or regional topics and Member States’ capacity challenges, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Counter Terrorism Committee and CTED, CTITF, and with the Financial Action Task Force to identify and prioritize areas for the provision of technical assistance to enable more effective implementation by Member States;

“95.  Requests the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to submit, in close collaboration with the CTED, to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) in 30 days recommendations to the Committee on measures that can be taken to strengthen monitoring of global implementation of resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2178 (2014) and additional steps that could be taken by the Committee to improve global compliance with these resolutions;

“96.  Requests the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to provide the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) on a quarterly basis oral briefings on its analysis of global implementation of resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2178 (2014) including gathered information and analysis relevant to potential sanctions designations by Member States or Committee actions that could be taken;

ISIL Reporting

“97.  Recalling the threat posed to international peace and security by ISIL and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, requests the Secretary-General to provide an initial strategic-level report that demonstrates and reflects the gravity of the aforementioned threat, including foreign terrorist fighters joining ISIL and associated groups and entities, and the sources of financing of these groups including through illicit trade in oil, antiquities, and other natural resources, as well as their planning and facilitation of attacks, and reflects the range of UN efforts in support of Member States in countering this threat, in 45 days and provide updates every four months thereafter, with the input of CTED, in close collaboration with the Monitoring Team, as well as other relevant UN actors;

Reviews

“98.  Decides to review the measures described in paragraph 2 above with a view to their possible further strengthening in eighteen months or sooner if necessary;

“99.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

“In accordance with paragraph 73 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee and shall have the following mandates and responsibilities:

(a)   To submit, in writing, comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, every six months, the first by 30 June 2016, on the following issues:

(i)   implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution;

(ii)  the global threat posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, including (but not limited to) the threat posed by the presence of ISIL and its affiliates in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya, and Afghanistan and the threats presented by the presence of Boko Haram;

(iii) the impact of the measures in resolution 2199 (2015), including progress on implementation of these measures, unintended consequences and unexpected challenges, as mandated in that resolution in the form of updates on each of the following subjects: oil trade; trade in cultural property; kidnapping for ransom and external donations; direct or indirect supply; sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types; as part of the impact assessment, pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2199 (2015);

(iv)  the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters recruited by or joining
Al-Qaida, ISIL, and all other associated groups, undertakings;

(v)   any other issues that the Security Council or the Committee requests the Monitoring Team to include in its comprehensive reports as set forth in paragraph 91 of this resolution; and

(vi) specific recommendations related to improved implementation of relevant sanctions measures, including those referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution, resolution 2178 (2014) and resolution 2199 (2015), and possible new measures;

(b)   To assist the Ombudsperson in carrying out his or her mandate as specified in annex II of this resolution, including by providing updated information on those individuals, groups, undertakings or entities seeking their removal from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(c)   To assist the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including by undertaking travel on behalf of the Committee, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and contact with Member States, with a view to developing the Committee’s record of the facts and circumstances relating to a listing;

(d)   To assist the Committee in following up on requests to Member States for information, including with respect to implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution;

(e)   To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its review and approval, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel, based on close coordination with CTED and the 1540 Committee’s group of experts to avoid duplication and reinforce synergies;

(f)   To work closely and share information with CTED and the 1540 Committee’s group of experts to identify areas of convergence and overlap and to help facilitate concrete coordination, including in the area of reporting, among the three Committees;

(g)   To participate actively in and support all relevant activities under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy including within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, established to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system, in particular through its relevant working groups;

(h)   To gather information, on behalf of the Committee, on instances of reported non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution, including by collating information from all relevant sources, including Member States, and engaging with related parties, pursuing case studies, both on its own initiative and upon the Committee’s request, and to provide cases of non‑compliance and recommendations to the Committee on actions to respond to such cases of non-compliance for its review;

(i)   To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by Member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(j)   To assist the Committee in its consideration of proposals for listing, including by compiling and circulating to the Committee information relevant to the proposed listing, and preparing a draft narrative summary referred to in paragraph 36 of this resolution;

(k)   To consult with the Committee or any relevant Member States, as appropriate, when identifying that certain individuals or entities should be added to, or removed from, the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List;

(l)   To bring to the Committee’s attention new or noteworthy circumstances that may warrant a delisting, such as publicly reported information on a deceased individual;

(m)   To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;

(n)   To coordinate and cooperate with the national counter-terrorism focal point or similar coordinating body in the state of visit where appropriate;

(o)   To cooperate closely with relevant United Nations counter-terrorism bodies in providing information on the measures taken by Member States on kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom by Al-Qaida, ISIL, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities, and on relevant trends and developments in this area;

(p)   To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, as instructed by the Committee;

(q)   To present to the Committee additional identifying and other information to assist the Committee in its efforts to keep the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List as updated and accurate as possible;

(r)   To encourage Member States to provide information to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the fulfilment of its mandate, as appropriate;

(s)   To study and report to the Committee on the changing nature of the threat of Al-Qaida and ISIL, and the best measures to confront them, including by developing, within existing resources, a dialogue with relevant scholars, academic bodies and experts through an annual workshop and/or other appropriate means, in consultation with the Committee;

(t)   To collate, assess, monitor, report on, and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures, including implementation of the measure in paragraph 2 (a) of this resolution as it pertains to preventing the criminal misuse of the Internet by ISIL, Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, which shall be included in the Monitoring Team’s regular report as outlined in section (a) of this Annex; to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;

(u)   To consult with Member States and other relevant organizations, including the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), INTERPOL, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional bodies as well as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), including regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account their comments, especially regarding any issues that might be reflected in the Monitoring Team’s reports referred to in paragraph (a) of this annex, such as gaps and challenges in States’ implementation of the measures in this resolution;

(v)   To consult, in confidence, with Member States’ intelligence and security services, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and to strengthen implementation of the measures;

(w)   To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector, including financial institutions and relevant non-financial businesses and professions, and international and regional organizations, including FATF and its regional bodies, to promote awareness of, and enhanced compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the asset freeze and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure;

(x)   To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of the private sector and international and regional organizations, including ICAO, IATA, WCO and INTERPOL, to promote awareness of, and enhanced compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the travel ban, including the use of advanced passenger information provided by civil aircraft operators to Member States, and to develop recommendations for the strengthening of the implementation of that measure;

(y)   To consult with Member States, relevant representatives of international and regional organizations and the private sector, in coordination with national authorities, as appropriate, to promote awareness of, enhance compliance with, and to learn about the practical implementation of the arms embargo, with a particular emphasis on measures to counter the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by listed individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the procurement of related components used to construct IEDs, in particular (but not limited to) trigger mechanisms, explosive precursors, commercial grade explosives, detonators, detonating cords, or poisons;

(z)   To assist the Committee in facilitating assistance on capacity-building for enhancing implementation of the measures, upon request by Member States;

(aa)  To work with INTERPOL and Member States to obtain photographs and, in accordance with their national legislation, biometric information of listed individuals for possible inclusion in INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices, to work with INTERPOL to ensure that INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices exist for all listed individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities; and to further work with INTERPOL, as appropriate, to address possible or confirmed cases of false or mistaken identify, with a view to reporting to the Committee on such instances and proposing any recommendations;

(bb)  To assist other subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, and their expert panels, upon request, with enhancing their cooperation with INTERPOL, referred to in resolution 1699 (2006), and to work, in consultation with the Secretariat, to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists and the Consolidated Sanctions List so as to facilitate implementation by national authorities;

(cc)  To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;

(dd)  Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

Annex II

“In accordance with paragraph 54 of this resolution, the Office of the Ombudsperson shall be authorized to carry out the following tasks upon receipt of a delisting request submitted by, or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking or entity on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List or by the legal representative or estate of such individual, group, undertaking or entity (“the petitioner”).

“The Council recalls that Member States are not permitted to submit delisting petitions on behalf of an individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Office of the Ombudsperson.

Information Gathering (Four Months)

“1.   Upon receipt of a delisting request, the Ombudsperson shall:

(a)   Acknowledge to the petitioner the receipt of the delisting request;

(b)   Inform the petitioner of the general procedure for processing delisting requests;

(c)   Answer specific questions from the petitioner about Committee procedures;

(d)   Inform the petitioner in case the petition fails to properly address the original listing criteria, as set forth in paragraph 2 of this resolution, and return it to the petitioner for his or her consideration; and

(e)   Verify if the request is a new request or a repeated request and, if it is a repeated request to the Ombudsperson and it does not contain relevant additional information, return it to the petitioner, with an appropriate explanation, for his or her consideration.

“2.   For delisting petitions not returned to the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall immediately forward the delisting request to the members of the Committee, designating State(s), State(s) of residence and nationality or incorporation, relevant United Nations bodies, and any other States deemed relevant by the Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson shall ask these States or relevant United Nations bodies to provide, within four months, any appropriate additional information relevant to the delisting request. The Ombudsperson may engage in dialogue with these States to determine:

(a)   These States’ opinions on whether the delisting request should be granted; and

(b)   Information, questions or requests for clarifications that these States would like to be communicated to the petitioner regarding the delisting request, including any information or steps that might be taken by a petitioner to clarify the delisting request.

“3.   Where all designating States consulted by the Ombudsperson do not object to the petitioner’s delisting, the Ombudsperson may shorten the information gathering period, as appropriate.

“4.   The Ombudsperson shall also immediately forward the delisting request to the Monitoring Team, which shall provide to the Ombudsperson, within four months:

(a)   All information available to the Monitoring Team that is relevant to the delisting request, including court decisions and proceedings, news reports, and information that States or relevant international organizations have previously shared with the Committee or the Monitoring Team;

(b)   Fact-based assessments of the information provided by the petitioner that is relevant to the delisting request; and

(c)   Questions or requests for clarifications that the Monitoring Team would like asked of the petitioner regarding the delisting request.

“5.   At the end of this four-month period of information gathering, the Ombudsperson shall present a written update to the Committee on progress to date, including details regarding which States have supplied information, and any significant challenges encountered therein. The Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for information gathering, giving due consideration to requests by Member States for additional time to provide information.

Dialogue (Two Months)

“6.   Upon completion of the information gathering period, the Ombudsperson shall facilitate a two-month period of engagement, which may include dialogue with the petitioner. Giving due consideration to requests for additional time, the Ombudsperson may extend this period once for up to two months if he or she assesses that more time is required for engagement and the drafting of the Comprehensive Report described in paragraph 8 below. The Ombudsperson may shorten this time period if he or she assesses less time is required.

“7.   During this period of engagement, the Ombudsperson:

(a)   May submit questions, either orally or in writing, to the petitioner, or request additional information or clarifications that may help the Committee’s consideration of the request, including any questions or information requests received from relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team;

(b)   Should request from the petitioner a signed statement in which the petitioner declares that they have no ongoing association with Al-Qaida, ISIL, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group, or derivative thereof, and undertakes not to associate with Al-Qaida or ISIL in the future;

(c)   Should meet with the petitioner, to the extent possible;

(d)   Shall forward replies from the petitioner back to relevant States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team and follow up with the petitioner in connection with incomplete responses by the petitioner;

(e)   Shall coordinate with States, the Committee and the Monitoring Team regarding any further inquiries of, or response to, the petitioner;

(f)   During the information gathering or dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson may share with relevant States information provided by a State, including that State’s position on the delisting request, if the State which provided the information consents;

(g)   In the course of the information gathering and dialogue phases and in the preparation of the report, the Ombudsperson shall not disclose any information shared by a state on a confidential basis, without the express written consent of that state; and

(h)   During the dialogue phase, the Ombudsperson shall give serious consideration to the opinions of designating States, as well as other Member States that come forward with relevant information, in particular those Member States most affected by acts or associations that led to the original listing.

“8.   Upon completion of the period of engagement described above, the Ombudsperson, with the help of the Monitoring Team, as appropriate, shall draft and circulate to the Committee a Comprehensive Report that will exclusively:

(a)   Summarize and, as appropriate, specify the sources of, all information available to the Ombudsperson that is relevant to the delisting request. The report shall respect confidential elements of Member States’ communications with the Ombudsperson;

(b)   Describe the Ombudsperson’s activities with respect to this delisting request, including dialogue with the petitioner; and

(c)   Based on an analysis of all the information available to the Ombudsperson and the Ombudsperson’s recommendation, lay out for the Committee the principal arguments concerning the delisting request. The recommendation should state the Ombudsperson’s views with respect to the listing as of the time of the examination of the delisting request.

Committee Discussion

“9.   After the Committee has had fifteen days to review the Comprehensive Report in all official languages of the United Nations, the Chair of the Committee shall place the delisting request on the Committee’s agenda for consideration.

“10.  When the Committee considers the delisting request, the Ombudsperson, shall present the Comprehensive Report in person and answer Committee members’ questions regarding the request.

“11.  Committee consideration of the Comprehensive Report shall be completed no later than thirty days from the date the Comprehensive Report is submitted to the Committee for its review.

“12.  After the Committee has completed its consideration of the Comprehensive Report, the Ombudsperson may notify all relevant States of the recommendation.

“13.  Upon the request of a designating State, State of nationality, residence, or incorporation, and with the approval of the Committee, the Ombudsperson may provide a copy of the Comprehensive Report, with any redactions deemed necessary by the Committee, to such States, along with a notification to such States confirming that:

(a)   All decisions to release information from the Ombudsperson’s Comprehensive Reports, including the scope of information, are made by the Committee at its discretion and on a case-by-case basis;

(b)   The Comprehensive Report reflects the basis for the Ombudsperson’s recommendation and is not attributable to any individual Committee member; and

(c)   The Comprehensive Report, and any information contained therein, should be treated as strictly confidential and not shared with the petitioner or any other Member State without the approval of the Committee.

“14.  In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing, the requirement for States to take the measures in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity, unless a Committee member submits a delisting request, which the Committee shall consider under its normal consensus procedures.

“15.  In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall terminate with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of a Comprehensive Report of the Ombudsperson, in accordance with this annex II, including paragraph 7 (h), unless the Committee decides by consensus before the end of that 60-day period that the requirement shall remain in place with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity; provided that, in cases where consensus does not exist, the Chair shall, on the request of a Committee Member, submit the question of whether to delist that individual, group, undertaking or entity to the Security Council for a decision within a period of 60 days; and provided further that, in the event of such a request, the requirement for States to take the measures described in paragraph 2 of this resolution shall remain in force for that period with respect to that individual, group, undertaking or entity until the question is decided by the Security Council.

“16.  Following the conclusion of the process described in paragraphs 55 and 56 of this resolution, the Committee shall convey to the Ombudsperson, within 60 days, whether the measures described in paragraph 2 are to be retained or terminated, setting out reasons and including any further relevant information, and an updated narrative summary of reasons for listing, where appropriate, for the Ombudsperson to transmit to the petitioner. The 60-day deadline applies to outstanding matters before the Ombudsperson or the Committee and will take effect from the adoption of this resolution.

“17.  After the Ombudsperson receives the communication from the committee under paragraph 28, if the measures in paragraph 2 are to be retained, the Ombudsperson shall send to the petitioner, with an advance copy sent to the Committee, a letter that:

(a)   Communicates the outcome of the petition;

(b)   Describes, to the extent possible and drawing upon the Ombudsperson’s Comprehensive Report, the process and publicly releasable factual information gathered by the Ombudsperson; and

(c)   Forwards from the Committee all information about the decision provided to the Ombudsperson pursuant to paragraph 28 above.

“18.  In all communications with the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall respect the confidentiality of Committee deliberations and confidential communications between the Ombudsperson and Member States.

“19.  The Ombudsperson may notify the petitioner, as well as those States relevant to a case but which are not members of the Committee, of the stage at which the process has reached.

Other Office of the Ombudsperson Tasks

“20.  In addition to the tasks specified above, the Ombudsperson shall:

(a)   Distribute publicly releasable information about Committee procedures, including Committee Guidelines, fact sheets and other Committee-prepared documents;

(b)   Where address is known, notify individuals or entities about the status of their listing, after the Secretariat has officially notified the Permanent Mission of the State or States, pursuant to paragraph 53 of this resolution; and

(c)   Submit biannual reports summarizing the activities of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council.”