BUDGET COMMITTEE TAKES UP PROPOSED $467 MILLION IN FINANCING FOR 27 POLITICAL MISSIONS IN 2009
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Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York |
Sixty-third General Assembly
Fifth Committee
24th Meeting (AM)
BUDGET COMMITTEE TAKES UP PROPOSED $467 MILLION IN FINANCING
FOR 27 POLITICAL MISSIONS IN 2009
Presented with $466.84 million in net requirements needed in 2009 to run 27 United Nations special political missions authorized by the General Assembly or the Security Council, several representatives in the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) today asked for increased transparency when determining the budget for those missions, based on more realistic forecasts from the Secretary-General.
According to Sharon van Buerle, Director of the Programme Planning and Budget Division, the two largest missions -- the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) -- accounted for approximately $330 million, or slightly over 70 per cent of the total amount, and the smallest mission would cost $628,400.
Introducing the Secretary-General’s report on estimates in respect of special political missions, which ranged from good offices missions of the Secretary-General to preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding missions, Ms. Van Buerle explained that an estimated $5.92 million would come from the amounts provided in 2008 that remain unencumbered. But, that would still leave $460.92 million in requirements to be met.
The Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), Susan McLurg, who introduced the Advisory Committee’s related report on the subject, said total net cost could be reduced by a potential $39.5 million -- or roughly 8 per cent of the total -- by reducing reliance on outside consultants for sanctions monitoring, and readjusting the forecast to reflect more realistic staffing requirements, among other things.
Ms. McLurg also pointed out possible changes that could affect the resources proposed. The mandate of the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission could be extended by the Security Council, if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon did not become operational as anticipated. There was also a possibility that the Council could extend the presence of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) for an additional six-month period. A technical assessment mission was being planned for early 2009 to propose options for an integrated United Nations presence in Guinea-Bissau, while full requirements for the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) in 2009 had not yet been presented to the General Assembly.
In a lengthy statement to the Committee, the representative of Japan stressed the importance of clear modalities for special political missions, and said some clarification was needed from the Secretary-General on “what special political missions are”. He wanted to know, for instance, why the Secretary-General was proposing missions without a time span, as was the case with the United Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia.
Canada’s representative, also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand, remarked that current requests were almost twice the amount originally sought in the estimate last year. Even with the constantly changing environment in which those missions must operate, and with the complexities involved in the United Nations tasks, the Secretary-General should, to the greatest extent, provide Member States with accurate forecasts. He encouraged the Secretary-General to “present more realistic estimates in the future”.
Like those speakers, the representative of Angola said future budget submissions should allow for “a proper analysis” of future requirements, based on information on past performance, for example. But, as did others, she praised the special missions for their contribution to various regions of the world, although she observed that the Assembly must provide adequate resources for missions established by other organs as well.
Also today, the Committee considered a report on revised estimates related to the provision of an integrated headquarters facility for UNAMI in Baghdad. On that subject, the representative of the United States said he looked forward to the General Assembly’s approval of that project, in principle, but understood that further discussion was needed during informal consultations.
Also speaking were the representatives of Qatar, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Norway and Turkmenistan.
The representative of Antigua and Barbuda raised an issue under “other matters”.
The Committee will meet again at 10 a.m., Wednesday, 17 November, to take up the financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).
Background
The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) met this morning to consider the financing of special political missions.
The Committee had before it a report (document A/63/346 and Corr.1), which was submitted in the context of actions taken or expected to be taken by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council regarding special political missions, including good offices, preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding missions.
The document contains proposed resource requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2009 for 27 special political missions authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council. The total estimate amounts to some $466.84 million net ($495.44 million gross). A substantial portion of the resources sought in the present report relates to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which accounts for the largest share of resources requested (36 per cent), followed by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) (34.7 per cent).
After taking into account the overall estimated balance of $5.92 million that is expected to remain unencumbered for special political missions at the end of 2008, the additional amount being sought in the report under the procedures provided for the use of the contingency fund amounts to $460.92 million net ($489.51 million gross).
The report also points out that, should the General Assembly approve the Secretary-General’s proposals on streamlining United Nations contractual arrangements, a total of nine special political missions would be affected, involving additional resource requirements of $9.5 million.
The Secretary-General recalls that, during its sixty-first session, the Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) for a preliminary budget estimate of some $4.2 billion for the biennium 2008-2009, including a provision of $604.06 million for special political missions expected to be extended into or approved during the course of the biennium. By its resolution 62/238, the Assembly then decided to reduce the overall provision for special political missions for the biennium 2008-2009 by some $200.15 million and approved a charge totalling $386.59 million against the appropriated amount for special political missions under section 3, Political affairs, under the terms of General Assembly resolution 62/237 A.
Additional budgets for special political missions for 2008 totalling $48.95 million were then approved by the terms of resolution 62/245, in which the Assembly also took note of the balance of about $17.32 million in the overall provision for special political missions and appropriated an additional amount of $31.63 million under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009 under the procedure provided for in connection with the contingency fund.
The first addendum to the report (document A/63/346/Add.1 and Corr.1) contains the estimates for thematic cluster I. special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives of the Secretary-General and Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, setting out the proposed resource requirements for 2009 for seven special political missions. The estimated requirements for 2009 for this cluster amount to $16.39 million. After taking into account the estimated balance of $1.36 million expected to remain unencumbered for the seven missions at the end of 2008, the additional requirements being sought for the seven missions amount to $15.03 million.
Those funds would be allocated among missions as follows: $753,200 for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar; $4.32 million for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus; $1.33 million for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide; $628,400 for the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara; $852,000 for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004); $6.72 million for the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; and $1.78 million for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Lord’s Resistance Army-affected areas.
Another report of the Secretary-General (document A/63/346/Add.2) contains the proposed resource requirements for 2009 for eight special political missions created by decisions of the Security Council and grouped under the thematic cluster of sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, in the amount $21.62 million. After taking into account the estimated balance of $816,000 expected to remain unencumbered for the eight missions at the end of 2008, the additional amount being sought for the eight missions amounts to $20.81 million.
Those funds would be allocated among missions as follows: $1.33 million for the Monitoring Group on Somalia; $797,000 for the Panel of Experts on Liberia; $1.30 million for the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire; $1.70 million for the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo; $1.77 million for the Panel of Experts on the Sudan; $4.02 million for the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; $2.72 million for the Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction; and $7.99 million for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.
Addendum 3 to the report on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council (document A/63/346/Add.3) places the 2009 requirements for thematic cluster III -- United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and commissions -- at around $98.92 million. But, after taking account of an estimated balance of $505,500 left over from 2008, the amount actually sought would be closer to $98.41 million.
The missions included in this cluster are the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA); United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA); United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS); United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS); United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL); United Nations support to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission; International Independent Investigating Commission; United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB); and the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).
Proposed resource requirements for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), totalling some $179.17 million gross, are presented in document A/63/346/Add.4. It is anticipated that the Mission’s projected expenditures for 2008 will amount to $86.35 million, resulting in overexpenditures totalling about $10.28 million. After taking into account the estimated overexpenditures, the net amount being sought for 2009 amounts to $178.44 million.
Addendum 5 to the report (document A/63/346/Add.5) contains the 2009 proposed resource requirements for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), totalling some $168.97 million gross. After taking into account the anticipated unencumbered balance of $13.47 million for 2008, the total net requirements for 2009 would amount to $148.29 million.
The Mission’s mandate was updated and expanded in resolution 1770 (2007) and renewed under resolution 1830 (2008). It is envisaged that, in 2009, UNAMI will step up its efforts in promoting political dialogue aimed at achieving national reconciliation, particularly with respect to resolving fundamental issues that continue to divide Iraqi communities. The total staffing proposed for UNAMI in 2009 amounts to 1,055 civilian personnel, comprising 461 international staff and 594 national staff, 13 Military Liaison Officers and 298 contingent personnel of the Guard Units. UNAMI is planning to increase its regional presence, security conditions permitting, in order to further improve its programme delivery. In order to accomplish this goal, three locations in Mosul, Najaf and Ramadi are to be opened in 2009.
The Committee also had before it a report of the Secretary-General on revised estimates relating to the programme budget for 2008-2009 related to the provision of an integrated headquarters facility for UNAMI in Baghdad (document A/62/828). The document presents new developments that occurred in January 2008 regarding the construction of the UNAMI compound, and reflects the implications of those developments.
The Secretary-General reports that, early in 2008, an alternate and more suitable site for the development of long-term facilities for UNAMI in Baghdad than the one initially selected was identified, and a decision was taken to place the initial project proposal for the construction of facilities on hold. This led to a delay in the submission of the report on the matter until the second part of the resumed sixty-second session of the Assembly.
The Assembly is requested to approve in principle the proposal for the construction of integrated headquarters for UNAMI at the site of the former Al-Sijud Palace; note the preliminary cost estimate of $98.6 million; and approve requirements to contract an architectural consultancy firm in 2008 to complete an engineering assessment on the site, develop an outline and final design, develop bid documentation and establish a construction contract management capability for the provision of total quality management services during construction, estimated at $5 million, to be absorbed within the overall appropriation for UNAMI for 2008.
The General Assembly is further requested to approve the transfer of the amount of $5 million from section 3, Political affairs, to section 32, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance, of the programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009; and request the Secretary-General to submit a new, complete and detailed proposal for the construction of the United Nations integrated compound in Baghdad, under section 32, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance, of the programme budget, for its consideration at the first part of its resumed sixty-third session in March 2009.
Introduction of Documents
SHARON VAN BUERLE, Director of the Programme Planning and Budget Division, introduced the Secretary-General’s reports before the Committee, saying that, out of 27 missions, 7 had open-ended mandates; 1 had a mandate ending 25 April 2011; 2 missions had mandates until 31 December 2010; 4 missions had mandates ranging from March 2009 to December 2009; 1 mission was under consideration by the General Assembly; and 2 missions were expected to be liquidated by 30 April 2009. The remaining 10 missions had mandates expiring through the end of December 2008. It was anticipated that the Security Council would extend the mandates of those missions on the basis of reports and requests already submitted or to be submitted to it. Since the issuance of the reports, two mandates, notably for the Panel of Experts on the Sudan and the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, had been extended until 15 October 2009 and 31 October 2009, respectively.
Continuing, she noted that the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) would be liquidated by 31 December 2008 and that the United Nations Representative to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) would complete its mandate at the same time. Further, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission were expected to be fully liquidated by the end of June 2009.
The total requirements for 2009 for the missions reflected in the reports amounted to $466.84 million net ($495.44 million gross), she said. Of the total requirements, $5.9 million would be met through the utilization of the anticipated unencumbered balance against the amounts provided in 2008. Thus, the overall additional requirements requested amounted to some $460 million net ($489.5 million gross). Requirements between missions varied widely, ranging from $628,400 to over $168.2 million. Requirements for the two largest missions (UNAMA and UNAMI) accounted for approximately $330 million, or some 70.7 per cent of the total amount.
On human resources, she said that a total of 4,526 positions were requested for 2009. The number of positions requested reflected a net reduction of 403 positions from 2008. That change reflected the current assumption of the liquidation of UNMIN and the International Independent Investigation Commission in early 2009, as well as liquidation of United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo in 2008, and included the transformation of UNIOSIL into UNIPSIL. The two largest missions accounted for 3,155 positions.
Presenting two reports of ACABQ (documents A/63/593 and A/63/601), the Chair of the Advisory Committee, SUSAN MCLURG, said that in section II of its report on the special political missions, the Advisory Committee made comments and observations of a general nature, ranging from how to better define what constituted a special political mission to the need for improved coordination with other actors in the field and the need for better presentation of the programmatic and budgetary requirements of those missions. ACABQ noted that efforts had been made to include information on performance of special political missions in 2008, with a focus on the status of achievement of expected accomplishments. However, the Advisory Committee was of the view that the performance information provided was not sufficiently clear or precise. ACABQ also reiterated the importance of well-founded planning assumptions in the budgeting of special political missions and the vital role they played in minimizing the variances and accurately reflecting the need for resources.
ACABQ noted the absence of a clear definition or modality for the establishment of special political missions, she said. It recognized that such missions varied considerably in their mandate, size and duration, but believed that there was a need for discipline in resorting to special political missions. ACABQ had emphasized in the past that proposals of the Secretary-General for the establishment of such missions should be based on an analysis of whether they were the best option under the circumstances. That analysis was particularly relevant in cases where mandates were open-ended. Moreover, it was important to ensure that the activities carried out by the missions were distinct from ongoing activities of the Department of Political Affairs. There was also concern that a number of special political missions could appear to duplicate one another. Although complex problems might require multifaceted approaches, efforts should be made to ensure that the functions required could not be carried out by other actors or offices already in the region. The Department of Political Affairs, in exercising its leadership, should be proactive in pointing out possibilities for consolidation or streamlining of arrangements, with a view to introducing efficiency and optimizing the use of resources.
As indicated by the Advisory Committee, the Secretary-General was to present a comprehensive report to the General Assembly in regard of support and management of special political missions, she continued. ACABQ requested that the comprehensive report also include an analysis of the criteria taken into consideration in establishing special political missions; the basis for proposing different modalities and structures; available means for reviewing their activities and performance and for ensuring oversight and accountability; and benchmarks for recommending the conclusion of a special political mission and application of lessons learned.
The Advisory Committee’s recommendations for cluster I would result in a reduction of $785,000, she continued. As for cluster II, ACABQ reiterated the importance of cooperation and information sharing, as well as the need to avoid duplication in order to ensure efficient use of resources. The presentation of the resources proposed for consultants in cluster II lacked transparency. In many cases, no distinction could be made between the resources requested for experts and consultants. The Advisory Committee recommended that efforts be made to ensure that required expertise was spread and diversified among the team of experts/members of the panels themselves, in order to ensure that technical expertise required for mandate implementation was provided. Consultants should, therefore, be resorted to for shorter periods and for very specialized expertise only that was not available from the experts/members. The recommendations in regard to cluster II would result in a reduction of $795,400 to the resources proposed by the Secretary-General.
Regarding cluster III, she said, the Advisory Committee pointed out possible changes that could affect the resources proposed. The mandate of the International Independent Investigation Commission could be extended by the Security Council if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon did not become operational as anticipated in 2009. There was also a possibility that the Council could extend the presence of UNMIN for an additional six-month period, with further adjustments. A technical assessment mission was planned early in 2009 to propose options for an integrated United Nations presence in Guinea-Bissau. Any budgetary implications arising from a decision would be presented to the Assembly. Further, the resources proposed for UNPOS covered the first six months of 2009, and a supplementary budget for the remaining six months was to be presented.
The Advisory Committee was recommending acceptance of the staffing proposed for UNIPSIL and encouraged that Office to recruit staff in an expeditious manner, especially national staff. However, ACABQ did not believe that vacancy factors applied to the estimates were realistic, and recommended that a vacancy factor of 20 per cent for international staff be applied and that a review of the requirements and structure of the Office be undertaken in the context of the budget for 2010, bearing in mind the capacity of the United Nations country team. The lack of both a work plan and a plan of action more than a year after the establishment of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia indicated poor planning in the pre-establishment phase. Also, some of the elements in the Centre’s terms of reference lacked clarity. The recommendations of the Advisory Committee would result in a decrease of $2.5 million in the proposals for cluster III.
On UNAMA, she said that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had updated the Advisory Committee on significant developments since the finalization of the Secretary-General’s report in the areas of humanitarian affairs and counter-narcotics. Taking into account the current number of vacancies, the significant increase of 437 positions proposed, as well as the prevailing environment, ACABQ was recommending an increase in the vacancy factors for international and national staff. It also recommended that the structure and staffing of the Mission be kept under review. As delays were likely in implementing the operational work plan for the Mission, within the time frame anticipated, ACABQ was also recommending a 10 per cent reduction to the overall resources for operational costs. The recommendations of the Advisory Committee would reduce the resource proposals for 2009 for UNAMA by $19 million.
With regard to the Mission in Iraq, she noted the Secretary-General’s intention to reduce UNAMI’s dependence on the Multinational Force in Iraq and become more self-reliant. ACABQ recommended that the Secretary-General be requested to provide further information on the progress achieved. At the same time, it was also planned to expand the United Nations presence in different regions where security continued to be a major challenge, which could entail additional costs. The recommendations on posts were made on the basis that offices should be first established and staffed with capacity already available, before resorting to requests for additional positions. Given the prevailing environment in which the Mission operated, as well as current recruitment experience, the Advisory Committee was recommending that vacancy factors be raised to 35 per cent, instead of the proposed 30 per cent. The practice of not adjusting the mission subsistence allowance for staff who received life and logistical support services should be re-examined. The Advisory Committee recommended that the proposed operational costs for UNAMI be reduced by $10 million. Its recommendations would entail a reduction of $16.4 million to the overall resources proposed for the Mission for 2009.
Overall, the recommendations of the Advisory Committee would entail a reduction of $39.5 million to the resources proposed for special political missions, she said.
On the proposed provision of an integrated headquarters facility for UNAMI, she said that there had been a number of developments since the issuance of the Secretary-General’s report, including a pledge of $25 million and the provision of a new site by the Government of Iraq. In light of those developments, the Advisory Committee had requested an update of the actions required by the General Assembly. Concerning the estimate of $98.6 million for the project as a whole, ACABQ recommended that the Assembly awaited the complete and detailed proposal to be submitted by the Secretary-General. Subject to its observations, ACABQ recommended approval of a commitment authority of $5 million to undertake design work in connection with a United Nations integrated compound in Baghdad.
Statements
ELSA PATACA (Angola), on behalf of the African Group, noted that 13 out of the 27 special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly or the Security Council dealt with African countries, and for that reason, the current agenda item was important to the African Group. Only 1 mission of the 27 had been established by the Assembly; yet, the Assembly must provide adequate resources for missions established by other organs. Thus, she expressed the African Group’s belief that proposals by the Secretary-General to establish special political missions must take into account other United Nations actors already operating in the region and their specific mandates.
She noted, also, that the Secretary-General’s report on special political missions were devoted mainly to providing information on resources requested, applying the same format as budget presentations for peacekeeping operations. The Group shared ACABQ’s recommendation that future budget submissions include information on past performance, so as to allow “a proper analysis” of future requirements and to enable the Secretariat to carry out results-based budgeting. The requested resources for those missions indicated that the Secretariat relied heavily on services provided by consultants, even though the Organization was assumed to have in-house expertise. The Group, therefore, expected reliance on external consultants to be an exception rather than the rule. She noted that the Organization was slow to -- or even did not -- hire nationals to professional posts, particularly in African special political missions. That situation called for remedial measures.
OLIVIER POULIN (Canada), speaking also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand, noted the Secretary-General’s request for $460 million for the special political missions’ budget for the second part of the biennium, on top of $403 million already appropriated for the first part of the biennium. The amount was almost twice the amount originally sought in his estimate last year. Even with the constantly changing environment in which those missions must operate, and with the complexities involved in the United Nations tasks, the Secretary-General should, to the greatest extent, provide Member States with accurate forecasts. He encouraged the Secretary-General to “present more realistic estimates in the future”.
Also, considering that the budget for special political missions tended to fluctuate considerably more than other parts of the regular budget, he said there would be merit in separating the special political budget from other parts of the regular budget. Such a separation would increase budget transparency of both parts and provide a more accurate picture of the Organization’s budgetary situation. Special political missions were temporary instruments. However, it would be more appropriate to finance offices or capacities of an ongoing nature through the appropriation for the Department of Political Affairs. Doing so would clarify accountability mechanisms between that Department and the mission/field capacity in question.
Turning specifically to UNAMA, whose mandate had been extended earlier in the year, he welcomed the Secretary-General’s budgetary proposals to implement the extended mandate. The Secretary-General had made clear links between resource requirements and the Mission’s mandate and operational realities in his report on the subject, which was commendable. He would appreciate clarifications on the potential impacts of the ACABQ recommendations to reduce the appropriation for operational costs. Furthermore, he looked forward to an in-depth discussion with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on the new plan for humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan.
Next, he said he was encouraged by the recent political process initiated in Cyprus and favoured the strengthening the Office of the Special Adviser on Cyprus. It was hoped that the increased resources would place Special Adviser Alexander Downer in a position to support both sides in reaching a satisfactory solution towards a bizonal, bicommunal federation, as defined in Security Council resolutions. He also noted that the Secretary-General was requesting funding to initiate the design phase of an integrated headquarters for UNAMI, which he understood would be financed through a cost-sharing arrangement between the United Nations and the Iraqi Government. He underlined the importance of a convincing proposal based on sound analysis, which would contain assurances that the project could be completed within the planned time frame and resources.
He ended by commenting on the timing of the discussion on special political missions, just a few days before the session’s end. It would seem to impede Member States from playing their oversight role.
KEN MUKAI ( Japan) said the Secretary-General was to have submitted his reports no later than the first week of November, and he regretted that their presentation had been delayed until the last week of the session. It was forcing the Committee to make hasty decisions under the pressure of time.
Continuing, he noted that special political missions took up nearly 20 per cent of the overall programme budget for 2008-2009. There had been a significant increase from $94 million in 2002 to $436 million in 2008. But, compared to 2008 approved resources of $436 million, the request for 2009 further represented an “annual increase” of approximately $53 million, or more than 12 per cent. The Secretary-General’s proposal for special political missions amounted to nearly $925 million for the current biennium.
He suggested that, when the efficiency and effectiveness of those missions were being examined by various bodies, including by the Security Council, their costs should be taken into account. Towards that end, he sought clarification from the Secretary-General on “what special political missions are”. If their activities were directed towards operational matters and, as stated in ACABQ’s report, they did not lend themselves to full integration with the Secretariat’s work programme, why then was the Secretary-General proposing missions without a time span, as was the case with the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia? Similarly, in the case of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), why couldn’t its function -- to facilitate collaboration among United Nations peace missions -- be taken as part of the Secretariat’s work programme? Agreeing with ACABQ, he said he would like to see an analysis to determine the merits of establishing special political missions. At the same time, the functions and responsibilities of special envoys, special representatives and other special high-level positions should be more clearly defined and streamlined. He endorsed ACABQ recommendations regarding the establishment and management of special political missions.
He also endorsed ACABQ recommendations to improve the presentation of future budgets. He expected the presentation and justification of resource requirements for special political missions to be of the same standard as those of peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, consideration should be given to the submission of performance reports for certain missions every year. Stressing that it was important for the Secretary-General to propose realistic budgets, he said he wanted to determine whether the 2009 budget proposals had been adjusted to consider a more realistic vacancy rate and operational costs, in light of the experience gained last year. The Secretary-General was encouraged to “intensify efforts” to identify areas where special missions, peacekeeping operations and other United Nations activities complemented each other. He expressed an interest in learning about progress made to ensure cooperation between the Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, to prevent duplication.
He said provisional amounts set aside for special political missions in the current and previous budget outlines had not provided an accurate forecast. For example, the 2008-2009 budget outline had provided for $604 million for the biennium, but actual requirements for 2008-2009 exceeded $925 million. In that context, and to ensure budgetary discipline and sound management, he expressed Japan’s view that the Organization maintain the practice of including special missions in the regular budget. In addition, Japan was confident that further reductions of up to 15 per cent of resource requirements was appropriate in many cases, and noted “significant underexpenditure” in relation to 2008 appropriations for many missions, including UNAMI.
He also said recruitment and deployment of staff should be carefully planned and phased, based on realistic assumptions and accurate understanding of the security situations. He would like to hear assurances that activities currently undertaken by other entities in the United Nations system, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, would not be hindered by premature deployment of the additional resources requested for those missions. He had other mission-specific questions, but they would be raised during informal sessions.
Mr. AL-HAMMADI (Qatar) said his delegation realized the importance of special political missions and good offices in the efforts to prevent international disputes, and agreed that it was necessary to enhance the Secretariat’s ability in that area. He supported the good offices of the Secretary-General, which needed resources and capacities. Good offices did not need to be part of a mandate of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or other offices. They were established in response to political situations that might need urgent intervention by the Secretary-General to support political work before a dispute escalated and required a peacekeeping operation. Good offices had had a great impact on the situation in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. The Secretariat had an important role in support of regional and subregional organizations, and he thanked the Secretary-General for his support for the efforts by Qatar to implement the resolution of the League of Arab States regarding peace talks in Doha among the Sudanese parties, in consultation with the African Union. That cooperation and consultations were in implementation of Chapter VIII of the Charter.
The proposed budget of the special political missions authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly during the sixty-third session amounted to over $466 million –- an increase of some 7 per cent compared with the last budget. However, spending on such missions was related to the challenges faced by the international community. In view of the increase in tensions, there was a need to support the Secretary-General, who needed to be ready to meet those challenges during 2008-2009 in order to maintain 27 special political missions and any other missions authorized by the Council or Assembly. The posts should be allocated according to the principle of geographical distribution, and that issue should be considered with countries that agreed to missions.
DAVID TRAYTSMAN ( United States) voiced support for the Secretary-General’s proposals on resource requirements for special political missions. The Special representatives and envoys performing the multitude of activities under that heading were a critical element of country- and region-specific initiatives for peace and security. He noted the concern of ACABQ that the Secretary-General’s budget proposals did not contain the justification necessary for an informed decision on resource requirements. As such, he supported the ACABQ’s recommendation that future budget proposals contain a more detailed justification, and looked forward to hearing how coordination with other actors and country teams would affect those proposed requirements.
However, he also noted that, in some cases, ACABQ recommendations themselves did not contain the level of justification necessary for an informed decision. For example, regarding the budget for UNAMA, he recalled the ACABQ recommendation of a 10 per cent reduction, which was not adequately justified. He would seek further details on that subject during informal consultations.
Concerning the proposal for the UNAMI compound construction, he stressed the importance of making progress on that issue, and looked forward to the General Assembly’s approval of that subject, in principle.
MAJDI RAMADAN (Lebanon) said positive developments had taken place since the adoption of Assembly resolution 62/238 and specifically section V of that text, relating to special political missions, which included estimates in respect of the Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). The resumption of the national dialogue in Lebanon and recent developments in the relations between Lebanon and Syria -- especially since the summit meeting of the two countries’ Presidents -- including progress in the establishment of diplomatic relations and the decision to set up permanent diplomatic missions, related to the mandate of the Special Envoy. That was mentioned in Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Security Council. Those positive developments only attested to the standing position of Lebanon since the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004); Lebanon considered Syria as a sister country. They also attested to the commitment of Lebanon to continuously strengthen its relations with Syria in the face of common challenges.
That commitment had been clearly manifested when the Lebanese people, represented by all their political groups, had unanimously called for the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria, he continued. They had also called for the resolution of all pending issues between the two sisterly countries, including the delineation of their common borders. Those recent developments came on top of the long-standing position of Lebanon that the violations of Lebanese sovereignty by Israel and continued Israeli occupation of Lebanese land fell within the mandate of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of resolution 1559. His delegation had repeatedly emphasized that reports on the financing of special political missions should reflect Israeli violations of the Lebanese sovereignty as part of the indicators of achievement for the logical framework of the Special Envoy. In fact, all the reports that the Special Envoy had submitted to the Security Council had referred to such violations. He believed that above-mentioned developments and violations of Lebanese sovereignty should be reflected by the Secretariat in the logical framework of the Special Envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559.
WAHIDULLAH AMIN ( Afghanistan) said his country faced heavy damage to its physical infrastructure after 25 years of conflict imposed from outside and 6 years of the Taliban. Afghanistan had also been hijacked by Al-Qaida. But great progress had been made by the Government since 2001 with the help of the United Nations and the international community. UNAMA played an integral coordinating role, although national ownership of the reconstruction process would be necessary to ensure the stability and sustainability of results. In addition, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Kai Eide, was a trusted presence.
But, in order for UNAMA to effectively discharge its responsibilities, it would need to increase its staff levels and use of specialized expertise. In that regard, his Government fully supported the proposed increase in UNAMA’s budget for next year. He added that UNAMA was providing essential assistance to the electoral commission in the run up to the next elections, scheduled for 2009 and 2010 –- the first to be administered by Afghan authorities since the 1970s.
He said the Government looked forward to increasing coordination with UNAMA to help ensure the success of the Afghan National Development Strategy. The harshest winter in 20 years, combined with the Government’s lack of capacity, had aggravated the country’s humanitarian challenges. Poverty, as well as lack of access to food, medical care and education, were obstacles to equitable and sustainable development. While there was significant progress in some areas, Afghanistan still faced the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world. Around 42 per cent of the population suffered from extreme poverty. With almost 2,000 non-governmental organizations, 20 international organizations and 41 troop-contributing countries all trying to work together in Afghanistan, it was essential that “someone coordinate all of these efforts”. UNAMA had proved itself capable of a large role in the stabilization process, and the Government would support it in the coming year.
JONAS JOLLE ( Norway) said that special political missions and good offices of the Secretary-General played an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation and cooperation with regional organizations were indispensable tools in preventing and solving conflicts. He supported the efforts of the Secretary-General in using those tools to maintain international peace and security.
Norway attached particular importance to UNAMA, which supported the Government and people of Afghanistan as they rebuilt their country, he said. With a mandate from the Security Council, UNAMA enjoyed unanimous support of the General Assembly, as recently expressed by resolution 63/18 on the situation in Afghanistan. The Assembly encouraged UNAMA “to consolidate its presence and to continue its expansion”. He, therefore, welcomed the conclusion of the Advisory Committee that the staffing changes proposed for 2009 responded to the priorities contained in Council resolution 1806 (2008) and the Paris Declaration of 19 June 2008. He looked forward to a substantive discussion on UNAMA and other special political missions.
AKSOLTAN ATAEVA (Turkmenistan), speaking on behalf of the five Central Asian countries, recalled the establishment of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia a year ago, and said it was working actively with the five countries on development and cooperation issues. It was also facilitating efforts at conflict resolution, by encouraging interaction among regional organizations. But, its activities involved constant travel, meetings and consultations, and was giving rise to additional human resource costs. The report of the Secretary-General provided a detailed description of tasked undertaken by the Centre, and had called for six additional posts to be established, including that of Political Affairs officer, to enable the Centre to intensify its activities, especially to encourage peace and stability in Afghanistan. She called for support for those requirements.
Responding to a question regarding the resolution in which the Secretary-General was requested to submit the estimates for special political missions no later than the first week of November, Ms. VAN BUERLE said that, except for the Baghdad construction, all reports on special political missions had been released or submitted for production in the period from 11 September to 27 October --- well before the date set in resolution 62/238.
As for how the estimates were prepared, she said that the Secretariat was working on an assumption that, in the absence of a legislative definition, special political missions were those that had a strong peace and security element to their activities, referred to mandates provided by the General Assembly or Security Council, and had no military contingents or very limited military or police personnel. Such missions were authorized either through a resolution or exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council.
Explaining how the estimates for the biennium were calculated, she said that, in the absence of specific information, the information for the current biennium was used to project forward. For example, special political missions approved for 2006-2007 had been used as the starting point for the current biennium, from which provisions for missions expected to be discontinued were extracted. That had been the working basis. In many cases, special political missions in the course of implementation ended up accelerating their activities. Those were unforeseen events, which could not be predicted at the time the estimates were put together.
CONROD HUNTE ( Antigua and Barbuda), speaking under “other matters”, asked that the Committee consider as an additional agenda item, the question of the rental space for “Group of 77” Office Secretariat. That issue had been discussed by the Committee in the past, resulting in resolution 56/253.
The Chair took note of that request.
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