Sixty-second General Assembly

First Committee

11^th Meeting (PM)

DE-ALERTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR SLASHING NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS,

DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE TOLD AS IT CONCLUDES THEMATIC DEBATE SEGMENT

Ten Drafts Submitted, Including New Resolution on Decreasing

Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems, Reducing Nuclear Danger

One of the greatest risks from nuclear weapons emanated from the thousands able to be launched in minutes in response to a perceived attack, but, although taking those weapons off “high alert” would significantly improve collective security, that was no substitute for irreversible cuts in their numbers, the Disarmament Committee heard today, as it concluded its thematic debate segment on nuclear weapons and began hearing introductions of related draft resolutions. 

New Zealand’s representative asserted that, while States’ voting records had illustrated “overwhelming support” for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and there had been a “sharp reduction” in nuclear weapons from their cold war peak, the estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads that remained posed a “risk of catastrophic consequences” if used.  That danger increased with the nuclear proliferation risk. 

While several nuclear-weapon States had taken steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the representative of Canada said that his country was concerned that new doctrines had been put forward which would assert a role for nuclear weapons as “war-fighting”, rather than strategic, tools.  Nuclear-weapon States should reduce and dismantle their nuclear arsenals as rapidly as possible, and for all “non-NPT” States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and fully adopt all non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament norms. 

Calling nuclear disarmament a “just and reasonable process”, China’s speaker agreed that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake the comprehensive destruction of their nuclear arsenals.  The two “main” nuclear-weapon States should reduce their arsenals first, in a “verifiable and irreversible” manner.  All nuclear Powers should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and they should offer those negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.  China maintained a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and not to use those weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. 

The representative of the Russian Federation said that his country stood for a gradual solution of the problem of nuclear arms reduction, in accordance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  On that basis, it had conducted dialogue with the United States regarding a new arrangement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which would be legally binding.  The essence of the Russian Federation approach was to ensure the succession of the process of strategic nuclear arms reduction and limitation, and to that end, preserve what was useful and effective in the “START” regime.  Meanwhile, the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons were kept under reliable control.

Several delegations, including South Africa’s, expressed deep concern about security doctrines that envisaged the actual use of nuclear weapons.  Recent developments in the area of nuclear-weapons systems, including decisions on the modernization of such systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, were incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.  Any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons would only lead to insecurity and the continuing arms race, he said.

Similarly, Cuba’s representative said that any security doctrine that was based on the use of those weapons was not acceptable and that any security guarantee through nuclear weapons was totally false.  Addressing the issue of nuclear weapons required a sensible approach.  It was unacceptable to have lack compliance by nuclear-weapon States with regard to their obligations.

Also today, 10 draft texts were submitted on:  decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons systems; a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons; missiles; the implementation of disarmament obligations; Treaty on South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty); nuclear disarmament; nuclear weapons convention; and reducing nuclear danger.

Statements in the thematic debate were made by the representatives of Uruguay (on behalf of MERCOSUR), Australia, United Arab Emirates, Netherlands, Norway, Malaysia, Pakistan, Mongolia, Indonesia, India, Myanmar, Brazil and Iran.

The representative of Syria also made a statement.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m., on Friday, 19 October, to begin its thematic debate on other weapons of mass destruction.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this afternoon to continue its thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

Statements

LESLIE M. GUMBI ( South Africa) said that his country remained deeply concerned over the huge number of nuclear weapons that remained deployed and stockpiled around the world and the security doctrines that envisaged the actual use of such weapons.  Recent developments in the area of nuclear weapons systems, including decisions on the modernization of such systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons were incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.  Any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons would only lead to insecurity and the continuing arms race.

He said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remained the only internationally recognised competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  That authority should not be undermined, and any concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements should be directed to the Agency for consideration of any actions that might be required.

In recognising the potential role that nuclear energy could play as an alternative renewable source of energy, it was the duty of the international community to ensure that no unwarranted restrictions were imposed, he stated.  Further modalities preventing the diversion of those sensitive technologies to nuclear weapons, however, might be required, in order to ensure that activities were pursued without fear and with necessary assurances.  A non-discriminatory approach was needed, which would assure the reliable supply of nuclear fuel, while fully protecting States’ inalienable right to pursue peaceful nuclear programmes, consistent with their non-proliferation obligations.

FEDERICO PERAZZA (Uruguay), speaking on behalf of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), said that those States had renounced the nuclear option and held “strong credentials” in non-proliferation, and, as such, they were concerned about the “paralysis” of the disarmament machinery.  Of particular concern was the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had not reached agreement on a programme of work, and that, as a consequence, it had not been possible to begin negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, or to establish a subsidiary organ with a mandate to address nuclear disarmament. 

Continuing, he said that the prospects for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were also a cause for concern, as the Treaty was one of the “fundamental pillars of nuclear disarmament”.  It was worrying that some countries with nuclear capability, and others that had carried out nuclear tests, had not yet ratified that instrument.  He called on the “annex 2” countries to join the Treaty, and he urged all States to maintain the moratorium on nuclear tests until it entered into force.

He said that the Common Market countries were committed to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and he stressed the need for full compliance with the commitments undertaken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly the 13 “practical steps” agreed in 2000.  He called on all States to become parties to that Treaty, without conditions, and as non-nuclear-weapon States.  He welcomed progress made in the reduction of nuclear arsenals, including that which had been achieved at the bilateral level, and he supported the proposal made by Brazil during the Preparatory Committee meeting last May for the 2010 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that the Secretariat put together a comparative table of the measures undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament.  That initiative would provide States parties with the means to better evaluate progress in that field.

Welcoming the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), he reiterated his support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.  He supported the strengthening of the juridical regimes of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, and the status of Mongolia as a State free of nuclear weapons.  He also called for greater coordination and cooperation between those zones, and for the entry into force of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.  A collective security system capable of establishing, maintaining and consolidating international peace and security could not be built on the basis of strategic security doctrines that contemplated the accumulation, use, and development of nuclear weapons.  The only effective guarantee against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was their complete elimination.

CRAIG MACLACHLAN ( Australia) said that continued cooperation and determination was required on the part of all States to ensure that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons continued to make progress towards ensuring a world free of nuclear weapons.  His country was committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament through balanced, progressive and reinforcing steps.  It looked to the nuclear-weapon States to take the lead through lasting reductions of their nuclear weapons.  Australia was encouraged by the steps that some nuclear-weapon States had taken in that direction and urged them to continue.  The non-nuclear-weapon States must also play their part in creating an environment of confidence and stability, in which nuclear disarmament could take place.

He said his country looked to possessor States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, thereby lowering the risk that those weapons might ever be used and advancing their eventual elimination.  Those States should further reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons in ways that promoted global security and stability.  Non-nuclear-weapon States also had a fundamental interest and duty to support practical steps that would facilitate nuclear disarmament.  Australia was also committed to the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and it actively supported the negotiation of a legally binding, non-discriminatory fissile material cut-off treaty with appropriate measures for verifying compliance.

Australia adhered strictly to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, through domestic controls and support for global measures like the IAEA Additional Protocol, strengthened nuclear security, and efforts against nuclear terrorism, he said.  Such measures were essential, for without complete and permanent assurances of non-proliferation, it would not be possible to rid the world of nuclear weapons.  States that challenged the non-proliferation regime not only threatened global security, but also undermined the international confidence and stability essential to achieving nuclear disarmament.

WU HAITAO ( China) said it was vital to steadily reduce the role of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear non-proliferation.  The international community must make joint efforts to promote the three main objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and explore ways to enhance its universality, authority, and effectiveness.  The nuclear-weapon States should undertake the comprehensive destruction of their nuclear arsenals, as nuclear disarmament was a “just and reasonable process”.  The two “main” nuclear-weapon States should first reduce their arsenals in a “verifiable and irreversible” manner, so that other nuclear- States could do the same.  All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and they should offer negative security guarantees for non-nuclear weapon States.  The Conference on Disarmament should reach consensus on a programme of work and start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

He said that, as a nuclear-weapon State, China stood for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and had never evaded its responsibilities.  China exercised restraint and maintained a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and no use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.  He supported the Conference on Disarmament’s efforts to reach a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, and he attached great importance to the new review cycle of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which China would participate constructively.  Disarmament and non-proliferation were complementary and mutually reinforcing.  Proliferation was a complex issue, and it was necessary to address both its causes and symptoms.  The principles of the United Nations Charter should be respected, and the non-proliferation regime should be strengthened, with its defects remedied to ensure impartiality. 

HEND ABDULAZIZ N. ALOWAIS ( United Arab Emirates) said that her country regretted to see the present emphasis on non-proliferation at the expense of true disarmament efforts.  Some nuclear-weapon States continued to improve and develop nuclear weapons quantitatively and qualitatively.  Nuclear materials and technology were also being acquired by certain States not party to the non-proliferation regime.  In fact, those States, outside the IAEA safeguards system, were being aided in that regard by some nuclear-weapon States.  Certain nuclear-weapon States had attempted to develop a new doctrine based on offensive, and not defensive, use of nuclear weapons, in violation of international law.

She called for the full and balanced implementation of all provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including a balancing of the disarmament and non-proliferation obligations.  The international community should reaffirm that Treaty’s universality by exerting pressure on those States that had not ratified it to do so.  It should also develop a universal and unconditional instrument to provide safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon States against the effects of the use of nuclear weapons.  Thus, the United Arab Emirates urged those States that had not acceded to the Treaty to do so expeditiously and to demonstrate the necessary will to reach consensus on pending matters.  It also hoped that the upcoming preparatory sessions for the 2010 Treaty Review would be successful.

JOHANNES C. LANDMANN ( Netherlands), aligning himself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union, referred to a Wall Street Journal article by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, and said that a new beginning in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation would be more than welcome.  The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be strengthened and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must enter force.  A treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for use in material weapons was also crucial, and his country had appreciated the treaty text submitted at the Conference on Disarmament by the United States in May 2006.  He called on all members of the Conference to express their readiness to enter into concrete and target-oriented negotiations.

He said it was of the “utmost importance” to move forward in Geneva; not moving forward on a fissile material cut-off treaty would have “severe consequences” for disarmament.  Merely “reflecting” on the treaty, however, would not be enough; negotiations must start early next year.  Countries that had not yet agreed to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons use should be encouraged to do so in the meantime.  He added that in the last two years the Conference had been very productive, and should allow for a “quick start”, since “solid and thorough groundwork has been done for a comprehensive package.”

DON MCKAY ( New Zealand) said the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons required a “sense of renewed ownership and energy”, and he hoped thatthe review process could lead to “concrete and measurable progress”.  Together with Chile, Nigeria, Sweden, and Switzerland, New Zealand would introduce a new resolution this year, “L.29”, on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems.  One of the greatest risks of nuclear weapons emanated from the estimated thousands of nuclear weapons remaining on “high alert”, able to be launched in minutes in response to a perceived attack.  Taking those weapons off alert status would allow more time for communication and for avoiding misunderstanding or miscalculation. 

Obviously, he said, reductions in deployment and operational status could not substitute for irreversible cuts in the numbers of nuclear weapons, but ensuring that all nuclear weapons were taken off of high alert would be a “significant improvement” for collective security.  While States’ voting records had illustrated “overwhelming support” for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and there had been a “sharp reduction” in nuclear weapons from their cold war peak, the estimated 27,000 nuclear warheads that remained posed a “risk of catastrophic consequences” if used.  That risk increased with the nuclear proliferation risk. 

As a non-nuclear-weapon State, New Zealand took seriously its obligation never to acquire or facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he said.  Accordingly, New Zealand had participated in a project to shut down the Russian Federation’s last plutonium-producing nuclear reactor, as well as a project on the Russia/Ukraine border to fight the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials.  His country was also working to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and was implementing changes to its domestic export control legislation.

He said that, together with Brazil, New Zealand would propose resolution “L.27”, calling for a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, a plan which he called “a powerful symbol” to indicate the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.  Some States were opposed to the resolution on the grounds that it would impair their freedom of navigation on the high seas, but he stressed that was not the case.  New Zealand would also put forward resolution “L.28”, together with Australia and Mexico, on the Test-Ban Treaty, and he said he hoped for its strong support.

EVGENY P. BUZHINSKY ( Russian Federation) said that his country stood for a gradual solution of the problem of nuclear arms reduction, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  On that basis, it had conducted dialogue with the United States regarding a new arrangement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which would be legally binding.  The essence of the Russian approach was to ensure the succession of the process of strategic nuclear arms reduction and limitation, and to that end, preserve what was useful and effective in the “START” regime.

Noting that the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles remained in force and continued to be important for maintaining strategic stability, he said that, at the same time, it was hardly acceptable that, while his country and the United States had eliminated that class of missile, other States had started to actively develop such weapons.  All countries, primarily those with missile capabilities, should consider the transformation of that Treaty into a universal arrangement open to broad international accession.

He said that Russia’s nuclear weapons were kept under reliable control.  Enhanced effectiveness of that control was achieved through organizational and technical measures.  Since 1991, the number of nuclear-weapon storage facilities had been reduced by four.  All non-strategic nuclear weapons had been moved to the central storage facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defence.  All those measures had made it possible to relocate financial resources to ensure safety and reliable protection of the reduced number of nuclear munitions storage facilities using state-of-the-art technical means of security and physical protection.  Russia had also developed and introduced a set of measures to counter terrorist actions, which envisaged regular comprehensive checks of all facilities that posed nuclear and radiation risks in terms of security.

Russia considered that the non-proliferation regime would be strengthened through enhancing the IAEA verification activities, as well as by ensuring the universal character of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards with the Agency, he went on.  States that had not yet ratified the Additional Protocol should do so as soon as possible.   Russia had reduced by half its production capacity that was excessive for defensive purposes.  It was also working towards shutting down industrial uranium-graphite reactors for weapon-grade plutonium production.  The production of uranium for manufacturing nuclear weapons was terminated long ago.

KNUT LANGELAND ( Norway) said that both disarmament and non-proliferation were essential to achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world.  Yet, the international community must refrain from artificial links.  Necessary non-proliferation measures must not be delayed due to a perceived lack of progress in the disarmament area.  At the same time, a diminished role of nuclear weapons in security policies would contribute to reducing the attractiveness of acquiring such weapons.  From Norway’s perspective, several steps should be taken to promote a robust non-proliferation regime and create an environment conducive to disarmament.

He said that those included resolution by the international community of the current proliferation challenges by diplomatic means, and intensification of efforts to make progress on the Iran dossier.  Norway urged Iran to meet the demands of the international community, in order to facilitate the process leading to a diplomatic solution.  It was Norway’s conviction that nuclear disarmament, on the basis of irreversibility, transparency and verification, was essential to remove the availability of nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons which were dismantled could not end up in the wrong hands.

Further reductions in nuclear arsenals were needed, and Norway welcomed the considerable reductions since the end of the cold war, he said.  The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) would expire in 2009, and SORT (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Moscow Treaty), in 2012.  It was vital that those treaties be replaced by new agreements, leading to deeper and irreversible reductions.  It was encouraging that consultations between the United States and the Russian Federation had already started.  Norway also hoped that it would be possible to move forward on sub-strategic nuclear weapons.

HAMIDON ALI ( Malaysia) said his delegation would introduce resolution “L.36”, entitled “Follow up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons”.  There was an impasse afflicting arms control negotiations, but the international community must not lose its focus on eliminating nuclear weapons, while curbing the spread of technology.  The opinion of the International Court of Justice was a “significant milestone” in international efforts on non-proliferation, since it provided a moral argument for the elimination of nuclear weapons. 

He called on all Member States to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, adding that, given the complexities of disarmament, the international community should increase political will and moral courage to break through the impasse.  In supporting resolution “L.36”, States would affirm their commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation.  Those expressions of commitment would go a long way towards dispelling the notion that disarmament was best achieved through unilateral or bilateral actions alone.

DAVID DA SILVA (Canada) said that positive progress on disarmament included the announcement at the six-party talks that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would shut down its nuclear facilities and make a complete declaration of its nuclear programmes by the end of the year, as well as the vision outlined by the United Kingdom on concrete steps required to achieve nuclear disarmament, and the announcement by the United States that its dismantlement of nuclear weapons was ahead of schedule.  However, a small number of countries continued to block agreement on a work programme in the Conference on Disarmament, and there was still great international concern over Iranian compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  Contrary to the claims of some, that Treaty remained at the centre of the international nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime.  Challenges to it existed, and failure to reform it could make it “less relevant -– and less effective -– in the future”.

He said that while several nuclear-weapon States had taken steps towards reducing their arsenals, he was concerned that new doctrines had been put forward which would assert a role for nuclear weapons as “war-fighting”, rather than strategic, tools.  He called on all nuclear-weapon States to reduce and dismantle their nuclear arsenals, as rapidly as possible.  All “non-NPT” States must sign and ratify that Treaty and fully adopt all international nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament norms.  Moreover, the remaining States must ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as early as possible.  The Conference on Disarmament had been “tantalizingly close” to breaking its deadlock this year on a programme of work that included the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.  It was “regrettable” that the opposition of only a few States continued to prevent the Conference from resuming substantive work.  All States should support the presidential draft decision tabled this year.

A former Mayor of the City of New York, Mario Cuomo, once said that “good public administration is composed of equal parts poetry and plumbing”.  Transferring that to disarmament issues, he said that “diplomatic poetry”, or policy debate and consensus-building, was important, but that “the plumbing of the international disarmament regime -– the nitty-gritty work of negotiating treaties, bringing them into force, and then respecting them, both in letter and in spirit”, was equally important.  “While the international community has made significant and commendable progress on diplomatic poetry in recent months, the diplomatic plumbing remains clogged and urgently needs our attention.”

MASOOD KHAN ( Pakistan) said that the principle of equal security for all States, as established by the Charter and upheld by the General Assembly’s first session on disarmament should remain paramount in the quest for security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.   Pakistan called for a new consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  That consensus should address the following:  contemporary issues related to underlying motives and causes that impelled States to acquire weapons of mass destruction; nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time frame; promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology under safeguards; prevention of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction technology by terrorists; missile and anti-ballistic missile systems; and security arrangements for sensitive regions, such as South Asia, the Middle East and North-East Asia.

He stressed the importance of a fissile material cut-off treaty to provide a schedule for a progressive transfer of existing stockpiles to civilian use, and that it should contain a provision for placing those stockpiles under safeguards to ensure that un-safeguarded stocks were equalized at the lowest possible level.  In order to have full effect, the treaty should also be accompanied by a mandatory programme for the elimination of asymmetries between States in the possession of fissile material stockpiles.  There were agreed principles that underlay the discourse on the treaty, developed by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the relevant General Assembly resolution in 1993, and the 1995 and 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences.

The objective had been to draft a fissile material cut-off treaty that would strengthen the security of all States, irrespective of their size and status, he noted.  It was important to evolve an agreed basis for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a non-discriminatory basis and under international safeguards, and in accordance with the international obligations of States.   Pakistan had a legitimate requirement for nuclear power generation to meet the energy needs of an expanding economy.  His country would continue to develop nuclear power technology under international safeguards.

NEMUUN GAL ( Mongolia) said that, despite reductions in nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war, the number of nuclear warheads remained “unacceptably high”, and the historic balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was perceived by many to have “shifted excessively towards non-proliferation”.  The 13 practical steps to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not been realized, negotiations on negative security assurances and a fissile material cut-off treaty were “long overdue”, and the Test-Ban Treaty had yet to enter into force. 

He said his country attached importance to the right of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, however, proof of compliance with the Treaty regime was “imperative”.  He reaffirmed Mongolia’s commitment to the IAEA’s safeguards system, recalling that the country had ratified the Additional Protocol in 2003.  He noted the recent establishment of an International Centre for Uranium Enrichment in Angarsk, and said he welcomed the Centre’s intention to meet the needs of other countries in nuclear fuel.  He attached importance to implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and noted that Mongolia was going to implement a project to strengthen its import and export controls over nuclear and other radioactive materials, with the financial assistance of the United States. 

On nuclear-weapon-free zones, he said Mongolia supported their existence and the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.  This year marked the fifteenth anniversary of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.  The country was working to achieve a legally-binding nuclear-weapon-free status, and he earnestly hoped the consultations on a relevant draft trilateral treaty would begin in the near future and produce concrete results.  

FEBRIAN ALPHYANTO RUDDYARD (Indonesia) said he remained concerned that, while non-nuclear-weapon States had agreed to renounce the nuclear option under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, some nuclear-weapon States, contrary to their disarmament obligations under the Treaty, were retaining their nuclear arsenals, and even continued to develop new capabilities in that regard.  The United Nations focus had remained mostly on the non-proliferation challenge, while disarmament had been largely ignored.  It was unfair and untenable to demand the non-nuclear-weapon States to comply with their obligations, while the nuclear-weapon States failed to live up to their own obligations and commitments.  The imbalance of attention would never adequately address the danger of nuclear weapons.  His country believed that both non-proliferation and disarmament should be advanced in a mutually reinforcing and non-discriminatory way.

He then introduced a draft resolution on the Treaty on South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) (document A/C.1/62/L.19) on behalf of its 10 States parties (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam).  The Treaty’s objectives included contributing effectively to regional efforts in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation; reasserting the right of countries in the region to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and ensuring the protection of the region from environmental pollution and the hazards posed by radioactive/nuclear materials or waste; and seeking negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States.  The draft resolution sought universal support for the zone; to encourage the ongoing consultation with nuclear-weapon States, with a view to their early accession; to enhance and explore further ways and means of cooperation between the zone and other such zones; and to contribute to global efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.

JAYANT PRASAD ( India) said the “startling transformation of the global security landscape” since the cold war had led to significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States, but further reductions were necessary, with all United Nations Member States, including the nuclear-weapon States, contributing to the process.  While the objective factors for the increasing militarization of international relations no longer existed, the global outlook for disarmament was overwhelmed with insecurity.

He said that, while his country’s policy included a “minimum” of deterrence, “there is no dilution in India’s commitment to disarmament”.  His country was not seeking a nuclear arms race with any other country; India’s security would be enhanced in a world free of nuclear weapons.  Indeed, its nuclear policy was characterized by restraint, responsibility, predictability and a defensive outlook.  He called for a global compact on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons, as had once been done for chemical and biological weapons.   India would propose a convention banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.  In addition, several pragmatic and feasible steps could be taken to reduce the threat of nuclear war, among those, establishing a dialogue on security, and de-alerting nuclear weapons.

WUNNA MAUNG LWIN ( Myanmar) introduced a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament (document A/C.1/62/L.40), saying that it emphasised the goal of total elimination as the greatest priority of the international community.  The draft reiterated the call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, early in 2008, on priority basis, a committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.  It also stressed the importance of the 13 practical steps to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament.  It was a comprehensive draft resolution on nuclear disarmament.

ANTONIO DA ROCHA PARANHOS (Brazil), aligning himself with the statement made on behalf of MERCOSUR, said it had been the intention of the Brazilian Government to present a draft resolution on the global state of nuclear disarmament, with the objective of commencing a “modest, non-confrontational exercise in transparency”, by which Member States would provide the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, with information on the measures undertaken on nuclear disarmament.  The country had held a series of informal consultations, and the draft resolution had received broad support, with several delegations willing to co-sponsor the initiative. 

However, he said, some delegations, including a few from developing countries, had expressed discomfort with some provisions of the draft.  Since he believed that the initiative should be based on the widest possible support, Brazil had decided not to table the draft resolution at present.  Instead, it would continue to work on this issue in the Committee and in the framework of the preparatory process of the 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Progress in that review process was dependent on concrete steps towards implementation of the Treaty’s article VI, through mechanisms of transparency and accountability.

MARIETA GARCIA JORDAN ( Cuba) said that her country continued to advocate the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.  The use of such weapons could have a devastating effect on all forms of life on Earth.  Unfortunately, new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons continued to be produced.   Cuba believed that any security doctrine that was based on the use of those weapons was not acceptable, and that any security guarantee through nuclear weapons was totally false.

She said that addressing the issue of nuclear weapons required a sensible approach.  It was unacceptable to have non-compliance by nuclear-weapon States with regard to their obligations.  Those States should honour their commitments, including the 13 practical steps.  At the same time, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not an end in itself and should not be subjected to selective application and double standards.  The peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology must be fully respected.  It was imperative to start negotiations to stop the use of nuclear weapons, and Cuba was in favour of the total elimination of those weapons.

SEYED MOHAMMAD ALI ROBATJAZI ( Iran) said his delegation would introduce a draft decision and a draft resolution.  The draft decision entitled “Missiles” was co-authored by Egypt, Indonesia and Iran.  Since the resolution’s first introduction in 1998, there had been an increase in support for dealing with the issue of missiles in all its aspects.  The first panel of experts had produced a report, A/57/229, which had been the first to examine missiles, but the second panel had fallen short of that achievement, so the General Assembly had asked the Secretary-General to establish a third panel of experts in 2007.  He was pleased that the third panel’s first session had had a serious and complex discussion.  The resolution’s sponsors, therefore, had decided to present a draft decision calling for missiles to be included in the provisional agenda of the sixty-third session of the General Assembly. 

He said his delegation would also introduce a draft resolution urging States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to follow up on the implementation of their disarmament obligations, within the framework of the 2010 Review Conference.

JAYANT PRASAD ( India) introduced two draft resolutions, respectively, on a convention on the use of nuclear weapons, “L.23”, and on reducing nuclear danger, “L.21”.  The draft on the nuclear weapons convention would serve to diminish the salience of nuclear weapons.  It would also reiterate the call on the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations to reach agreement on such an instrument.  The draft on reducing nuclear danger would note that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind.   India had been advocating for ways to mitigate the dangers posed by those weapons, and the draft offered pragmatic proposals along those lines, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

BASSAM DARWISH ( Syria) said he wished to record his sincere thanks to Ambassador Badji, the United Nations Secretariat, and the interpretation section for the efforts made in order to ascertain the “grave error” which took place on 16 October when he exercised his right of reply to a statement made by Israel.  It had been a translator’s error that had caused confusion, leading to political consequences which, he said, had been used to defame his country and his delegation.  He appreciated that interpreters functioned under pressure, especially in translating unwritten statements, such as rights of reply. 

Nevertheless, he said, errors could cause political problems, which could be seized by circles outside of the United Nations for political purposes, and he demanded that the highest degree of caution and attention be exercised in dealing with statements with such a degree of sensitivity. 

He wished to put on record his thanks for the statement by the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, which had emphasized that the Syrian delegate had never said a word about nuclear installations, and that the error fell on the shoulders of the interpreter.  He hoped that that position would be reflected widely so that the rumours that were spread about that subject during the last two days and were negatively exploited could be refuted.  His delegation welcomed the apology and hoped the situation would not be repeated.  He would wait to see what more was revealed by the procedure.

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For information media • not an official record