Sixty-second General Assembly

First Committee

9^th & 10^th Meetings (AM & PM)

NUCLEAR THREATS MORE DANGEROUS AND COMPLEX, WITH EMERGENCE OF ILLICIT NUCLEAR

TECHNOLOGY TRADE, PRODUCTION TOUGHER TO VERIFY, IAEA TELLS FIRST COMMITTEE

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ‘Last and Clearly Visible

Barrier between Peaceful Legitimate Use and Misuse of Nuclear Energy’

Nuclear threats had become more dangerous and complex, with the emergence of illicit trade in nuclear technology, the reported interest of extremist groups in acquiring nuclear weapons, greater difficulty in verifying nuclear production, and, to address energy security concerns, more countries interested in mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle -– “a step that brings them quite close to a potential nuclear weapon capability”, the Disarmament Committee was told today. 

Contributing this morning to a panel discussion with members of the First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), the representative of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gustavo Zlauvinen, warned that, with the reported nearly 27,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of some nine countries, and the cold war “hair trigger” alert deployment status of significant numbers of those weapons further contributing to nuclear fears, three critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime needed to be strengthened if a cascade of nuclear proliferation was to be avoided.

Those included an urgent need for security of existing nuclear materials and improved controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material, as effective control of nuclear material remained the “choke point” of preventing the production of additional nuclear weapons, he said.  A second aspect was the need to strengthen the verification authority and capability of IAEA.  During the last decade, the Agency’s safeguards system had evolved from a system focused on declared nuclear material and nuclear facilities to a much more comprehensive information-driven system able to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.  A third aspect was the need to give disarmament the prominence and priority it deserved.

A nuclear test provided the “final and irreversible proof” as to a State’s intentions and, therefore, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty provided the “last and clearly visible barrier between the peaceful legitimate use and the misuse of nuclear energy”, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Treaty’s Organization (CTBTO), Tibor Toth, said in that panel.  Therefore, a Test-Ban Treaty that was in force was a “logical and necessary” element of the system, if present and future nuclear non-proliferation challenges were to be addressed credibly.  Nuclear energy production and nuclear capacity were projected to increase significantly in the coming decades, and the clear differentiation between permitted civilian and prohibited activities was a complex challenge.

In his remarks, Sergio Duarte, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, said that, rather than render the United Nations obsolete, the growth of international organizations in the disarmament field devoted to specific types of weapons had strongly reinforced the United Nations own vital role.  The United Nations was indispensable in achieving a synergy among the diverse activities of the international organizations at both the global and regional levels.  There was much highly technical work that needed to be undertaken as free as possible from political interference.  At the same time, there was a need to ensure that the collective work on global disarmament challenges was coordinated and integrated, so that the international community did not find itself mired in duplication of effort, or even worse, working at cross purposes.

The other panellists were the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the Conference on Disarmament and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Sergei Ordzhonikidze, and the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Rogelio Pfirter.

Speaking during a second panel discussion, a representative of the United States said that his country’s emphasis was not on what to do in order to control and eliminate nuclear weapons, but rather, on how to create circumstances under which such an elimination process would be the most stable and realistic policy choice.  There was a need to create an environment in which nobody needed nuclear weapons for security.  The key issues in that question were adherence to non-proliferation; suppression of trafficking of mass destruction weapons; elimination of other forms of those weapons; finding other means of deterrence; use of ballistic missiles; and creating a system of detection, deterrence and response.

Another panellist, the representative of Indonesia, said that, in the context of implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there was a widespread perception that the nuclear-weapon States had attempted to avoid their obligations under the Treaty.  Despite the end of the cold war, the world had seen more failures than successes in nuclear disarmament.  It had emerged in the last review of that Treaty that the non-nuclear-weapon States felt it was unfair to demand that they comply with their obligations under the Treaty while the nuclear-weapon States failed to live up to their own obligations and commitments.  Failure to deal with that issue ran the risk of rendering the Treaty irrelevant.

Patricia Lewis, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), made a presentation during the second panel discussion.

Statements in the thematic debate on nuclear weapons were made in the afternoon by the representatives of Bangladesh, Mexico, Portugal (on behalf of the European Union), Uzbekistan, Japan, Republic of Korea and Switzerland.  The representative of Syria made a statement this morning.

The Committee will meet again at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 18 October, to continue its thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

Background

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) met this morning to begin its thematic debate.  Members would hear opening remarks by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte, as well as:  Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the Conference on Disarmament and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Sergei Ordzhonikidze; Director-General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Rogelio Pfirter; Tibor Toth, Executive Secretary, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO); and representative of the Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Gustavo Zlauvinen.  Following those statements, the Committee would convene a discussion in an informal mode with the panellists.

Then, the Committee would return for its formal thematic debate on nuclear weapons.  Subsequent sessions during the thematic segment would focus on:  other weapons of mass destruction; outer space; conventional weapons; other disarmament measures and international security; regional disarmament and security; and disarmament machinery.

SERGIO DUARTE, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, said that the growth of international organizations in the disarmament field devoted to specific types of weapons had not rendered the United Nations obsolete.  On the contrary, it had strongly reinforced the United Nations own vital role.  The Organization was indispensable in achieving a synergy among the diverse activities of international organizations throughout the world, at both the global and regional levels.  There was much work to do that was highly technical, and that needed to be undertaken as free as possible from political interference.  At the same time, there was a need to ensure that the collective work on global disarmament challenges was coordinated and integrated, so that the international community did not find itself mired in duplication of effort, or even worse, working at cross purposes.

He said that all the United Nations efforts served to benefit the work of those other disarmament-related organizations.  That included its advocacy initiatives, its work with non-governmental organizations, its efforts to educate the public, its many regional and subregional workshops to promote implementation of agreed multilateral norms, its efforts to promote the rule of law and universality in key multilateral treaties, its ongoing deliberations on the state of existing and emerging disarmament initiatives, and, through the Security Council, its role in enforcing agreed norms.  All of that was consistent with one of the most fundamental purposes of the United Nations, namely, to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in pursuit of their common goals.  It was also consistent with the Final Document, adopted in 1978, of its first Special Session on Disarmament.  In that text, the General Assembly underscored that the United Nations had “a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament”.  The United Nations commitment to each of those entities was profound, and had been registered at the highest level.

The United Nations cooperation with other international organizations was not limited to those dealing with weapons of mass destruction, he went on.  It worked in local, subregional, and regional organizations, virtually on a daily basis, to promote efforts against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.  The Office for Disarmament Affairs was the coordinating focal point of efforts within the inter-agency United Nations family to promote that goal.  The effort against that illicit trade had achieved widespread recognition, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean.  His office also led the Working Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation to improve coordination between the United Nations and regional and intergovernmental organizations, and it was working with other organizations to promote norms against inhumane weaponry.

He said that the United Nations envisaged great prospects for cooperation between all international organizations involved in disarmament.  It also saw a trend towards joint partnerships, greater information sharing, mutual recognition of the work of the various organizations, new initiatives to promote public education, expanded collective efforts at the regional and subregional levels, jointly produced publications and innovative media approaches, and many other ways that partnerships could achieve historic common goals.

SERGEI ORDZHONIKIDZE, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the Conference on Disarmament and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, said that over the last year, disarmament had been neglected in international forums, and the Conference on Disarmament was probably the most neglected.  Paradoxically, that was the one that could potentially bring more stability and confidence to the world than any other.  The origins of the impasse were at the end of the cold war, which changed the international security equilibrium, and led to a re-evaluation of priorities and a changing perception of security.

He said that, with the possibility of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, international relations had become more complex and unpredictable than before.  Multilateralism had given way to predominance of particular national interest, and the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to start negotiations on any item in its agenda.  Intensive efforts to break the deadlock had not brought the expected results, and instead of negotiating multilateral agreements, the Conference had been trying to forge consensus on disarmament priorities.  That had been due, in part, to a lack of support from non-governmental organizations and from the media, without whose help Conference members were unable to reach out to Governments and the public. 

The expansion of the Conference by 23 members in 1996 and by five members in 1999 had not helped matters, as members continued to disagree, he noted.  In addition, civil society was still not fully using the existing mechanism for disseminating its views.  Progress was vital for the sake of collective security and international development.  A report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) had put global spending on arms at $1.2 trillion, for the first time since the cold war.  At the same time, the amount spent on aid was $78.6 billion.  Disarmament, therefore, could liberate significant resources to be used on development, in addition to building confidence and contributing to strategic stability, also of use to the development agenda and the Millennium Development Goals.

Stressing the need to overhaul the multilateral disarmament machinery, he called for joint efforts based on new, imaginative approaches.  It was vital to develop new political consensus on priorities, and to go beyond national interest.  However, without political decisions at the highest level, even the most determined efforts of the Conference on Disarmament would not succeed.  The current impasse could not be broken through procedural means, but only through a new political consensus.

The possibility of suspending or dissolving the Conference had been floated since 2004, but that would not necessarily solve the problem, which was one of political will.  After all, the Conference had produced many important international agreements.  It should review its working methods and seek new approaches.  Progress might be modest, but the Conference could not afford to remain inactive.

Clearly, he said, the Conference was at a crossroads.  There had been a positive development in 2006, when the Conference Presidents began closed consultations, thereby attracting the cooperation of experts.  Since 2006, there had been a close collaboration among the six Presidents in terms of vision, which was helping the Conference to move forward.  It had developed a more substantive report this year than last year, and that report had been elaborated in a good spirit, which was important in any diplomatic effort.  There, he referred to remarks by the Syrian Ambassador, who said of last year’s Conference that “a momentum was created to move the CD out of its longstanding stalemate, and efforts to reach consensus must continue”.  The new practice of presidential continuity had already led the Presidents of 2008 to begin discussions among themselves on their upcoming work.

Major challenges lay ahead, and he asked whether the notion of a comprehensive work programme was unrealistically ambitious.  In aiming for a comprehensive approach, the Conference ironically ended up with no work programme.  New determined efforts were needed to overcome that block.  The investment in this year’s effort had meant that the potential of the Conference was alive, and it was capable of realizing that potential in the near future.

ROGELIO PFIRTER, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, said that the Chemical Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction) had achieved membership by 182 States.  That was an outcome of the effort by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  One-third of all declared chemical weapons had also been effectively and irreversible eliminated, and all the 65 declared production facilities had been deactivated.  Meanwhile, the Organization’s inspectors had continued to monitor destruction efforts.  Close to 1,800 inspections had been carried out.  He stressed the importance of a well-honed inspection regime.  In addition, effective national implementation represented an important factor in the success of the Convention.  The Organization had developed assistance programmes to support countries in implementing the Convention, and there had been progressively increasing domestic adaptation of those programmes by countries.  Full national implementation also represented a crucial contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. 

He warned, however, that what had been accomplished only served to bring out what remained to be achieved in the area of chemical weapons.  With only four years to deadline for destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles, as called for in the Convention, many challenges remained.  Destruction of such weapons was, however, within reach.   Albania had become the first country to completely eliminate its chemical weapons, even in the face of considerable challenges.  In that regard, tribute was owed the United States and several other countries for their critical support to Albania in the destruction campaign.  Five other possessor States had requested, and had been granted, extensions of the deadlines for them to complete the destruction of their stockpiles.  The Russian Federation had completed destruction of 22 per cent of its stockpile, and the United States had destroyed more than 13,000 tons of agents.  Those were important milestones in that campaign.  The United States had actually begun the destruction of its stockpile even before the entry into force of the Convention.  In addition, the country provided critical assistance to other States in their destruction efforts.  For its part, India had destroyed 87 per cent of its stockpile, while Libya had undertaken measures to ensure that its stockpile was destroyed by 2011.

There was a need to continue to ensure that the non-proliferation regime was implemented in all its aspects, he continued.  In the long term, non-proliferation would represent the Organization’s major activity.  The chemical industry continued to evolve, with increasing overlap with the biological and other areas, and crucial relevance to the purposes of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  In that regard, it was necessary to ensure that the Organization remained capable of addressing that evolution in an effective way.

TIBOR TOTH, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, said the adoption of a Final Declaration by consensus at the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Test-Ban Treaty was a “rare commodity” in disarmament affairs.  Further, “the conference and its final declaration were again proof of the international community’s strong commitment to establishing a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”.  Twenty States had signed or ratified the Treaty since 2005, bringing the total number to 177 signatories and 140 ratifiers.

He recalled that his speech to the First Committee last year had taken place on 9 October, the day of the nuclear weapon test proclaimed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and he had called that “the most defining moment for the Preparatory Commission in recent years”.  That test had been a “performance test” for the nascent verification regime -- a measure of the system’s technical capabilities and procedures.  Within 20 minutes, 22 seismic stations from around the world, including one as far away as La Paz, Bolivia, had recorded and located the event, and within two hours, State signatories to the Test-Ban Treaty had received data with the exact time and location of the explosion.  The monitoring system, therefore, had “lived up to its name by functioning as a system, in a holistic and synergistic way”, and the Preparatory Commission had been able to prove the value of the significant investment into the verification system.  The event in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, therefore, had been a validation of the “CTBT system”.

Since last year, the Preparatory Commission had continued to make progress, and he said he expected 71 per cent of stations to be certified by the end of the year, an increase of 20 per cent over last year, he noted.  The number of noble gas stations had increased by 20 per cent over the year, and the network of hydro-acoustic stations was nearly complete.  China had begun to transmit initial data from a radionuclide station to Vienna, which was a “significant development”, since, for the first time, all five nuclear-weapon States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were contributing data to the International Data Centre.  Further, in March, the Commission had inaugurated a new Operations Centre, which watched over every step in the movement of verification data, from generation at the monitoring station to transmission to Vienna, processing at the International Data Centre, and finally, its distribution.  Essential improvements had been made in the Data Centre’s processing methods and software, particularly significant for data analysis of radionuclide particulates and noble gas, as well as for atmospheric transport modelling.

Important challenges were ahead, he said.  The remaining stations to be installed and certified were among the most difficult, posing considerable technical, financial and political challenges.  The build up of noble gas stations needed to be accelerated.  It was necessary to learn, by the time of the Treaty’s entry into force, how to keep that dynamically growing monitoring system up and running.  At the same time, high standards of data availability and timeliness needed to be maintained, and improvements in processing methods and software were required.  Station operations must be cost-efficient.  He pointed to the first ever integrated on-site inspection field exercise, to be conducted next year, as a major challenge for the Preparatory Commission and as an important step towards operational readiness and the capability to carry out an on-site inspection after the Treaty’s entry into force.

He stressed that, while the North Korean nuclear test was “deeply regrettable”, it also refocused the attention of the international community on the importance of the Test-Ban Treaty, underscoring how much the international community supported it.  The Treaty was truly functioning in a multilateral manner, with 89 countries from the North and South, East and West hosting the monitoring system’s facilities.  “No country could build and deploy such a system alone,” he said, calling the Treaty “an example of democratic and transparent verification”.  Since 2005, there had been a 20 per cent increase in users in national institutions, with the overall number reaching 840.  The system also had a variety of civil and scientific applications, notably in contributing to tsunami warning organizations as the provider of the fastest seismic and hydro-acoustic data.

Nuclear energy production and nuclear capacity were projected to increase significantly in the coming decades, and he said “we may be moving in a direction where the important delineation between nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes will be more a political and legal issue rather than technical challenge”.  Legal and other barriers to prevent the misuse of nuclear energy were facing increasing difficulties, due to the fact that the clear differentiation between permitted civilian and prohibited activities was a complex challenge.  A nuclear test provided the “final and irreversible proof” as to a State’s intentions and, therefore, the Test-Ban Treaty provided the “last and clearly visible barrier between the peaceful legitimate use and the misuse of nuclear energy”.  Therefore, a Test-Ban Treaty that was in force was a “logical and necessary” element of the system, if present and future nuclear non-proliferation challenges were to be addressed credibly.

GUSTAVO ZLAUVINEN, representative of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said that nuclear threats had become more dangerous and complex.  The emergence of illicit trade in nuclear technology was one of the key examples.  Another was the reported interest of sophisticated extremist groups in acquiring nuclear weapons or radioactive dispersal devices.  In parallel, nuclear material and its production had become more difficult to verify.  Energy security concerns and climate change were prompting many countries to revisit the nuclear power option.  “To ensure a supply of power reactor fuel, more countries have shown interest in mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle -- a step that brings them quite close to a potential nuclear weapon capability,” he warned.

Furthermore, nearly 27,000 nuclear warheads reportedly existed in the arsenals of some nine countries, and the cold war “hair trigger” alert deployment status of significant numbers of those weapons, further contributed to nuclear fears, he said.  Against that backdrop, three critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime needed to be strengthened if a cascade of nuclear proliferation was to be avoided.

Those, he said, included an urgent need for security of existing nuclear materials and improved controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material, as effective control of nuclear material remained the “choke point” of preventing the production of additional nuclear weapons.  There were currently over 1,800 tons of plutonium and high-enriched uranium in civil stocks.  Many initiatives were in progress to help improve the physical protection of that weapon-useable nuclear material.  Good progress had been made in recent years, but hard work still lay ahead.  The IAEA was supporting international efforts to minimize and eventually eliminate the civilian use of high-enriched uranium.

A second aspect was the need to strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA, he went on.  Effective verification required adequate legal authority; state of the art technology; access to all relevant information and locations; and sufficient human and financial resources.  During the last decade, the Agency’s safeguards system had evolved from a system focused on declared nuclear material and declared nuclear facilities to a much more comprehensive information-driven system, able to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States as a whole.  For a credible verification system, a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol should be the universal standard.  Also, as new facilities and countries came under safeguards, the IAEA would need corresponding increases in funding and personnel.

A third aspect was the need to give disarmament the prominence and priority that it deserved, he stressed, adding the need to revive multilateral disarmament efforts.  All States, except four, were within the fold of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and whether countries chose to continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the centrepiece of their security strategy or abandon that reliance would influence the actions of other States.  The current situation called for revived effort to bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and to initiate negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

BASSAM DARWISH ( Syria) said he would like to speak about what had been published in the news bulletin for the meeting of the First Committee last night, specifically page 11 of the bulletin, the paragraph before last, when his country’s delegate exercised the right of reply at the end of the morning session. 

He said that his delegation had, in fact, said the following:  “Those who violate airspace of sovereign States and execute military attacks, perform military attacks against them, as was the case on the 6 of September 2007, against my country.”

He said that what was actually said in the English press brief was:  “It had taken action against nuclear facilities, including the 6 of July attack in Syria.”

He said that that brief in its entirety, or at least the portion related to Syria’s statement, “has many mistakes and does not reflect the truth at all”.  It contained “additions and misrepresentations”, and he hoped that was an error.  

He asked the First Committee Secretariat and Chairman to conduct a very careful comparison of both the English and the Arabic texts, and then open an official investigation, in order to ascertain the truth of what actually took place, and determine responsibility in that framework.  He further asked for the publication of a formal correction of the error, and the publication of his present intervention in its entirety, accurately in today’s news bulletin. 

He also asked to be informed of the results of those endeavours, noting that his delegation would like to follow up on the matter, which was important to his delegation.  If some had the power to manipulate the media outside the United Nations, then they should not be enabled to use the United Nations, itself, in order to propagate propaganda and falsify the records of the official sessions and the delegates’ statements inside the Organization.

Panel Discussion

In an opening statement, SUDJADNAN PARNOHADININGRAT, Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States, said that in the context of implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there existed a widespread perception that the nuclear- weapon States had attempted to avoid their obligations.  Despite the end of the cold war, the world had seen more failures than successes in the area of nuclear disarmament.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty enjoined non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons.  At the last Review Conference, it had emerged that the non-nuclear weapon States felt that it would be unfair to demand them to comply with their obligations under the Treaty, while the nuclear-weapon States had failed to live up to their own obligations and commitments.

He said that failure to deal with that issue ran the risk of rendering the Treaty irrelevant.  As long as nuclear weapons existed, so would the threat they posed.  Some nuclear-weapon States, rather than eliminating their nuclear weapons, were modernizing and replacing them.  It was true that thousands of nuclear weapons had been dismantled under the Moscow Treaty (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, or SORT), but those actions were not irreversible.  The IAEA could be involved in a process to monitor and verify bilateral nuclear arms agreements.  States should not retreat from past commitments.  Nuclear weapons must never again be used.  A leadership role by the nuclear-weapon States was called for.

JEFFREY EBERHARD ( United States) said that the United States had achieved a dramatic reduction in its stockpile of weapons and fissile material.  When the country reached its Moscow Treaty numbers, the reductions would have reached 80 per cent of the cold war high.  Commensurate with those reductions, his country continued to reduce its systems of nuclear delivery, and would soon retire its nuclear-tipped advanced cruise missiles.  The United States was not, as some had alleged, simply putting warheads “on the shelf”, but rather, it was dismantling them, and at a faster rate than previously -- in fact, at a rate that had been accelerated by 150 per cent.  The country had also spent billions of dollars to assist Russia’s disarmament efforts.

He said that, of late, interest had increased in the question of how to sustain disarmament and create global security.  He referred, in particular, to the Wall Street Journal editorial of January 2007 by George Shultz, Will Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn.  Mikhail Gorbachev had also written on the topic.

The new United States emphasis was not on what to do in order to control and eliminate nuclear weapons, but rather, on how to create circumstances under which such an elimination process would be the most stable and realistic policy choice, he said.  There was a need to create an environment in which nobody needed nuclear weapons for security.  Key issues in that question were:  adherence to non-proliferation; suppression of trafficking mass destruction weapons; elimination of other forms of those weapons; finding other means of deterrence; use of ballistic missiles; and creating a system of detection, deterrence and response.

As for how to create the underlying conditions that would make disarmament a reasonable policy choice, he referred to a speech given last June by the United Kingdom’s former Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett.  She had called for a new vision and action aimed at limiting the role of nuclear weapons in security policy, and had also called for more progress in “hard diplomatic work” in the underlying political conditions that created insecurity.

He said that the greatest challenge of all was determining what path could be taken to implement nuclear disarmament without creating new insecurities.  Both advocates of disarmament and those who believed that disarmament was impossible should pay attention to the challenges that would arise in sustaining a world without nuclear weapons.  It was only the ardent, unrealistic supporters of disarmament, the “sophists”, who would dislike asking and struggling with those important questions.

PATRICIA LEWIS, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), reviewed current perceptions about nuclear weapons and said that it came down to a question of the “haves versus the have-nots”, as the primary source of conflict.  In all societies, the issue of fairness was a driver of conflict.  The perceived unfairness about nuclear weapons created unsustainability in the non-proliferation regime.  What existed currently was dynamic equilibrium that might have, unwittingly, turned nuclear weapons into a sought after goal.  The path on which the world was travelling was a dangerous one, as it might be the path of nuclear proliferation.

Stressing the need to establish confidence-building measures, she said that one proposal was to have a moratorium on the production of nuclear weapons, and to thoroughly examine ways to bring into force the Test-Ban Treaty.  Regional security needs should also be addressed.  Consideration should be given to outlawing nuclear weapons, as had been done with chemical weapons.  As an interim measure on the way to a world without nuclear weapons, she proposed the creation of “a bank” for nuclear weapons.  Such a bank would be a repository into which nuclear-weapon States could deposit their nuclear weapons.

Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons

MASUD BIN MOMEN (Bangladesh), noting that the 2005 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had failed and the Conference on Disarmament remained at an impasse, said that it was ironic that the lack of political will of only a few countries had contributed to making the world more dangerous.  All pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty needed full, non-discriminatory attention, and article IV, giving States the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, must be upheld.  There was also a need for guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.  Further, the Test-Ban Treaty, which would soon mark its eleventh anniversary, had not yet entered force, and he called on the 11 remaining “annex 2” States to ratify it. 

He said that Bangladesh believed in the importance of regional approaches to disarmament, and nuclear-weapon-free zones were important regional confidence- building measures.  He praised the existing such zones, and called for the creation of such zones in South Asia and the Middle East.  He said there were “glimmers of hope” that the Conference on Disarmament would begin negotiations on a treaty on fissile matter.  He felt a “deep sense of pride” in Bangladesh’s “impeccable” disarmament and non-proliferation credentials, noting that the country had been the first “annex 2” country in South Asia to have signed the Test-Ban Treaty.  Bangladesh also had an agreement with the IAEA, all of which was testimony to its “unwavering commitment” to disarmament and non-proliferation.

LUIS ALFONSO DE ALBA ( Mexico) said that doctrines that placed emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons were dangerous, as they encouraged those who wished to acquire nuclear weapons.  The international community needed to recognize that disarmament was in crisis.  Its legal basis was in question.  As noted recently by a nuclear Power, the facts were disquieting, such as the weakening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  If the international community was to reinvigorate that Treaty, especially at the 2010 Review Conference, all parties must seek its universalization.  It was only by respecting the spirit and letter of that instrument that it would be strengthened. 

He said that Mexico was convinced that, in order to make progress, accommodation must be reached between those who considered disarmament a priority and those that considered non-proliferation a priority.  Those issues were two sides of the same coin; they were inseparable.  That discussion must be left behind in order to make progress on all fronts.  The nuclear Powers had an obligation to work towards the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.  The establishment of transparency mechanisms would contribute to reducing international tension, while also help to ensure that nuclear material destined for peaceful uses was not diverted for military purposes.

Mexico encouraged cooperation between existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and it supported the establishment of new ones, he said.  In that regard, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) had demonstrated the usefulness of such zones.

JOSE JULIO PEREIRA GOMES (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, were crucial for global peace and security.  The Treaty was based on mutually reinforcing pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  The Treaty provided the essential multilateral norm and the basis of all the Union’s endeavours to address the security challenges in the nuclear field.  Today, the Treaty was more important than ever, and its authority and integrity should be preserved and strengthened.

He reiterated the Union’s support for an effective and universal non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty and international safeguards.  The Union recognized the right of States parties to develop, research and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but believed that the international community must unequivocally exclude any possibility of improper use of civilian nuclear programmes for nuclear weapons purposes.

It was time to take the first concrete steps towards a new approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, he said.  A balanced multilateral mechanism would significantly contribute to reducing concerns about proliferation, as well as about the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  The Union deplored Iran’s failure to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.  It was greatly concerned by Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA and its defiance of the international community by continuing uranium enrichment-related activities.  Such a step directly contradicted the repeated requests of the IAEA Board of Governors, made mandatory by Security Council resolutions.

The Union welcomed the news that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had shut down its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and had admitted IAEA inspectors, he added.  It also welcomed the agreement reached during the last round of Six-Party Talks.  It remained concerned, however, about the situation in the Korean peninsula and by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s self-declared possession and testing of nuclear weapons.  That country should comply with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and implement its commitments under the Joint Statement of September 2005.  

He said that the Union also stressed the need for an overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, in accordance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular, by those countries which possessed the largest arsenals.  Application of the principle of irreversibility should guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control as a contribution to the maintenance and enforcement of international peace, security and stability.  The Union was pursuing efforts to secure transparency, as a voluntary confidence- building measure to support further progress in disarmament.

ALISHER VOHIDOV ( Uzbekistan), on behalf of the States parties to the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia, said that, over the past 61 years, mankind’s alarm had not diminished, and the race to acquire nuclear weapons had continued.  Now, there were more than 20,000 units of that kind of weaponry on earth.  Terrorists aspired to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and there was a “crisis of governability” in that area, with the weakening of international tools.  The entire system of multilateral instruments must be adapted to the new realities.  That was equally true of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had become asymmetric in its enforcement.  

He said that the Central Asian States believed that everything being done today to stave off the threat of nuclear weapons deserved the greatest attention and support.  He supported efforts to combat the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and advocated the strengthening of non-proliferation and the entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty, with the revitalization of negotiations on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

On 8 September 2006, a treaty was signed on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, he recalled.  That had shown that States were able to act together to ensure security, stability and peace in a region, thereby creating the necessary conditions for the prosperity of their peoples.  Recent events had shown that the Central Asian zone was timely and relevant.  The treaty was a real contribution to States in the region, in terms of implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the formation of a regional security mechanism.  It was clear that the treaty’s signing was a breakthrough in the stagnation of the negotiation process on questions of non-proliferation.  He called on the nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their commitment to negative security assurances.

SUMIO TARUI ( Japan) said that disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States was a necessary condition for achieving international peace and security.  As former British Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett said in a speech on 25 June, nuclear disarmament was the “grand bargain” of the Non-Proliferation Treaty between the “nuclear haves and have-nots”.  He signalled that Japan would submit a resolution on a renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.  There was broad support for an approach that advocated a peaceful world free of nuclear weapons, and Japan believed that the text’s adoption would intensify the movement towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

He welcomed the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States, especially the United States and the Russian Federation, in reducing their nuclear arsenals.  Still, further concrete efforts were required, and he encouraged those countries to implement the Moscow Treaty.  Japan would continue to pay close attention to talks between those States on actions to be taken after that Treaty expired, he said, stressing the need for transparency in disarmament.

In order to avoid an “accidental” nuclear war, States should further lower the operational status of their nuclear weapons, he warned.  The Test-Ban Treaty was a very high priority.  To date, 177 countries had signed, and 140 had ratified it, indicating its wide acceptance in international law.  He urged all States to join the Treaty, adding that, pending its entry into force, there should be a moratorium on all nuclear weapons test explosions.

During its recent meeting, the Conference on Disarmament had formulated a package centred on document L.1, which, he said, would provide a mandate for each of the four core agenda items.  That package had come close to achieving consensus, and had reflected the best possible compromise.

On the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, he urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with resolution 1718 (2006).  He further emphasized the significance of the Second Phase actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement, in which that country had agreed to dismantle its nuclear facilities.  It had also agreed to disable its facility at Yongbyon.  That was only one step towards the goal of full implementation of the Joint Statement of the September 2005 talks.  Further progress was necessary, and Japan would continue to work on the matter.

He said that the work carried out between the IAEA and Iran was positive, calling it a “forward-looking step”.  Hopefully, Iran would fully cooperate with the IAEA and make additional efforts to restore the confidence of the international community, by complying with the Agency, without further delay.

Noting that, on 15 October, the documentary film “White Light Black Rain” had been shown in this very room, he said he believed that the many people who watched the film had directly felt the devastation caused by atomic bombs.  Japan would continue to work tirelessly to achieve disarmament, so that the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could never again occur.

CHANG DONG-HEE (Republic of Korea) said that, while there had been growing criticism of multilateral disarmament, there had nevertheless been positive developments, including the adoption of a final declaration by the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction), and the agreement to establish the Implementation Support Unit.  While the Conference on Disarmament had not yet agreed on a work programme, it was still deemed to have built considerably on the pervious year’s achievements.

Emphasizing the vital importance of nuclear disarmament to the effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he said that, although significant progress had been made in reducing nuclear arsenals, the five nuclear-weapon States still possessed more than 26,000 nuclear warheads.  There remained a significant “perception gap” between the “nuclear haves and have-nots” about the accomplishment of nuclear-weapon States on nuclear reductions.  To close that gap, those States must “faithfully implement” their article VI obligations.  Also necessary were negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Although the Test-Ban Treaty had marked its eleventh anniversary last month, its entry into force remained a “distant goal”, he said, adding that a prolonged logjam might tempt some States to test, thereby jeopardizing the test ban norms.  He further stressed the importance of a fissile material cut-off treaty as a guarantor of nuclear non-proliferation and a precursor to nuclear disarmament, and he urged all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare and abide by a moratorium on the fissile material production pending the enactment of such a treaty.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation, and all States should strive to secure its universal application.

Noting the recent breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issue, he said that Six-Party Talks had been the main vehicle for the resolution of that issue, and that process had made “significant progress” since its launch in 2003.  In the Joint Statement of September 2005, the six nations had agreed on a blueprint for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  The Initial Actions Agreement of February this year had taken that consensus forwards another step, laying out the specific actions to implement the Joint Statement.

He said that additional progress had been achieved in the recent round of Six-Party Talks last month.  That had included adoption of the agreement on the Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, which specified the disabling of the core North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and a complete declaration of all nuclear programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the end of the year.  The completion of “disablement and declaration” within the stipulated timeframe could allow entry into the dismantlement phase beginning next year.

The Korean Government would continue to cooperate with related parties for the smooth implementation of the agreement, and would make every effort for the Six-Party Talks to move beyond the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and develop into a multilateral dialogue mechanism in Northeast Asia.

JURG STREULI ( Switzerland) said debate on disarmament remained blocked, with an increasing rift between the national interests of different States.  Non-nuclear-weapon States were focused on the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, while nuclear-weapon States focused on proliferation.  At the same time, some States were primarily concerned with their energy needs, and did not want their access to nuclear technology to be restricted.  That situation was worrying.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty review process should be revitalized.  The Treaty had borne the stamp of compromise since its inception, but that spirit was reaching its limit, given that certain promises had not been kept.  Nonetheless, that was the only multilateral instrument capable of responding to disarmament and non-proliferation questions.

He said that nuclear-weapon States had carried out programmes to develop or replace their nuclear arsenals, and last year, for the first time, some nuclear- weapon States had not supported the resolution calling for the negotiation of a binding multilateral instrument to give effective security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons.  The Test-Ban Treaty still had not entered into force.  Meanwhile, he praised agreement on a “work plan” between the IAEA and Iran, and called for all possible diplomatic measures to be taken on that file.  The development concerning the Korean peninsula had been promising, and he hoped that the peninsula’s complete denuclearization would come about rapidly.  He commended the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Nuclear disarmament required a realistic approach with realistic objectives, he said.  In that context, he noted that, while the discussions in the Conference on Disarmament had been particularly substantive this year, they had not led to the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.  Switzerland would spare no effort to maintain momentum in the Conference, with a view to negotiating such a treaty.  His country, in collaboration with Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria and Sweden, had authored a resolution, entitled “Lowering the Operational Status of Nuclear Weapons Systems”.

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For information media • not an official record