PRESS CONFERENCE ON REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS/ARMS EMBARGOES SINCE 1990

A review of United Nations sanctions and arms embargoes since 1990 indicated a low rate of compliance, but the possibility for a significantly improved outcome existed when coupled with certain measures, such as border controls and inspections, and the presence of United Nations peacekeepers on the ground, correspondents heard today at a Headquarters press conference.

Peter Wallensteen, Programme Leader of the Special Programme on Implementation of Targeted Sanctions at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, introduced the report, “United Nations arms embargoes:  Their impact on arms flows and target behaviour”.

The report -- one in a series on sanctions issues supported by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the goal of improving the use of that peaceful tool for influencing international affairs –- focused on arms embargoes and covered all the embargoes by the United Nations since 1990.  Twenty-seven such embargoes had been implemented, including some that were still ongoing.

It was jointly produced by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Special Programme on Implementation of Targeted Sanctions, Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Uppsala University.  Also speaking at the press conference, sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, was Siemon Wezeman of the SIPRI Arms Transfer Project.

The study looked at the impact of sanctions by reviewing the behaviour of various actors after they had been targeted and comparing that with their actions prior to the sanctions, explained Mr. Wallensteen.  The findings showed that sanctions resulted in a change in behaviour in about 25 per cent of the situations.  However, when the issue had to do with conflict management, the percentage went up to 32 per cent, and to 37 per cent if border control and inspections were included.  When United Nations peacekeepers were on the ground, the percentage of situations in which behaviour changed rose to 47 per cent.

He added that the study found that sanctions tended to be less successful when they dealt with global security issues, while those that dealt with conflict management issues tended to be more successful.

Mr. Wallensteen noted that the basic approach nowadays was to go for targeted sanctions, aimed at particular individuals or commodities, and added that the report included a recommendation that United Nations peace operations be given special mandates to also supervise arms embargoes.  It also recommended sanctions assistance programmes to support neighbouring countries of States under sanctions since the sanctions were more likely to be efficient when the bordering countries were able to have better control over their borders.

The report further recommended that, in order to improve the credibility of the sanctions, direct secondary sanctions should be imposed oncountries that failed to comply, he went on.

Mr. Wezeman said that his team looked at whether an arms embargo worked as a means to stop the flow of weapons, as opposed to whether it achieved its goal.  The reality was that, although arms transfers became illegal with sanctions, they often did not stop.  In all the 27 cases of United Nations Security Council embargoes after the end of the cold war, none had completely stopped the transfer of weapons to the target.  There had always been breaches, sometimes major, other times minor.  That did not make arms embargoes useless, but embargoes could be more useful if the elements that worked were employed in future ones.

He added that, apart from the political value of arms embargoes, they put a big stamp on the target as having been identified by the international community, through the Security Council, as having been “very bad”.  Although there were many conflicts in the world, only 27 had had resulted in the imposition of embargoes.

Among the elements required for effective arms embargo was serious cooperation and political will, especially among the permanent members of the Security Council, but also among the suppliers and trans-shipment countries, in order to manage and monitor the embargo, he went on.  Such cooperation would help to enforce the embargo, as well as punish those that breached it.

Mr. Wezeman stressed the importance of having a clear definition inthe Security Council resolution of what was being banned, in order to avoid misunderstandings or loopholes, as those could be exploited.  The Security Council demands should also be clear so that it would be possible to measure whether an embargo was actually fulfilling its goal.  Throughout the life of an embargo, the ban, as well as the situation, should be reassessed to see if any changes were required and to be sure the embargo was not having any unintended consequences.  He also advocated improvements in the trade and control of arms, allowing for clarity in the case of legitimate arms transfers.

In response to a question, Mr. Wallensteen said that a successful sanction would be one where the flow of arms was stopped and there was a change in behaviour.  In that regard, an example of a successful sanction would be the case of Liberia.  In the case of Iraq after the first Gulf War, the sanctions stopped the flow of weapons, but did not result in a change in behaviour of the regime.

Mr. Wezeman added that, in Iraq, the flow of weapons had been reduced to almost nothing by the sanctions, but that had not changed the behaviour of the regime.  However, that had ultimately weakened the capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces to defend themselves against the 2003 invasion.  In several of the cases in West Africa, the sanctions had failed to halt the flow of weapons.  In some cases, the flow actually increased after the arms embargo, primarily because there had been no conflict before the embargoes, but conflict began after they were imposed.   Somalia was another case where weapons flowed in freely despite the embargo.

Mr. Wallensteen added his hope that the Security Council would take reports like the new one into consideration when designing new embargoes.

Mr. Wezeman said that the negative effects of sanctions included the fact that they were inflexible and did not take into account changing situations on the ground, as had been seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia, where the legitimate Government was almost overrun by the Islamic Courts Union.  Also, some targets could react, not by surrendering, but by adopting a different means of fighting their wars.

On other tools available to the Security Council, he said that embargoes continued to be used on a limited basis, but that the Council could use travel bans and other such targeted measures.

Regarding possible new embargoes on countries like Iran, Sudan and Myanmar, he said that the main challenge was to get all the permanent members of the Security Council to agree not to veto such embargoes since the countries involved were not insignificant.  Beyond that, there was the question of having clear goals of what was wanted from those countries.  There was also a question of monitoring since those countries had extremely large borders and it would be necessary to have the technical means to monitor.

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For information media • not an official record